Evolène avalanche accident
The Evolène avalanche accident occurred on February 21, 1999 in the canton of Valais in the municipality of Evolène . Twelve people died in the avalanche , and property damage was high. After the avalanche disaster in Galtür, the accident is the avalanche with the second highest number of victims in the avalanche winter of 1999 . In Switzerland, only two avalanches caused more deaths in the 20th century ( Reckingen , 1970 with 30 deaths, and Vals , 1951 with 19 deaths).
prehistory
The avalanche winter of 1999 was characterized by three north-west congestion areas that followed each other at relatively short intervals. Large amounts of fresh snow fell during these congestion . The new snow layers from the two previous accumulation layers were not yet solidified when the third accumulation layer began on February 17th. Within 24 hours, 30 to 60 cm of fresh snow fell. A warm front followed on February 19 , causing the snowfall line in the region to rise to 2,000 meters, with a continued increase in fresh snow above the snowfall line. On February 21st at noon the heat wave was over; the temperatures dropped and the snowfall increased. At around 8:30 p.m., the avalanche broke loose. The avalanche bulletin no. 100 of February 21, 1999 5:00 p.m. stated a “very high avalanche danger” for the Bernese Oberland , but only “great avalanche danger” for this part of Valais. The power of the outgoing avalanche surprised the population in Evolène, as "only" the second highest warning level applied. It was not until the avalanche bulletin no. 101 of February 22, 1999 from 9:00 am that there was a "very high risk of avalanches" in the affected area; at this point the avalanche had already passed.
The security officer and the mayor met for a meeting the morning after the service on February 21 to discuss the situation. The safety officer had created a snow profile at La Sage at an altitude of around 1700 meters , on the basis of which he assessed the avalanche danger on February 21, 1999 with level 5 ("very high") and thus higher than avalanche bulletins No. 99 and No. 100 . An evacuation of the red and partly blue danger zone did not take place. Traffic routes going through the red zone were not blocked either. It was precisely this point, the contradiction between classification in the highest hazard class and failure to take the necessary measures, which was discussed in the later court hearing. At this point in time, there was also no clear regulation for the community about what to do when.
procedure
The avalanche broke off at around 8:30 p.m. over a width of around four kilometers along the ridge between the Sasseneire and the Pointe du Tsaté . It could not be determined whether the crack took place in one or in several stages. The starting area lies at a height of between 2900 and 3200 meters and is a flank that is mainly exposed to the southwest. According to the course of the terrain (streams), the avalanche channeled itself into several, more or less defined trains. Two avalanches ran out at Mayens de Cotter. Here four people were carried away and several alpine huts were destroyed. A person could be saved alive here, he was carried away 300 meters but not completely buried. For the three completely buried people, any help came too late. Another avalanche train (Torrent des Maures) went north of the village of Villaz, over 3.5 kilometers down to the valley level south of Evolène. In the process, he destroyed several buildings and buried the main road in the valley floor over a width of 50 meters and a height of up to 10 meters. Another avalanche train (Le Bréquet) also reached the valley floor. In the process, he tore down several buildings on the southern edge that were uninhabited at the time, buried the access road from Villaz and took away some parked cars. At La Confraric, at 1410 meters (thus in the valley floor), eight buildings were destroyed by the avalanche (one of them in the white (safe) zone), five people died in the houses and two outside (in front of the community's salt depot). The main road was also buried over a length of 100 meters at a height of up to six meters. A car was buried with two occupants who were later found dead.
Rescue operation
The accident report was received by the FXB du sauvetage in Sion at 20:35 . Thereupon three mountain guides (trained rescue specialists) and four avalanche dog handlers who were in Nendaz were arranged to go to the scene of the accident. The other rescue organizations were also called up. The Air-Glaciers helicopter could only fly until shortly before Evolène, and not directly to the site of the accident. The rescue specialists and dog handlers arrived at the avalanche cone near La Confraric at 9:10 p.m., whereupon the search began immediately. Meanwhile, an injured child had been found in the avalanche cone of Prés de Villaz and it was known that people had also been buried by this avalanche. At 10:05 p.m., the two people who had been in front of a salt depot were found; they could only be recovered dead. During the night, due to the unclear avalanche situation, the search efforts were reduced to the area around a destroyed chalet where the five missing people were staying.
In the morning, the search was stopped completely as the weather worsened and the evacuation of the village of La Sage and other potentially endangered areas began. When the weather improved, a reconnaissance flight into the cracked area could start at 1 p.m. It was found that the entire area had disappeared and that there was no longer any acute danger of avalanches. The evacuations were stopped, partially reversed and the search resumed. However, this was not crowned with success that day. The search on the avalanche cone of Prés de Villaz was stopped overnight for safety reasons, also because after such a long time outside of buildings the chances of survival were extremely low.
In La Confraric the search went on uninterrupted. At noon on February 23, the first dead were found, and four more in the evening. Thus all known missing persons at the time were found in this avalanche cone. On February 24th, the search in the avalanche cone of Prés de Villaz was intensified. It was now known that three people were still missing there. The first person was found by probing at 11:40 a.m. and the second person at 1:00 p.m. The third person wasn't found until March 5th.
On March 1, a missing person report was received from Germany. Two people drove to Val d'Hérens on February 21 and never returned home. When the investigations by the police were unsuccessful and showed that they had never reached the specified destination, the suspicion that they might have gotten into one of the two avalanches that had reached the main road was reinforced. In the afternoon of March 5, the crushed car was found and the two missing persons in it. The destruction of the car suggests that the two occupants had no chance of survival.
aftermath
The Evolène avalanche event triggered criminal proceedings against employees of the responsible authorities. This procedure went up to the federal court . On August 30, 2006 the case was finally decided by the Federal Supreme Court. The mayor of Evolène and the security chief were convicted of multiple negligent homicide and disruption of public transport. The verdict caused uncertainty in the avalanche warning services , as after this verdict the question arose as to who should take responsibility for the avalanche warning at all. For this reason, the Swiss Federal Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research ( SLF) commissioned a study to discuss the accident and the lessons learned from it, especially with regard to the responsibility of people.
literature
- The avalanche winter 1999. Event analysis . Federal Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research, Davos 2000, ISBN 3-905620-80-4 .
- SLF study The fall of the avalanche in Evolène on February 21, 1999 with special consideration of the effects of the legal proceedings on the work of the avalanche services PDF
Individual evidence
- ↑ LSF report, Chapters 3.1 and 3.2
- ↑ Avalanche winter 1999. Chapter “Weather development”, especially subchapter “3. Period (February 17th to 25th) ”. Pages 35-39
- ↑ SLF study, sections 3.9 and 3.10
- ↑ Avalanche winter 1999 chapter Course of the accident, pages 181–182
- ↑ Avalanche winter 1999, chapter rescue operation, pp. 182-184.
- ↑ Federal court rulings: 6P.39 / 2006, 6S.75 / 2006, 6P.40 / 2006 and 6S.76 / 2006 of August 30, 2006. Swiss Federal Court, Lausanne.