Constitutional jurisdiction

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The constitutional jurisdiction examines the compatibility of sovereign acts , especially laws , with the respective constitution . It has the option of declaring such acts unconstitutional . The consequences of such a declaration depend on the respective legal system .


Constitutional jurisdiction was called for in England as early as 1610 when the court questioned whether parliamentary acts (i.e. laws in the formal sense) that violate legal principles were subject to judicial control, which they could then find null and void. In the spirit of the British judge Sir Edward Coke, the legislature was bound by the constitution or certain legal principles ( The Bonham Case ). However, this stance could not prevail in Great Britain . In contrast, this constitutional understanding was adopted in the American colonies and emphasized in the American constitution of 1787.

The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) found in 1803 that it had the power to declare federal laws unconstitutional and null and void and thus prevent their application (so-called objection authority ). The Institute of Norms Control from the Marbury v. Madison born. This relativization of the strict separation of powers has met with some criticism.

In Germany , the Paulskirche constitution already contained the basis of a constitutional complaint that was not put into force; constitutional jurisdiction remained an idea until the Weimar Republic . The Weimar Constitution of 1919 provided for constitutional jurisdiction in the form of a Reich State Court. However, he was only responsible for disputes between the Reich and the states. The first court of justice to be solely responsible for constitutional jurisdiction was created in Austria in 1920 with the entry into force of the Federal Constitutional Law . It is the oldest exclusive constitutional court in the world, its decisions are for repeal and not just for failure to apply laws and regulations. In Germany, a real constitutional jurisdiction was only created after the Second World War with the Federal Constitutional Court.


Types of constitutional jurisdiction can be determined on the basis of organizational and functional differences, the latter of which are of great importance for the type and extent of the so-called judicial review and thus for the (power) relationship between the judiciary and the legislature .

Unit model and separation model

Probably the most striking, if functionally not very relevant, distinction is whether there is an institutionally independent constitutional court. In the unit model this is not the case; A court of general jurisdiction decides on the constitutionality of the legal act to be checked (as in the following brackets only by way of example and not exhaustive: USA, Norway, Switzerland), in contrast, in the separation model, a special court (Austria, Germany, Italy).

The model alone does not initially say anything about the powers of the constitutional jurisdiction of the respective country. It is true that in many countries with a separation model there is also the possibility of reviewing legal acts in their own constitutional court proceedings outside of a specific judicial process (so-called abstract norm control ; for example in Germany, Poland, Portugal), while in countries with a standard model there is only a specific norm control there (USA, Switzerland). However, there is an abstract control of norms in Estonia, although the constitutional jurisdiction there follows the unitary model; and vice versa, there are also countries with a separation model that still only have a specific control of norms (Italy, Greece).

Effect of judgments

The legal consequences of finding a legal act to be unconstitutional also differ from country to country.

The effect of the determination of the unconstitutionality occurs partly by law without the need for a special order of the constitutional court. In some states, the law is ineffective from the time of the constitutional judgment; H. Courts and administration are no longer allowed to apply the law, and the legislature is obliged to revise it within a period (Spain). In most states the law will then be voided retrospectively; H. also decisions already made based on it, e.g. B. by criminal courts, are repealed (Italy, Greece, USA).

Some constitutional courts can determine the legal consequences themselves (Belgium, Germany, Portugal); In these cases, the Constitutional Court can order the ineffectiveness from the time of the judgment or the retroactive nullity, but also the legal consequence that is more lenient than the nullity of the law, that the legislature is obliged to re-regulate, but the law may continue to be applied until then (so-called. Appeal decision ).

Possibility of asserting individual constitutional rights

The appeal to constitutionally protected rights is possible in almost all states with constitutional jurisdiction; France and Luxembourg are exceptions.

In particular, the constitutional complaint and the specific control of norms are available as options . The constitutional complaint is directed directly against a legal act; in the case of the specific control of norms, the constitutionality is checked within a procedure of general jurisdiction.

Constitutional complaint

As a rule, constitutional complaints can only be filed after the appeal of the courts has been exhausted, which means that they can generally only be filed against court decisions.

The constitutional conformity of the laws can also be checked regularly in a constitutional complaint procedure. In some of the countries, those directly affected by a law can lodge constitutional complaints (Belgium, Germany, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, the Czech Republic and Hungary). In other countries, a constitutional complaint is only possible against court judgments; Legal protection must then first be sought before the general courts (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, USA).

