Referendum against the Young Plan

The referendum against the Young Plan was an attempt at popular legislation in the Weimar Republic . It was triggered by the popular initiative “against the enslavement of the German people (freedom law)” launched by right-wing parties and organizations in 1929, which enabled the Müller government to reach an agreement with the former opponents of the German Reich in the First World War on the amount and conditions of reparation payments wanted to reverse in the Young Plan . The so-called Freedom Act , which resulted in a total revision of the Versailles Treaty and made the members of the Reich government subject to treason , was put to the decision .

During the referendum, those eligible to vote had time from October 16 to 29, 1929 to put themselves on lists and thus express their support for the draft of the Freedom Act. With just over 10% of those eligible to vote, the quorum was just met and the referendum was successful. The German Reichstag debated the draft on November 29th and 30th and rejected it with a majority of MPs. Thereupon the initiators applied for a referendum to be initiated. This took place on December 22, 1929. Because of unconstitutionality, the decision required the approval of an absolute majority of all eligible voters instead of just the votes cast. This failed because of the low participation of just under 15% of those entitled to vote, although 94.5% of the votes cast supported the initiative.

Popular initiatives and referendums were nevertheless of importance for the political development of the following years. The propaganda campaign led by the political right was one of the largest campaigns of its kind during the Weimar Republic. The government camp, for its part, responded with considerable counter-propaganda. For the first time the traditional right like the DNVP acted together with the NSDAP . What is disputed in research is the importance it had for the rise of Adolf Hitler's party .

Participants in a rally for the referendum on September 1, 1929 at the Hermannsdenkmal . In the middle Alfred Hugenberg (in a frock coat ).

Young plan

→ Main article : Young Plan

The German delegation at the second Hague Conference: Reich Finance Minister Paul Moldenhauer , Reich Foreign Minister Julius Curtius, Minister for the Occupied Territory Joseph Wirth , on the far right State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry Carl von Schubert

One of the domestic problems that weighed heavily on the Weimar Republic was the reparations payments that the German Reich had to make as a result of its defeat in the First World War. The Versailles Treaty obliged Germany in Articles 231 ff. To make reparations . There were repeated foreign policy disputes between Germany and the victorious powers over the amount of these payments, which was first set at 132 billion gold marks in the London payment plan in 1921 . When Germany failed to meet its payment obligations in 1923 , French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr area , which contributed greatly to the hyperinflation . In 1924, international expert commissions examined Germany's economic strength and developed proposals for the payment of reparations. The results were the Dawes Plan and the London Agreement of 1924, which led to regular German payments for the first time. For what was believed to be the final clarification of the reparations question, the Young Plan (named after Owen D. Young ) was drafted in Paris from February to June 1929 in Paris by another international commission of experts . Internationally it was decided at two conferences at government level in August 1929 and January 1930 in The Hague . The amount of the German reparation debt was reduced to the equivalent of 36 billion Reichsmarks . The annual payments were lower than in the Dawes Plan, but they should run until 1988. The advantage for Germany was that the Reparations Commission and all international economic controls were no longer applicable, which gave the country back a large part of its sovereignty . In addition, if the plan was accepted , the Rhineland, which had been occupied by Allied troops since 1920 , was to be vacated early. The government camp also highlighted these advantages in the confrontation with its opponents. The lower annuities and thus the relief of the imperial budget were particularly emphasized. The Young Plan is considered to be the last success in the understanding policy of Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann ( DVP ), who died before it was finally passed on October 3, 1929.

Domestic dispute

The Karl Liebknecht House of the KPD on the day of the Reichstag election in 1930 with slogans against the Young Plan

In the summer of 1929, the domestic political debate began in Germany with the Young Plan. A large part of the public was appalled by the long term and the total amount of the payments to which Germany had committed: The sum of all annual payments under the Young Plan added up to 115 billion Reichsmarks - in view of the fact that the entire Reich revenue increased amounted to 7.73 billion Reichsmarks in the 1929/30 financial year, this figure appeared very high. The right was able to tie in with this for propaganda purposes. She conjured up the image according to which the grandson was in debt up to his neck when he was born. The fight against the Young Plan offered itself as a focal point for the divided right wing in order to be able to hit the hated system of the “November criminals”.

In public, representatives of agriculture and heavy industry in particular came out against the plans. The Reich Committee of German Agriculture described the plan as economically unacceptable. The Langnam Association passed a resolution claiming that the Young Plan was placing “unbearable burdens” on the German economy. However, the negative attitude of the industry was by no means unanimous. It was above all heavy industry that turned against the Young Plan; in the economy as a whole, approval tended to dominate, as the plan was associated with financial relief. Even in the Langnam Association, the radical rejection position could not prevail. Their representatives in the preparations for the referendum were recalled.

Alfred Hugenberg , industrialist and chairman of the DNVP, had led the party on a radical course against the Weimar Republic after the losses in the Reichstag election of 1928 . As early as January 1929, Hugenberg aimed at a collection of the political right. The fight against the Young Plan seemed to him a suitable instrument for this purpose. At the same time, he waged an intra-party conflict in order to subordinate the German national parliamentary group under Kuno von Westarp to his control. Hugenberg brought together a large number of newspapers and news services, including the publications of the Scherl-Verlag , and Germany's most important film company, UFA . He thus had a strong influence on the formation of public opinion.

