Hans Bernd Gisevius

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Gisevius April 26, 1946 ( Nuremberg Trial )

Gustav-Adolf Timotheus Hans Bernd Gisevius (born July 14, 1904 in Arnsberg , † February 23, 1974 in Müllheim ) was a German politician, civil servant and resistance fighter .

As a former German national , Gisevius initially offered himself to National Socialism before turning to the resistance. Until he was forced to resign in January 1934 and then moved to the police department of the Reich Ministry of the Interior , he worked as a court assessor in the Secret State Police Office (Gestapa). He belonged to the resistance group around Ludwig Beck , Hans Oster and Helmuth Groscurth and acted as a liaison to the American secret service Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Bern , which was headed by Allen W. Dulles . During the assassination attempt on July 20, 1944 , he was in the Bendler Block . As one of the few survivors of the resistance of July 20, 1944, he published several books after the war about the time of National Socialism , the value of which is assessed differently.

Life

Earlier career

Cover sheet and curriculum vitae from Gisevius' dissertation.

Gisevius was the son of the higher administrative judge Hans Gisevius (1861-1938) and his wife Hedwig. He came from a family of officials and farmers. He attended humanistic high schools in Arnsberg, Berlin-Lichterfelde and Luckau. In March 1924 he passed the certificate of maturity. One of his classmates in Lichterfelde was Walter Kempner , who later became known as a doctor.

From 1924 to 1928 Gisevius studied law in Marburg, Berlin and Munich. Among his fellow students in Berlin were the later Nazi medical officer Leonardo Conti and Robert Kempner , the later prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials, whom Gisevius was supposed to meet again as a witness . On 25/28 In July 1928 Gisevius passed the first legal state examination at the Higher Regional Court in Kassel and in September 1928 became a trainee lawyer in the district court district in Berlin . During the preparatory service it was only used in the district of the Berlin II regional court at the public prosecutor's office II, at the Berlin-Lichterfelde district court and at the regional court II in Berlin. After a punitive transfer (see below), he spent the last part of his preparatory service in the Düsseldorf Regional Court District, where he was employed by the Düsseldorf Regional Court , the Düsseldorf District Court and the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court . 1929 Gisevius was one of Franz Leonhard supervised work on the use claim of the owner in Marburg Dr. jur. doctorate (examination of November 18, 1929, grade: cum laude). He passed the Great State Examination in Law, the conclusion of his preparatory service, on June 26, 1933.

Politically, Gisevius was close to the young conservative movement in the 1920s : He joined the aggressively anti-Semitic Hochschulring Deutscher Kind and was in contact with ethnic-nationalist intellectuals such as Martin Spahn and Edgar Jung.

From 1929 Gisevius belonged to the anti-Semitic-ethnic DNVP, for which he appeared as a political speaker. So he agitated in 1929 for the popular initiative against the Young Plan brought in by the DNVP , the NSDAP , the Stahlhelm and other national revisionist organizations . Because of the nature of his political behavior, the supervisory authorities to which he was subject as a trainee lawyer repeatedly took disciplinary action against him. In addition, several criminal trials were initiated against Gisevius for insulting political opponents. A case of insulting District Administrator Hausmann caused a stir in the press. An insult to the Chancellor Heinrich Brüning led to a judicial conviction. In May 1930 he was finally transferred from Berlin to Düsseldorf as a punishment for his propaganda activities for the Young Plan referendum.

In 1930 Gisevius applied for a seat as a member of the Reichstag and in 1932 for a seat in the Prussian state parliament , but was not elected on both occasions.

