Railway accident in the Hokuriku tunnel
In the railway accident in Hokuriku tunnel ( Jap. 北陸トンネル火災事故 , Hokuriku tonneru kasai jiko even 急行きたぐに号火災事故, Kyuko Kitaguni-gō kasai jiko ) died on November 6, 1972, the Main Line Hokuriku between the station Tsuruga and Minami-Imajō in Minami-Echizen , Fukui Prefecture , Japan , 30 people were injured in a train fire, 714 were also injured.
Starting position
On the Hokuriku Main Line is the 13.87 km long double-track Hokuriku Tunnel. At that time the tunnel was neither illuminated nor did it have a smoke extraction system. In 1967, five years after the opening and at the same time five years before the railway accident , the fire brigade in Tsuruga asked the State Railways (JNR) to equip trains traveling through the long Hokuriku tunnel with breathing apparatus to be on the safe side. In order to save face, however, the state railway suppressed this request.
The "Kitaguni-Express", train 501, traveled the route on the night of November 5th to 6th on its journey from Osaka to Aomori . It consisted of a electric locomotive of the series JNR class EF70 62 and 15 from coaches of the series 10, including as a carriage 11, a dining car (series Oshi 17 2018). In the front part of the train there were sleeping cars in which the passengers slept at the time of the accident.
the accident
While driving through the Hokuriku Tunnel, an employee of the dining car noticed a fire under one of the seats in the smoking area of the car at around 1:13 a.m. ( JST ). The initial assumption that the fire in the dining car was caused by a cigarette butt in the smoking area or by the coal stove in the kitchen in the dining car was not confirmed. Rather, the fire was caused by improperly laying a power line, which caused a short circuit in an electric radiator. The employee who noticed the fire reported it to the conductor , who immediately activated the emergency brake in accordance with regulations, which brought the train to a halt in the tunnel 4.6 km from the exit towards Tsuruga. The train crew began with the extinguishing work, which was made more difficult by the darkness in the tunnel.
The intention was initially to detach the part of the train in which the burning car was located and to use the rest of the train for the evacuation, but this could no longer be implemented. At about 1:29 a.m., the fire was so strong that it cut off the front of the train from the rear. At 1:52 a.m., the heat in the tunnel was so great that a water pipe melted on the tunnel ceiling, water leaked and caused a short circuit in the overhead contact line , causing the energy supply to collapse.
The evacuation turned out to be chaotic because the several kilometers long way out of the tunnel in both directions now had to be mastered on foot. Rescue workers with breathing apparatus were driven to the burning train from both sides to rescue travelers. According to official information, the fire brigade from Tsuruga was on site at 1:50 a.m., i.e. around 40 minutes, and the fire brigade on the opposite side of the tunnel around 2:08 a.m., i.e. around an hour after the fire broke out. Since there was no railway employee present at the time the rescue workers arrived, the fire brigade requested motor trolleys from Tsuruga station to support the rescue work, but the necessary approval from the railway authorities was lacking.
In the meantime, at 1:40 a.m. train 506M from the opposite direction had stopped at a signal 2 km in front of the tunnel. The fire had also caused a short circuit on the opposite track, causing the signal to switch to "Stop". 21 minutes later, around 2:00 am, the signal suddenly showed "Drive free". The reason for this ultimately remained unclear. The engine driver drove slowly towards the Hokuriku tunnel. After about 300 m he noticed travelers fleeing from the Kitakuni Express on the tracks, stopped his train and picked up 225 people. The train then reversed back to Imajō.
consequences
Immediate consequences
30 people died and more than 714 were injured.
Consequences
The regulations for such emergencies have been changed: if a fire breaks out, the engine driver should continue the journey until he can stop the train outside the tunnel.
In addition, the guidelines for fire resistance of the material used in trains that run in long tunnels and for subway vehicles have been revised. The most important measures for the construction of passenger cars were:
- wooden parts of the interior were replaced by aluminum,
- the glass panes of the passage doors between the cars were replaced with wire-reinforced glass to prevent the spread of fire,
- the tarpaulins in the passages between the cars were made of flame-retardant materials,
- Dining cars that ran alongside sleeping cars or in sleeping car trains were made of flame-retardant materials,
- the number of fire extinguishers was increased,
- Sleeping cars were fitted with smoke detectors, portable lamps, and megaphones.
Others
- The Japanese television broadcaster NHK broadcast a documentary about the railway accident on June 15, 2004 as part of the “Project X 〜Challengers〜” series.
- On the same day that the accident occurred, the hijacking of Japan Airlines Flight 351 rocked the country.
literature
- Peter WB Semmens: Disasters on the rails. A worldwide documentation. Transpress, Stuttgart 1996, ISBN 3-344-71030-3 .
Remarks
- ↑ This name, by which the accident is also known, takes into account that the train was the Kitaguni Express.
- ↑ This series is based on the light steel wagons of the Swiss Federal Railways .
Individual evidence
Coordinates: 35 ° 41 ′ 12 ″ N , 136 ° 7 ′ 57 ″ E