Ernst Oberfohren

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Ernst Oberfohren

Ernst Oberfohren (born March 15, 1881 in Dümpten , † May 7, 1933 in Kiel ) was a German politician ( DNVP ).

Live and act

Earlier career

Ernst Oberfohren was born as the son of the farmer Johann Oberfohren and his wife Anna Krüger. From 1892 to 1900 he attended high school in Mülheim an der Ruhr , which he left with the Abitur. Then he was trained at the teachers' seminar (which was also a high school for boys) in Mettmann until 1903 . Oberfohren then studied Protestant theology , philosophy , German and French at the universities of Berlin and Bonn . There he passed the state examination for higher teaching post in 1907. Until 1909 he taught as a senior teacher (teacher) at schools in Godesberg , Bonn and Kattowitz (1908), then from 1909 to 1924 at the municipal higher girls 'school and at the teachers' seminar in Kiel. In addition to his school work, he was more scientifically active and in 1914 at the University of Kiel with a thesis on Jean Bodin Doctor of Political Sciences PhD . During the First World War , Oberfohren also began to write essays on political topics. Conservatively minded, he joined the German National People's Party (DNVP) in the Weimar Republic . Politics became increasingly his life. His interest in world trade and maritime transport, due to his place of residence in Kiel, led to an honorary membership at the Institute for World Economy in Kiel. Throughout his life, however, he also campaigned for the interests of agriculture, depending on his origin. Oberfohren was proactive in political matters, striving for influence and recognition. School service became more and more of a limitation.

Politics in the Weimar Republic

Imperial politics

In 1919/1920 Oberfohren was a member of the Weimar National Assembly . From 1920 to 1933 he was a member of the DNVP for the constituency of Schleswig-Holstein in the Reichstag . As part of his parliamentary work, he dealt with tax, financial and budgetary issues. Due to the constituency, there were also marine and agricultural issues. He gave up his profession as a teacher in 1924 after his interests had clearly turned to politics and he had consolidated his position in the party so much that he could live full-time from politics. When the DNVP took part in a government for the first time in the Luther cabinet in early 1925 after the Reichstag election in December 1924 , which went well, Oberfohren was one of the MPs who could speak and act responsibly for their party.

In the next election to the Reichstag , the DNVP - like other parties in the bourgeoisie spectrum - suffered a significant loss of votes. A large group within the party blamed entry into the imperial government, which had been pushed through by the leadership under Kuno von Westarp and Gottfried Treviranus : You couldn't join the government of the state you were fighting. Westarp and others took the view that the party should continue to work on the democratic-parliamentary system after the setback. The party should open up to new voters. The confrontation course of the radical party circles made the party untrustworthy. The first group was of the opinion that one had to strengthen the opposition to the republic and enter into a race for the bourgeoisie with the growing NSDAP . For this position stood Alfred Hugenberg , who remained the victor in the dispute and became party leader. He began "to transform the party into an instrument of his will" and led it in a very authoritarian manner. Oberfohren had so clearly supported Hugenberg in the internal party struggles that great tasks awaited him. On December 4, 1929, with Hugenberg's help, he succeeded the outgoing parliamentary group chairman Kuno Graf Westarp and held this office for three years until the beginning of April 1933. Oberfohren was considered to be Hugenberg's man. His task was to push through the change of the DNVP from a relatively pluralistic party within the political spectrum of the conservatives to an " autocratic leader party" in the DNVP. After the Reichstag election in 1930 , when the party again lost votes, it split when Westarp u. a, who founded the People's Conservative Association , which supported the Brüning I cabinet . In March 1930, before his appointment as Reich Chancellor, Heinrich Brüning had tried in vain to get Oberfohren on his side.

