Marbury v. Madison

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Marbury v. Madison
Supreme Court logo
Negotiated
February 11, 1803
Decided
February 24, 1803
Surname: William Marbury v. James Madison , Secretary of State of the United States
Quoted: 5 US 137 (1803)
facts
Complaint in the Supreme Court in the First Instance Concerning the Appointment of Federal Judges During Changes of Government and the Legislative Power of Congress in the Field of Justice, December 1801
decision
Congress cannot pass laws that violate the Constitution. It is the job of the federal courts to determine what the constitution allows.
occupation
Chairman: John Marshall
Assessor: Cushing · Paterson · Chase · Washington · Moore
Positions
Majority opinion: Marshall, Paterson, Chase, Washington
Agreeing:
Dissenting opinion:
Opinion:
Applied Law
United States Constitution, Art. I & III; Judiciary Act of 1789, Section 13

Marbury v. Madison is a case ruled by the United States Supreme Court in 1803 , which gained prominence in American case law . With this decision, the Supreme Court established the right to review federal laws for their constitutionality and to declare them null and void ( judicial review ). Not least because of this vote, the court under Chief Justice John Marshall , known as "the Marshall Court", gained political and historical importance.

The case is also noteworthy internationally as it was the first to give birth to the concept of constitutional jurisdiction , albeit not in that name. Although there had been case law in Europe since the 15th century to delimit the rights of state organs, judicial review was carried out in a qualitatively new constellation due to the political system of the American constitution, as positivist control in the area of ​​tension between popular sovereignty and the separation of powers.

background

William Marbury

In the 1800 presidential election , Thomas Jefferson defeated incumbent John Adams to become the third President of the United States . Although the result of the election was already known on February 17, 1801, Jefferson did not take office until March 4, 1801, according to the constitution. Up to that day, Adams and the Federalist Party- controlled Congress remained in power. They feared that Jefferson, who was an "anti-federalist" as the founder of the opposition Democratic Republicans party, could end the political dominance of the federalist party. Against this Jeffersonian Revolution of the anti-federalists, a judicial bulwark was to be built in the last days of the old government. To this end, on February 13, 1801, Congress passed a new Judiciary Act of 1801 , which created a number of new federal courts to be controlled by the federalists.

On March 2, Adams - only a Lame Duck as the elected president - appointed 42 federalists as judges in these new courts. The Senate approved the appointments the following day a few hours before Adams took office. One of these candidates, known as the " Midnight Judges " ( Midnight Judges ) was William Marbury , who was appointed Judge of the District of Columbia . At noon on March 4, Adam's term ended and Jefferson was sworn in as the new president.

Marbury's charter of appointment had been signed by Adams and John Marshall in his office as Secretary of State . The case was made even more complicated by the fact that John Marshall was appointed by Adams as the new Chief Justice on February 4, but he continued to serve as minister until Jefferson took office and did not take up his office at the Supreme Court until March 3. The following day he took the oath of office from Jefferson .

Jefferson saw 25 of the 42 signed on the day of his inauguration appointment certificates to be void, since they are not up to the end of the day delivered were. Jefferson named James Madison his new Secretary of State and directed him not to serve the deeds.

Marbury then appealed to the Supreme Court. The lawsuit demanded that the Court James Madison by preliminary legal protection ( writ of mandamus ) order should deliver the letters of appointment, so that the appointments would be legally binding.

Relevant law

Art. 3, para. 2, p. 2, United States Constitution

“In all cases involving ambassadors, envoys and consuls, and in those in which a single state is a party, the Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction . In all other cases mentioned above, the Supreme Court is the appellate body for both legal and factual judgments under the exceptional and procedural provisions to be established by Congress. "

Section 13, Judiciary Act of 1789

“The Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases in after provided for; and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts ... and writs of mandamus ... to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States. "

"The Supreme Court has appeal jurisdiction to the county and state courts in the cases listed below and has jurisdiction and cease and desist orders [ suspensive ] in the county courts ... and provisional orders ... in all courts or to place public officials under the control of the United States. "

Legal issue

There are two ways to go to the Supreme Court on a case. On the one hand, the action can be brought directly to the Court of Justice, or an appeal can be lodged against the decision of a lower court.

Since Marbury had lodged his complaint directly with the Supreme Court, the latter first had to check whether he could act in the first instance on the legal issue before the case as such could be heard. In its third article, the constitution expressly names groups of cases in which the Supreme Court has first instance jurisdiction. In jurisprudence today there is largely consensus that the Marburys case does not fall under any of these groups of cases.

