Fire disaster at Düsseldorf Airport in 1996

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Names of the victims in the memorial room of the airport

The fire disaster at Düsseldorf Airport in 1996 was a serious fire accident that began on April 11, 1996 at around 3:30 p.m. in the arrivals level of Terminal A at Düsseldorf Airport . 17 people died and another 88 were injured.

course

At around 1 p.m., two workers started welding an expansion joint above a flower shop located on the arrivals level of Terminal A. The airport fire brigade was not informed that the work was being carried out, so that the fire brigade did not carry out a mandatory fire watch in such a case.

A taxi driver reported to the fire brigade at 3:31 p.m. that sparks were repeatedly being seen on the ceiling in the area of ​​the flower shop. Two fire fighters who arrived four minutes later initially suspected a fault in an electrical system in the false ceiling. It was more or less by chance that the fire fighters discovered the welding work and promptly asked the welders to stop their work. At this point, however, a smoldering fire (thermal decomposition without a visible flame) in the built-in Styrofoam panels developed in the false ceiling , which initially went undetected. This led to an enormous amount of heat, so that at 3:50 p.m. the stability and thus the air seal of the cavity failed. At that moment, the penetration of oxygen led to a flashover and thus to a full fire of the entire false ceiling over a length of several hundred meters.

The fire was only noticed because of the enormous amount of smoke that developed in a very short time. Finally, at 3:55 p.m., a fire alarm was triggered. Although the airport fire brigade assumed that they would be able to cope with the operation on their own, it quickly became clear during an initial investigation of the location of the fire that this could not be done. Therefore, first the Düsseldorf fire brigade and, in the further course of the fire, the fire brigades of the Mettmann district (here in particular Ratingen), the Neuss district, Wuppertal, Duisburg and rescue equipment from Bonn were ordered to the deployment site. Nevertheless, the emergency teams were overwhelmed by the extent of the disaster. The main reason for this was that the airport fire brigade could not communicate with the rest of the emergency services due to different radio frequencies and, as external fire brigades, they did not have precise building plans for their emergency services to navigate.

It was only around 4:30 p.m. that the helpers reached the arrival level, where 16 people had already suffocated from smoke gases. Eight of the victims died in the Air France VIP lounge because they could not leave the room due to the thick smoke. The only survivor from the lounge broke through a glass wall with an armchair and jumped several meters deep, seriously injuring himself, but was rescued in time. Another seven victims were in two elevators, which were still in operation despite the fire and headed for the smoke-filled level. The smoke that entered immediately after the doors were opened blocked the light barrier of the elevators, making it impossible for the occupants to escape. Another person was killed by smoke in a toilet. The last and 17th deaths died from serious injuries just under six weeks later in the hospital.

It was not until 16:36, a good 40 minutes after the fire alarm was triggered, that flight operations at the airport ceased and the aircraft were diverted to Cologne / Bonn Airport. Around 7:30 p.m., the total of around 1,000 fire fighters had the fire under control.

The first flights were started on April 13th by the LTU in another terminal. The operating company also temporarily set up handling facilities in beer tents. Clearances were also carried out outdoors. The tents were replaced by weatherproof lightweight halls in June of the same year, which served as a temporary measure in the following years until the main terminals were completely restored.

consequences

The cause of the fire was the unauthorized use of expanded polystyrene in the insulation of the false ceilings and the disregard of fire protection regulations during welding work on an expansion joint in the driveway above a flower shop in Terminal A. In addition, a large amount of dust had accumulated on the ventilation ducts, over which the fire spread spread rapidly in all directions. Reasons for the many fatalities were, among other things, the lack of fire doors and the distribution of smoke gases through the air conditioning.

The damage to property was estimated at up to one billion DM .

During the five-year main process at the Düsseldorf Regional Court , not only the welders and the responsible site management team but also numerous people responsible for the construction of the dispatch hall around 30 years ago were on trial. It emerged that at that time, for reasons of cost, fire-safe building materials had not been used sufficiently, structural fire protection had been neglected and no sprinkler system had been installed. In addition, further omissions became clear: There was no fire safety watch during the welding work, air conditioning and elevators were shut down too late, the first fire engine did not appear at the scene of the fire until 20 minutes after the fire alarm. At the end of 2001, the proceedings against the payment of fines were discontinued because the court could not finally clarify whether construction defects or the failure of the fire brigade were decisive for the disaster. The accused managers, welders, architects and those responsible for the airport and fire brigade were fined between 3,000 and 20,000 euros, but remained unpunished. Various civil claims for damages were still pending in court in April 2006, ten years after the accident.

The proceedings were about the blame for the confirmed damage of 30 million euros. The airport company was declared the main culprit and had to pay for millions in fines and compensation claims. The company that carried out the welding work was also sentenced to pay damages, but to a lesser extent. In total, claims for damages totaling 150 million had been received, most of which, however, had not been found to be admissible.

Terminals A and B were very badly damaged by the fire and had to be completely refurbished (Terminal A) or demolished (Terminal B) due to severe contamination with dangerous pollutants. Terminal C, on the other hand, was able to go back into operation a few months after the fire in 1996 after cleaning and renovation work. Until the opening of the new Terminal B in 2001, it served as a terminal for most scheduled airlines as well as LTU's long-haul flights. Only Lufthansa and its partners were handled in the completely refurbished Terminal A as a permanent domicile from 1998 onwards. Until 2001, most of the other airlines were handled in temporary halls (departure halls D and E) on the edge of the airport site. With the opening of Terminal B in 2001, the actual fire restoration came to an end.

The Düsseldorf fire brigade was increased by around one hundred positions and received more modern equipment.

Movies

  • Frank Bürgin: The Düsseldorf airport fire. A film from the ARD series: Protocol of a disaster . Documentary, Germany, A production of the zeitlupe GmbH Gelsenkirchen, WDR 2006.

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c Chronology: The fire disaster at Düsseldorf Airport. Der Spiegel , December 15, 1999.
  2. ↑ Pictures of the provisional handling facilities with explanations on rp-online.de , accessed on April 11, 2021
  3. ↑ nfpa.org with final report on the 1996 fire (PDF; 64 kB)
  4. ↑ Reiner Burger: 20 years of airport fire - By elevator into the Inferno. In: faz.net . April 11, 2016. Retrieved October 18, 2016 .
  5. ^ Page no longer available , search in web archives: The fire at Düsseldorf airport on April 11, 1996, causes and consequences in terms of building and criminal law@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.brandschutz.bureauveritas.de
  6. ↑ a b Katharina Rüth: Düsseldorf airport is primarily to blame for the fire. In: DerWesten.de . November 14, 2010, accessed October 18, 2016 .
  7. ↑ werner-baurecht.de on compensation for the fire disaster in 1996
  8. ↑ The airport has to be liable for most of the fire damage
  9. ↑ pilkington.com to Terminal B  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.pilkington.com  
  10. ↑ Terminal construction after the fire disaster in 1996 at baunetz.de
  11. ↑ rp-online.de on the reconstruction of the terminals
  12. ↑ http://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/rheinland/wirtschaftspruefer-feuerwehr-duesseldorf-100.html

Web links