Seat war

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Europe in 1939/40 during and after the invasion of Poland. Despite the British-French declaration of war on September 3, 1939, there was no fighting on the Western Front.
November 1939: Members of the British Expeditionary Force and the French Air Force in front of a shed called "Downing Street No. 10 "(the address of the British Prime Minister)

As a phoney war , formerly Strangely War ( French Drôle de guerre - "weird, strange war"; English Phoney War ), the state on the Western Front of World War II between the declaration of war Britain and France to the German Reich on 3 September 1939 as a result the German attack on Poland and the beginning of the German campaign in the west on May 10, 1940, in which both sides remained largely passive militarily.

history

In the Franco-Polish military agreement signed by Maurice Gamelin and Tadeusz Kasprzycki on May 19, 1939 , France committed itself to three tactical actions in the event of a German-Polish war:

"1. France immediately carries out an aerial action according to a predetermined plan.
 2. As soon as part of the French troops are ready (around the third day), France will initiate progressive offensive actions with limited objectives.
 3. As soon as Germany's main effort should be directed against Poland, France (from the fifteenth day on) would begin an offensive action against Germany with the majority of its troops. "

The seated war can be traced back to various causes, not least the lack of a common allied strategy. Although France had an army of several million men, it was hardly prepared for the waging of an offensive war. Instead, in the event of war with Germany, French military doctrine primarily provided for a defense based on the Maginot Line . A transition to the offensive was then planned for 1941 at the earliest.

With any prospect of success, an invasion of Germany could hardly have been carried out without violating Belgium's neutrality , which was out of the question for political reasons. The German Siegfried Line was assessed by the French high command as strong enough to be held for a long time by the few German divisions of Army Group C deployed there, even against a distinct French superiority. French air strikes on Germany were also discarded, as strong retaliatory attacks by the air force were expected, which could have severely impaired the French aircraft industry, which is concentrated in the east of the country.

On the German side, an order from Adolf Hitler from August 31, 1939 was valid :

“In the West, the important thing is to clearly leave the responsibility for opening hostilities to England and France. Minor border violations must initially be countered purely locally. The German western border cannot be crossed at any point without my express permission. "

Saar offensive

Territory occupied by French troops
French soldiers during the "Opération Sarre", south of Saarbrücken .

In order to meet the obligations of the Franco-Polish Assistance Pact of May 1939, the French General Staff ordered the “Opération Sarre” (often also called “Offensive de la Sarre”). French troops crossed the German border on September 9th. According to the orders, Wehrmacht troops did not offer any resistance (Germany wanted to avoid a two-front war). On September 12, the troops stood up to eight kilometers on German territory, occupying twelve German villages along the cleared border zone in the Saar region in front of the Siegfried Line. The limited offensive aimed only at establishing the strength of the defenses of the western wall. On September 21, General Maurice Gamelin ordered the troops to be withdrawn to their original positions on the Maginot Line . The last French troops left German territory on October 17th. France had lost a total of around 2,000 soldiers to death, wounding or illness in the offensive. Some French generals such as B. Henri Giraud did not approve of the withdrawal and saw an unused opportunity.

Poland was defeated in early October 1939; thereupon the Wehrmacht moved large numbers of soldiers and weapons to the western front (back). The 1st Army , commanded by Erwin von Witzleben (1881–1944), led a counter-offensive from October 16 to 24. They occupied a few square kilometers of French territory; There were 196 dead, 356 wounded and eleven aircraft destroyed on the German side. Then a ceasefire began, which lasted until May 10, 1940.

An effective relief of the Polish ally or even a prevention of the Polish defeat could not be achieved in this way. This hesitant behavior of the Allied leadership goes back to the effort not to break completely with the Soviet Union, which began its occupation of eastern Poland on September 17th , despite the Hitler-Stalin Pact . The reaction of the Western Powers to this remained cautious, the alliance treaties concluded before the war between France and Great Britain and Poland explicitly referred only to Germany, the enemy of the war. Winston Churchill, then Minister of the Navy, said in a radio address on October 1, a few days after the fall of Warsaw:

"[...] We could have wished that the Russian armies should be standing on their present line as the friends and allies of Poland instead of as invaders. But that the Russian armies should stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace. At any rate, the line is there, and an Eastern front has been created which Nazi Germany does not dare assail. When Herr von Ribbentrop was summoned to Moscow last week it was to learn the fact, and to accept the fact, that the Nazi designs upon the Baltic States and upon the Ukraine must come to a dead stop. "

