Liman von Sanders crisis

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Officers of the German military mission leaving for Turkey in December 1913; in the middle (with cap) Otto Liman von Sanders, the head of the mission

The Liman von Sanders Crisis (also "Liman von Sanders Affair" or "Liman Affair") was the last major diplomatic conflict before the outbreak of the First World War . In early 1913 the Ottoman Empire asked for a German military mission to be sent to Constantinople . Lieutenant General Otto Liman von Sanders was entrusted with the management of this mission .

The Russian administration and the Russian Foreign Minister Sasonov saw it as an attempt to influence or even control the straits ( Bosporus , the Sea of ​​Marmara and the Dardanelles ). These allow access from the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea and thus directly affected the strategic interests of the Russian Empire, as it suffered from a lack of ice-free ports with access to the world's oceans in its European part. The governments of the United Kingdom and France also saw the dispatch of Liman von Sanders and his staff as a serious but not a threatening matter, since they themselves had military advisers in the Ottoman Empire: England had a naval mission, combined with the supreme command of the Turkish fleet under Admiral Arthur Limpus, and France provided General Albert Baumann (1869–1945) as the commandant of the gendarmerie .

prehistory

The defeat of the Ottoman army in the Balkan War of 1912/1913 had reinforced the impression among the major European powers that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was imminent. This threatened a power vacuum on the strategically important straits and the governments of Great Britain, Russia, France and the German Empire endeavored to expand their influence on Turkey, Dardanelles and the Bosporus . A division of the Ottoman Empire was also in the room.

Due to the military weakness of the Ottoman Empire as a result of the defeats in recent years, which the Young Turkish government in Istanbul through sustained reforms and reorganizations z. B. wanted to improve the military, the government in Istanbul turned to the government of the German Reich on May 22, 1913 with the request for a military mission with extensive powers, since military missions had been sent from there to the Ottoman Empire for many years were. The German Reich also advocated the latter in the subsequent peace negotiations between the Balkan states and the Ottoman Empire. Previously, on January 3 of the same year, the new Istanbul Foreign Minister Gabriel Noradunghian had turned to the Ambassador of the German Reich in Istanbul, Hans von Wangenheim , with the request that he, the Turkish Foreign Minister, quickly learn about the competencies of the Greek Provide service to French General Eydoux. Two days later von Wangenheim explained this request to his service authority, the Berlin Foreign Ministry, pointing out that the Hohe Pforte (Turkish Foreign Ministry) was considering soliciting a German general as commander in chief in peacetime. And in February 1913, the Turkish Grand Vizier Mahmud Sehvket stated that he intended to send a large German military mission for fundamental reforms - in the style of General Eydoux's activity in Greece.

By sending this military mission, the government of the German Reich wanted to continue its advisory work, especially after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans War in 1912. Reasons on the German side were u. a. the damaged image of the German consultancy work by the defeats of the Ottoman army in the previous wars, as well as the possibility of securing influence for the German Reich, perhaps limiting the British and procuring orders for the German arms industry .

course

Caricature by Gustav Brandt on the Liman von Sanders Crisis: A German instructor teaches the sick man on the Bosporus the goose-step under the supervision of the English, French and Russians (January 1914).

Immediately after Liman von Sanders arrived with the first officers of the military mission on December 14, 1913 in what was then the Turkish capital Constantinople, he took over command of the Turkish 1st Army Corps from Jemal Pasha in accordance with the agreement made by contract with the Ottoman Empire Headquarters was on site. He was not only active in an advisory capacity and in the reorganization, but also a troop leader - and this in the metropolis on the strategically important strait itself. Liman von Sanders had previously stood up for this command to create a kind of model corps with the I. Corps as a training center for to create Turkish officers in the capital. On December 13, 1913, the Russian ambassador de Giers , together with the British and French ambassadors, asked the Grand Vizier about the nature and scope of Liman von Sanders' mission, which the Grand Vizier only wanted to answer "officially" two days later . The Russian government in particular believed z. B. in the appointment of a German as corps commander in Istanbul [Germany] [...] made herself de facto master of the situation in Constantinople, and in this respect Russia confronted an accomplished fact [...].