At the end of 1931 Gisevius became the youngest member of the DNVP's Reich Executive Committee. In the course of the successive restructuring of the DNVP into a political movement based on the principle of leadership under the party chairman Alfred Hugenberg , who has been in office since 1928, the party's so-called combat squadrons were set up. In this context, Gisevius took over the organization of a working group of young German nationalists in Düsseldorf in the autumn of 1931, from which the paramilitary German National Combat Ring West - one of several so-called combat rings that was supposed to provide physical support for the DNVP in the increasingly violent political conflict at the time - developed whose leader he became. He was also involved in the party-internal wing battles of the DNVP, where he, together with Spahn and Eduard Stadtler, took the line of rapprochement with the NSDAP, which then led to the alliance of the Harzburg Front . In October 1931, Gisevius took part in a meeting of young conservative intellectuals organized by Herbert von Bose , which took place on the sidelines of the conference, which served to discuss the future political direction of right-wing intellectual circles. In the words of Ulrich Herbert , Gisevius and his party colleague Spahn were already strongly “sympathizing” with the NSDAP at this point.

time of the nationalsocialism

After sympathizing with the NSDAP since 1931 , Gisevius entered into direct cooperation with this party after the National Socialists and their allies came to power in the spring of 1933.

It has not yet been clarified whether he also became a member, as an index card for him could not be found in the party's - incomplete - membership files (central and regional files) in the Federal Archives in Berlin-Lichterfelde. However, his decision to join is documented, because Gisevius' application for membership has been preserved in the "Party correspondence of the NSDAP". It is dated November 11, 1933, although it is uncertain whether the admission could be completed, as an admission ban had been imposed since May 1933 . That does not necessarily speak against a successful entry into the party, since exceptions were made to the ban, as was the case with Martin Spahn, who he admired and who applied for membership in June 1933 and was accepted a little later. On June 11, 1933, the public was informed by a report from the Völkischer Beobachter entitled “Disintegration of the German National Front” that Gisevius and Martin Spahn , MP for the DNVP, had joined the NSDAP. As an explanation, he stated that there was “no more room for that parliamentary, tactical approach”, that the “party state” was “dead”. In a novel by the writer Peter Kamber , the author says that Gisevius himself declared in 1961 that he had only signed "a completely non-binding declaration of readiness" to join the NSDAP, as it was "presented to officials who were unpopular for signature in 1933 in order to wear them down or - in the case of refusal to sign - justify their transfer. " But he never entered the party. Such self-declarations and, in particular, misinterpretations of applications for membership occurred in an inflationary manner in the denazification procedures and in other contexts and cannot be used as evidence in any direction.

After studying law, Gisevius joined the political police at the Berlin police headquarters in August 1933 . After being transferred to the Reich Ministry of the Interior , in January 1934 he was employed as a research assistant in the police department headed by Kurt Daluege . In this position he was involved in the expansion of the Secret State Police (Gestapo) in 1933/34 under Rudolf Diels . On May 16, 1934, he was officially taken over as a court assessor from the judicial service to the general administration and appointed as a government assessor. He was appointed by appointment from October 31, 1934 Government appointed.

Diels declared after 1945 that Gisevius had the ambition in 1933 to become head of the political police himself, which he, Diels, prevented. Gisevius was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior in January 1934 - after five months with the police - at Diels' instigation. Robert Kempner, who had known Diels and Gisevius before 1933 as young men in the administration and met them again at the Nuremberg trials, described them as "intimate enemies" from the beginning of their relationship and declared that they had "idolized" each other. This was manifestly reflected in her memoirs published after the war.

Due to his refusal to expand the Gestapo further - and his activities against it - Gisevius resigned from the Ministry of the Interior in June 1935. Instead, he was transferred to the Prussian State Criminal Police Office as a government and criminal adviser , and he developed a close friendship with its director Arthur Nebe (with whom he had been in contact since 1933).

When Gisevius was supposed to be hired as part of the police preparation for the 1936 Summer Olympics in Berlin, Reinhard Heydrich wrote to the Berlin police chief Wolf-Heinrich von Helldorff in a letter dated February 17, 1936 that Gisevius was recalled from this task. Heydrich complained that Gisevius "always caused the Secret State Police all imaginable difficulties, so that the relationship between him and us was extremely unpleasant." Heinrich Himmler's appointment as Reich Police Chief led to Gisevius' dismissal from the police force.