“We could have hoped that the Russian armed forces would stand as friends and allies of Poland instead of attacking the current border line. But that the Russian armies would stand on this border was clearly necessary for the security of Russia against the Nazi threat. Be that as it may, the border exists and an eastern front has been created which Nazi Germany does not dare to storm. When Mr. von Ribbentrop was summoned to Moscow last week, it was to get to know and accept the fact that the National Socialist plans regarding the Baltic States and Ukraine must come to a standstill. "

After the attack on Poland

When the French mobilization was completed in mid-September 1939, Poland was almost defeated. Soviet troops had begun occupying eastern Poland , which made the political situation even more difficult.

Quite a few politicians began to focus on a political solution to the conflict, especially after Hitler's offer of peace to the Western powers on October 6th. An offer made by the Netherlands and Belgium to mediate peace to the heads of state of England, France and Germany in November 1939 was rejected by England and France; these demanded Austria as a basis for peace negotiations beyond the restoration of Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The operational readiness of the British expeditionary force , which initially comprised only four divisions, was not even established until mid-October. At this point in time the mass of the German army had long since begun to move west. The Allies therefore set up defense on the Maginot Line.

Developments September 1939 to May 1940

Planning the " yellow case "

The decision to attack France in 1939 had been made before the " White Case " was completely over and Warsaw fell. On October 9, 1939, “Instruction No. 6” was issued, which laid down the basic lines of operations in the West, before the Allies on 10/12. October 1939 had rejected the German peace offer of October 6, 1939. The first plan of attack was completed on October 19, 1939 by the General Staff of the Army under Colonel General Franz Halder and was very similar to the " Schlieffen Plan " with a focus on the right wing. The violation of Belgian and Dutch neutrality was planned from the outset with a view to the necessary bases of operations for the navy and air force against Great Britain, as in the First World War . To the horror of the generals of the High Command of the Army (OKH) under Walther von Brauchitsch , the presumption with the order of October 31, 1939 became certainty: despite massive concerns of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW) regarding combat strength and ammunition supply for the Wehrmacht, the attack was on December 12th November 1939 set a quarter of an hour before sunrise.

In a dispute between Adolf Hitler and Walther von Brauchitsch about the capabilities of the Wehrmacht on November 5, 1939, after a fit of rage, “the Führer” forgot to confirm the order to attack. Although the order was not lifted after Hitler had calmed down, extremely bad weather prevented the offensive from starting in the further course of autumn. Heavy rains and winds forbade the use of the Luftwaffe, which was the decisive factor for the new tactics of the Wehrmacht in the interaction of tanks and airplanes . During this forced break, the " sickle cut plan " was created in several steps , which is based on an idea of ​​General of the Infantry Erich von Manstein . But even Hitler was dissatisfied with the plans developed up to now and tended to focus on the center.

After the " Mechelen Affair " on January 10, 1940, the OKW had to assume that the Allies were aware of the German attack plans and that the element of surprise was gone. On February 17, 1940, von Manstein and Hitler met for the first time in the New Reich Chancellery as part of a commanders' meeting. Then the risky " Plan Sedan ", as well as diversions and attacks on key positions in Belgium and Holland were developed. With these u. a. the new paratrooper weapon can be used, e.g. B. to take the " Fort Eben-Emael " by detonating it with newly developed shaped charges . After a final delay two days earlier, the order to attack the following day was confirmed on May 9, 1940.

Allied planning

British soldiers from the BEF landed in Cherbourg in September 1939

The Allies had two weak points: on the one hand the decentralized command structure of the French army, on the other hand the lack of uniform planning and coordination of the forces in the run-up to the confrontation. France's plans were purely defensive and focused on the Maginot Line . Great Britain sent an expeditionary force, the "British Expeditionary Force" (BEF) under Field Marshal Lord Gort , to support the French troops. This subordinated itself militarily to the French high command, but received political instructions from London. With reference to its neutrality / independence, Belgium refused to plan together and set up defensively to defend its borders. In the absence of troops, neutral Holland limited itself to defending the most important parts of the country (" Fortress Holland ") and did not expect an attack.