In a few cases all citizens can lodge a constitutional complaint against a law without being affected (Slovenia, Hungary until 2012, in Germany only in Bavaria); one speaks here of a constitutional popular lawsuit .

Concrete control of norms

Almost always, if there is a constitutional jurisdiction in the state, courts can review norms in a judicial process for their constitutionality or have them reviewed by a special court. Exceptions are France and Luxembourg, which do not allow this option at all. In other countries there are various restrictions, for example on subordinate norms (Netherlands), on laws only of the cantons, not of the federal government (Switzerland), on only obvious constitutional violations (Sweden).

In Austria, in addition to the courts, citizens affected by a legal provision can also apply for a norm review if the norm in question is directly effective without a decision by an administrative authority or a court ( individual application ) or if the norm in question was applied in proceedings before an ordinary court and the court has not submitted an application himself ( party application ).

Review of laws without individual concern

The possibility of an abstract control of norms does not exist in all states with constitutional jurisdiction. In most cases it requires an institutional arrangement based on the separation model ( see above ). The abstract control of norms, unlike the constitutional complaint or the concrete control of norms, is initiated by organs or parts of organs of the legislature or the executive branch.

As part of the abstract control of norms, there are countries in which a preventive control takes place before the law comes into force ( Estonia , Ireland , Poland , Portugal , Hungary , to a limited extent France ); in others it does not take place until it has come into force ( Belgium , Germany , Latvia , Lithuania , Austria , Poland, Portugal, Slovakia , Slovenia , Spain , the Czech Republic , Hungary, USA ). In some countries, both are possible (Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Hungary).

In Germany some laws, e.g. B. Approval laws for international treaties are reviewed before they come into force .

In Portugal , when referendums are held, the draft law introduced by the initiators is checked preventively.

Constitutional jurisdiction in the individual legal systems

Where a constitutional court consists of, either by a special court (is Constitutional Court , State Court , etc.) exercised or - as most of the countries of the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition - by a general Supreme Court (Supreme Court) .


The German Federal Constitutional Court.

In the Federal Republic of Germany , the Federal Constitutional Court performs the function of the constitutional court at federal level.

The Federal Constitutional Court is only responsible for an enumerative - conclusive - catalog of matters ( § 13 BVerfGG ). The most important institution is the constitutional complaint , which accounts for 90% of all proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court. With the Elfes judgment , the Federal Constitutional Court granted itself considerable authority (similar to the decision of the US Supreme Court in the Marbury v. Madison case ) to examine violations of fundamental rights. In addition to the constitutional complaints, the municipal constitutional complaint alleging a violation of the right of self-administration of municipalities can be filed.

Controls of standards should also be mentioned. A distinction must be made between the specific control of norms (a court considers an applicable legal norm to be unconstitutional and submits the norm to the Federal Constitutional Court for review) and the abstract control of norms (at the request of the federal government , a state government or a quarter of the German Bundestag , the norm becomes without concrete Occasion checked).

Organ disputes between the federal organs must be brought before the Federal Constitutional Court. Disputes of a constitutional nature between the federal government and the states or an individual state, as well as disputes under public law between the states, must be brought before the Federal Constitutional Court. The forfeiture of fundamental rights, party bans, election reviews, presidential indictments and indictments against federal judges are of lesser importance in German constitutional jurisdiction.

As a rule, German constitutional jurisdiction has no instances . Although it is conceivable to appeal against the decisions of a state constitutional court to the Federal Constitutional Court and ultimately also to the European Court of Human Rights , the constitutional jurisdiction does not represent a super- revision instance for the proceedings of the other jurisdictions ( specialized jurisdiction ) in the context of the constitutional complaint.

State jurisdiction in the Weimar Republic

Building of the Imperial Court in Leipzig

Under the Weimar Imperial Constitution (WRV) of August 11, 1919 (RGBl. P. 1383) there was the State Court of Justice for the German Reich (cf. Art. 108 WRV) at the Imperial Court in Leipzig , which was responsible for clarifying constitutional disputes between the Reich and the states was responsible. In this role, the Tribunal displayed a formidable power, especially in that it interpreted its examination competence widely. Famous, for example, is the decision in the Prussian versus Reich dispute of October 25, 1932, which involved a Reich execution against Prussia under Article 48, Paragraph 1, which became known as the Prussian Strike. The judges rejected the emergency ordinance of the Reich President in parts as unconstitutional. The prevailing doctrine had only considered an examination of errors of judgment to be permissible, the court, however, claimed a comprehensive judicial review right for the actions of the Reich.