Reich Committee for the German referendum

Alfred Hugenberg was the driving force behind the alliance of the right against the Young Plan

In June 1929, Hugenberg, former chairman of the board of directors of Friedrich Krupp AG , put together a "Reich Committee for the German referendum against the Young Plan and the war guilt lie". The first meeting was attended by: Heinrich Claß from the Pan-German Association , Franz Seldte and Theodor Duesterberg from the Stahlhelm , Rüdiger von der Goltz from the United Patriotic Associations , Martin Schiele (DNVP) and Karl Hepp (DVP) for the Reichslandbund and thanks to Hugenberg's invitation also Adolf Hitler (NSDAP). The Reich Committee also included Fritz Thyssen from the Reich Association of German Industry and Albert Vögler . The latter had attended the expert meetings in Paris, but had resigned in protest.

At this first meeting, a working committee (presidium) of 16 people was elected, including Adolf Hitler. In addition to the aforementioned leading representatives of the organizations, the Presidium also included other people. From the DNVP, these were Annagrete Lehmann as the leader of the women's associations, Friedrich von Winterfeld , parliamentary group leader in the Prussian state parliament , and Paul Rüffer from the German National Workers' Union. Gregor Strasser from the NSDAP was also a member of the presidium. Various committees were set up to organize certain sub-areas, such as propaganda. More important, however, was an executive board (narrower presidium) made up of six people. The actual tone, however, was set by the two chairmen of the executive board, Seldte and Hugenberg. The committee was financed primarily by business. The Reich Committee divided these funds among the parties and organizations involved. A partial alleged preference for the NSDAP cannot be empirically proven.

The aim was not only to prevent the Young Plan, but from the outset the aim was to overthrow the Social Democrat-led Müller government and to hold new elections. The approach did not meet with unanimous approval, even in the more conservative camp. Paul Reusch , one of the leading figures of the Ruhrlade , called the referendum a “great stupidity” because like large parts of the industry he rejected the Young Plan, but at that time was not interested in new elections or a political crisis. Nevertheless, like other representatives of the Ruhr industry, he continued to support the steel helmet.

Reich Committee and NSDAP

The connection between the DNVP and the National Socialists had been severed since the Hitler putsch . Hugenberg restored it by including the NSDAP in the Reich Committee. Although this was against a people's legislation as a fundamental opponent of democracy, Hitler took part because he expected political advantages from it. Participation in the Reich Committee was a great success for Hitler. Until then, he was considered the size of a Bavarian beer cellar, head of a comparatively insignificant party with twelve seats in the Reichstag, whose members were considered bullies. Now he was sitting with recognized leaders of the bourgeois right and played a certain role at the imperial level.

In its own ranks, especially in the circles around Gregor and Otto Strasser , joining forces with the conservative right was not without controversy. Joseph Goebbels noted in his diary: “There are names under the appeal! Oh dear God! With Hitler you can only say: It hurts my soul that I see you in society. ”He saw the collaboration as compromising. Hitler too had reservations. Only once did he and Hugenberg appear together in public. Goebbels noted: “In Munich, Hitler and Hugenberg spoke together. Brrr! ”As Otmar Jung explains, Hitler's cooperation was not based on sympathy with the conservative right, but purely tactical.

"Freedom Law"

Hugenberg and the Stahlhelm leaders Franz von Stephani and Franz Seldte at a rally for the referendum in the Berlin Sports Palace

The political right made use of the particularly progressive plebiscitary elements of the imperial constitution with the instrument of the referendum and the subsequent referendum . According to their Article 73, a referendum was successful if at least 10% of those entitled to vote agreed. There had only been two popular petitions at the national level, both times on the initiative of the KPD : in 1926 it wanted to enforce the expropriation of the princes , in 1928 it was about preventing the construction of the armored cruiser A. Both times the intended goal had not been achieved. The relationship of the initiators to popular legislation was purely instrumental. Franz Seldte made this clear in a speech on October 26th: “The referendum is only a means of struggle. We are ready and determined to continue this fight with new weapons, regardless of whether we get 3 million or 6 million. "

On September 28, 1929, the Reich Committee submitted a draft law to the Reich Ministry of the Interior , which should be submitted to the people for a vote if the Reichstag should reject it. In addition to the right wing of the DNVP around Hugenberg, the NSDAP was also involved in the drafting. Reich Minister of the Interior Carl Severing (SPD) allowed the application to be made despite concerns from his own house, because he assumed that a refusal would only play into the hands of the right and he assumed that the referendum would fail. The draft was entitled: "Law against the enslavement of the German people." In the concise short form, it was propagandistically called "Freedom Law".

The draft was divided into four content-related paragraphs and went beyond reparation issues in the narrower sense.