Marbury's argument was that Congress, through the Judiciary Act, allowed the Supreme Court to act in first instance when issuing an interim order. On the basis of this argument, the Court had to clarify two questions:

  1. Does the Third Constitutional Article only regulate a minimum jurisdiction for the Court of Justice, which Congress can expand, or is jurisdiction here conclusively regulated and cannot be changed by Congress?
  2. If jurisdiction is immutable but Congress tries to change it through law, what is the primary source of law : the Constitution or the law ? And, more importantly: who decides on the priority? So by answering this question, the court would define its own jurisdiction.

judgment

John Marshall (engraving, 1808)

The court ruled unanimously on February 24, 1803 (4: 0) that it had no jurisdiction in the case because the constitution does not provide for first instance jurisdiction for such a case.

The Supreme Court could now have followed the maxim already known in the 19th century that the jurisdiction of the court should be examined before the merits of an action. Then he could have dismissed the action as inadmissible without having to deal with the politically sensitive questions of its merits. However, he did the opposite. Chief Justice John Marshall justified this decision by curiam by raising and answering three legal questions:

  1. Does Marbury have the right to receive the certificate of appointment?
  2. If he has such a right, did applicable law provide Marbury with appropriate remedies ?
  3. Is the Supreme Court Appeal the Right Type of Procedure?

Only the third question concerns the jurisdiction of the court over the action. Before Marshall said no, he answered the first two questions in the affirmative and found that the failure to deliver the certificate of appointment violated a guaranteed right.

Regarding the question of whether a standardized type of procedure is available for this case, Marshall stated:

“The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. "

“The form of government in the United States is emphatically defined as governing the law, not individuals. It would lose its reputation if the law did not provide legal remedies for violating a guaranteed right. "

One of the most important principles derived from this case is that for every right there must also be a remedy that can be used in the event of a violation of the law. This is expressed in English with the formula no right without remedy . This fundamental legal principle is reflected in many legal systems .

According to Marshall, there is only an exception to this principle when it comes to "a purely political act that the government is called to decide". In these cases there is no legal protection. However, if, as in the case to be decided with regard to the handing over of the deed of appointment, the legislature has clearly prescribed the performance of certain acts by law and the beneficiary has a clear interest in the performance of the acts, a constitutional state must provide an appeal. Marshall found that service of the deed of appointment was such a legally required act and that Marbury had legal recourse to enforce service. By refusing to hand over the document by order of President Jefferson, Madison violated this rule of law in the opinion of the court.

By answering the first two questions in line with the lawsuit, Marshall recognized a twofold breach of law by the newly elected Jefferson government. At the same time, he was able to provide impeccable testimony to former federal president Adams and himself as ex-minister. Except for the handover of the certificate of appointment, which was no longer completed due to lack of time, they would have done everything right.

It was only after answering these two questions that Marshall turned to the third question, whether the action for interim relief in the Supreme Court was the permissible type of procedure. Marshall proceeded more cautiously and said no. To answer this question, Marshall referred to the Judiciary Act, from which alone the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could result. The norm is not considered to be entirely clear, but Marshall interpreted it in such a way that it results in the jurisdiction of the court of first instance.

Marshall then looked at the Third Article of the Constitution, which describes the jurisdiction of the court in both first and last instance and does not contain this same first instance jurisdiction for interim legal protection. Marbury had argued that this was harmless, as the provisions of the constitution were only intended to be a basic set of powers to which Congress could add others by law. Marshall disagreed, however, and found that Congress had no power to extend jurisdiction. The Judiciary Act is therefore contrary to the constitution in this regard.

At this point Marshall came to the point that was central to the consequences of the decision: the contradiction between simple statutory law and constitutional law. He now had to investigate what to do if a federal law is incompatible with the constitution. Marshall stated that "laws that violate the constitution are unlawful ". In such cases the courts are forced to abide by the constitution. To support this point, Marshall referred to the nature of the constitution: "What is the purpose of a constitution that courts can ignore?"

"To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?"

"For what purpose is state authority limited, and for what purpose are these limitations written down, if these limitations can at any time be overridden by those who are to be limited by them?"

Marshall also argued with the prohibition of legal refusal , which required the courts to make such an assessment. Since courts are used to rule on cases, they must also be able to determine which law is applicable. Finally, Marshall referred to the oath of office, which requires the upholding of the Constitution, and to the Constitution itself, which in its text itself appears within the list of the highest sources of law before the law of the United States.

criticism

Legal scholars have challenged Marshall's line of thought in establishing the unconstitutionality of the Judiciary Act . They claim that he cites the law so selectively that it reads an (unconstitutional) extension of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. In particular, they argue that the court should have followed the motion for interim relief as the third constitutional article gave it first instance jurisdiction in all cases involving "public ministers and consuls" and that Madison, as Secretary of State and defendant in this court case , belong to that group of people.