On October 24, 1939, the French high command decided to take precautions in the event of a German attack on Belgium. According to " Plan Escaut ", troops were to be moved up to the Scheldt near the French border in order to keep the German troops away from it. For this purpose, motorized units were moved to the Belgian border. After the German attack was a long time coming and the Belgian defense measures began to take shape, the plan was expanded and the possibility of defending the Albert Canal near the German border was examined. In the end, an agreement was reached with the draft of 5th and “Instruction No. 8” of November 15, 1939, on an interim solution, “ Plan Dijele ”, which would secure Brussels and shorten the approach routes. The instruction of November 14, 1939 provided for Holland to also support in the event of a German attack, for which parts of the motorized units were planned (" Plan Breda "). The Belgian government was informed of the Allied plans, but did not ask for military assistance even after the "Mechelen Affair" of January 10, 1940. Instead, on the night of January 13-14, 1940, the Belgian military attaché General Delvoie informed the French generalissimo Maurice Gamelin of an attack that was certain to be imminent the following day. The breach of secrecy and the onset of heavy snowfalls actually prevented an attack that Hitler had ordered for January 17, 1940. When the offensive did not take place, the Allied troops were ordered to winter quarters.

Due to the forced standstill and a lack of strategic options on this front, further planning was postponed in favor of a possible deployment in Norway and Sweden. Mining of the Rhine with drift mines by the Royal Air Force (RAF) (“Royal Marines” plan) and bombing of German armaments factories were rejected after long discussions, as reprisals against French cities were feared. Instead, it was planned to mine Norwegian waters (" Operation Wilfred ") as part of the Allied invasion of Norway (" Plan R 4 "). The Wehrmacht came just hours earlier with " Operation Weser Exercise ", while British troops were already embarking in Rosyth .

Troop concentration at the border

The commanding officer of the BEF, General Gort and the commander-in-chief of the French army Maurice Gamelin in October 1939.
King Leopold III. and Belgian Defense Minister Denis in May 1940 next to a T-15 tank of the Belgian armed forces.

At the beginning of the dispute, France had set up between 101 and 108 divisions (including fortress associations) as well as numerous special units and service departments, according to various reports. Of these, five were cavalry divisions (DC) or "light cavalry divisions" (DCL) and two or three "light motorized divisions" (DLM) for reconnaissance, as well as ten motorized infantry divisions. With the exception of the mobile units, most of the divisions were used passively to secure the "Maginot Line", which in some places led to absurd distributions. So stood z. For example, in May 1940 in Alsace and Lorraine, 40 French divisions of the 3rd , 4th , 5th and 8th Army with heavy artillery and tank support passively opposed about 20 German infantry divisions. The motorized divisions were mainly concentrated in the 1st, 7th and 9th French armies on the border with Belgium and Luxembourg . On January 16, 1940, the French high command ordered the creation of armored divisions (DCR = 'Division cuirassée') as a consequence of Poland's defeat . By May 10, 1940, three and a half divisions numbered from 1 to 4 were set up, with the fourth, incomplete DCR being commanded by the later head of state and then Colonel Charles de Gaulle . Furthermore, a "light division" and six infantry divisions (DI) were set up during the winter.

From September 1939 the first units of the British expeditionary force arrived in France. In December 1939, all five active divisions of the professional army were in France. In May 1940, according to various sources, eleven divisions with a total of 394,195 men or 13 infantry and one incomplete tank division were on the Belgian border. These were integrated as a block between the 1st and 9th French Army, with the exception of an infantry division, which was assigned to the 3rd French Army.

Belgium's army initially consisted of 20 or 22 divisions, later 23. A part was set up on the border with France to ensure neutrality, as the Belgian government feared that it would be occupied by French troops as a preventive measure. After the German attack plans became known, one half was set up against an attack from Holland and the other half to secure the eastern border. The Dutch army consisted of ten divisions, which were concentrated in key positions in the country.

In September 1939 there were only eleven active German divisions facing the Allied superiority. Before the end of the campaign in Poland, the first troops were transferred to the Rhine as quickly as possible in railroad trains and on motorways. The establishment of 35 divisions of the third and fourth line was carried out at high pressure. Only the defensive orientation of the Allied armies and the hesitant behavior of the Allied General Staffs prevented a catastrophe for the German Reich. In mid-October there were finally 70 divisions at the border. With the "Operation Weser Exercise", which was brought forward by Hitler on April 9, 1940 for strategic reasons, many regular troops and special units were ordered to Denmark and Norway . On April 10, 1940, the Wehrmacht on the western front reached a strength of 136 ½ divisions, which was precisely determined by the French captain Glain, who was in charge of enemy surveillance and communicated to the incredulous “Grand Headquarters” in Fort Vincennes . Of these, ten were armored and six motorized infantry divisions, as well as one motorized cavalry division and two motorized divisions of the Waffen SS.