Hugenberg and Oberfohren swore the party on a strict opposition course against the government, which was formed by the democratic parties. His position in the party was based more on the goodwill of Hugenberg than on support in the faction. In the period that followed, there was a radicalization and hardening of Hugenberg's positions, which Oberfohren supported without objection until the end of 1932. In October 1931 Oberfohren formulated a regular declaration of war against the Weimar Republic and the bourgeois parties that supported it in the Reichstag :

"We come to this Reichstag to put a war announcement on the table (Bravo! For the German Nationalists) a war announcement for the system under which we are governed and the supporters of this system [...] The German people want to see big decisions today . Either these small parties [...] find the path that is given according to the origin and objective of their policy, or they are destroyed. They will be torn apart in the open air, shot in the open! "

On the question of cooperation with the NSDAP, which Hugenberg vehemently advocated in the run-up to the Harzburg Front meeting in autumn 1931, Oberfohren contradicted his party leader. A month later he complained to a parliamentary group colleague about Hugenberg's “utopian” plans to become Chancellor or President, but then turned around and “praised Hugenberg beyond measure”.

Politics in Schleswig-Holstein

Although even without special functions in Schleswig-Holstein, Oberfohren dominated the regional association of the DNVP almost completely. Oberfohren benefited from his connection to headquarters, but also from his “political experience” and “intensive party work”. The party had its strongest support until 1928 in the "peasant and medium-sized industrial classes, as well as administration and military". Tailored to this agrarian and medium-sized voter potential, the DNVP's propaganda was designed exclusively to oppose social democracy. The primary goal in the Land and Reich is to build an “anti-Marxist front.” Oberfohren repeatedly emphasized how damaging the time in government had been for the party. Hugenberg had the "merit of leading the party on the path of the national opposition". This is not a "policy of obstruction", but rather the "safeguarding of important national interests". The aim of this policy was the "collapse" of Weimar democracy. Even so, the number of voters in the DNVP decreased significantly. Whereas in 1924 the proportion of votes was 33% of the votes cast, it was 23% in 1928, compared to only 6.1% in 1930. That was a loss of around 80% of the vote. These electoral groups first migrated to professional parties, and in 1932 they joined the NSDAP. In July 1932 it received 51% of the votes. It was clear to both parties that they were fighting for the "same politically, economically and socially insecure" groups of voters. Therefore, from 1928 onwards, there was an increasing front position between the DNVP and the NSDAP in Schleswig-Holstein. Oberfohren tried to make it clear to the voters that the DNVP was the only group from which they could hope for help in the fight for their interests, which was directed against the state. In the eyes of the voters, the NSDAP represented this role of the state opponent much more convincingly than the DNVP, in whose ranks there were many senior officials and officials of the opposed state.

The dispute between the NSDAP and DNVP and their leader Oberfohren was fierce from 1928 onwards. The main opponents were Oberfohren and the Gauleiter of the NSDAP Schleswig-Holstein, Hinrich Lohse . Initially, the dispute was carried out in the press, at meetings and also in court. Although the DNVP criticized the NSDAP in a lot of content, which was not easy for it due to the similar aim of destroying the republic, it also criticized the "demagogic style and the form of the dispute, which was described as irresponsible". The NSDAP is a "demagogic-violent party, its candidates are partly morally inferior, partly their qualifications are not sufficient for the desired offices". The climax of the dispute was a lawsuit by Lohse against Oberfohren, which the latter was able to throw off in part. The DNVP's information appeared in the mostly conservative-minded local press, such as the “Ostholsteiner Tageblatt”, and that of the NSDAP in the party's own “ Schleswig-Holstein daily newspaper ” or on leaflets. According to Wulf, it is significant which of the NSDAP's program items were not criticized. Neither the “anti-parliamentary and anti-democratic attitude of the NSDAP” nor the “fight against the system” nor the open anti-Semitism of the NSDAP were attacked. These attitudes also existed in the DNVP and they provided a basis for partial cooperation in the Reich under the umbrella of the “National Opposition”.

