June crisis (Switzerland)

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

As June crisis some Swiss historians call the state politically highly for the country drastic situation of June 1940, when France with the invasion of the Wehrmacht was eliminated in Paris as the only remaining allied neighbor as a power factor and Switzerland by the fascist Axis powers was completely encircled.

For Jakob Tanner , 1940, along with the national strike year of 1918, was “the most unstable in the history of modern Switzerland”. Above all, the German invasion of Paris on June 14, 1940 "had a psychologically devastating effect both on the population and on the country's military and political leadership."

A week before this key event, dark clouds were brewing over the small, neutral and relatively ready-to-fight alpine state: an undisguised threat from Berlin that one would respond "by other means" in future if Switzerland continues to give its air force a free hand to attack German airmen. which violate Swiss airspace. General Henri Guisan reacted by banning the airspace protection measures that had previously been quite successful for Swiss pilots.

After France's defeat, the country's strategic situation became even more critical: On June 17th and again between June 22nd and 25th, the "unemployed" (J. Tanner) Panzer Corps Heinz Guderian with around 850 tanks moved dangerously close to the Swiss border. There was hectic activity on the Swiss management levels. On June 22nd, during a general staff meeting, General Guisan came to the rather surprising conclusion that he was “convinced that the Germans will now primarily exert political and economic pressure”. The next day his order was issued, e.g. B. to dismantle the defensive positions established in the cities. On June 25, Federal President Marcel Pilet-Golaz announced in a speech to the population that had apparently been agreed with the general that there was “no more military danger” and that two thirds of the troops deployed to guard the border would now be gradually demobilized .

Today's interpretation of these announcements divides expert opinions: Exponents such as the aforementioned Tanner or Hans Ulrich Jost speak of surrender gestures in front of the Germans ( adjustment policy ), while more conservative circles such as the recently deceased ex-chief of staff, Hans Senn, speak of the whole thing rather than tactical see smart »measure so that Hitler was not provoked.

It is more or less undisputed that the defeat of France for around a month, up to the Rütli report of General Guisan - which was also controversially discussed today - intensified defeatist tendencies in key political circles . It was either a traditionally pro-Nazi circles (thought pattern: «Your own ranks must be sparkling clean!») Or, now, people who see the chances of success in a military defensive struggle against this overpowering enemy as hopeless and therefore a political adjustment Favored course to the so-called Third Reich. Since the end of the war, Marcel Pilet-Golaz has been regarded as a prime example of the adaptor in the country's political perception, while Henri Guisan - partly because of generally undisputed relatively courageous decisions, but partly because of the tabooing of facts such as those mentioned here - of a scapegoat role was categorically spared. Guisan's reduit strategy of July 1940, originally mythologized as a symbol of national preparedness for defense, is now even heavily questioned from the point of view of its purely military effectiveness (starvation problem; defenseless civilian population and industry).

literature

  • Jakob Tanner : "Events are marching quickly": Switzerland in the summer of 1940. In: History and Society. Special issue. Issue 19, 2001, pp. 257-282.
  • Jakob Tanner: «Réduit national» and foreign trade: interactions between military dissuasion and economic cooperation with the Axis powers. In: Philipp Sarasin , Regina Wecker (eds.): Raubgold, Reduit, refugees. On the history of Switzerland in the Second World War. Zurich 1998, pp. 81-103.
  • Hans Ulrich Jost : Threat and Narrow (1914–1945). In: History of Switzerland and the Swiss. Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel / Frankfurt am Main 1986, pp. 731–819.
  • Jürg Fink: Switzerland from the perspective of the Third Reich: Assessment and assessment of Switzerland by the top German leadership since Hitler came to power. Schulthess, Zurich 1985.
  • Edgar Bonjour : History of Swiss Neutrality. Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel 1970 ff.
  • Klaus Urner : Switzerland still has to be swallowed. Verlag NZZ 1990.