Doubts are also raised about Marshall's constitutional understanding of federal law. Alexander Bickel argues that Marshall has an unrealistic and mechanical view of the function of justice; in which courts have an absolute duty to annul any unconstitutional law. In this way, they would have no discretion and, in particular, should not take into account the consequences of their decisions.

Since the Constitution itself does not contain any provisions on constitutional jurisdiction, critics claim that it is based on a major misinterpretation of the text. It is true that neither the constitution itself nor the English legal tradition could provide a clear overall picture of the question of the role of the Supreme Court and the examination of the primacy of the constitution. Marshall could just as easily have decided at the time that the courts are organized on an equal footing with the other state authorities and that each state authority is responsible for examining the constitutionality in its area of ​​competence.

Despite this criticism, the ability of the courts to review laws for constitutionality is now seen as an important function of the legal system in American society. The priority of the courts and the judicial review based on this decision guarantees, from today's perspective, more legal certainty than the equality thesis.

Effect and meaning

At first, the ruling had a strong political impact. Marshall would have been biased because of the history. Marshall's argumentation was certainly not always compelling and sometimes superfluous as obiter dictum . However, with the decision he succeeded in making the statements that were important to him without having to expose himself to the accusation of manipulation. Had he upheld the lawsuit, impeachment proceedings would have been feared. If he had already denied the admissibility of the action, he should not have been allowed to examine the matter further. With this decision, Marshall could not ensure that Marbury received his certificate of appointment. On the one hand, he succeeded in calming the angry Federalist Party. In addition, his judgment strengthened the Supreme Court by establishing the primacy of constitutional jurisdiction. This primacy of constitutional jurisdiction was by no means self-evident at the time. The anchoring of the Judicial Review is seen as a genuine American contribution to the modern constitutional state.

See also

literature

  • Winfried Brugger : Struggle for constitutional jurisdiction: 200 years of Marbury v. Madison , in: JuS 2003, pp. 320-325.
  • Robert Lowry Clinton: Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review, Lawrence (Kansas) 1989. ISBN 0-7006-0411-1
  • Peter Irons: A People's History of the Supreme Court, New York 1999, pp. 104-107. ISBN 0-14-029201-2
  • Julien Henninger: Marbury v. Madison. Un arrêt fondateur, mal fondé , Strasbourg 2005. ISBN 2-86820-283-7
  • Werner Heun : “The birth of constitutional jurisdiction - 200 years of Marbury v. Madison “, in: Der Staat , Vol. 42 (2003), pp. 267-283.
  • Marcus Höreth: "The establishment of constitutional dispute settlement: Marbury v. Madison as judicial self-authorization and gentle revolution". In: Amerikastudien , Vol. 54 (2009), pp. 211–228.
  • Jacques Lambert: “ Les Origines du contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois fédérales aux États-Unis. Marbury v. Madison ”, in: Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et à l'Etranger , tome 48, 38ème année, 1931, pp. 1-69.
  • William E. Nelson: Marbury v. Madison. The Origins and Legacy of Judicial Review, Lawrence (Kansas) 2000. ISBN 0-7006-1062-6
  • R. Kent Newmyer: John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court, Baton Rouge (Louisiana) 2001. ISBN 0-8071-2701-9
  • Jean Edward Smith: The Constitution And American Foreign Policy, St. Paul (Minnesota) 1989. ISBN 0-314-42317-6
  • Jean Edward Smith: John Marshall. Definer Of A Nation, New York 1996. ISBN 0-8050-1389-X
  • Elizabeth Zoller (Ed.): Marbury v. Madison. 1803-2003. Un dialogue franco-américain , Paris 2003. ISBN 2-247-05328-9

Individual evidence

  1. in Germany, for example, at the Reich Chamber Court from 1495 and at the Reichshofrat from 1518.
  2. in Germany one speaks in this regard of legal recourse guarantee
  3. 5 US (1 Cranch) on p. 176.
  4. 5 US (1 Cranch) on p. 177.
  5. Geoffrey R. Stone et al. a .: Constitutional Law , New York 2005, pp. 29-51. ISBN 0-7355-5014-X
  6. Alexander M. Bickel: The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics , 2nd edition, New Haven (Conn.) 1986. ISBN 0-300-03299-4

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