• § 1 refused to recognize the war guilt .
• § 2 called for the repeal of the corresponding Article 231 in the Treaty of Versailles
• § 3 refused to accept new reparation obligations.
• Section 4 was particularly spectacular. It said: "Reich Chancellor and Reich Minister and their authorized representatives who sign contracts with foreign powers contrary to the provision of Section 3 are subject to the penalties provided for in Section 92 No. 3 of the Criminal Code." What was meant here was treason with no less than two years Prison was punished. The last paragraph in particular went back to Hitler.

The last paragraph was highly controversial even in the Reich Committee. Hugenberg and the Reichslandbund found this passage embarrassing and wanted to do without it entirely. But the NSDAP made their continued participation dependent on the retention of the section. It didn't help that Hugenberg went to Munich to see Hitler in person to negotiate with him personally. Hitler insisted on his point of view and at the meeting of the Reich Committee on September 21, the proponents of § 4 prevailed. At least a certain defuse was achieved. In a first draft, the law also threatened President Paul von Hindenburg . While Joseph Goebbels and other National Socialists would have had nothing against including Hindenburg, the conservative members of the Reich Committee saw it differently. After all, the Reich President was an honorary member of the Stahlhelm. Therefore the wording has been changed slightly. The Reich President nevertheless refused to support the goals of the campaign. He refused any connection with the initiative and forbade himself to be used in propaganda. Thereupon the propaganda of the Hugenberg concern was directed against the head of state. Hindenburg has been labeled senile and has been claimed to be a willless tool of the left .

Propaganda of the right-wing parties

The right-wing parties used harsh propaganda to promote participation in the referendum. The slogan was effective: “You have to indulge yourself by the third generation.” The Reich Committee established a regular press service and published the series “Fort with the Paris Tributes”. In addition to the usual advertising materials such as posters and leaflets, they relied primarily on the press of the Hugenberg Group. The use of commercials in the cinema for political propaganda was relatively new.

In the area of ​​assembly activities, the DNVP and the NSDAP stood out. During the first two weeks of the registration period, Hugenberg gave a speech every other day and visited numerous cities throughout Germany during this time. Goebbels was similarly active, while Hitler only appeared in public a few times. The NSDAP alone held 7,000 meetings in October. It often unexpectedly attracted large audiences. It should be noted, however, that the campaign against the Young Plan overlapped with various state and local elections and that the election campaigns had priority for the party .

In addition to the Reich Committee, there were local committees of the Reich Committee that were active to varying degrees. The propaganda through gatherings was particularly strong in Western Pomerania, Schleswig-Holstein, but also in the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area, in Bavaria and Baden. Sometimes the parties worked together at the meetings of the local committees. The success of the meetings varied greatly. The influx in Essen was about considerable, in Siegen, however, mediocre. A big rally took place on September 1st at the Hermannsdenkmal near Detmold. In Western Pomerania the movement was well organized by local and district committees. They held numerous meetings and raised donations through house collections. There, the committees could also count on the support of non-political organizations such as the war clubs or the volunteer fire brigade. In terms of content, they worked with partially absurd conspiracy theories. After that, the government would not have published all regulations. There were rumors of “German nationals who could, as it were, be sold abroad as wage slaves or would have to do work there in the colonies of the creditor states.” The criticism was also combined with anti-Semitic claims and did not shrink from completely false claims. It was claimed that the unmarried former Chancellor Joseph Wirth was married to a Jewish woman. Especially in the strongholds of the right-wing parties, the local newspapers were happy to print the statements of the right-wing parties. In Schleswig-Holstein, on the other hand, only the newspapers in Kiel and Itzehoe printed statements from opponents of the campaign.

Heinrich Claß's attacks on Gustav Stresemann make clear how polemical the members of the Reich Committee were. This was defamed "as the embodiment of all dangerous tendencies of our nation (...) whose psychological decadence is clearly derived from its political decadence" . The NSDAP, in particular, took its position to extremes during the period leading up to the referendum. In the “New Front” published in the Ruhr area, it was said: “That the National Socialist struggle against Stresemann did not stop at his grave!” At the 1929 Reich Party Congress, she introduced the term “un-German”. “The popular initiative creates (...) two categories [of people]; the one who believes in a German future, the Germans, and the other, who for whatever reason is against it, the non-Germans. ” The extreme positions of the NSDAP, but also Hugenbergs, led to conflicts within the Reich Committee itself. There was also in the DNVP there were considerable forces that were increasingly skeptical of the matter. Parts of the original supporters such as the Landbund and Landvolk turned away. The Young German Order and even leading members of the earlier Freikorps rejected the referendum. Captain Hermann Ehrhardt described the procedure as “ a nonsensical trick ” which would ultimately have to prove counterproductive for the national camp.

Countermeasures by the government camp

Carl Severing was seen by the public as the most resolute opponent of the campaign

The ongoing negotiations in The Hague forced the Reich government to act cautiously at first. The situation of the grand coalition at that time was difficult anyway. The Reich financial reform had failed and the wing parties SPD and DVP found themselves in an ongoing dispute over the reform of the unemployment insurance. She left the field to the agitation of the opponents of the Young Plan. It was only after the first conference in The Hague in August 1929 that the government began to oppose it. She used the United Press Department of the Reich Government and the Foreign Office. Above all, the associated Reich headquarters for homeland service (this was a forerunner of the Federal Agency for Civic Education ) played a major role. The state departments have been instructed to pay special attention to the Young Plan. In addition, the government set up a special press office. In view of the strong position of the Hugenberg Group's press , this could only be partially successful.