He temporarily worked for the Westphalian President Ferdinand Freiherr von Lüninck as a councilor in Münster, and at the end of 1937 he switched to the government in Potsdam. By 1938 at the latest, he was privy to the first plans of assassination by military circles. In particular, he worked closely with Hans Oster and, according to the historian Gerd R. Ueberschär , was one of the “main actors in the coup d'état against the dictator planned in the summer of 1938 to prevent a war over the Sudeten areas”. After the Munich Agreement , these plans were canceled, Gisevius and Oster destroyed all documents. From 1939 Gisevius pursued together with Ludwig Beck , Hans Oster and Helmuth Groscurth the goal of a violent overthrow of the Nazi regime. In this this group differed from that of the new Army Chief of Staff, Franz Halder , who initially only wanted to prevent an expansion of the war.

In September 1939, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris had Gisevius move into the Foreign / Defense Office in the Wehrmacht High Command as a special leader . From there, Gisevius was transferred to the German Consulate General in Zurich in 1940 as Vice Consul , where he pursued intelligence activities.

The secret headquarters of the German defense was then in Bern . Gisevius established connections between the resistance group around Beck and the US-American ( Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under the direction of Allen Welsh Dulles ) and British secret services ( Special Operations Executive or from 1941 Political Warfare Executive , Bern's representative was Elizabeth) Wiskemann ). Often commuting between Switzerland and Germany, Gisevius traveled to Berlin in mid-July 1944 in anticipation of the assassination attempt on Hitler by Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg .

Since the conspirators were aiming for a separate peace with the Western Allies and a war to be continued with them against the Soviet Union, Gisevius offered the Americans on their behalf in April / May 1944, in the event of a Western invasion, airborne operations of the Allies at strategically central locations support, named names of the conspirators and suitable sites for amphibious landings. The core of the proposals submitted by Gisevius were landings of the Allied forces in Bremen and Hamburg and - despite Rommel's ambivalent attitude - on the Atlantic coast. Hitler was to be isolated on the Obersalzberg . The intention behind these proposals was to " prevent the spread of communism in Germany", for which it was deemed necessary "to give the Anglo-American troops the way to Germany before the Eastern front collapses".

Gisevius spent part of July 20, 1944 in the Bendlerblock , but was able to evade the Gestapo after the failure of the coup. In an overview of the members of the conspirators of July 20, 1944 who were taken into kin imprisonment , which was compiled in December 1944 on the instructions of the head of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) Ernst Kaltenbrunner , it says: “Further measures of kin liability extend to the Goerdeler family as well on the close relatives of the fugitive Gisevius and Kuhn as well as Colonel von Hofacker, who was sentenced to death . ”Gisevius was able to go into hiding in Berlin and in January 1945, with the help of papers forged by the OSS, left for Switzerland , which granted him political asylum . Because Gisevius could not be found, his sister Anneliese (* 1903) was taken into kin custody in his place: together with other relatives of those involved, she was interned in the Hindenburg-Baude in the Giant Mountains on July 20, 1944 and finally liberated in South Tyrol in May 1945 .

Nuremberg Trials and Life in the FRG

In 1946, Gisevius testified extensively as a witness at the Nuremberg trial against the main war criminals before the International Military Court in Nuremberg against Hermann Göring , Ernst Kaltenbrunner and Wilhelm Keitel and in favor of Hjalmar Schacht and Wilhelm Frick . After questioning by the Nuremberg prosecutor Robert H. Jackson about the perpetrator of the Reichstag fire , he stated that, based on Adolf Hitler's wish for a major propaganda coup in the run-up to the Reichstag elections , Joseph Goebbels had the idea of ​​setting fire to the Reichstag and setting it on fire To blame communists. It was carried out by a ten-member SA command under the direction of SA Sturmführer Hans Georg Gewehr , which on February 28, 1933, covered by Hermann Göring, penetrated the Reichstag building through an underground tunnel between the Reichstag presidential palace and the Reichstag and caused the fire there Spread of self-igniting materials.

