Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdiction

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Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions, FOCJ , (German: Functionally overlapping competitive sovereignty , singular FOCUS) are functional economic and / or political bodies that are characterized by non-governmental coercive power and a certain tax sovereignty . They were developed in 1997 by Bruno S. Frey ( University of Zurich ) and Reiner Eichenberger ( University of Freiburg , then Zurich ) and are also propagated by them as a new federalism model. The FOCJ resemble a moderate form of panarchyand also have similarities with anarcho-capitalism .

precursor

Before the emergence of nation states , law was not only tied to the land, but also to the person . A subject of the Elector of Trier could only be prosecuted before an Electorate Court or, in exceptional cases, before a court of the Holy Roman Empire . If he committed a crime outside the territory of the Elector, he had to be transferred to a court in Trier. In the pre-Reformation churches , every head ( pope , diocesan bishop , patriarch ) of a particular church ( diocese , patriarchate ) exercised direct jurisdiction over his (part) church.

The special-purpose districts common in the United States have characteristics similar to the FOCJ and can also levy taxes,

concept

The concept is based on the assumption that nation- states are outdated in global society :

“ The nation state as the only identity of the citizen is outdated in global society (...) Individuals can therefore also be citizens of organizations outside the nation. The following possibilities can be thought of: Individuals are citizens of sub-national bodies such as regions, provinces or municipalities, or supra-national bodies such as the European Union, NATO, the World Bank or the UN. "

- Bruno S. Frey.

Citizens of semi-state , non-state , private organizations or profit-oriented companies are listed as further possibilities .

Autonomous local authorities or non-territorial organizations are in direct political and fiscal competition. These units can determine their function themselves and levy fees for it. Since each function requires a different extension, the local authorities can also overlap and thus compete for communities and citizens.

With the help of the FOCJ concept - according to Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger - the advantages of federalism would be strengthened and combined with those of centralization in many areas. FOCJ are determined by their function, compete with each other for citizens and communities, have democratic institutions and tax sovereignty.

Due to the functional orientation of these independent units, they can offer the citizens individual or several services or service packages according to their preferences and thus use economies of scale, which allows them to offer the services cost-effectively. Furthermore, spill-overs can also be avoided as a result, i. H. the group of beneficiaries corresponds to the group of cost bearers. Local differences in demand will be taken into account, as FOCJs are not geographically bound and therefore flexible. The overlapping structure would guarantee an efficient size for these units. Democratic political competition between FOCJs led to the desired fiscal equivalence and an economic use of resources, since FOCJs also have the opportunity to collect taxes for their performance tasks. In short: in the opinion of the authors, FOCJ lead to more flexibility, better preference compliance and an opening of political markets that would otherwise be dominated by cartels of politicians.

FOCJs are founded by the citizens, who also decide for themselves about their services, decision-making mechanisms and taxes, which are not increased but "postponed". The political rights of citizens require an increased constitutional protection of their own.

Application of the theoretical concept

The purpose community is a suggestion of the FOCJ concept that has not yet been used anywhere. It differs fundamentally from the Zweckverband , which has a long tradition.

Bruno S. Frey sees a possible application of the FOCJ in the cross-border EU regions , where it could reduce the “democratic deficit” of the EU through political competition, achieve great gains in prosperity and enable the integration of the Eastern European peoples.

See also

literature

  • Bruno S. Frey, Reiner Eichenberger: The New Democratic Federalism for Europe - Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions . Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 1999, ISBN 1-84064-004-9
  • Bruno S. Frey, Reiner Eichenberger: A Proposal for a Flexible Europe - FOCJ , University of Zurich , Department of Economics, Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics No. 56, 2000, PDF download

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Bruno S. Frey: Two utopias beyond the world state and anarchy
  2. ↑ Jacob Moser: From the Reichs-Stättischen regimental constitution. Frankfurt a. M./Leipzig 1772 (online)
  3. ↑ David Stadelmann, Are FOCJs More Efficient Than Traditional Church Structures? An empirical analysis, University of Freiburg, 2005
  4. ↑ Special Districts ZAX, JS: Is There a Leviathan in Your Neighborhood? In: American Economic Review. Vol. 79, No. 3 (1989), pp. 560-567.
  5. ↑ Bruno S. Frey: A flexible world order for the future? In: What world order? Verlag Rüegger, Chur 2005, ISBN 3-7253-0770-9 , pp. 77-100. (online) ( Memento of the original dated November 5, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 1.5 MB) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.bsfrey.ch
  6. ↑ Bruno S. Frey: A new federalism for Europe: The idea of ​​the FOCJ. Mohr Siebeck, 1997.