The period in which the voters could enter themselves in the corresponding lists lasted from October 16 to 29, 1929. The Reich government spent considerable sums of money on counter-propaganda. In September 1929 it was planned to involve the parties, trade unions and other government-related organizations in particular. It was hoped for a thousand speakers from this environment and material costs of 250,000 Reichsmarks. Overall, it was expected that the cost would be 400,000 Reichsmarks, small parts of which came from the budgets of the Foreign Office and the Reich Chancellery, but mainly came from the Ministry of Finance under Rudolf Hilferding , but not planned. The Prussian government also took part. In addition to speeches and print media, radio and film were also used for counter-propaganda . In particular, the use of broadcasting, which was controlled by the state but so far relatively apolitical, also met with criticism in the camp of government supporters. In contrast, Reich Interior Minister Severing saw the radio as a decisive propaganda instrument. The various broadcasters were obliged to send so-called edition presentations unchanged. A total of six edition presentations went over the airwaves during the registration period. There were noticeable interferences with various stations. The suspicion of sabotage could not be proven.

Prussian officials were forbidden to take part in the referendum, violations were subject to disciplinary penalties. The DNVP sued against this. The Prussian State Court initially rejected the application. In the final decision, which was only issued after the election, the court recognized the civil servants' right to participate in a proper referendum. Only active advocacy for the goals could be viewed as a breach of service.

The parties of the grand coalition were comparatively cautious. The DVP, the party of the late Stresemann, fought hardest against the popular initiative. Shortly before his death, against the background of the pending referendum, he had ruled out a collaboration between the DVP and the DNVP led by Hugenberg. This also narrowed the party's political leeway: “I see that we have to go with the left because parts of the right in Germany have gone crazy.” This position did not last long after Stresemann's death. Rather, the party swerved to the right.

Severing positioned himself most clearly, so that the public view the dispute over the referendum as a battle between Severing and Hugenberg. Severing initiated a public appeal by the Reich government, which was entitled "To the German people." In it, the content of the referendum was described as an "attempt at the worst incitement to hatred". He committed himself to the republic and Stresemann's policy of understanding. The appeal was signed by influential public figures. These included Hjalmar Schacht , Robert Bosch , Albert Einstein , Max Planck , Gerhart Hauptmann and Thomas Mann . However, other personalities refused to sign. Thus participating Carl Friedrich von Siemens , Hans Luther , or Carl Duisberg not.

Reichstag debate on the Freedom Act

After the end of the registration period on October 29, only 10.02% of those eligible to vote had entered the lists, i.e. 0.02 percentage points more than was necessary for the referendum to be successful. The Reich Committee was most successful in eastern Germany. Alone on Pomerania , East Prussia and Mecklenburg accounted for three quarters of all votes.

Gottfried Feder spoke in the Reichstag for the NSDAP on the Freedom Act

In accordance with the provisions of the constitution, the bill was discussed in the Reichstag on November 29, 1929. To this end, the Reich Committee submitted a statement of reasons for the Freedom Act, in which it once again stated its point of view.

In place of Severing, Foreign Minister Julius Curtius from the DVP spoke for the government . The government wanted to make it clear that the dispute would not be about the battle between Severing and Hugenberg or a Marxist versus an anti-Marxist front. Curtius accused the initiators of the referendum of completely confusing the “constitutional order and separation of the political powers of the Reich.” The campaign was “an attack against the authority of the state.” Hugenberg, who had not been for nine years, spoke for the DNVP had appeared as speakers in Parliament, but Ernst Oberfohren and Axel von Freytagh-Loringhoven . Gottfried Feder spoke for the NSDAP . During the debate in parliament, a representative of the NSDAP made it clear that the party's participation in the referendum was about the " legal elimination of the system " . The position of the governing parties was represented by Thomas Eßer (center). He stressed that the referendum wanted to replace “a policy of negotiation and understanding” with a “policy of sabotage and challenge”. "It creates the illusion that Germany can throw off the burden of war compensation through mere protest, and that it can completely liberate the Rhineland and the Saar region immediately."

On the second day of the debate, Severing spoke. He stressed that the campaign was not just an attack on the late Stresemann and his foreign policy. "Oh no, we understood from the outset that the gentlemen's intention was to act against democracy, against the 'system', against the Weimar Constitution with the referendum."

As expected, Parliament rejected the bill by a large majority in its second reading on November 30th. Hugenberg did not have all members of the DNVP behind him in the vote. While the parliamentary group approved the first three paragraphs of the bill, this was no longer the case with the fourth paragraph. Of 72 parliamentary group members, only 52 voted yes. His internal party critics around the parliamentary group leader Kuno von Westarp accused Hugenberg that his politics intensified the differences and made cooperation with other bourgeois parties impossible; the threat of punishment in the Freedom Act is tied to the party "on the wagon of the National Socialists," whose agitation methods are rejected as well as their social and economic demands. As a result, Hugenberg took sharp action against the dissenters, which contributed to a split in the faction. Westarp resigned and some deviants founded the "German National Working Group". The Conservative People's Party emerged from this .