Situation in the German Reich

Despite the surprisingly quick victory over Poland, the mood was tense and nervous. In the cities near the French border rumors went around that the French had already crossed the Rhine and that setbacks such as the “ Marne Battle ” after initial successes in World War I were not forgotten. Only after it became clear that France would not launch an offensive to relieve Poland did the situation ease somewhat.

The empire was not prepared for a major European war and therefore faced significant economic and military problems. To make matters worse, there was an extremely impatient commander-in-chief in Hitler. The mobilization was pushed ahead in a feverish hurry, but the arms production could not initially follow the troop levies. The ammunition stocks of the army and air force were exhausted and the production was only just switched over to the case of war and was not yet sufficiently effective. The Wehrmacht, which was set up in the fast-track procedure, was not yet secure and horrified the generals who had grown up in the Imperial Model Army , who even considered a strike by the OKH. All these shortcomings were covered up by Nazi propaganda , which led the people to believe that the Führer had everything under control and that the Reich was strong and armed. It was only through the break due to the weather that the Reich was able to organize itself and attack in a concentrated manner.

While the army and air force only acted defensively, the sea ​​war with submarines and the mining of British waters by z. T. Magnet mines operated with full force from day one. Relations with the United States were directly beginning of the war by the prize regulations and international law conflicting sinking of the Athenia heavily loaded, came in the 28 US citizens were killed.

Location in France

After the declaration of war on the German Reich, there was an oppressive atmosphere of fear and confusion in France. The days of August at the beginning of the First World War had not yet been forgotten, so that one was subsequently grateful for the deceptive calm, without major losses as in the years 1914-18. The alleged impregnability of the “Westwall” and “Maginot Line” led to the assumption that offensives in themselves are pointless and that a solution to the stalemate can only come about through economic blockade and propaganda. Rumors of secret negotiations circulated, and soldiers believed they would be demobilized without firing a shot. This and a lack of employment led to boredom, laziness and neglect in the troops, which the army leadership did not oppose energetically enough. On the contrary, the army staff held luxury banquets to which u. a. Parisian master chefs were hired and turbot brought in from Boulogne.

Despite the experiences of the First World War, mobilization in France had not been efficiently planned and prepared. Accordingly, it was slow. The administrative apparatus continued to work as if in the deepest peace. Specialists in the manufacture of weapons were called in by mistake and had to be brought back to the factories with great difficulty and against much resistance. Farm workers then complained that they were "cannon fodder" for the army and demanded special conditions for the sowing. There were sometimes comical, sometimes tragic incidents that hindered the armament, e.g. B. the sabotage of 120  anti-tank guns (PaK) in the arsenal of Montluçon . In the end five million men were mobilized, which was an eighth of the population. Nevertheless, this was about 415,000 fewer than in 1917, after three years of war and 1.5 million dead and wounded.

In this situation, the previous Prime Minister Édouard Daladier was overthrown on March 19, 1940 . His " appeasement policy " had obviously failed and the refusal of aid for Finland under attack by the Soviet Union (see Winter War 1939–1940) was the proverbial drop that broke the barrel. His successor, after an extremely tight vote, was Paul Reynaud , who was considered an advocate of the "war to the death". In contrast to his predecessor, he harbored a strong aversion to the Commander-in-Chief Maurice Gamelin, which was mutual and led to serious political and military complications.

UK location

In London too, there was great horror at the failed "appeasement policy" and the mood was depressed. Even if the government was determined to resist, there was initially confusion and defeatism among the population , which led, among other things, to strikes and resistance to the war-related overtime and employment of women in the armaments industry. Arms production started slowly and, like the entire supply of the island, was dependent on imports from overseas, which were constantly endangered by the submarine and trade war .

All available troops of the British professional army were mobilized and shipped to France as quickly as possible. The Royal Navy and RAF were put into a state of war according to prepared plans and set up a naval blockade to cut off the German Reich from its western trade routes. Samples were also carried out to a limited extent, although initially only single young men were recorded and a number of exceptions were granted. In the end, only one fortieth of the population was mobilized.

On May 7, 1940, the British representative of "old politics" Neville Chamberlain was overthrown in the lower house as a result of the heated debate over Norway . Winston Churchill was elected to succeed him; this immediately convened his later legendary war cabinet and appealed z. B. in the " blood-sweat-and-tears speech " of May 13, 1940 to the cohesion of the population.