In addition to the State Court of Justice , the Reich Court of Justice also showed signs of constitutional jurisdiction in the Reich , which, in the course of its revaluation jurisprudence, claimed the authority to review the constitutionality of Reich laws.

Constitutional jurisdiction in the German states

The constitutional courts of the federal states are particularly responsible for examining the compatibility of the state's laws with state constitutional law and for resolving disputes arising from the state's constitutional life. The constitutional courts are not courts that are subordinate to the Federal Constitutional Court in accordance with a series of instances.

All countries have a constitutional court. Schleswig-Holstein last set up a state constitutional court in 2008; previously the Federal Constitutional Court took over the tasks of a state constitutional court for Schleswig-Holstein.

designation Federal states
Constitutional Court (VerfG) Brandenburg and Hamburg
State Constitutional Court (LVerfG) Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania , Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein
Constitutional Court (VerfGH) Baden-Württemberg , Bavaria , Berlin , North Rhine-Westphalia , Rhineland-Palatinate , Saarland , Saxony and Thuringia
State Court of Justice (StGH) Bremen , Hesse and Lower Saxony

The State Court of Justice originally referred to a court whose jurisdiction is limited to state-organizational disputes (without individual constitutional complaints). However, this restriction does not apply in Hesse despite the designation, while in some other countries, despite the designation as a (regional) constitutional court (-shof), no individual constitutional complaint takes place.

See also: List of constitutional courts of the federal states


Constitutional Court of the Republic of Austria

The Austrian Constitutional Court is a court of public law and, among other things, has constitutional jurisdiction. It was established with the Federal Constitutional Act 1920, making it the oldest exclusive constitutional court in the world. In contrast to other courts that already exercised constitutional jurisdiction before it, the Constitutional Court did not award itself this competence, but was founded specifically as an independent constitutional court.

The Constitutional Court not only declares the inapplicability of laws, but repeals them for good. His decisions therefore have a cashing effect; however, the Constitutional Court usually grants the responsible federal or state legislature a period of time to improve the defective law.

In order to remove actually unconstitutional laws from the access of the constitutional court, it has long been the practice in Austria to pass them as constitutional laws. Since a new Federal Constitutional Law changes the content of the constitution and thus becomes part of it itself, it cannot be unconstitutional in terms of content. Constitutional laws that represent an overall amendment to the Federal Constitution can, however, be repealed by the Constitutional Court if they have not been subjected to the mandatory referendum and are therefore unconstitutional. For this reason, the Constitutional Court has so far only repealed one constitutional law.

Substantive decisions by the Constitutional Court are called "findings". If necessary, they are carried out by the Federal President .


Constitutional jurisdiction at the federal level

Since federal laws are subject to an optional referendum in Swiss direct democracy , the idea of ​​a constitutional jurisdiction as a legal corrective of the legislature does not correspond to the Swiss constitutional tradition. In the opinion of some lawyers and politicians, the balancing act ( concordance ) between the executive, legislative, judicial and sovereign (voters, people) does not speak in favor of a (one-sided) strengthening of the judiciary in the form of a constitutional court.

According to Article 190 of the Federal Constitution (BV), the federal laws are binding for the Federal Supreme Court and the other courts ; therefore, they cannot revoke them, declare them invalid or refuse to use them. The efforts of the Federal Council to change this regulation as part of the judicial reform failed in the National Council . However, according to part of the legal doctrine, the Federal Supreme Court may and occasionally criticize unconstitutional federal laws in the grounds of a judgment. Such criticism occasionally leads to legislative changes by the Federal Assembly. In the case of indeterminate legal terms in federal laws, the courts can also interpret them in accordance with the constitution within the framework of legal interpretation, as long as the legal norm is not reinterpreted or corrected.