Way to the referendum

The Reich Committee was able to see itself confirmed in a certain way, since Hjalmar Schacht, himself a member of the Committee of Experts on the Young Plan, presented a memorandum at the beginning of December in which he distanced himself from the results of the first Hague Conference on the Young Plan.

The initiators now requested a referendum, which was to take place on December 22, 1929. The Reich Government had deliberately set the date on the last Sunday shopping before Christmas in order to keep the number of people voting low. Those responsible for the trial intensified their propaganda again. They were also able to take advantage of the aforementioned state court ruling on the involvement of civil servants and statements made by Reichsbank President Schacht that were critical of the government. In contrast, the opponents of the referendum hardly discussed the matter.

The Reich government judged the bill to be unconstitutional. This meant that the adoption of the bill would have brought about constitutional changes. That is why it would have required the approval of more than 50% of the electorate; in the case of a constitutional draft, a majority of the voters would have been sufficient. However, the result yielded only 13.8% and thus little more approval than the referendum. Thus the official aim of the campaign by the right-wing parties had failed. However, there were regional differences. In 9 of the 35 Reich constituencies, more than a fifth of the voters approved the bill. These were Pomerania, East Prussia, East Hanover, Mecklenburg, Frankfurt an der Oder, Merseburg, Thuringia, Magdeburg and Chemnitz-Zwickau.

It turned out that the radical right had an above-average voter potential in socially and economically differently structured areas. Some of them were already strongholds of the NSDAP or the Volkish bloc in the Reichstag elections in 1928. These included Thuringia, East Hanover and Chemnitz-Zwickau. Pomerania and East Prussia were core areas of the DNVP. Although the highest approval of the referendum was recorded here, these values ​​were well below the number of votes of the DNVP in the last Reichstag election.

The picture becomes even more differentiated if one looks at the administrative levels below the Reich constituencies: There were eighteen districts in which more than 50% of those entitled to vote voted in favor; among them were mainly rural districts in Pomerania. But there were also a number of Central Franconian district offices. The referendum achieved the highest approval with 75% in the district office of Rothenburg ob der Tauber , a stronghold of the DNVP in the Reichstag election in 1928, in which it had received 78.7% of the valid votes cast. The areas on the lower administrative level were far apart and clearly different. What they all had in common was their rural character and their voting behavior in favor of right-wing parties hostile to the republic, which differed significantly from the national average. Approval was already waning in the respective district towns. Most of them were also Protestant areas.

Overall, a comparison with the Reichstag election of 1930 shows that there were connections between a high level of support for the referendum and a particularly strong performance by the NSDAP.

On March 12, 1930, the Reichstag ratified the Young Plan by 270 votes to 192.

consequences

The failure of the campaign seemed to indicate remarkable stability in the republic . But the months of propaganda trying to defame the reputation of parliamentary democracy had permanently changed the political culture. Changes had begun in the area of ​​the political right, which ultimately led to the weakening of the more conservative forces in favor of the NSDAP. How unstable the republic was became apparent only a few months later in the course of the global economic crisis with the rise of the NSDAP and the erosion of parliamentary democracy.

One of Hugenberg's main goals was to use the campaign against the Young Plan to gather political rights. This goal had failed with the breakup of the own faction, the founding of the People's Conservative Association or the Conservative People's Party and the Christian Social People's Service . In the Reichstag election of 1930, the Protestant conservative right was therefore fragmented and the DNVP only got 7% ​​of the vote. The close proximity to the NSDAP, which was emphasized during the campaign, also made it impossible to form a civic bloc including the DNVP. This initiated a development which in the future contributed to the decline of the bourgeois parties as a whole.

In retrospect, the NSDAP appears to be the real winner. This was able to increase in the state elections in Baden and Thuringia and the state elections in Lübeck in late 1929 and early 1930. In January 1930 there was a first NSDAP minister in Thuringia, Wilhelm Frick . In the 1930 Reichstag election , the party was able to multiply its result from 2.6% to 18.3%.

By participating in the Reich Committee, the party succeeded in breaking the previous political isolation. For the first time since 1923, Hitler played a significant role in German politics. After that, a considerable part of the research argues that Hitler would have become an alliance for civil political rights with the participation. During the campaign and afterwards, the NSDAP received large amounts of money from industry, which contributed significantly to the party's success in the 1930 Reichstag election. The Hugenberg press is also said to have been available to Hitler. However, the immediate effect of the campaign for the rise of the NSDAP is controversial. Otmar Jung in particular warned against an overestimation. Participation in the popular initiative then played only a minor role in the rise of the NSDAP. Participation in the Reich Committee was therefore associated with little money or additional propaganda opportunities for the party. Others don't see this so clearly. According to Eberhard Kolb , the NSDAP was able to fall back on the financial resources of the Reich Committee, which made it possible, for example, to organize the largest party congress to date with 200,000 participants in September 1929, i.e. in the middle of the Anti-Young Plan campaign, and to uniformly allocate 20,000 SA men uniform. Gerhard Schulz emphasized early on that Hitler had succeeded in shaping the cooperation in such a way that he was not seen as an opportunist and could continue to be viewed as a revolutionary radical. The NSDAP had become a partner, but also a rival for the still overpowering traditional right, especially the steel helmet. The party's strategy was to avoid long-term ties with other groups. On the other hand, she was open to short-term alliances if this helped to strengthen herself.

