Crater battle

Civil War

Image of the crater

date	July 30, 1864
place	Petersburg (Virginia)
output	Confederate victory

Parties to the conflict
United States	Confederate States of America
Commander
Major General Ambrose Burnside	General William Mahone
Troop strength
20,708	11,466
losses
3,798 killed : 504 wounded: 1,181 missing / captured: 1,413	1,611 killed : 358 wounded: 731 missing / captured: 403

The Crater Battle was a battle of the American Civil War . It took place on July 30, 1864 as part of the siege of Petersburg east of the then second largest city in Virginia , Petersburg .

prehistory

At the beginning of July, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Army , Lieutenant General Grant , had the VI. Corps and parts of the Cavalry Corps of the Potomac Army of the Union under the command of Major General Sheridan pulled out of the St. Petersburg front to fight the II Corps of the Northern Virginia Army under Lieutenant General Jubal Anderson Early in the Shenandoah Valley. The Commander in Chief of the Potomac Army, Major General Meade , saw no possibility of offensive action against the Northern Virginia Army on both sides and in front of Petersburg.

Since the failed attacks on Petersburg in early and mid-June, a confederate front ledge (called Elliot's Salient ) protruded up to 140 m from the positions of the IX. Corps approach. The commander of the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment, Lt. Col. Henry Pleasants, a civilian mining engineer in railroad tunneling, suggested the commanding general of the IX. Corps, Major General Ambrose Burnside , proposed to undermine this Confederate bastion with a tunnel and blow it up. Meade agreed to this plan with little enthusiasm, probably mainly because it would keep the soldiers busy.

Grudgingly, Lieutenant General Grant had also approved Burnside's plan. However, as the work on the tunnel progressed, he saw another opportunity to break through the Confederate positions and take Petersburg. So he ordered the Potomac Army to conduct an operation on the right wing north of the James . In fact, the First Battle of Deep Bottom forced General Lee to withdraw troops from the front lines before the IX. Corps to pull out. Lieutenant General Grant ordered the start of the attack on July 30th. In order to be able to take advantage of any success immediately, Major General Meade had the two neighboring corps ready so that they could continue the attack in depth.

Starting position

Positions near Petersburg on July 30, 1864

red: confederate troops
blue: union troops

The Pennsylvanian miners' plan was viewed with disdain by army pioneers. After all, it had never been possible to drive a tunnel over a length of more than 120 m under a position. Therefore, Lt. Col. Pleasants received no personal or material support from the army pioneer leader. The Potomac Army provided no additional personnel, equipment (shovels, picks, etc.) or materials to support the tunnel. Pleasants even had to borrow a theodolite from Washington. Work began on June 25th. The beginning of the tunnel was closed by an airtight door. A square tube ran from the entrance to the end of the tunnel and supplied the workers with fresh air. Air circulation was maintained with the help of a chimney. The soldiers completed the tunnel on July 17th. It was 155 m long and ended in three side corridors, which were filled with a total of three and a half tons of black powder from July 23, so that the force of the detonation was directed upwards. Pleasant had the last twelve meters of the tunnel refilled as a containment.

The tactical target of the attack to be carried out after the explosion of the mine was to be the crest of a bump (Cemetery Ridge) 450 m behind the Confederate positions, from which it was possible to bombard Petersburg directly.

On the Confederate side, the digging of the tunnel did not go unnoticed. Brigadier General Edward Porter Alexander reported to General Lee on June 30th that he suspected the 48th Pennsylvania Regiment, made up of miners, was building a tunnel under the ledge. Although the Confederate pioneers also considered such a tunnel to be unrealistic, Lee immediately had shafts dug on both sides of the front ledge, at the end of which listening tunnels were driven. The Union's adit was not found, and since the digging noises stopped after July 23, the Confederates assumed that the Union's project had been abandoned or failed.

planning

Sketch of the tunnel

General

The IX. Corps consisted of four divisions. Burnside had the divisions' readiness checked by Lieutenant Colonel Loring. This reported to the commanding general that the white troops of the corps were not suitable for an assault. During the overland campaign, the 4th Division was solely charged with guarding and supplying tasks in the rear corps area. It was therefore the strongest division in the corps. The division led by Brigadier General Edward Ferrero and consisted entirely of colored soldiers.

The plan of operations envisaged proceeding on both sides of the breach made by the detonation, taking the Confederate positions there and thus giving the following divisions the opportunity to advance into the depths of the Cemetery Ridge without enemy fire from the flank.