Other events

Consequences and aftermath

From September 1, 1939 to May 9, 1940, the Wehrmacht lost almost 10,000 men in the western theater of war, around 5,000 of them dead and missing. The army accounted for just under 40% of the total number of losses.

Alfred Jodl said at the Nuremberg trials : "The fact that we did not fail in 1939 was only due to the fact that during the Polish campaign the estimated 110 French and British divisions in the west were kept completely inactive against the 23 German divisions."

The term Sitzkrieg was coined by the British press and used as an ironic antonym of Blitzkrieg .

The term was used more recently in 1991 during the Second Gulf War , when the Allied strategy initially relied primarily on a massive air strike while the fronts in Kuwait were still inactive.

literature

Web links

Commons : Sitzkrieg  - collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Walther Hofer : The unleashing of the second world war. A study of international relations in the summer of 1939 . Frankfurt am Main 1960, p. 172.
  2. ↑ Jean Doise, Maurice Vaïsse: Diplomacy et outil militaire 1871-1991. Paperback edition. Éditions du seuil, Paris 1991, pp. 396f and 416f
  3. ↑ Quoted from: Hans-Walter Herrmann : Saarbrücken under the Nazi rule. In: Rolf Wittenbrock: History of the City of Saarbrücken, Vol. 2. Saarbrücken 1999, p. 256.
  4. ↑ Chemins de memoire ( Memento of the original of August 21, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.cheminsdememoire.gouv.fr
  5. ↑ The German Reich and the Second World War. Volume 2. Stuttgart 1979, p. 272.
  6. ↑ La drole de guerre 39-40 , on cheminsdememoire.gouv.fr (French), accessed on June 25, 2020.
  7. ↑ Sir Winston Churchill and Randolph S. Churchill: Blood, Sweat and Tears. Kessinger Publishing, 2005, p. 173.
  8. ^ Issue December 1939 ( Memento from December 19, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 3.5 MB) of the Weisse Blätter , p. 313, in Das große Weltgeschehen. November 1939 on 7th, 13th and 15th
  9. ^ Raymond Cartier p. 66.
  10. ^ Raymond Cartier p. 38 / John Keegan p. 86.
  11. ^ Raymond Cartier p. 37 / John Keegan p. 83.
  12. ↑ Raymond Cartier p. 68 / John Keegan p. 86ff
  13. ^ Raymond Cartier p. 59 / John Keegan p. 100.
  14. ↑ Raymond Cartier p. 32 / John Keegan p. 95.
  15. ↑ John Keegan p. 100.
  16. ↑ Raymond Cartier p. 63 / John Keegan p. 96 / Winston Churchill p. 227.
  17. ↑ John Keegan p. 103.
  18. ↑ a b Raymond Cartier p. 94.
  19. ^ Raymond Cartier p. 63.
  20. ^ Raymond Cartier p. 64.
  21. ↑ a b Raymond Cartier p. 78.
  22. ↑ John Keegan p. 94.
  23. ↑ a b c d Raymond Cartier p. 53.
  24. ↑ John Keegan p. 98.
  25. ↑ John Keegan pp. 98-99.
  26. ↑ a b John Keegan p. 99.
  27. ^ Raymond Cartier p. 97.
  28. ↑ a b c d Raymond Cartier p. 58.
  29. ↑ John Keegan p. 97.
  30. ↑ John Keegan pp. 97-98.
  31. ^ Raymond Cartier p. 61.
  32. ↑ John Keegan p. 96.
  33. ^ Raymond Cartier p. 93.
  34. ^ Raymond Cartier p. 65.
  35. ^ Raymond Cartier p. 91 and John Keegan p. 103.
  36. ↑ Raymond Cartier pp. 25-26.
  37. ↑ Winston Churchill p. 223.
  38. ^ Raymond Cartier p. 26.
  39. ^ Raymond Cartier p. 22.
  40. ^ Raymond Cartier p. 39.
  41. ^ A b Raymond Cartier, p. 35.
  42. ^ Raymond Cartier, p. 34.
  43. ↑ Raymond Cartier p. 34 / John Keegan p. 98, 101-102 / Winston Churchill p. 226.
  44. ↑ a b Raymond Cartier p. 75.
  45. ^ Raymond Cartier p. 88.
  46. ↑ The German Reich and the Second World War, Volume 2, Stuttgart 1979, p. 307.
  47. ↑ IMT Vol XV p.350