Luxembourg compromise

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Luxembourg Compromise (also known as the Luxembourg Agreement ) on January 29, 1966 settled divergences in the EEC's agricultural policy .

prehistory

This was preceded by France breaking off the EEC negotiations on the agricultural fund on July 1, 1965 ; the country then no longer sent a representative to the meetings of the Council of the European Community , which thus became incapable of decision-making ( empty chair policy ).

Content or subject of the agreement

The Luxembourg compromise is seen as the minimum solution in a severe European crisis.

Key message

The so-called Luxembourg Compromise provided for decisions in the Council of Ministers that, even if a decision is in principle possible with a qualified majority , a consensus should (nevertheless) be sought. A Member State asserting "very important interests" should not be overruled "simply" . Rather, the discussion should continue "until unanimous agreement" is reached. Accordingly, in cases in which it could, in principle , decide by a qualified majority , the Council must negotiate if “very important interests” of a member state are prejudiced.

Unsolved questions

The provision of “important national interest” remained unclear and therefore open.

The question of how to proceed if a dissent cannot be resolved also remained unclear. The text of the agreement reveals the lack of an agreement between France on the one hand and the other five Member States on the other. France took the view that in such a case negotiations should continue until a unanimous result was achieved. The other states, on the other hand, indicated in the document that no agreement had been reached on what to do if unanimity was not achieved.

The Luxembourg compromise was therefore not a compromise, but a text that set out the disagreement over the application of majority votes in writing.

Legal quality

The compromise is formally not legally binding , but it is adhered to in practice.

It is only granted the quality of a fact of trust.

The agreement has created a kind of customary law, according to which member states continue to negotiate in important cases until a consensus is reached.

The same is predominantly the case in areas in which a qualified majority is actually intended to be sufficient.

Handle after 1966

From then on there was in fact no majority vote against the will of a member state. Individual member states referred to the compromise several times. The EEA did not touch the compromise.

Further developments

In a modified form, the Luxembourg compromise still applies to this day.

Amsterdam Treaty

The submission of a veto "for national reasons" in an upcoming qualified majority vote in the area of ​​the CFSP led according to Art. 23 para. 2 TEU (as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam ) stipulates that there is no vote at all.

Lisbon Treaty

In the current treaties there is a similar provision in Art. 31 Para. 2, Subparagraph 2 TEU: "If a member of the Council declares that, for essential reasons of national policy, which it must also name, it intends to join a qualified The High Representative shall work closely with the Member State concerned to find a solution acceptable to that Member State. If this is not successful, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may resolve the matter with a view to a unanimous decision is referred to the European Council. "

See also

literature

  • Jean-Marie Palayret, Helen Wallace, Pascaline Winand (Eds.): Visions, Votes and Vetoes. The Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On. Peter Lang, Bruxelles / Bern / Berlin, 2006, ISBN 978-90-5201-031-1 .

Web links