Two specific circumstances, in addition to the questions of prestige and the preservation of face, apparently made a solution more difficult: The government, which was influenced by the Young Turks, should initially oppose the requests for information and cooperation on the part of the administrations of the Triple Entente states Russia, France and Great Britain have decided every change to the Liman mandate. Furthermore, the German Foreign Office and the German Embassy are said to have initially tried in vain to convince Liman von Sanders to take command of the 1st Army Corps in favor of an extended task associated with an increase in rank, e.g. B. as inspector general of the Turkish army.

But at the beginning of January 1914 the deserving Ottoman Minister of War Ahmed İzzet Pascha was suddenly replaced by the 31-year-old young Turk Enver Pascha, who was promoted to major general . He immediately relieved more than 200 officers of their functions in a ruthless manner and often politically motivated, and some of them were arrested. At the same time, Enver Pascha appointed a German officer to the Turkish General Staff without permission from Liman von Sanders , contrary to the contract of the military mission of Liman von Sanders, so that on January 8th he declared his readiness to relinquish command of the 1st Army Corps. Associated with this, he expected an increase in rank and a new task, which had already been formulated by German politics at the end of 1913 to solve the problem. Accordingly, on January 14, 1914, the German Emperor promoted Liman von Sanders prematurely to the position of German general and thus to the Ottoman Marshal in accordance with the contract, which enabled him to hand over command of the I. Army Corps to Turkish hands, but was instead appointed Inspector General of the Ottoman Army.

The diplomatic crisis, from which there was no immediate danger of war, could be settled by this yielding on the part of the German Reich, but relations between the Russian and German governments were permanently disrupted. Although the military and political leadership in Berlin had renounced the command objected by Russia, their withdrawal had succeeded without significant loss of prestige or power within the Ottoman Empire, so that the government in Moscow and the Entente had the actual goal of weakening the German military mission and the German influence in the strait had hardly come closer. For the reputation of the military mission, however, it was unfavorable that the internal Turkish military crisis had taken place in January 1914, in which the merited Ottoman Minister of War Ahmed İzzet Pascha was abruptly replaced by Enver Pascha, who was promoted to major general, and Enver immediately had many officers had dismissed.

Effect and evaluation

Liman von Sanders Pasha as Turkish Commander in Chief in World War I (1916)

In the past, the question has occasionally been raised as to whether the activities of the German military mission possibly fostered the outbreak of the First World War. The prospect of an effective reorganization of the Ottoman military could perhaps have increased the readiness of the Russian government to go to war, as the straits were of strategic importance to them. Extensive trial mobilizations were carried out in Russia in April, May and June 1914. According to Christopher Clark , the crisis showed "how bellicose the mindset of some Russian politicians had become."

  • For the Russian leadership, control over the straits was a declared goal. Their policy was therefore aimed at destabilizing the Ottoman Empire and against strengthening it through a reorganization of the army.
  • At the time of the Liman crisis, the British government had itself become more involved in Turkey. Since 1912 the British admiral Limpus commanded the Turkish fleet and reorganized the Turkish navy. At the beginning of December 1913, a contract between a British shipyard association and Turkey had been concluded, which provided for the construction and maintenance of docks, arsenals and shipyards for the Turkish Navy. At the same time, thanks to French funding, the Turkish government was able to order and build two modern, large warships in Great Britain. Accordingly, the British government followed the demands of Foreign Minister Sasonov of the Triple Entente partner Russia rather hesitantly to slow.
  • The governments of France had engaged mainly economically in the Ottoman Empire and were the main creditors of the bankrupt state. In so far as they were interested in stabilizing the same, as was necessary for France's economic activity and for the repayment of debts, they could have no interest in their influence falling further in favor of the German administration. France was also the official protecting power of the Catholics in the Ottoman Empire and particularly engaged in Syria.
  • In view of the somewhat politically isolated position in Europe, the political leadership of the German Empire was interested in political and military relations with the Ottoman Empire. It was also hoped that the construction of the Baghdad Railway, despite many obstacles, would have a certain future political influence in the east of the empire.