In the same year Gisevius' memoirs on his resistance activities under National Socialism appeared under the title Until the bitter end , in which he said he wanted to “de-heroize” the assassination attempt of July 20, 1944 in order to avoid a “false myth”. Instead, he spoke of the failure of the conspirators, all feeling "part of a common guilt". Allen W. Dulles wrote the foreword for the English-language edition, which appeared a year later, in which he stated that he himself had helped Gisevius escape Berlin.

From 1950 to 1955 Gisevius was director at the Council of World Affairs in Dallas , Texas, after which he lived for several years in West Berlin , then again in Switzerland. In the 1960s, the SA-Sturmführer Gewehr protested under civil law against the claim that he was the perpetrator of the Reichstag fire in 1933. Gisevius had not only made this accusation at the Nuremberg Trial, but also repeated it in his book Bis zum bitteren Ende and in the weekly newspaper Die Zeit . The Düsseldorf Regional Court forbade him to repeat this claim in 1969 and sentenced him to pay compensation of around DM 30,000, while Gewehr had to pay the legal costs.

marriage and family

Gisevius was married to Gerda Gisevius-Woog († June 14, 1983), b. Brugsch.

estate

After the death of his widow in the 1980s, Gisevius' personal estate was taken over by the archives of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich . The reasons for the transfer to a Swiss archive were the hostility to which Gisevius had been exposed in Germany after 1945 and the fact that he and his widow had their main residence in Switzerland. A smaller fragment of the estate is also in the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich. His personal files from his time in the judiciary are in the Berlin Federal Archives .

reception

Regarding his resistance activities, Gisevius, who, according to the historian Peter Hoffmann , "had developed from Gestapo officer in 1933 and 1934 to conspirator of 1938", is predominantly one of the most popular in the relevant literature on national-conservative resistance against National Socialist rule positive certificate issued. The British-Israeli historian and anti-Semitism researcher Robert Wistrich sees Gisevius' book Up to the Bitter End as a meritorious description of resistance activities, including “close-ups of leading personalities of the Third Reich”. In addition, Gisevius did not withhold the approval of millions of Germans who “played hide and seek with themselves”. The former deputy director of the German Historical Institute in London , Lothar Kettenacker , calls Gisevius' notes the "first eyewitness report of a co-conspirator who was present in Bendlerstrasse on July 20". In English-speaking countries in particular, Gisevius had contributed to the benevolent reception of German resistance research with his confession of the inadequacies and failures of the resistance to which he belonged.

The reliability of Gisevius' memories was also questioned from various quarters. The historian Hans Rothfels criticized as early as 1949 that "especially in the form of verbatim conversations and dramatic scenes in the detective novel style " Gisevius' work was not very convincing. According to Christian Hartmann , "Gisevius' testimony [...] cannot serve as the sole basis of evidence because of some inconsistencies in individual cases, at most as a support for knowledge obtained from other sources". Gisevius' efforts to highlight the role of Hans Globke in the preparation of Stauffenberg's assassination attempt on Hitler - "without Globke, July 20 would not have been possible," he wrote in his memoir - "cannot be taken seriously , according to his biographer Jürgen Bevers become".

The reception of Gisevius' personality and the value of his book Up to the Bitter End is controversial among historians who are considered to be protagonists in the dispute over the question of Marinus van der Lubbe's sole perpetrator in the Reichstag fire in 1933. Karl-Heinz Janßen and Fritz Tobias described it as a "sensational and unconcerned gangster novel," according to Henning Köhler , it contains "only snapped, rumor-like reports, self-important claims about what he wants to have seen, and even that which is actually experienced is often In contrast, the proponents of the multi-perpetrator thesis in the Reichstag fire, Alexander Bahar and Wilfried Kugel , criticize a number of inaccuracies in Gisevius' memorandum and a tendency to "novel-like embellishments" due to the circumstances of the time, but consider his representations essentially authentic Inside knowledge of a member of the resistance movement. The American historian Benjamin Carter Hett points out that the IfZ historian Hermann Graml gave the book a positive assessment as early as 1962 in an expert report for a legal dispute. Hett himself considers Gisevius' statement about the Reichstag fire, which Gisevius made without access to documents, in connection with the Nuremberg trials and his memorial report to be “considerable”, since the “theses” of his statement, “through ever new finds of various documents in large parts are well supported ”.