Some political opponents rated the campaign against the Young Plan for the rise of the NSDAP as very important. In September 1929 Josef Stalin asked Heinz Neumann that the KPD should also take a fundamentally different position on the reparations issue. He saw the campaign against the Young Plan as the key to the sudden success of the NSDAP. At first there were reservations in the Comintern against a national populist turnaround , but these ended in 1930 in view of further successes of the NSDAP. In August of that year the Rote Fahne published a "Program Declaration on National and Social Liberation" in which the KPD struck a strong national tone. The attempt to steal the protest voters away from the NSDAP with national slogans failed. In the Reichstag elections of 1930 , the KPD was barely able to gain, while the NSDAP achieved a landslide victory.

Results

Yes votes in referendum in% of all eligible voters by constituency

10.2% of eligible voters registered for the referendum.

The following referendum consisted of 13.5% of all votes, 5,838,890 yes-votes and only 338,195 no-votes. 94.5% of those who voted had approved the original referendum.

Only the number of non-voters or the not skipped required participation quorum of 50%, introduced by Paul von Hindenburg on March 15, 1926 for the expropriation of the princes , was therefore decisive for the failure.

Constituency	Entries in the referendum in%	Yes in the referendum in% of the valid votes	Yes in a referendum in% of all eligible votes
German Empire	10.2	94.5	13.8
East Prussia	23.9	92.9	26.6
Berlin	6.2	95.5	8.3
Potsdam I.	10.2	94.6	13.8
Potsdam II	15th	95.8	18th
Frankfurt Oder	19.1	94.1	24.4
Pomerania	32.9	93.8	33.1
Wroclaw	13.3	92.3	17.6
Liegnitz	13.9	92.7	19.1
Opole	7.5	90.0	11.6
Magdeburg	16.6	94.5	21.1
Merseburg	18.6	94.2	23.9
Thuringia	16.4	96.0	23.7
Schleswig-Holstein	13.5	94.7	17.9
Weser-Ems	11.7	96.2	16.7
East Hanover	19.8	94.6	26.0
South Hanover-Braunschweig	11	93.4	16.2
Westphalia North	3.9	94.7	6.6
Westphalia-South	3.2	95.4	5.5
Hessen-Nassau	5.5	96.0	10.1
Cologne-Aachen	1.3	92.8	2.3
Koblenz-Trier	1.3	93.9	5.0
Düsseldorf-East	2.0	94.2	3.1
Düsseldorf-West	3.2	94.5	5.5
Upper Bavaria-Swabia	4.3	94.3	8.0
Lower Bavaria	2.5	93.1	4.4
Francs	13.3	96.9	19.2
Palatinate	2.8	94.5	5.4
Dresden-Bautzen	9.4	94.4	15.3
Leipzig	9.0	94.3	13.0
Chemnitz-Zwickau	15.9	95.3	20.5
Württemberg	6.4	97.4	11.6
to bathe	2.2	95.7	5.5
Hessen-Darmstadt	3.0	95.0	8.4
Hamburg	4.0	95.4	5.1
Mecklenburg	20.9	91.8	25.4

literature

• Volker R. Berghahn : The referendum against the Young Plan and the origins of the presidential regime 1928–1930. In: D. Stegmann u. a. (Ed.): Industrial society and political system. Contributions to political social history. Bonn 1978, pp. 431-446.
• Helmut Heiber : The Republic of Weimar. Munich, 1996 [first 1966].
• Otmar Jung: Plebiscitary breakthrough in 1929? On the significance of referendums and referendums against the Young Plan for the NSDAP. In: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, No. 4, 1989, pp. 489-510.
• Eberhard Kolb : The Weimar Republic. Munich 2002.
• Doris Pfleiderer: Referendum and referendum against the Youngplan. In: Archive News 35/2007 ( PDF ).
• Gerhard Schulz : Between Democracy and Dictatorship. Vol. 2: Germany on the eve of the Great Crisis. Berlin / New York 1987.
• Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History. Berlin 2006.

Web links

• Entry on dhm.de
• Results on gonschior.de
• Results on wahlen-in-deutschland.de

swell

• The Müller II cabinet (1928–1930) , 2nd vol., Boppard am Rhein 1970 (=  files of the Reich Chancellery. Weimar Republic ). Edited by Martin Vogt, ed. for the Historical Commission at the Bavarian Academy of Sciences by Karl Dietrich Erdmann and for the Federal Archives by Wolfgang Mommsen (until 1972) with the participation of Walter Vogel (until 1978), Hans Booms ( online ).