Political attempts to change this were rejected by the Federal Assembly in 1999 as part of the judicial reform of the Federal Constitution. However, two parliamentary initiatives on this subject were again tabled. The two initiatives of the national councilors Heiner Studer ( EPP ) and Vreni Müller-Hemmi ( SP ), who have since been voted out , were followed in 2009. As a result, the National Council's legal commission must prepare a draft and deal with it by the councils.

Other enactments at federal level (such as ordinances or official orders ) can be checked by the courts and the authorities applying the law in the context of a specific review of norms for their constitutionality and refuse to apply them in specific cases.

The courts and authorities can also review enactments under cantonal law to ensure that they comply with the Federal Constitution as part of the specific review of norms. In addition, there is the possibility of abstract norm control with these decrees . This is carried out by the Federal Supreme Court based on a complaint in public law matters.

The cantonal constitutions are an exception . Their compliance with federal law is checked by the Federal Assembly (Art. 172 para. 2 BV). The Federal Supreme Court examines the cantonal constitutions for their compatibility with the superordinate Federal Constitution, therefore only with regard to provisions in the Federal Constitution which came into force after the cantonal constitution in question and could therefore not be taken into account by the Federal Assembly.

The introduction of constitutional jurisdiction by repealing Art. 190 BV was approved by the National Council in June 2012, but rejected by the Council of States. Both councils would have to approve so that the electorate could vote on it. The business was dealt with again by the National Council in the 2012 winter session. With 101: 68 he rejected the constitutional amendment. The change would not have enabled a norm review action as in Germany, but would only have authorized the Federal Supreme Court to declare a federal law invalid in a specific application.

Constitutional jurisdiction in the cantons

The violation of cantonal constitutional rights can be reprimanded against the Federal Supreme Court (Art. 95 lit. c Federal Supreme Court Act ).

Constitutional jurisdiction is implemented differently at the level of the cantons. The canton of Bern does not have a constitutional court, but the cantonal constitution stipulates in Art. 66 Paragraph 3: "Cantonal decrees that contradict higher-ranking law may not be applied by the judicial authorities." This regulation obliges the courts not to apply cantonal laws, if necessary, if they contradict the cantonal constitution. The cantonal constitution of Nidwalden contains a similar provision in Art. 66, Paragraph 2: "Laws that violate this constitution or are contrary to federal law, as well as unconstitutional and unlawful enactments, are not binding on the courts." The cantonal constitution of Glarus also states in Art. 106 Para. 2: "They [= the courts] may not apply decrees that contradict federal law or cantonal constitutional and statutory law." The cantonal constitution of Aargau is almost literally similar to it in Art. 95 Para. 2: "You [ = the courts] are required to refuse to apply enactments that contradict federal law or cantonal constitutional or statutory law. ”The cantons in this group therefore have a regulation that corresponds to judicial review in Anglo-Saxon legal tradition.

One can speak of a constitutional court in eleven cantons (as of 2016), although its competencies vary widely:

In the canton of Aargau , the administrative court has been reviewing regulations of an administrative nature in cantonal laws, decrees and ordinances as well as in enactments by municipalities and public corporations and institutions for their compliance with superordinate law since 2007.

In the canton of Basel-Stadt , the appellate court has functioned as the cantonal constitutional court since 2008, which according to § 116 para. 2 lit. b of the cantonal constitution. It assesses complaints about violations of constitutional rights, the admissibility of popular initiatives and disputes relating to communal autonomy. In the abstract norm control procedure, it examines cantonal and communal ordinances and other decrees that are below the legal level, in the concrete norm control procedure (i.e. in the case of application) also laws. This solution has parallels with the Italian Corte Costituzionale .

In the canton of Basel-Landschaft , constitutional jurisdiction is exercised by the chamber of the cantonal court that is responsible for administrative jurisdiction (cantonal constitution, section 86 (1)). It is responsible for the abstract norm control of decrees below the legal level, for the concrete norm control of constitutional and legal provisions, for complaints about violations of fundamental and popular rights, for disputes regarding the autonomy of the communes and for disputes over competencies between cantons and communes.

The canton of Geneva has had its own constitutional court (Cour constitutionnelle) since 2014 , which, in accordance with Art. 124 of the Geneva cantonal constitution of October 14, 2012, examines the compliance of cantonal decrees with superordinate law upon request, deals with disputes relating to the exercise of cantonal and communal political rights and conflicts decides between state powers ("autorités"). It assesses complaints against constitutional laws, laws and ordinances of the Council of State (Government Council), against votes and elections, and against the validity of popular initiatives.