The 4th Division began preparing after the order was placed. This included field briefings for commanders and company commanders as well as intensive combat exercises for the regiments. The training began three weeks before the planned operation and lasted until the soldiers of the regiments could carry out the movements even in the dark.

Burnside presented his plan of operations to Maj. Meade on July 28th. Meade had previously reduced the amount of explosives required for detonation by a quarter. Now he did not agree to the use of the colored division as the head of the attack, because he considered colored people unable to carry out such difficult tasks. In addition, Meade insisted that the attacking troops should advance through the breach directly on the target - Cemetery Ridge - without paying attention to a possible flank threat. Burnside protested violently against these orders and got Meade, who wanted to ride to Lieutenant General Grant that same day, asked him for a decision. When Burnside received no information from the Army High Command that Grant's decision to the contrary that evening and the next morning, he assumed that his plan of operations was approved and did not ask the Army again. He set the start of the attack on July 30 at 3:30 a.m.

Around noon on July 29th, Major General Meade appeared at Burnside and informed him that Lieutenant General Grant had decided that white divisions were to be used as attack spikes. Meade himself insisted that the attack should be aimed at Cemetery Ridge under all circumstances, ignoring the flanks.

During a meeting that lasted several hours and was attended by the three “white” division commanders, Burnside could not decide which division should be used as the front-line attack. At around 3 p.m. he finally threw three pieces of paper into a hat; the division commander of the 1st Division, Brigadier General Ledlie, "won" . Burnside instructed Lieutenant Colonel Loring to instruct the division commanders in the area and ordered the divisions to start positions.

Operation plans

Meade appeared again at the IX that afternoon. Corps to make sure that the attack on Cemetery Ridge he ordered was planned without deviations. The Potomac Army's operational plan was:

The IX. Corps was to attack after the detonation at 3:30 a.m. over the breach, take the height (Cemetery Ridge) and hold. Then the XVIII. right and the V Corps left over the IX. Corps to extend the bridgehead reached. Burnside had to come up with the elaborate plan of operations for the IX. Corps change because of Meade's instructions. This now provided:

The 1st Division was to attack through the breach. The target was Cemetery Ridge across the breach. The 2nd and 3rd divisions were to follow the 1st and, when it had taken the target, take over the flank protection to the left and right of the 1st division. The 4th Division was then to attack via the 1st Division and on towards Petersburg.

Brigadier General Ledlie ordered his two brigade commanders to advance left and right of the breach and take the Confederate positions. The crater likely to be created by the explosion should not be entered. Ledlie assumed that afterwards the two other divisions would also attack left and right of the breach, while the 4th Division would advance through the breach on Cemetery Ridge.

A brigade commander of the 1st Division ordered his commanders that taking and holding the enemy entrenchments on both sides of the breach was the primary goal of the 1st Division. The capture of Cemetery Ridge is of minor importance.

Confederate location

After Brigadier General Alexander noticed the tunnel was being built, he ordered the Confederate artillery to be regrouped. In Elliot's Salient there was only one battery of four guns left; to the left, behind and right of the ledge he set batteries in position so that the fire could be concentrated on Elliot's Salient . The field fortifications in the lead were still occupied by parts of the 18th and 22nd South Carolina infantry regiments from Elliot's brigade. The units of the neighboring infantry brigades were able to flank Elliot's salient . In the event of a mine detonation, General Beauregard had a new field fortification built about 30 m behind the ledge with a wall height of about three meters, which was significantly higher than the field fortifications of the main battle line.

Course of the battle

Start of attack

In the late evening and at night the 1st to 3rd Divisions of the IX. Corps as well as the units of the neighboring corps intended for the expansion of the success of their field fortifications and moved largely silently into the rooms from which the attack was to begin. The 1st division did not reach its starting positions until 2:00 am. A total of about 50,000 soldiers were ready for the attack.

In order to let the detonation take place on time at 3:30 a.m., soldiers of the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment set the fuse in the tunnel on fire. When there was no detonation by 4:00 a.m., soldiers again ventured into the tunnel. The fuse had run out. The soldiers installed a new fuse and lit it. At 4:44 a.m., the three and a half tons of explosives installed under Elliot's Salient detonated.

Attack after the detonation
Pencil sketch by Alfred Rudolph Waud

The detonation surprised many Confederate soldiers in their sleep. Bodies and body parts, military equipment and earth flew through the air, many soldiers in shelters were buried. The detonation immediately killed or wounded 278 soldiers. The artillery battery lost all four guns. The surviving soldiers in the field fortifications on either side of Elliot's Salient fled demoralized. There were therefore no more Confederate troops between the 1st Division and Cemetery Ridge. Immediately after the detonation, the Union artillery cordoned off the area beyond the resulting crater.