The more programmatic and propagandistic conflict acquired a “political-practical dimension” from the spring of 1932. On May 29, 1932, the National Socialists obtained an absolute majority in the Free State of Oldenburg and formed the first National Socialist government there on June 16, 1932. The part of Lübeck belonged to the Free State, which roughly corresponded to the Eutin district that existed until 1970 . The district president of this area was SA-Standartenführer and NSDAP functionary JHA Böhmcker , also called "Latten-Böhmker" after his preferred percussion instrument in political disputes. In the Free State as well as in the Lübeck part of the state, National Socialist co-ordination began. In the Lübeck part of the state, 50 SA men, some of whom were equipped with hand grenades, were appointed auxiliary police officers who were supposed to externally support the police force, but who in reality set up a “true regiment of terror”. The district president developed an injustice regime. Among other things, he dismissed the correctly working Mayor of Eutin, Otto Stoffregen, who was a member of the DNVP, and two days later the correctly investigating police commissioner of the city, Paul Marks. Both officers tried to investigate a hand grenade attack on an SPD facility on August 11th, which had apparently been committed by the ranks of the SA. With this, the NSDAP made it clear that after a successful seizure of power in the German Reich it would implement its plans “against all law and all laws”. An arbitrary regime was set up in the Lübeck region. Resistance was pointless, as the law was no longer valid and only violence was practiced ”. The events met with a great response in the Schleswig-Holstein press. For the German Nationals in Schleswig-Holstein it was clear that they had to expect from the National Socialists in the Reich no loyalty to the alliance but rather ruthless opposition and oppression.

The Hitler cabinet

When a coalition between the NSDAP and the DNVP under a Chancellor Adolf Hitler emerged in January 1933 , Oberfohren was not fundamentally against it, but he was of the opinion that his party should not give up certain positions in negotiations. From January 16, 1933, there were various meetings of DNVP members in Berlin at which the contemplated coalition with the National Socialists was debated. At all of these meetings, Oberfohren does not seem to have "raised any objection to this coalition". Wulf finds this astonishing after the experience of the DNVP and its attitude towards the NSDAP in Schleswig-Holstein. On the other hand, he refers to the DNVP's and Oberfohren's unique opportunity for the party to come to power and implement its program. The “entry fee” was the coalition with the NSDAP. At that time, Oberfohren, like other leading DNVP politicians, was of the opinion that sufficient safeguards against the supremacy of the NSDAP had been built into the coalition. Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath was a protégé of President Hindenburg and had already served in the previous cabinets. The Reichswehr Minister Werner von Blomberg was appointed minister in Hitler's cabinet by Hindenburg. Hugenberg could speak for four ministries. In addition, Wulf points out that Oberfohren was ultimately a Hugenberg man. Oberfohren felt obliged to Hugenberg. For Wulf there is no doubt that Oberfohren "supported" the decision to form a government coalition with the National Socialists in the second half of January 1933. After the appointment of the Hitler-Papen-Hugenberg cabinet on January 30, 1933, the many fuses turned out to be quite fragile. The four-time Minister and Commissioner for Osthilfe Hugenberg was not up to his offices. In addition, he did not keep in touch with the parliamentary group. Therefore, he was also isolated in his arguments with the National Socialists and the other government members in the cabinet. It soon became clear that the National Socialists were “not tamed” but were about to “pull past the DNVP”.

