Loganair flight 670A

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Loganair flight 670A
Loganair Short 360-100 Watt-1.jpg

An identical Shorts 360-100 from Loganair
Accident summary
Accident type Ditching after engine failure
place Firth of Forth , Scotland , United KingdomUnited KingdomUnited Kingdom 
date February 27, 2001
Fatalities 2
Survivors 0
Aircraft
Aircraft type United KingdomUnited Kingdom Shorts 360-100
operator United KingdomUnited Kingdom Loganair
Mark United KingdomUnited Kingdom G-BNMT
Departure airport Edinburgh Airport , Scotland , United KingdomUnited KingdomUnited Kingdom 
Destination airport Belfast Airport , Northern Ireland , UKUnited KingdomUnited Kingdom 
Passengers 0
crew 2
Lists of aviation accidents

On February 27, 2001 a Shorts 360-100 of the Scottish airline Loganair had an accident on Loganair flight 670A (flight number: LC670A ) , with which a mail flight on behalf of the Royal Mail from Edinburgh to Belfast was to be undertaken. After a total engine failure in the Firth of Forth , the machine had to make an emergency landing, with the two pilots on board being killed.

plane

The aircraft concerned was a British-made Shorts 360-100 regional airliner . The affected machine with the serial number SH 3723 was initially provided with the test identification G-14-3723 , but completed the first flight at the manufacturer's on July 13, 1987 with the aircraft identification G-BNMT . On October 27, 1987, the machine was delivered to Command Airways , the registration with the aircraft registration N160DD took place on October 27, 1987 to the First National Bank of Boston , the machine was by Command Airways with the fleet number 60 under the brand name American Eagle operated. After Command Airways was absorbed by Flagship Airlines , the machine was transferred to the airline's fleet in June 1991. The Executive Airlines took over the machine in November 1995, in February 1997, the shorts on which was State Street Bank and Trust Company admitted. From October 1998 the machine was leased to Loganair , which operated it under the brand name British Airways . The twin-engine commuter aircraft was equipped with two turboprop -Triebwerken type Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-67R equipped. At the time of the accident, the machine was painted in the colors of British Airways, with the tail unit being specially painted.

crew

The crew consisted of a flight captain and a first officer. The 58-year-old flight captain began his piloting career with the Royal Air Force . He flew both planes and helicopters there. After his military career he was used as a helicopter pilot for six years and was mainly used on surface flights over the North Sea with the Sikorsky S-61 and Bell 214ST helicopters . For the next twelve years he was a flight instructor for aircraft. In February 1999 he started a training course for the aircraft type Shorts 360 at Loganair. He was hired as a flight captain and in June 1999 was appointed test captain on scheduled flights. The captain had a flying experience of 13,569 hours, of which he had completed 972 hours with the Shorts 360. The 29-year-old first officer had been with Loganair since December 13, 2000. He had a total of 438 hours of flight experience, 72 hours of which with the Shorts 360. He was initially trained on scheduled flights, and since January 30, 2001, he was then regularly used as first officer on scheduled flights.

the accident

The wreck of the machine

The machine was to be flown to Belfast on behalf of Royal Mail Post and Freight. At 5:10 p.m. local time, the first officer requested clearance for take-off, and after a short delay the crew taxied for take-off from runway 06 at Edinburgh Airport. While the pilot was flying, a normal take-off was followed by a normal derating at 1,200 feet. At an altitude of 2,200 feet, the copilot selected the engine de-icing systems while the master switched to a new radio frequency. Four seconds later, the torque indicators for both engines suddenly dropped to zero and the aircraft suffered a complete loss of propeller thrust. While the first officer was declaring an air emergency , the master initiated an emergency descent at a reduced airspeed of 110 knots while turning right towards the coast. When the pilots realized they could not reach the bank, they prepared to ditch in the Firth of Forth . At a flight speed of 86 knots and with an angle of attack of 6.8 degrees and a left roll angle of 3.6 degrees, the machine touched down on the water. The shorts broke apart, killing both pilots.

After the accident

The machine was found 65 meters offshore in a 45-degree position, with the front half of the hull sunk in a water depth of about 6 meters. The cockpit was almost completely destroyed and the hull was stuck in the sand. The tail unit had separated and was found floating 100 meters east of the main wreck. Both cockpit seats remained firmly anchored in their position on the cockpit floor, the seat belts withstood the impact forces. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and the flight data recorder (FDR) were both recovered intact. The Shorts 360 was eventually recovered and dismantled with some difficulty before being loaded onto a truck and transported to the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) headquarters in Farnborough for detailed investigation .

Cause of accident

The accident investigation found that the accident was mainly caused by the lack of an established practical procedure for flight crews to install engine air intake covers in adverse weather conditions.

On the day of the accident, the aircraft landed at Edinburgh Airport at midnight in snow and then remained parked on the airfield for around 17 hours in moderate to strong winds. Since no protective plugs were placed in the engine intakes, the wind blew a significant amount of snow into the intakes. The inlet plugs were not carried as part of the aircraft's on-board equipment and were not readily available at Edinburgh Airport. Instructions from the aircraft manufacturer in the manual for operation in winter conditions had not been incorporated into the airline's Shorts 360 Operations Manual and were therefore not followed. The AAIB determined that there may have been large amounts of snow or slush accumulated that went undetected during the walk around prior to departure, especially since the engine inlets of the Shorts 360 are about 2.8 meters above the ground. At the start, this snow almost completely obstructed the intake air flow of the engine, as it almost completely blocked the air supply. A flame stall on both engines occurred after the de-icing vanes of both engines were opened simultaneously according to the procedure. The accident investigators found that the successive selection of engine de-icing on the engines with a time interval in between would have prevented a double flame stall.

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