Individual evidence

1. ^ German history (website of the bpb )
2. ↑ Doris Pfleiderer: Referendum and referendum against the Youngplan , in: Archivnachrichten 35/2007, p. 41.
3. ↑ Eberhard Kolb : The Weimar Republic. Munich 2002, p. 121.
4. ↑ Gerhard Schulz: Rise of National Socialism. Crisis and Revolution in Germany. Berlin 1975, p. 400 f.
5. ↑ Harold James , Germany in the Great Depression 1924–1936 , DVA, Stuttgart 1988, p. 64.
6. ↑ Helmut Heiber : The Republic of Weimar. Munich 1996, p. 202.
7. ^ Heinrich August Winkler: The appearance of normality. Workers and Labor Movement in the Weimar Republic 1924 to 1930. Berlin 1985.
8. ↑ Reinhard Neebe: Big Industry, State and NSDAP 1930-1933. Paul Silverberg and the Reich Association of German Industry in the Crisis of the Weimar Republic (=  critical studies on historical science. Vol. 45). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1981, p. 53.
9. ^ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct democratic elements in the German constitutional history. Berlin 2006, p. 89.
10. ↑ Maximilian Terhalle: German National in Weimar: The political biography of the Reichstag member Otto Schmidt (-Hannover) 1888–1971. Böhlau, Cologne [a. a.] 2009, p. 207.
11. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Doris Pfleiderer: Popular initiative and referendum against the Youngplan , in: Archivnachrichten 35/2007, p. 43.
12. ↑ Maximilian Terhalle: German National in Weimar: The political biography of the Reichstag member Otto Schmidt (-Hannover) 1888–1971. Böhlau, Cologne [a. a.] 2009, p. 212.
13. ↑ Otmar Jung: Plebiscitary breakthrough in 1929? On the significance of referendums and referendums against the Young Plan for the NSDAP , in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 4 (1989), p. 493.
14. ↑ Otmar Jung: Plebiscitary breakthrough in 1929? On the importance of referendums and referendums against the Young Plan for the NSDAP , in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 4 (1989), p. 495.
15. ^ Gerhard Schulz: Between Democracy and Dictatorship. Vol. 2: Germany on the eve of the Great Crisis. Berlin / New York 1987, p. 422.
16. ^ ^{A b} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct democratic elements in German constitutional history. Berlin 2006, p. 90.
17. ↑ Helmut Heiber: The Republic of Weimar. Munich 1996, p. 203.
18. ^ EJ Passant, WO Henderson, J. Lander: Germany 1815-1945: German history in a British perspective. Berlin 1962, p. 195.
19. ↑ Joseph Goebbels, diary entry of July 12, 1929, October 28, 1929 quoted. According to Otmar Jung: Plebiscitary breakthrough in 1929? On the significance of referendums and referendums against the Young Plan for the NSDAP , in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 4 (1989), p. 492.
20. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Wilhelm Ribhegge: Prussia in the west. Münster 2008, p. 453.
21. ^ Text printed by Wolfgang Michalka and Gottfried Niedhart (eds.), Die ungeliebte Republik. Documents on the domestic and foreign policy of Weimar 1918–1933 , dtv, Munich 1980, p. 263.
22. ↑ See declaration of the Reich Committee for the referendum of September 11, 1929 ( Memento of the original of October 21, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
23. ↑ Helmut Heiber: The Republic of Weimar. Munich 1996, p. 204.
24. ^ Heinrich August Winkler : The long way to the west. German History 1806-1933 , Munich 2000, p. 481 f.
25. ^ Wilhelm Ribhegge: Prussia in the west. Münster 2008, p. 450.
26. ^ Richard Freyh: Strength and weakness of the Weimar Republic , in: Walter Tormin (Ed.): The Weimar Republic. Hanover 1973, p. 176.
27. ↑ Helmut Heiber: The Republic of Weimar. Munich 1996, p. 204.
28. ↑ Jesko von Hoegen: The hero of Tannenberg: Genesis and function of the Hindenburg myth. Cologne 2007, p. 311 f.
29. ↑ See a poster of the Reich Committee .
30. ^ Wilhelm Ribhegge: Prussia in the west. Münster 2008, p. 451.
31. ^ ^{A b} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct democratic elements in German constitutional history. Berlin 2006, p. 91.
32. ↑ Otmar Jung: Plebiscitary breakthrough in 1929? On the significance of referendums and referendums against the Young Plan for the NSDAP , in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 4 (1989), p. 498.
33. ↑ Otmar Jung: Plebiscitary breakthrough in 1929? On the importance of referendums and referendums against the Young Plan for the NSDAP , in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 4 (1989), p. 502 f.
34. ↑ Cabinet Müller II No. 319 Overview of the agitation of the right-wing parties against the Young Plan, compiled on the basis of the reports of the regional departments by the Reich Central Office for Homeland Service. October 14, 1929 Assembly activity ( online ).