In the days that followed, Oberfohren came to the conclusion that the coalition with the NSDAP had been a mistake. The National Socialists were about to proceed in the same way as in the Lübeck part of the Free State of Oldenburg. On February 10th, he became involved in the parliamentary group meeting for the first time openly against Hugenberg. "From Oberfohren upset" Hugenberg was now also criticized by other parliamentary groups. In response to the criticism, the latter announced that after the elections on March 5, he would have every DNVP MP sign a lapel that he would approve in advance every measure taken by the cabinet. Oberfohren felt since Hugenberg's demand, which was seen as an encroachment on the autonomy of parliamentarians, “free of any ties to Hugenberg”. In the meantime, the impression of Hugenberg's physical and political-tactical inadequacy increased. Hugenberg was only concerned about maintaining his offices and proved to be only "hesitant and indecisive" in his administration and disputes with the National Socialists in the cabinet. According to fellow parliamentary groups, the National Socialists marched past him. After the March 5 election, the DNVP's position in government deteriorated. Because now the National Socialists had the majority in the Reichstag, since the votes of the Communists had been declared invalid by the Reichstag Presidium under Göring - certainly with the votes of the DNVP. Apart from constitutional changes, the Nazis could now make decisions on their own. At the cabinet meeting on March 11, Hitler passed Hugenberg over when the latter wanted time to "review" the surprising proposal made to establish a Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda , which Joseph Goebbels was supposed to take over. Hugenberg and the non-National Socialist cabinet members had little influence on the most important project of the National Socialists before the composition of the new Reichstag, the Enabling Act proposed by Wilhelm Frick . Insofar as they “did not fight each other” in their objections, they let Hitler, Hermann Göring and Frick cover them up. On March 23, 1933, the Reichstag passed the Enabling Act.

At the first parliamentary group meeting after the election, Hugenberg did not manage to calm down the internal party opposition to him. The meeting was "tumultuous", the MP Reinhold Quaatz noted in his diary: "Oberfohren rushed". Hugenberg now began to replace Oberfohren as group chairman. Oberfohren, for his part, received numerous letters from party friends during this time, who reported that the National Socialists were everywhere using force to fill key positions in politics and administration with their own supporters. German national officials were illegally dismissed from their posts. This also affected election officials in the constituency of Oberfohrens, such as on March 25, 1933, for example, Heinrich Thon , President of the Province of Schleswig-Holstein, who had been in office since November 1932 . He was illegally retired and replaced with the NSDAP Gauleiter Hinrich Lohse . On March 22, 1933, the parliamentary group voted in a test vote for the election of the new parliamentary group chairman for Oberfohren. In order to further strengthen his position and to force Hugenberg to change course, Oberfohren forwarded some of the letters that had reached him from the Reich seeking help to party friends. On March 24, 1933, during the parliamentary group meeting, he and Hugenberg had a five-hour argument, during which the paper seemed to turn to Hugenberg.

Withdrawal and death

The National Socialists had got wind of the clashes in the DNVP. Goering, as Reich Commissioner of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, ordered searches of Oberfohren's Berlin offices and his private apartment in Kiel for March 26th and 27th . Quotes from letters directed against Hugenberg that were found there, Göring had passed on to the press. This action was in connection with National Socialist pressures against German national politicians like Günter Gereke and the dismissal of officials who were close to the party. Oberfohren expected a solidarity action from the party and parliamentary group against the violation of the rights of a party colleague. When this did not occur, he became, as the historian Peter Wulf writes, "aware of the failure of his life's work". His warnings and political efforts were in vain. "The own party made a pact with its own executioner". A nervous breakdown was the result. At the end of March Oberfohren resigned his seat in the Reichstag, perhaps also to send a clear signal against the house searches, which violated his political immunity as a member of the Reichstag. He withdrew to Kiel bitterly. On April 12, 1933, Hugenberg stated untruthfully in front of the parliamentary group that Oberfohren had been against the coalition with the NSDAP from the start, and that his resignation was “an admission of guilt”.

In mid-April 1933 Oberfohren went to a sanatorium in Bad Weißer Hirsch near Dresden, but returned home restless after a few days. He and his wife were publicly attacked by the National Socialist press and pilloried as enemies of the National Socialist movement. Now the couple feared falling victim to a physical attack or an assassination attempt by the National Socialists. On May 7, 1933, Oberfohren was found shot dead in his apartment in Kiel. The official police report found a suicide . In the prevailing atmosphere of terror in the first few weeks after the seizure of power , this was doubted by some.