Fonts (selection)

  • The owner's claim to use , Quakenbrück 1929.
  • Until the bitter end . Zurich 1946. Volume 1: From the Reichstag Fire to the Fritsch Crisis . Second volume: From the Munich Agreement of July 20, 1944. Fretz & Wasmuth Verlag, Zurich 1946; again in 1947/48; “Special edition brought up to date by the author” in Volume 1, Bertelsmann Lesering 1961; again Droemer Knaur , 1987 ISBN 3-426-03677-0 .
  • Adolf Hitler. Attempt at an interpretation. Rütten & Loening, Munich 1963.
  • Where's Nebe? Memories of Hitler's Reich Criminal Director . Droemer Verlag, Zurich 1966.
  • The beginning of the end. How it began with Wilhelm II. Droemer Knaur, Zurich 1971.

literature

Biographical sketches

  • Susanne Strässer: Hans Bernd Gisevius - An opposition member on »outposts«. In: Klemens von Klemperer , Rainer Zitelmann , Enrico Syring (eds.): "For Germany". The men of July 20th. Ullstein, Frankfurt am Main 1996, ISBN 3-548-33207-2 , pp. 56-70.
  • Marcus Giebeler: The controversy over the Reichstag fire. Source problems and historiographical paradigms. Martin Meidenbauer, Munich 2010, pp. 272–274.
  • Michael Wildt : Generation of the Unconditional. The leadership corps of the Reich Security Main Office. Hamburger Edition, Hamburg 2003, ISBN 3-930908-87-5 (also habilitation thesis, University of Hanover, 2001).

In representations of resistance

In the memoir literature

  • Allen Welsh Dulles : Conspiracy in Germany. Kassel 1949 [1947]. (In the Original Germany's Underground ).

Movie

  • The Master Spy of Bern , directed by Mathias Haentjes. Portrait of Allen Welsh Dulles, first broadcast in 2005 on Swiss television SF1 ( online )

