Liberum veto

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Liberum Veto ( Latin veto , dt. I forbid ) was a right of objection in the Polish aristocratic parliament , the Sejm . From the 16th century onwards , every member of parliament had the right to exercise their veto , as decisions had to be made unanimously. In this case all previous decisions of the Sejm meeting became invalid.

history

On March 8, 1652, the liberum veto was first used . In view of the large number of problems, King John II Casimir had requested that the Sejm's session be extended. The country messenger Władysław Siciński objected to this and left the hall, which is why the objection could not, as in previous cases, be resolved with persuasion or violence. Since the protest could not be overturned, the Sejm was considered "torn" and everything negotiated as unfinished. In November 1669, the first Reichstag was torn apart before the regular session period had expired by the veto of a single country messenger (Adam Olizar, teacher and delegate from Kiev). Other examples of this situation are the years 1750 and 1752.

The constitutional clause created by these precedents had a negative impact on political practice in Poland in the decades that followed. The liberum veto was seen (in the “legal” application at least, not its “abuse”) as an old privilege of the knighthood against the claims of the powerful, which in the consciousness of the aristocratic nation possessed such a high legal intrinsic value that one did not want to reveal it under any circumstances .

In view of the fundamental crisis of the estate economy and the eroding economic base of the small and medium-sized land nobility ( szlachta zagonowa, szlachta cząstkowa, szlachta ), however, it also became a legal instrument of the powerful magnate families ( oligarchia magnacka ) for preservation from the second half of the 17th century their advantages over the crown and the masses of the landed nobility, for example with regard to the burden-sharing of the financing of necessary reforms. It was also an expression of the particularism of the great magnate families who set their local politics in the state parliaments ( Sejmik ) via the brotherhoods and neighborhoods of the landed aristocracy who are dependent on them (and partly also remunerated) and thus control or "tear up the Reichstag" “Could leave. This was facilitated by the fact that many regional problems (complaints about public officials, for example) could, according to the constitution, be decided by the Reichstag alone and thus represented an extensive pool of valid possibilities for appeal.

By 1788, 53 Reichstag were “torn apart” in this way. Under Michael Wiśniowiecki (ruled 1669–1674) it was three out of five Reichstag and under Johann III. Sobieski (r. 1674–1696) five of the eleven diets that were torn apart. Of the thirty-seven diets of the Saxon period , only twelve came to a resolution. Under August III. (ruled 1733–1763) in the years after 1736 no parliamentary resolution at all could be passed.

This peculiarity of the political order was exploited by the Polish magnate parties and by Poland's neighboring states ( Russia , Prussia , etc.) to block reform proposals by the opposing party and unpleasant decisions in the Sejm by winning over individual country messengers. France spent most of its money on such interference, as Poland's immediate neighbors had other means of blackmail at their disposal.

In particular, the "family" or the house of Czartoryski and the Potocki had been facing each other since the 1820s . The rise of the Czartoryski took place through the promotion of the Saxon court, which hoped for an easier implementation of its policy (in particular the securing of the Polish crown for the House of Wettin ). Their opponents and the magnates overlooked in the court's favor then rallied around the Potocki and formed an opposing party of roughly equal strength (“patriots”, “republicans”). Both parties had their own contacts abroad, with the Czartoryski oriented towards support from Russia and the Potocki towards France. The increased awareness of the nobility for the massive domestic and foreign political problems of Poland then led to the time of August III. to an abundance of reform proposals from both parties, all of which failed.

Despite the continuing criticism of the obstruction of the Reichstag, hardly any of the constitutional theorists advised restricting the liberum veto , let alone abolishing it, since the first half of the 17th century . Stanisław Konarski (1700–1773) was the first critic in the 1740s with the aim of fundamental constitutional reform.

Basically, despite all the rivalries, it was difficult to “tear up” a Reichstag. The troublemaker was always threatened and attempts were made to force him to discuss and give up his blockade attitude. B. simply stayed away from the deliberations. The corresponding procedure required the backing of a magnate party and other land messengers, so that various tactics were used. Often the negotiations were delayed by polemical attacks or flimsy additional motions on insignificance, while the opposing party simply countered with the immediate acceptance or invalidation of these motions and thus sought to prevent the Reichstag from being torn apart directly in accordance with the precedent . But in the end, new, restricted vetoes created new barriers, so that the negotiations ended without results, without breaking the law too openly or being able to seek blame on individuals. Even if the Reichstag went well, an uncontrolled discussion was sparked at the latest at the end of the deliberations while exercising the right to “free vote”, in which the deputies did not sign.

As a result, political traffic in the country stagnated or revolved around highly rudimentary and poorly thought-out reform proposals or was accompanied by an atmosphere of violence (e.g. in the state parliaments after the failure of the Crown Tribunal in Petrikau in 1749). The failure of the Reichstag also encouraged abuse of office, as the ministers were not accountable. After 1764 the liberum veto was no longer used in view of the increasing dissolution of the state. The election of King Stanislaus II took place on a Confederation Reichstag, in which the majority of votes was sufficient and the liberum veto was circumvented. Attempts to curtail aristocratic power or to abolish the liberum veto , however, resulted in diplomatic and military interventions by neighboring countries. In this context, bans on speaking were sometimes imposed in the Reichstag, which was then referred to as the " Silent Sejm ". The introduction of the majority principle by the constitution of May 3, 1791 led directly to a Russian-Polish war .