Whether it was really suicide or even murder is still controversial today. Peter Wulf refers to the big SA meeting that took place on May 6th and 7th in Kiel and made Oberfohren very afraid. In this situation of absolute defeat and the failure of his personal and political life's work, death seemed to him the only way out. As early as 1956, Oberfohren's widow stated that her husband had chosen to commit suicide out of “deep despair”. The Braunbuch published in Paris by Willi Munzenberg on behalf of the KPD reported in 1933 that Oberfohren had been murdered without naming the source. This version was believed credible by most historians up until 1962. In that year the book Der Reichstagbrand - Legende undreality by Fritz Tobias appeared , who came to a reassessment of the causes of the Reichstag fire, which had already been pre-published in 1959/60 in a series in Des Spiegel , and rejected the murder thesis. More recent publications by a group of historians around the Swiss historian Walther Hofer put this into question again, which was again questioned in a publication about the political scientist Uwe Backes in 1986.

In 2001 the historians Alexander Bahar and Wilfried Kugel took the view that Oberfohren's death was merely a murder disguised as a suicide. In doing so, they rely on, among other things, the memoirs of the Gestapo chief Rudolf Diels , according to which Oberfohren's death aroused the Gestapo's suspicion. Investigations by the Kiel police had "led to the arrest of an SA roll command" that had "acted on its own initiative". Since 1934 it has been proven that such a roll command under the leadership of Paul Röhrbein's Oberfohren is said to have either shot or forced suicide. In 2016, the American historian Carter Hett spoke of the fact that Oberfohren was driven to suicide, despite the content of the Diels memoirs cited above. The murder of which "the Brown Book spoke" did not take place. In contrast, Oberfohren had already spoken to a journalist from the New Forward in April 1933 of the possibility of suicide.

Historians who consider the murder to be probable are mostly cited in this context that Oberfohren collected incriminating material about the Reichstag fire that would have proven or suggested a National Socialist responsibility for the fire. The so-called Oberfohren memorandum is valid as evidence. A previous version appeared anonymously in the Manchester Guardian at the end of April 1933 , later versions that appeared in Willi Münzenberg's Brown Book named Oberfohren as the author. This text is now considered a forgery by the communist journalist Albert Norden . The American historian Benjamin Carter Hett agrees , but in his opinion the content of the publication in the Manchester Guardian was based on assessments shared by Oberfohren. On the other hand, he considers it impossible that Oberfohren knew anything about the preparations for the arson in the Reichstag. The general editor of the Neue Deutsche Biographie Franz Menges, however, considers it possible that the publication in the Manchester Guardian was attributed to Oberfohren and led to his murder. The cultural historian Jonathan Miles focuses on Comintern functionary Louis Gibarti in a completely different way, who from his point of view, together with Otto Katz, ensured that the document was printed in the Manchester Guardian and, according to the opinion that can be met, is also the author.

Fonts

  • Jean Bodin and his school. Studies on the early days of universal economics , Kiel 1914. (Dissertation)
  • The idea of ​​the universal economy in French economic literature , Jena 1915.
  • French efforts to displace German trade , Jena 1916.
  • The food supply of the city of Kiel in the first three years of the war , Kiel 1918.
  • German national tax policy 1924.
  • We and the Tax Proposals , 1925.
  • German National Tax Policy and SMEs , 1926.
  • Economic and tax problems of the independent middle class , 1927.
  • Imperial budget and financial equalization , 1928.
  • Off to the opposition! , 1928.
  • Imperial budget 1929.
  • To the freedom law! , s. a. [1930].
  • Combat program of the German National People's Party , 1930.
  • Declaration of war on the Brünning system! , Berlin 1931.