35. ↑ Cabinet Müller II No. 319 Overview of the agitation of the right-wing parties against the Young Plan, compiled on the basis of the reports of the regional departments by the Reich Central Office for Homeland Service. October 14, 1929, press work ( online ).
36. ^ Gordon Alexander Craig: German history 1866-1945: from the North German Confederation to the end of the Third Reich. Munich 1999, ISBN 3-406-42106-7 , p. 568.
37. ↑ Cabinet Müller II No. 319 Overview of the agitation of the right-wing parties against the Young Plan, compiled on the basis of the reports of the regional departments by the Reich Central Office for Homeland Service. October 14, 1929, press work ( online ).
38. ^ ^{A b} Gerhard Schulz: Between Democracy and Dictatorship. Vol. 2: Germany on the eve of the Great Crisis. Berlin / New York 1987, p. 425.
39. ^ Gerhard Schulz: Between Democracy and Dictatorship. Vol. 2: Germany on the eve of the Great Crisis. Berlin / New York 1987, p. 422 f.
40. ↑ See Cabinet Müller II No. 281 Ministerial Meeting of September 3, 1929, 4 p.m. ( online ).
41. ↑ Cabinet Müller II. No. 299 Ministerialdirektor Zechlin to State Secretary Pünder. September 19, 1929 ( online ).
42. ↑ Cabinet Müller II. No. 310 Cabinet meeting and ministerial meeting on October 3, 1929, 5 p.m. ( online ).
43. ↑ Cf. Matthias Lau: Press policy as an opportunity. State public relations in the countries of the Weimar Republic. Wiesbaden 2003, p. 310 ff.
44. ↑ ^{a b c} Doris Pfleiderer: Referendum and referendum against the Youngplan , in: Archivnachrichten 35/2007, p. 46.
45. ↑ See Severing's position: Thomas Alexander: Carl Severing. Social democrat from Westphalia with Prussian virtues. Westfalen-Verlag, Bielefeld 1992, p. 171 f.
46. ^ ^{A b c} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct democratic elements in the German constitutional history. Berlin 2006, p. 92.
47. ^ Marie-Luise Recker: Parliamentarism in Europe: Germany, England and France in comparison. Munich 2004, p. 58.
48. ↑ Helmut Heiber: The Republic of Weimar. Munich 1996, p. 206.
49. ↑ Thomas Alexander: Carl Severing. Social democrat from Westphalia with Prussian virtues. Westfalen-Verlag, Bielefeld 1992, p. 172.
50. ↑ For discussion in the cabinet and considerations on signatories cf. Cabinet Müller II No. 316 Cabinet meeting on October 10, 1929, 11 a.m. ( online ); Draft of the call .
51. ↑ Joachim Scholtyseck: Robert Bosch and the liberal resistance against Hitler: 1933 to 1945. Munich 2009, p. 81.
52. ^ Negotiations of the German Reichstag 104 session Friday, November 29, 1929 Digitized version
53. ^ Cabinet Müller II. General reasons for the Freedom Act ( online ).
54. ↑ Helmut Heiber: The Republic of Weimar. Munich 1996, p. 204.
55. ^ Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen , The German National People's Party , in: Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey (eds.), The end of the parties 1933. Representations and documents. Paperback edition, Droste, Düsseldorf 1984, p. 549.
56. ^ ^{A b} Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west. German History 1806–1933 , Munich 2000, p. 482.
57. ↑ Helmut Heiber: The Republic of Weimar. Munich 1996, p. 205.
58. ^ Cabinet Müller II No. 369 The President of the Reichsbank to the Reich Chancellor. December 5, 1929 ( online ).
59. ^ Cabinet Müller II No. 341 The Reich Minister of the Interior to the Reich Minister. November 5, 1929 Annex 3 Statement by the Reich Minister of Justice ( online ).
60. ^ Heinrich August Winkler: The appearance of normality. Workers and the labor movement in the Weimar Republic 1924–1930. Bonn / Berlin 1985, p. 738.
61. ^ Gerhard Schulz: Between Democracy and Dictatorship. Vol. 2: Germany on the eve of the Great Crisis. Berlin / New York 1987, p. 123 f.
62. ^ ^{A b c} Wilhelm Ribhegge: Prussia in the west. Münster 2008, p. 455.
63. ↑ Eberhard Kolb: The Weimar Republic. Munich 2002, p. 122.
64. ↑ See for example Kurt Bauer: National Socialism. Vienna [u. a.] 2008, p. 135.
65. ↑ Otmar Jung: Plebiscitary breakthrough in 1929? On the importance of referendums and referendums against the Young Plan for the NSDAP , in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Heft 4, 1989, p. 489 f.
66. ↑ Otmar Jung: Plebiscitary breakthrough in 1929? On the importance of referendums and referendums against the Young Plan for the NSDAP , in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 4 (1989), p. 509 f.
67. ↑ See on research Andreas Wirsching: The Weimar Republic in its inner development. Munich 2000, p. 58.
68. ↑ Eberhard Kolb: The Weimar Republic. Munich 2002, passim.
69. ↑ Gerhard Schulz: Rise of National Socialism. Crisis and Revolution in Germany. Berlin 1975, p. 465.
70. ↑ Bert Hoppe : Stalin and the KPD in the Weimar Republic , in: Jürgen Zarusky (Hrsg.): Stalin and the Germans: new contributions to research. Munich 2006, p. 29 f.
71. ↑ Figures after elections in Germany

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