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ A b Susanne Strässer: Hans Bernd Gisevius - An opposition member on "outposts". In: Klemens von Klemperer (Ed.): "For Germany". The men of July 20th. 1996, p. 56.
  2. ^ Curriculum vitae in: Gisevius: The owner's claim to use. Quakenbrück 1929; Robert Kempner, on the other hand, writes: Prosecutor of an era. Life memories. 1986, p. 30 explicitly: "Of course, [Gisevius] was not at grammar school in Lichterfelde, he was at secondary school! Of course, that's where people came from, they wanted to be more real. "
  3. ^ Robert Kempner: Prosecutor of an Era. Life memories. 1986, p. 230 "[Gisevius] sat in a class with my brother."
  4. ^ Robert Kempner: Prosecutor of an Era. Life memories. 1986, p. 30.
  5. ^ A b Susanne Strässer: Hans Bernd Gisevius - An opposition member on "outposts". In: Klemens von Klemperer (Ed.): "For Germany". The men of July 20th. 1996, p. 56 f.
  6. ↑ Ulrich Herbert: Best. Biographical studies on radicalism, worldview and reason. P. 120 f.
  7. ↑ Alexander Bahar / Wilfried Kugel: Reichstag fire: How history is made. 2001, p. 542. (see also Bundesarchiv Berlin: BDC: PK files Hans Bernd Gisevius; kept as microfilm PK D 59, image 600).
  8. ↑ Jürgen Elvert, Central Europe! German plans for a European reorganization (1918–1945), Stuttgart 1999, p. 158.
  9. ↑ Susanne Strässer: Hans Bernd Gisevius - An Oppositionist on “Outposts”, in: Klemens von Klemperer (Ed.): “For Germany” The men of July 20 , 1996, p. 57. Part of his party entry is in literature also dated February or June 1933: February 1933 gives to Michael Wildt: Generation des Unbedinges. The leadership corps of the Reich Security Main Office . Hamburger Edition, Hamburg 2003, p. 306; June 1933 gives Anton Ritthaler : A stage on Hitler's path to undivided power. Hugenberg's resignation as Reich Minister. (PDF; 1.4 MB) In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte . 2nd issue / April 1960, pp. 193-219, here pp. 198 f.
  10. ^ Anton Ritthaler : A stage on Hitler's path to undivided power. Hugenberg's resignation as Reich Minister. (PDF; 1.4 MB) In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. 2nd issue / April 1960, p. 199.
  11. ↑ http://www.geheimeagentin.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=70 .
  12. ↑ See the website of the German Resistance Memorial Center: [1] .
  13. ^ Klaus Wallbaum: The defector. Rudolf Diels (1900–1957) - the first Gestapo chief of the Hitler regime , Frankfurt a. M. u. a. 2009, p. 129.
  14. ↑ German biographical encyclopedia. Volume 3. Ed. Rolf Vierhaus. Saur, Munich 2006, ISBN 978-3-598-25030-9 , p. 467.
  15. ↑ Michael Wildt: Generation of the Unconditional. The leadership corps of the Reich Security Main Office . Hamburger Edition, Hamburg 2003, p. 306.
  16. ↑ Gerd R. Ueberschär: Military opposition to Hitler's war policy 1939 to 1941. In: Jürgen Schmädeke and Peter Steinbach : The resistance against National Socialism. German society and the resistance against Hitler . Piper, Munich 1986, pp. 345-367, here p. 346; on this in detail Peter Hoffmann: Resistance, coup d'etat, assassination attempt: the fight of the opposition against Hitler. Piper, 3rd edition, Munich 1979, pp. 112-119.
  17. ↑ Gerd R. Ueberschär: Military opposition to Hitler's war policy 1939 to 1941 , p. 360; see. also Ekkehard Klausa : Conservatives in the Resistance. In: Peter Steinbach and Johannes Tuchel: Resistance against the National Socialist dictatorship 1933–1945. Lukas, Berlin 2004, pp. 185–201, here p. 195; see. in detail Peter Hoffmann: Resistance, coup d'état, assassination attempt: the fight of the opposition against Hitler. Piper, 3rd edition, Munich 1979, pp. 176-182.
  18. ↑ Short biography of the German Resistance Memorial Center
  19. ↑ Bernd Martin: The foreign policy failure of the resistance 1943/44 . In: Jürgen Schmädeke and Peter Steinbach (ed.): The resistance against National Socialism. German society and the resistance against Hitler . Piper, Munich 1986, pp. 1037-1060, here pp. 1047 f.
  20. ↑ Peter Hoffmann: Resistance, coup d'état, assassination attempt: the fight of the opposition against Hitler. Piper, 3rd edition, Munich 1979, p. 298 f.
  21. ^ Hermann Weiß : Biographical Lexicon for the Third Reich . Fischer-Taschenbuch, Frankfurt a. M. 2002, ISBN 3-596-13086-7 , p. 146 f.