literature

  • Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren and the DNVP at the end of the Weimar Republic. In: Erich Hoffmann and Peter Wulf [eds.]: "We are building the empire." The rise and first years of National Socialism in Schleswig-Holstein. Wachholtz, Neumünster 1983, ISBN 3-529-02181-4 .
  • Martin Schumacher (Hrsg.): MdR The Reichstag members of the Weimar Republic in the time of National Socialism. Political persecution, emigration and expatriation, 1933–1945. A biographical documentation . 3rd, considerably expanded and revised edition. Droste, Düsseldorf 1994, ISBN 3-7700-5183-1 .
  • Franz Menges:  Oberfohren, Ernst. In: New German Biography (NDB). Volume 19, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1999, ISBN 3-428-00200-8 , p. 384 f. ( Digitized version ).
  • Oberfohren, Ernst . In Reichs Handbuch der Deutschen Gesellschaft, Das Handbuch der Personalities in words and pictures . Vol. 2 (L – Z), Deutscher Wirtschaftsverlag, Berlin 1931. P. 1344.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren and the DNVP at the end of the Weimar Republic. In: Erich Hoffmann and Peter Wulf [eds.]: "We are building the empire." The rise and first years of National Socialism in Schleswig-Holstein. Neumünster 1983, ISBN 3-529-02181-4 , p. 167.
  2. ^ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren and the DNVP at the end of the Weimar Republic. ... 1983, p. 167f.
  3. ↑ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren ... 1983, p. 168.
  4. ↑ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren ... 1983, p. 169.
  5. ↑ Hermann Weiß and Paul Hoser (eds.): The German Nationals and the Destruction of the Weimar Republic. From Reinhold Quaatz's diary 1928–1933 . (= Series of the quarterly books for contemporary history, 59), Oldenbourg, Munich 1989, ISBN 3-486-64559-5 , p. 105.
  6. ↑ Hans Mommsen : Rise and Fall of the Republic of Weimar. Ullstein, Berlin 1998, p. 359.
  7. ↑ Annelise Thimme : Escape into the Myth. The German National People's Party and the defeat of 1918. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1969, p. 142.
  8. ^ Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen : The German National People's Party. In: Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey (eds.): The end of the parties. Representations and documents . Droste, Düsseldorf 1960, p. 558.
  9. ↑ Hermann Weiß and Paul Hoser (eds.): The German Nationals and the Destruction of the Weimar Republic. From Reinhold Quaatz's diary 1928–1933 . Oldenbourg, Munich 1989, p. 161.
  10. ↑ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren ... 1983, p. 170.
  11. ↑ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren ... 1983, p. 171.
  12. ↑ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren ... 1983, p. 174.
  13. ↑ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren ... 1983, p. 177.
  14. ↑ Lawrence D. Stokes: "My little town stands for a thousand others ...". Studies on the history of Eutin in Holstein, 1918–1945 . Struve's Buchdruckerei, Eutin 2004, ISBN 3-923457-72-3 , p. 185.
  15. ↑ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren ... 1983, p. 176f.
  16. ↑ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren ... 1983, p. 178.
  17. ^ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren and the DNVP at the end of the Weimar Republic. ... 1983, p. 178.
  18. ↑ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren ... 1983, p. 179f.
  19. ↑ So the assessment of the delegates Reinhold Quaatz , Hermann Weiß and Paul Hoser (eds.): The German Nationals and the Destruction of the Weimar Republic. From Reinhold Quaatz's diary 1928–1933 . Oldenbourg, Munich 1989, p. 235.
  20. ↑ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren ... 1983, p. 180 f.
  21. ↑ Hermann Weiß and Paul Hoser (eds.): The German Nationals and the Destruction of the Weimar Republic. From Reinhold Quaatz's diary 1928–1933 . Oldenbourg, Munich 1989, p. 235.
  22. ^ Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen: The German National People's Party. In: Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey (eds.): The end of the parties. Representations and documents . Droste, Düsseldorf 1960, p. 588 f.