In the canton of Graubünden , in accordance with Art. 55, Paragraph 2 of the cantonal constitution, the administrative court has assumed the function of the constitutional court in cases of "complaints about violation of constitutional and political rights and the principle of the primacy of federal law" as well as in cases of "complaints about violation of Autonomy of the municipalities, the districts and the regional churches. ”Laws and ordinances can be challenged in both abstract and concrete norms control procedures.

The canton of Jura has had a constitutional court since 1978, which is organized as a chamber of the cantonal court. Upon request, it reviews the constitutional conformity of the law and, within the limits of the law, disputes about the legality of cantonal and communal ordinances, communal autonomy, the exercise of political rights and disputes over competencies. According to Art. 104 of the Jura cantonal constitution, the verification of the constitutional conformity of a law can only take place before the relevant decree comes into force. This solution therefore mixes the preventive system of the French Conseil Constitutionnel with the system of constitutional courts, as it is known, for example, in Germany. This mixture is vaguely reminiscent of the Italian model of checking the admissibility of referenda.

In the canton of Lucerne , the cantonal court has been able to review legal clauses of administrative (but not legislative) content in cantonal decrees since 1972 for their conformity with the constitution, the law or a higher legal clause.

In the canton of Nidwalden , Article 69 of the cantonal constitution designates the higher court as a constitutional court. Since 1965, it has assessed in particular "disputes about the exercise of political rights and the validity of elections and votes", "disputes about the legality of laws and ordinances of the canton, communes and corporations", "conflicts of jurisdiction between cantonal authorities", "Disputes about the independence of parishes, corporations and churches recognized under public law" and "Complaints against decisions of the district administrator or the administrative council on the constitutional admissibility of applications and counter-proposals".

In the canton of Schaffhausen , the higher court has been reviewing regulations of an administrative (but not legal) nature in decrees of the canton, the municipalities and the public corporations and institutions for their constitutional and legality since 1971.

In the canton of Vaud there has been a constitutional court since 2005 (Art. 136 of the cantonal constitution), which is organized as a department of the cantonal court. It checks the compliance of cantonal decrees with the superordinate law and is responsible for disputes regarding the exercise of political rights at cantonal and communal level as well as conflicts of jurisdiction among authorities.

In the canton of Zurich, according to Art. 79 of the cantonal constitution, the administrative court has been reviewing cantonal decrees that are below the legal level since 2010 to determine whether they are compatible with superordinate law.


The State Court of Justice of the Principality of Liechtenstein (StGH) forms the constitutional court. "The State Court of Justice is considered the 'coronation' of the constitution of 1921. In fact, it was the first European constitutional court with comprehensive review powers with regard to the constitutionality of both final court decisions and laws and ordinances." The review of the constitutionality of laws and ordinances was already in Austria was introduced with the B-VG 1920. The review of all final court decisions was therefore a novelty in the Liechtenstein Constitution of 1921.

According to Art. 104 LV, the State Court of Justice is responsible for protecting the constitutionally guaranteed rights and for deciding on conflicts of jurisdiction between the courts and the administrative authorities. Finally, it also acts as a disciplinary tribunal for members of the government . The competence of the State Court also includes the examination of the constitutionality of laws and international treaties as well as the legality of government regulations. And lastly, it also serves as an electoral court.

“With the abundance of its powers, the Liechtenstein State Court was virtually unrivaled in international comparison for a long time. It was not until more than a quarter of a century later that the German Federal Constitutional Court emerged as a state body with similar competencies [...].


The Italian Constitutional Court ( Corte Costituzionale ) was introduced with the Republican Constitution of 1948. It consists of 15 judges, one third each of which is appointed by the President , Parliament and the highest ordinary and administrative courts. The judges' term of office is nine years.

The Constitutional Court has a strong position in the Italian political system . Above all, it decides

The Constitutional Court has had its seat in the Palazzo della Consulta on the Quirinal in Rome since 1955 .

Constitutional courts of other European countries


At the European level, there are two supranational courts that can check national laws for compliance with European law. Although their decisions are not based on a constitutional document, but on international treaty law, it is hardly disputed that these international treaties are to be included in substantive (European) constitutional law due to their extraordinarily great importance for the legal system. In this sense, it can be said that these courts exercise European constitutional jurisdiction for the respective contracting states.

