Hazard tariff

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The hazard tariff is a statute of a German commercial trade association . It is used to calculate the accident insurance contribution for individual companies for which the employers' liability insurance association is responsible.

Purpose of the hazard tariff

The assessment of the contribution to accident insurance for the risk of accidents on the basis of risk tariff is used for prevention of industrial accidents and occupational diseases . It is intended to favor those entrepreneurs who ensure working conditions that are as dangerous as possible in the long term. The idea of ​​prevention can flow into the entrepreneurial calculation through a preferential treatment of the contribution and thus be “worthwhile” for the entrepreneur, who is otherwise exempt from liability in the employment relationship by the accident insurance.

Legal nature, determination and validity of the hazard tariff

The hazard tariff is decided by the representative assembly of the professional association as an autonomous statutory right . In practice, however, the decision is prepared by the administration of the professional association (contribution department).

The hazard tariff itself and any changes require approval by the supervisory authority of the Federal Social Security Office ( Section 158 (1) SGB ​​VII ).

If the risk tariff is not set again in good time every six years (maximum period of validity according to Section 157 (5) SGB VII), the supervisory authority shall set it up as a substitute ( Section 158 (2) SGB VII, Section 89 SGB ​​IV ).

Structure of the hazard tariff

The hazard tariff is generally divided into two parts:

  • Part I contains an overview in tabular form of the branches of industry for which the employers' liability insurance association is responsible and of the hazard classes that are assigned to them.
  • while Part II contains special provisions for the assessment procedure.

An example for Part I of the hazard tariff of the former sugar trade association, which came into force on January 1, 1999:

Hazardous tariff points Industries Hazard classes
1 Sugar factories, sugar refineries 5.0
2 Production of rock candy, syrup, artificial honey and the like without front operation as well as production of instant sugar 5.0
3 commercial and administrative part of the company 0.8

Tariff positions

The tariff lines combine the entrepreneurs into risk communities ( Section 157, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1, SGB VII). These entrepreneurs have similar accident loads. On the other hand, actuarial aspects also play a role here: the risk of accidents must be distributed randomly in a tariff, otherwise the "insurance-related risk compensation" required by law will not occur. So that is the insurance principle implemented in the financing of accident insurance. It is at the discretion of the Assembly of Representatives which and how many tariff positions it includes in the hazard tariff. However, according to the case law of the Federal Social Court, the encumbrances of the branches of industry, which are summarized in a tariff, may "not deviate noticeably (statistically significant) from the average encumbrance of the tariff".

Hazard classes

The different levels of accident exposure of the respective industry and activity in relation to the other branches of industry are expressed in the hazard classes. In addition to the target contribution and the wage bill, the risk classes determine the amount of the contributions to accident insurance .

According to Section 157 (3) SGB VII, the risk classes are “calculated from the ratio of the benefits paid to the wages”. According to the wording of the law, other possibilities for it to come about (negotiation between entrepreneurs and insured persons' representatives in the representative assembly; comparative agreement in administrative or social court proceedings ) are therefore excluded. However, the case law emphasizes that the hazard class must be “not calculable, but must be understandable”. The hazard class ultimately determined can therefore deviate from the calculated so-called exposure figure.

Legal disputes therefore often revolve around the question of the reasons for which the risk class may be set differently from the arithmetical value of the exposure figure. Essentially, the prohibition of excess and the protection of legitimate expectations , which set an upper limit on the increase in contributions, are relevant. Increases in premiums should "keep within reasonable limits".

The most current data should be included in the calculation (new charges tariff), but the weighting of new charges to old charges is at the discretion of the meeting of representatives.

Legal protection against the hazard tariff

The entrepreneur can only act indirectly against the determination of the hazard tariff by opposing the assessment or the contribution notification. Both notices are based on the hazard tariff.

The social court can reject the hazard tariff as a material law when examining the notices. However, this only applies to the tariff that is relevant for the plaintiff, because only to that extent is he complained and his rights violated. The court cannot therefore declare the hazard tariff as a whole ineffective.

Disputes over hazard tariffs

Two conflicts in the administrative professional association that have led to a number of disputes before the social courts and to bad press for the statutory accident insurance have become known in recent times :

Professional sports clubs

Fixing the subheadings and the hazard classes for sports clubs that professional athletes engage in the risk rates in 1995 and 2001 was highly contested because the professional football clubs would have been thus suddenly obliged to pay a multiple of their previous contribution. The quarrels were finally settled in a settlement between the employers' liability insurance association and the German Football Association , in which the clubs were retroactively granted considerable premium discounts. The background was considerable political and financial pressure on the employers' liability insurance association.

Significant increases in contributions for the sports clubs were again averted in 2010, this time through an intervention by the German Olympic Sports Confederation  at the Federal Ministry of Labor .

The uncertainty in this area persists, because professional sports consistently have high levels of accidents, especially ice hockey and football. The trade association responded to this in 2014 with a prevention campaign aimed at sports clubs and professional athletes. The other branches of the company insured with the Verwaltungs-Berufsgenossenschaft complain that they would wrongly co-finance the expenses of the sports clubs if they are not used to make contributions that correspond to their accident risk. Temporary employment agencies , in particular, oppose this indirect concern , while the tax consultants took action against increases in contributions by creating new tariff positions, albeit unsuccessfully.