  23. ↑ Hermann Weiß Weiß and Paul Hoser (eds.): The German Nationalists and the Destruction of the Weimar Republic. From Reinhold Quaatz's diary 1928–1933 . Oldenbourg, Munich 1989, p. 244.
  24. ^ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren and the DNVP at the end of the Weimar Republic. ... 1983, p. 181 f.
  25. ^ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren and the DNVP at the end of the Weimar Republic. ... 1983, p. 182.
  26. ^ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren and the DNVP at the end of the Weimar Republic. ... 1983, p. 183 f.
  27. ↑ Richard J. Evans : The Third Reich, Vol. I: Rise . Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Munich 2004, p. 486.
  28. ^ Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen: The German National People's Party. In: Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey (eds.): The end of the parties. Representations and documents . Droste, Düsseldorf 1960, p. 596.
  29. ^ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren and the DNVP at the end of the Weimar Republic. ... 1983, pp. 184f.
  30. ^ Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen: The German National People's Party. In: Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey (eds.): The end of the parties. Representations and documents . Droste, Düsseldorf 1960, p. 606; Lars-Broder Keil and Sven Felix Kellerhoff: German Legends. About the 'stab in the back' and other myths of history. Ch.links Verlag, Berlin, 2002, p. 51.
  31. ↑ Richard J. Evans: The Third Reich, Vol. I: Rise . Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Munich 2004, p. 488.
  32. ^ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren and the DNVP at the end of the Weimar Republic. ... 1983, p. 185 ff.
  33. ^ Lars-Broder Keil and Sven Felix Kellerhoff : German Legends. About the 'stab in the back' and other myths of history. Ch.links Verlag, Berlin, 2002, p. 52.
  34. ^ Richard Wolff: Der Reichstagbrand 1933. A research report , in: From politics and contemporary history , Bonn: Federal Center for Political Education, ISSN  0479-611X , No. B 3/56, January 18, 1956, p. 35. Quotes a letter from Ida Oberfohrens, which can be viewed online as IFZ testimony. Oberfrohren, Ida - zs-0654
  35. ↑ Fritz Tobias : The Reichstag fire - legend and reality . Grote, Rastatt 1962.
  36. ↑ Rudolf Diels: Lucifer ante portas: ... the first chief of the Gestapo speaks . Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, Stuttgart 1950, p. 304.
  37. ↑ Alexander Bahar and Wilfried Kugel: The Reichstag fire. How history is made . edition q, Berlin 2001, ISBN 3-86124-513-2 , pp. 634-637.
  38. ↑ Benjamin Carter Hett: The Reichstag fire. Retrial . Rowohlt, Reinbek (near Hamburg) 2016, ISBN 978-3-498-03029-2 , p. 211 u. 221.
  39. ^ Peter Wulf: Ernst Oberfohren and the DNVP at the end of the Weimar Republic. ... 1983, p. 166 f .; Franz Menges : "Oberfohren, Ernst" in: Neue Deutsche Biographie 19 (1999), p. 384 f. ( online ), accessed March 6, 2018; Lars-Broder Keil and Sven Felix Kellerhoff: German Legends. About the 'stab in the back' and other myths of history. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin, 2002, p. 51 f .; Hermann Beck: The Fateful Alliance: German Conservatives and Nazis in 1933: The Seizure of Power in a New Light . Berghahn Books, New York 2013, ISBN 9780857454102 , pp. 168 + 227.
  40. ↑ Benjamin Carter Hett: The Reichstag fire. Retrial . Translation from English by Karin Hielscher. Rowohlt, Reinbek (near Hamburg), 2016, ISBN 978-3-498-03029-2 , p. 221.
  41. ^ Franz Menges: Oberfohren, Ernst in: Neue Deutsche Biographie 19 (1999), p. 384 f. ( online ), accessed March 6, 2018
  42. ↑ Jonathan Miles: The Nine Lives of Otto Katz. The Remarkable Story of a Communist Super-Spy , Bantam Books, London a. a. 2010, p. 94 f.
personal data
SURNAME Oberfohren, Ernst
BRIEF DESCRIPTION German politician (DNVP), MdR
DATE OF BIRTH March 15, 1881
PLACE OF BIRTH Muffled
DATE OF DEATH May 7, 1933
Place of death Kiel