  22. ↑ Ulrike Hett, Johannes Tuchel: The reactions of the Nazi state to July 20, 1944. In: Peter Steinbach and Johannes Tuchel (eds.): Resistance against the National Socialist dictatorship 1933–1945. Lukas, Berlin 2004, pp. 522-538, here pp. 528f .; See also on the incarceration of his sister, Annelise Gisevius, in the Dachau concentration camp Peter Koblank: The Liberation of Special Prisoners and Kinship Prisoners in South Tyrol , online edition Mythos Elser 2006.
  23. ↑ Marcus Giebeler: The controversy over the Reichstag fire. Source problems and historiographical paradigms . Martin Meidenbauer, Munich 2010, p. 273.
  24. ↑ The Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, November 14, 1945 to October 1, 1946. Volume 12, Nuremberg 1947, pp. 185–331.
  25. ^ The trial of the main war criminals before the International Military Court, Nuremberg, Vol. 12, Nuremberg 1947. pp. 276 ff .; see Alexander Bahar and Wilfried Kugel: Der Reichstagbrand. How history is made. Berlin 2001, p. 542 ff.
  26. ↑ Gisevius, Bis zum bitteren Ende, p. 202, p. 368 and P. 372 according to Lothar Kettenacker: The attitude of the Western Allies towards the Hitler attack and resistance after July 20, 1944 . In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Ed.): July 20, 1944. Evaluation and reception of the German resistance against the Nazi regime. Bund, Cologne 1994, pp. 19–37, here pp. 27 f.
  27. ^ Lothar Kettenacker: The attitude of the Western Allies towards the Hitler attack and resistance after July 20, 1944. P. 23.
  28. ↑ Alexander Bahar and Wilfried Kugel : The Reichstag fire. How history is made. edition q, Berlin 2001. pp. 787-792, in particular pp. 791 f.
  29. ↑ http://www.geheimeagentin.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=70
  30. ↑ Peter Hoffmann: Resistance, coup d'état, assassination attempt: the fight of the opposition against Hitler . Piper, 3rd edition, Munich 1979, p. 295.
  31. ↑ In addition to the contributions already mentioned here in the bibliography and in the footnotes, there are numerous other references from Marcus Giebeler: The controversy about the Reichstag fire. Source problems and historiographical paradigms . Martin Meidenbauer, Munich 2010, pp. 273f., Footnote 950.
  32. ^ Robert Wistrich: Who was who in the Third Reich? A biographical lexicon . Fischer paperback, Frankfurt a. M. 1987, ISBN 3-596-24373-4 , p. 107.
  33. ^ Lothar Kettenacker: The attitude of the Western Allies towards the Hitler attack and resistance after July 20, 1944 . In: Gerd R. Ueberschär (Ed.): July 20, 1944. Evaluation and reception of the German resistance against the Nazi regime. Bund, Cologne 1994, pp. 19–37, here p. 27.
  34. ^ Lothar Kettenacker: The attitude of the Western Allies towards the Hitler attack and resistance after July 20, 1944 , p. 28.
  35. ^ Hans Rothfels: The German opposition to Hitler. An appreciation . Scherpe, Krefeld 1949, p. 210.
  36. ^ Christian Hartmann: Halder. Chief of Staff of Hitler 1938–1942 . Schöningh, Paderborn 1991, p. 29 f., Note 26. Hartmann quotes Winfried Baumgart with approval : On Hitler's address to the leaders of the Wehrmacht on August 22, 1939. A source-critical investigation . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 16 (1968), p. 127 ( online , accessed on December 16, 2013).
  37. ↑ Jürgen Bevers: The man behind Adenauer. Hans Globke's rise from Nazi lawyer to Eminence Gray of the Bonn Republic . Ch.links Verlag, Berlin 2009, p. 82.
  38. ↑ Cf. on this Marcus Giebeler: The controversy about the Reichstag fire. Source problems and historiographical paradigms . Martin Meidenbauer, Munich 2010, p. 273.
  39. ^ Karl-Heinz Janßen / Fritz Tobias: The fall of the generals. Hitler and the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis in 1938 . CH Beck, Munich 1994, ISBN 3-406-38109-X , p. 69 ff.
  40. ^ Henning Köhler: Germany on the way to itself. A history of the century . Hohenheim-Verlag, Stuttgart 2002, p. 338.
  41. ↑ Alexander Bahar and Wilfried Kugel: The Reichstag fire. How history is made . edition q, Berlin 2001. p. 542 ff.
  42. ↑ Benjamin Carter Hett: The Reichstag fire. Retrial . Rowohlt, Reinbek bei Hamburg 2016, ISBN 978-3-498-03029-2 , p. 459.
  43. ↑ Benjamin Carter Hett: The Reichstag fire. Retrial . Rowohlt, Reinbek bei Hamburg 2016, p. 513 f.
personal data
SURNAME Gisevius, Hans Bernd
BRIEF DESCRIPTION German civil servant, resistance fighter of July 20, 1944 and author
DATE OF BIRTH July 14, 1904
PLACE OF BIRTH Arnsberg
DATE OF DEATH February 23, 1974
Place of death Muellheim (Baden)