Rating

The Liberum Veto has been evaluated differently. The German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel saw an unreasonable use of freedom, the “wild” or “negative freedom”, as it is shown in the Liberum Veto, a main cause of the decline of Poland in the 18th century. The British historian Norman Davies names the frequent use of the Liberum Veto since the reign of John III. Sobieski as one of the reasons why Poland did not recover from its various setbacks and defeats. The Australian political scientist John Keane describes the Liberum Veto as a revolt against the principles of representative democracy , which ended in a Pyrrhic victory : the inability of the "aristocratic democracy" that the Liberum Veto brought with it called the neighboring great powers on the scene destroyed Polish freedom in the Polish partitions .

The German historians Jörg K. Hoensch and Alfons Brüning see it more positively: They describe the Liberum Veto as a tool against a “ dictatorship of the majority” or as a “means of restoring the balance of power and especially against the tyranny of a powerful majority”.

The Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) came to a differentiated assessment in his Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne in 1772: Based on his Identitarian Democracy Theory, he basically praised the principle of unanimity when it came to the foundations of the state: to make the constitution as solid and these laws as immutable as possible ”. At the same time he criticized the Sejm for not distinguishing between acts of sovereignty and government. For the latter, it would have been better to allow a simple majority or a qualified majority, since Poland is surrounded by enemies and therefore decisive government action is necessary.

literature

  • Manfred Alexander : Brief history of Poland (= Federal Center for Political Education. Series of publications. Bd. 537). Federal Agency for Civic Education, Bonn 2005, ISBN 3-89331-662-0 .
  • Hans Roos: Estates and parliamentary constitution in Poland (1505–1772). In: Dietrich Gerhard (Hrsg.): Statistic representations in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries (= publications of the Max Planck Institute for History. Vol. 27 = Studies presented to the International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions . Vol. 37). 2nd unaltered edition. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1974, ISBN 3-525-35332-4 , pp. 310–366, here p. 363ff.
  • Michael G. Müller : Poland between Prussia and Russia. Crisis of sovereignty and reform policy 1736–1752 (= individual publications by the Historical Commission in Berlin. Vol. 40 = publications on the history of German-Polish relations. Vol. 3). Colloquium-Verlag, Berlin 1983, ISBN 3-7678-0603-7 (also: Frankfurt am Main, University, dissertation, 1977).
  • Carmen Thiele : Rules and procedures for decision-making within states and associations of states. Investigations under constitutional and municipal law as well as European and international law. Springer, Berlin et al. 2008, ISBN 978-3-540-78994-9 (also: Frankfurt (Oder), European University, habilitation paper, 2007).

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Manfred Alexander: Small history of Poland. 2005, p. 128.
  2. ↑ Michael G. Müller : Poland between Prussia and Russia. Sovereignty Crisis and Reform Policy, 1736–1752 . Colloquium verlag, Berlin 1983, p. 130.
  3. ↑ Carmen Thiele: Rules and procedures of decision-making within states and associations of states. 2008, p. 40.
  4. ↑ Cf. Michael G. Müller: Poland between Prussia and Russia. Sovereignty Crisis and Reform Policy, 1736–1752 . Colloquium Verlag, Berlin 1983, p. 141.
  5. ^ A b Jerzy Lukowski, Hubert Zawadzki: A concise history of Poland. 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge et al. 2006, ISBN 0-521-85332-X , pp. 90 f.
  6. ↑ Michael G. Müller: Poland between Prussia and Russia. Sovereignty Crisis and Reform Policy, 1736–1752 . Colloquium Verlag, Berlin 1983, p. 37.
  7. ↑ The domestic political reputation of the family and the court was damaged by the repeated marching through of Russian troops without the approval of the Reichstag, especially when they caused damage (e.g. in 1738 in the southeastern provinces).
  8. ↑ See also Michael G. Müller: Poland between Prussia and Russia. Sovereignty Crisis and Reform Policy, 1736–1752 . Colloquium Verlag, Berlin 1983.
  9. ↑ Effective vetoes related to For example, the removal of an allegedly illegally appointed deputy in 1740 and 1748, self-indictment of bribery by Prussia with simultaneous accusation of other deputies in 1744, redefinition of regional tariffs and the ban on candlelight meetings in 1746. The vetoes did not force the Chamber of Courts to dissolve immediately, but only interrupted them the negotiations and condemned to passivity until the objection could be resolved. The vetoes were not always backed by one of the competing parties. In 1752 the initiative came from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who feared he would be held responsible for abuse of office.
  10. ↑ See The Works of Frederick the Great. In German translation, ed. by Gustav Berthold Volz, 10 vols., Berlin: Hobbing, 1913 f., 5th volume: old age, state and pamphlets, p. 9
  11. ^ Roman Kozlowski: Hegel on Poland and the Poles . In: Hegel-Jahrbuch (2000), pp. 215-218.
  12. ↑ Norman Davies: In the Heart of Europe. History of Poland. Fourth, revised edition. Beck, Munich 2006, p. 276.
  13. ^ John Keane: The Life and Death of Democracy . Simon and Schuster, London 2009, pp. 257-263.
  14. ^ Jörg Konrad Hoensch: Social constitution and political reform. Poland in the pre-revolutionary era . Böhlau, Vienna / Cologne / Weimar 1973, number of pages missing.
  15. ^ Alfons Brüning: Unio non est unitas. Poland-Lithuania Path in the Denominational Age (1569–1648) . Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden 2008, p. 87 f.
  16. ↑ “De cette maniere on rendra la constitution solide & ces loix irrévocables autant qu'elles peuvent l'être”. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne . In: The same: Collection complète des œuvres de JJ Rousseau , sn, 1782, Tome premier: Contenant les ouvrages de Politique , chap. 2 ( online on Wikisource , accessed August 16, 2020), quoted from Melissa Schwartzberg: Voting the General Will: Rousseau on Decision Rules . In: Political Theory 36, No. 3 (2008), pp. 403-423, here pp. 415 ff.