The force of the detonation surprised the soldiers of the 1st Division of the IX. Corps. Many left in a panic where they were and sought protection from the flying debris further back. This completely mixed up the order of the battle. The deafening noise of the artillery fire, which began almost at the same time, made it difficult to restore order.

When the smoke and smoke from the detonation had cleared after 20 minutes, the first attackers climbed out of the field fortifications. Its walls were about eight feet high and the attacking soldiers had no ladders with them. The soldiers climbed one after the other over the edge of the trench over quickly filled sandbags and bayonets driven into the wooden cladding , so that the intended combat formation could not be taken. The confusion increased when the attackers had to find their way through their own fortifications. Without resistance, the first soldiers reached the crater created by the detonation. It was 10 meters deep, 60 meters wide and 20 meters long. There was a 300-meter-wide breach in the Confederate front line. On both sides of the breach, the positions were abandoned by the Confederates for a length of 300 m.

When the front regiment had reached the rim of the crater, the soldiers stopped in astonishment and marveled at the result of the explosion. Eventually they climbed into the crater, partly to get hold of souvenirs, partly to help buried Confederates. Since the mission called for the attack through the breach, which had become a crater, the officers followed their soldiers. The same happened with the following regiments of the 1st Division. A continuation of the attack from the crater did not succeed because the crater walls could only be climbed with great difficulty without ladders. The division commander, Brigadier General Ledlie, had not yet followed the attack and was in a shelter in the field fortifications. There he remained for the duration of the battle.

Some officers of the 14th New York Heavy Artillery Regiment - deployed as infantrymen - managed to lead parts of their units on the crater rim to the other side and break into the Confederate field fortifications there.

Confederate Countermeasures

Confederate field fortifications on both sides and behind the crater

The force of the detonation frightened the members of the regiments deployed on both sides of the projection as well as their counterparts. In a panic, soldiers left their field fortifications and fled west. Only a few Confederate soldiers were left in the Confederate field fortifications 150 m on either side of the crater.

When the Confederates recognized the approach of Union troops, the artillery batteries deployed on both sides and back of the crater opened fire. The infantry regiments remaining in the field fortifications also began to fire at the attacking Union soldiers from the flanks.

They holed up in the crater under the mistaken assumption that this was a good cover. Confederate forces, led by Brigadier General William Mahone, counterattacked the crater and fired into it from all sides. When the 1st Division occupied the crater, Confederate officers managed to put an end to the panic among the fled soldiers and returned them to the abandoned positions. There they worked on the advancing 2nd Division of the IX. Corps. At the same time there was trench warfare west of the crater with the infiltrated infantry.

General Lee, who had his command post just 500 meters west of the crater with respect ordered to 6:00 counterattacked with two infantry brigades under the leadership of Major General William Mahones .

Continuation of the attack of the IX. corps

The 2nd and 3rd divisions followed the 1st division. Because of the increasing defensive fire in the flanks of the attackers, one brigade took up positions to the right and left of the crater in order to set up flank protection. The other two brigades also got into the crater. The soldiers in the crater were exposed to the increasing artillery and infantry fire without protection, as the steep walls offered no cover.

The soldiers of the 14th New York Heavy Artillery Regiment, who were inexperienced in the battle for and in field fortifications, had partially lost their positions and were thrown back towards the crater by the returning Confederates.

Instead of abandoning the attack, Maj. Gen. Burnside the colored troops of the USCT under Brigadier General Edward Ferrero into battle, who also tried to entrench themselves in the crater.

Further Union troops drove the Confederates back for a few hours in hand-to-hand combat, but ultimately the Confederates under Mahone were able to completely secure the fortification again.

Effects

Meade sued Burnside below. Burnside was reprimanded in the investigation and never returned to active duty. In early 1865 Burnside was exonerated and Meade sentenced for changing the plan of attack. Ledlie was fired for his conduct during the battle.

Pleasants, who was not involved in the battle itself, received praise for the idea and execution. His role was explicitly mentioned for his appointment as Brevet Brigadier General on March 13, 1865.

Mahone's victory built an enduring reputation as one of the finest young generals in Lee's army in the final year of the war.