The German military mission did not actively campaign for a German-Ottoman arms alliance and was actually not politically active despite its politically motivated appointment. Although the mission on the German side was an important condition for a German-Ottoman arms alliance, the commitment of the alliance remained low almost until the last few weeks before the Ottoman Empire entered the war. Even the secret Ottoman-German treaty of August 2, 1914, had not yet mandated the Ottomans to form a coalition with the Central Powers.

In view of the general interests of the powers and especially the European alliance constellation before the beginning of the world war, it can be concluded that the activities of the military mission itself or even the takeover of the I. Army Corps by Liman von Sanders did not contribute to the outbreak of the First World War. The Young Turkish leadership - even if urged by the German Reich to hurry - joined the Central Powers out of their own interest and thereby pursued independent goals. A control of the Germans over the straits never existed and at least the military mission had not attempted to do so.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Otto Liman von Sanders: Five years of Turkey. Scherl, Berlin 1920, p. 10 f.
  2. ↑ Liman von Sanders, pp. 23-25.
  3. ↑ Alan Palmer : Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire. Heyne, Munich 1994 (original: London 1992), p. 320.
  4. ^ The Great Policy of the European Cabinets 1871-1914 . 38th volume. New danger zones in the Orient 1913-1914. Berlin 1926, pp. 193–195 (including Ambassador von Wangenheim in Istanbul on January 21, 1913)
  5. ↑ Heinz A. Richter: The war in the southeast. Volume 1: Gallipoli 1915 . Verlag Franz Philipp Rutzen, Ruhpolding and Harrasowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden 2013, p. 37. (PELEUS. Studies on the archeology and history of Greece and Cyprus. Volume 65)
  6. ↑ Jehuda L. Wallach: Anatomy of a military aid. The Prussian-German Military Missions in Turkey 1835-1919 . Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1976, pp. 121-125.
  7. ^ Liman von Sanders, p. 14.
  8. ↑ Joseph Pomiankowski : The collapse of the Ottoman Empire - memories of Turkey from the time of the world war , Amalthea, Vienna 1928, p. 36 f.
  9. ^ British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914. Vol. X, PART I, THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST ON THE EVE OF WAR. London 1936, p. 379, no.426
  10. ^ The Great Policy of the European Cabinets 1871-1914 . 38th volume. Pp. 250-251
  11. ↑ So the Russian Prime Minister Kokowzow to the German Ambassador in Petersburg on December 12, 1913. The Great Politics of the European Cabinets 1871-1914 . 38th volume. P. 248.
  12. ↑ Jehuda L. Wallach, Anatomy of a military aid. Pp. 142-143.
  13. ↑ The big policy ... . 38th Volume, pp. 290-291.
  14. ↑ Pomiankowski, p. 37 f.
  15. ↑ Christopher Clark : The Sleepwalkers. How Europe moved into World War I. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Munich 2013, pp. 447–449
  16. ↑ Jost Düffler, Martin Kröger, Rolf-Harald Wippich (eds.): Avoided wars. De-escalation of conflicts between the great powers between the Crimean War and the First World War (1856 - 1914) . Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1997. pp. 663-664
  17. ^ British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914. Vol. X, PART I, pp. 361-362, No. 407.
  18. ↑ Heinz A. Richter, The War in the Southeast. Volume 1: Gallipoli 1915 , p. 33.
  19. ^ Liman von Sanders, p. 11.
  20. ↑ Palmer, p. 322.
  21. ^ Pomiankowski, p. 85.
  22. ↑ Liman von Sanders, p. 34 f.
  23. ↑ Shaw, Stanford J. & Ezel Kural Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 , in: Shaw, Stanford Jay, History of the Ottomoman Empire and Modern Turkey , 2 , pp. I- XXV + 1-518, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge et al. 1977, ISBN 0-521-21449-1 + ISBN 0-521-29166-6 , p. 308.