Temporary employment agencies

Another point of contention was the risk classes for companies providing temporary employment . They demanded to be placed in the same way as the industries in which they "borrow" employees, but were unsuccessful in the courts.

literature

  • Volker Eckhoff: Incentive systems for structuring contributions in statutory accident insurance . Zugl .: Kiel, Univ., Diss., 2009. Lit-Verlag, Berlin / Münster 2010, ISBN 978-3-643-10582-0 .
  • Jürgen Fenn: Constitutional issues of contribution structure in commercial accident insurance. Hazardous tariff and GDR contamination as a problem of equality . Zugl .: Frankfurt (Main), Univ., Diss., 2005. Lang, Frankfurt am Main a. a. 2006, ISBN 3-631-54536-3 .
  • Jürgen Fenn: Effective legal protection against hazardous tariffs . SGb 2004, 94.
  • Wolfgang lattice: The setting of dangerous tariffs in the statutory accident insurance with regard to football . In: NZS , 1996, 247.
  • David Heldmann: The contributions to the statutory accident insurance. Solidarity and equivalence in the financing system of the commercial professional associations . Zugl .: Münster, Univ., Diss., 2006. Nomos-Verlag, Baden-Baden 2006, ISBN 3-8329-2184-2 .
  • Hans-Jürgen Papier , Johannes Möller: Constitutional questions regarding the setting of contributions in accident insurance . In: SGb , 1998, 337.
  • Hans-Jürgen Papier, Johannes Möller: The role of solidarity compensation in statutory accident insurance . In: NZS , 1998, 353.
  • Anna Rink: The prevention mandate of the statutory accident insurance. Constitutional and European law requirements for preventive measures . Zugl .: Trier, Univ., Diss., 2009/2010. Duncker & Humbloth. Berlin, 2010, ISBN 9783428133529 .
  • Udo Schulz: The hazard tariff of the commercial professional associations . HVBG, Sankt Augustin 1999, ISBN 3-88383-505-6 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Udo Schulz: Risk-fair financing as a design factor in the prevention of the commercial trade associations , in: Festschrift Watermann, 1996, pp. 149, 149.
  2. ^ Jürgen Fenn: Constitutional issues of the contribution structure in the commercial accident insurance. Hazardous tariff and GDR contamination as a problem of equality . 2006. ISBN 3-631-54536-3 . P. 53ff.
  3. ↑ On January 1, 2010, the Zucker-BG merged with the Steinbruchs-BG, the Bergbau-BG, the trade association for the chemical industry, the paper-making trade association and the leather industry trade association to form the raw materials and chemical industry trade association . - 1999 danger tariff of the Zucker-BG according to: Jürgen Fenn: Constitutional issues of contribution structure in commercial accident insurance. Hazardous tariff and GDR contamination as a problem of equality . 2006. ISBN 3-631-54536-3 . P. 54, table 1.5.
  4. ↑ BSG, B 2 U 4/12 R, judgment of April 11, 2013 , Rn. 18 - Bakeries / pastry shops in one tariff.
  5. ↑ BSG, judgment of April 11, 2013 - B 2 U 4/12 R, Rn. 28; Judgment of April 11, 2013 - B 2 U 8/12 R, Rn. 28. - Critical about this: Ralf Möller: The latest case law of the Federal Social Court (BSG) on the design of the hazard tariff of the commercial trade associations (BG) . In: SGb 2014, 435–441, 440.
  6. ↑ BSG SGb 1995, 253, 255.
  7. ↑ BVerfGE 13, 274, 278. BSG SGb 1974, 384, 387. BSG SozR 3–2200 § 725 No. 2; LSG Rhineland-Palatinate, Breith. 1983, 970.
  8. ↑ BSGE 43, 289, 291 = SozR 2200 § 731 RVO No. 1 p. 3.
  9. ↑ Barefoot, but with armor . In: Der Spiegel . No. 38 , 1995, p. 192 ( online ).
  10. ^ Jürgen Fenn: Constitutional issues of the contribution structure in the commercial accident insurance. Hazardous tariff and GDR contamination as a problem of equality . 2006. ISBN 3-631-54536-3 . Pp. 13-20 with further references
  11. ↑ Solution in the contribution dispute . In: Der Spiegel . No. 51 , 2010, p. 115 ( online ).
  12. ↑ a b Professional sport: soccer players and ice hockey players are most likely to get injured . In: Spiegel online. November 18, 2013. Accessed on February 12, 2014: “Hardly any other professional sport in Germany has more accidents than football. According to the administrative trade association (VBG), the injuries per 100 players add up to an average of 206 per year. Only professional ice hockey players have more accidents. There the experts registered an average of 260 injuries per 100 players per year. 'There is no such relationship in the entire economy,' said VBG managing director Bernd Petri when presenting a prevention campaign. "
  13. ↑ Michael Reinsch: Expensive Kicks . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. November 19, 2013. Retrieved February 12, 2014.
  14. ^ Contributions to accident insurance: Temporary employment agencies rebel against sponsoring sports . In: Spiegel online. August 15, 2012. Retrieved February 12, 2014.
  15. ↑ LSG Berlin-Brandenburg. Judgment. November 27, 2014 - L 3 U 134/13.
  16. ↑ VBG hazard tariff 2011 legal . Press release from the German Association of Tax Consultants. February 9, 2015. Accessed February 22, 2015.
  17. ^ Jürgen Fenn: Constitutional issues of the contribution structure in the commercial accident insurance. Hazardous tariff and GDR contamination as a problem of equality . 2006. ISBN 3-631-54536-3 . Pp. 8-13 with further references
  18. ↑ BSG, B 2 U 21/02 R, judgment of June 24, 2003 . The constitutional complaint directed against this was unsuccessful: BVerfG, 1 BvR 1696/03, decision of July 3, 2007 . Retrieved February 12, 2014.