Place of battle today

The 2004 crater

Today the site of the crater battle is part of the historic Petersburg National Battlefield Park in the middle of the urban area of ​​Petersburg and is located about 3 kilometers southeast of the city center of Petersburg. The park is visited by around 140,000 people annually and includes the site of the crater battle at Elliot's Salient, a visitor center and museum on Virginia State Route 36 and other locations from the Richmond-Petersburg campaign. The entrance to the tunnel where the explosives were detonated is opened to visitors on the anniversary of July 30th each year.

Film adaptations

The film On the Road to Cold Mountain begins with this battle.

literature

• Ron Field: The Battle of the Crater. In: Ron Field: Petersburg 1864-65. The Longest Siege (= Osprey Military Campaign Series. 208). Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2009, ISBN 978-1-84603-355-1 , pp. 37-59.
• Shelby Foote : The Civil War. A narrative. Volume 3: Red River to Appomattox. 1st Vintage Books edition. Vintage Books, New York NY 1986, ISBN 0-394-74622-8 .
• Earl J. Hess: Into the Crater. The Mine Attack at Petersburg. University of South Carolina Press, Columbia SC 2010, ISBN 978-1-57003-922-5 .
• Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buel (Eds.): Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 4. The Century Co, New York NY 1884-1888, ( digitized ).
• Kevin M. Levin: Remembering the Battle of the Crater. Was as Murder. The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington KY 2012, ISBN 978-0-8131-3610-3 .
• James M. McPherson : Battle Cry of Freedom. The Civil War Era (= The Oxford History of the United States. Vol. 6). Oxford University Press, Oxford et al. 2003, ISBN 0-19-516895-X .
• James M. McPherson (Ed.): The Atlas of the Civil War. Courage, Philadelphia PA et al. 2005, ISBN 0-7624-2356-0 .
• John F. Schmutz: The Battle of the Crater. A Complete History. McFarland, Jefferson NC 2009, ISBN 978-0-7864-3982-9 .
• United States War Department: The War of the Rebellion. A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Government Printing Office, Washington DC 1880-1901.

Web links

Commons : Battle of the Crater  - collection of images, videos and audio files

• Brendan Wolfe: Battle of the Crater . In: Encyclopedia Virginia .
• Official website of the Petersburg National Battlefield Park (English)

Individual evidence

1. ↑ ^{a b} Field, Petersburg , p. 59. These are the numbers of those who actually took part in the battle.
2. ↑ Fox's Regimental Losses, chap. XIV. Civilwarhome.com, February 23, 2002, accessed March 7, 2011 (Union losses). 
3. ^ John F. Schmutz, The Battle of the Crater, p. 356
4. ↑ Personal Memoirs of US Grant, chap. 57, para. 15. Bartleby.com, Inc., 2000, accessed February 26, 2011 (Grant's report on Burnside's proposal). 
5. ↑ Personal Memoirs of US Grant, chap. 57, para. 17. Bartleby.com, Inc., 2000, accessed February 26, 2011 (Grant's report on Burnside's proposal). 
6. ^ Shelby Foote, The Civil War - Red River to Appomattox, p. 532
7. ^ Edward Porter Alexander, Military memoirs of a Confederate: a critical narrative, chap. 22, p. 563ff. Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University, accessed February 27, 2011 (Confederate Countermeasures). 
8. ^ John F. Schmutz, The Battle of the Crater, p. 92
9. ^ John F. Schmutz, The Battle of the Crater, pp. 96f
10. ^ John F. Schmutz, The Battle of the Crater, pp. 97ff
11. ^ John F. Schmutz, The Battle of the Crater, p. 102
12. ^ John F. Schmutz, The Battle of the Crater, pp. 102ff
13. ↑ The War of the Rebellion: Official Records, Vol. XL, Part 1, p. 788. Cornell University Library, 2011, accessed March 12, 2011 (Confederate detonation losses). 
14. ^ John F. Schmutz, The Battle of the Crater, 137
15. ↑ After the devastating losses of the Potomac Army during the first battles of the overland campaign, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Grant, ordered as many soldiers as possible to be removed from the stage from their assignments. These soldiers were grouped into infantry regiments and placed under the Potomac Army. The 14th New York Heavy consisted of soldiers from the fortress artillery from the fortifications of New York Harbor. The infantry training took place during the deployment during the overland campaign.
16. ^ Campaign for Petersburg, Richard Wayne Lykes, pp. 25ff. National Park Service History Series, Washington, DC, 1970, Retrieved July 24, 2015 (The Crater Battle). 

Coordinates: 37 ° 13 ′ 6 ″  N , 77 ° 22 ′ 40 ″  W.