United States of America

The US Supreme Court

All courts, ultimately the US Supreme Court, exercise a constitutional function in the US . Since the decision of Marbury v. Madison (1803), in which the Supreme Court granted the judiciary the right to review the constitutionality of laws, constitutional review in court form has become the model for many other constitutional courts. An important difference to the model of "concentrated" constitutional jurisdiction ( separation model ) that is prevalent in Europe is that there is no monopoly in a single specialized court (such as the German Federal Constitutional Court ), but every ordinary court incidentally (i.e. in an act of application of the law) has to check the constitutionality. Unconstitutional laws are therefore not formally repealed by the court in the USA (but according to Section 31 (2) BVerfGG), but simply ignored as "void" (no actual nullity in the legal sense).

Other constitutional courts worldwide

In the world there are other constitutional jurisdictions, for example in Thailand with particularly wide powers (see Thai Constitutional Court ).





  • Andreas Auer : Constitutional law of the Swiss cantons. Stämpfli, Bern 2016, pp. 591–623.
  • Martin Schubarth : Constitutional jurisdiction: comparative law, historical, political, sociological, legal-political; with the involvement of the European courts of law. 2nd, revised and expanded edition. Stämpfli, Bern 2017, ISBN 978-3-7272-0742-6 .

Web links

Wiktionary: Constitutional Court  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Individual evidence

  1. The country examples cited can be found in Birgit Enzmann, The Democratic Constitutional State Between Legitimationskonflikt und Deutungsoffenheit , Wiesbaden 2009, p. 34 ff.
  2. Gábor Halmai: highly problematic: Hungary's new constitution. In: Eastern Europe . Issue 12/2011, pp. 144–156.
  3. RGZ 111, 320
  4. Heiner Studer: 05.445 - Parliamentary initiative: constitutional jurisdiction. In: , October 7, 2005.
  5. Vreni Müller-Hemmi: 07.476 - Parliamentary initiative: Federal Constitution decisive for authorities that apply the law. In: , October 5, 2007.
  6. ^ No to constitutional jurisdiction , Neue Zürcher Zeitung , June 5, 2012.
  7. National councils sink proposals for constitutional jurisdiction , Basler Zeitung , December 4, 2012.
  8. Constitution of the Canton of Bern of June 6, 1993 (PDF; 226 kB)
  9. ^ Constitution of the canton of Nidwalden of October 10, 1965 (PDF; 193 kB)
  10. ^ Constitution of the Canton of Glarus of May 1, 1988 (PDF; 210 kB)
  11. ^ Constitution of the Canton of Aargau of June 25, 1980
  12. ^ Andreas Auer: Constitutional law of the Swiss cantons. Stämpfli, Bern 2016, pp. 600–602.
  13. ^ A b c d e Andreas Auer: Constitutional law of the Swiss cantons. Stämpfli, Bern 2016, p. 602.
  14. Constitution of the Canton of Basel-Stadt of March 23, 2005 (PDF; 185 kB)
  15. ^ A b c d e f Andreas Auer: Constitutional law of the Swiss cantons. Stämpfli, Bern 2016, p. 601.
  16. Constitution of the Canton of Basel-Landschaft from May 17, 1984 (PDF; 205 kB)
  17. Constitution de la République et canton de Genève of October 14, 2012
  18. ^ Constitution of the Canton of Graubünden from September 14, 2004
  19. ^ Constitution de la République et Canton du Jura of March 20, 1977
  20. Art. 69 of the constitution of the canton of Nidwalden of October 10, 1965
  21. See Constitution of the Canton of Schaffhausen of June 17, 2002
  22. ^ Constitution of the Canton of Vaud of April 14, 2003
  23. ^ Constitution of the Canton of Zurich of February 27, 2005
  24. Source: State Court of the Principality of Liechtenstein (ed.), 75 Years State Court of the Principality of Liechtenstein , Vaduz 2000, p. 7.
  25. Wolfram Höfling, Liechtensteinische Politische Schriften Nr. 20: Die Liechtensteinische Grundrechtordnung , quoted from: State Court of the Principality of Liechtenstein (ed.), 75 Years State Court of the Principality of Liechtenstein , Vaduz 2000, p. 7.