Constitutional procedural law (Germany)

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In German public law, constitutional procedural law includes the statutory provisions that regulate the formal course of legal proceedings before the constitutional courts . The judicial proceedings are concerned with the compatibility of sovereign measures with the constitution.

There is constitutional jurisdiction in Germany at both federal and state level. At the federal level, this is exercised by the Federal Constitutional Court based in Karlsruhe . The Federal Constitutional Court reviews measures for their compatibility with the Basic Law (GG). At the state level, the state constitutional courts monitor the standards of the respective state constitution .

Proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court

The types of proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court are regulated in the Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional Court Act (BVerfGG) and the Investigation Committee Act (PUAG). These legal sources finally list the types of proceedings that come into question before the Federal Constitutional Court. In contrast to other jurisdictions, the allocation of proceedings does not take place via a general clause , such as exists for administrative jurisdiction in Section 40 (1) sentence 1 of the Administrative Court Code .

As part of its proceedings, the Federal Constitutional Court's review is limited to checks based on the Basic Law. Therefore it is outside the regular instance train .

The proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court are tailored to different situations: In adversarial proceedings, several sovereigns argue about their rights and obligations. This includes the organ dispute proceedings. Objective complaint procedures, on the other hand, serve to check whether a measure is compatible with the Basic Law, independently of an individual case. This includes, for example, the abstract control of norms. Other procedures serve the judicial control of certain sovereign acts. This applies, for example, to the individual constitutional complaint with which a violation of fundamental rights can be alleged by an act of public authority.

The following proceedings are permitted before the Federal Constitutional Court:

Organ dispute proceedings

The organ dispute concerns a dispute over the scope of the rights and duties of the highest constitutional organs or their members. This is an adversarial procedure. In the context of an application in the organ dispute proceedings, a definition and delimitation of organizational rights and obligations takes place. An application in the organ dispute proceedings comes into question, for example, if a member of the Bundestag seeks a declaration that he has a right to information against the federal government .

Admissibility of an application

The main features of organ dispute proceedings are regulated in Art. 93 (1) number 1 GG and Section 13 (1) number 5 BVerfGG. These provisions are specified in § 63 - § 67 BVerfGG.

Party ability

Since the Organstreit proceedings are adversarial proceedings, the admissibility of an application presupposes that the applicant and the respondent are capable of participating.

Section 63 BVerfGG

The Federal President , the German Bundestag , the Bundesrat and the Federal Government as the highest federal organs are initially eligible to participate in organ dispute proceedings pursuant to Section 63 BVerfGG .

Furthermore, § 63 BVerfGG grants party capacity to those parts of the highest federal organs that have their own rights under the Basic Law or the rules of procedure of the Bundestag (GOBT), the Bundesrat (GOBR) or the federal government (GOBReg). This applies, for example, to parliamentary groups and recognized parliamentary groups as permanent subdivisions of parliament, to which the GOBT assigns numerous rights. The standing committees of the German Bundestag, which are provided for in Art. 45 , Art. 45a , Art. 45c of the Basic Law, are also capable of taking part . The President of the Bundestag , who, for example, pursuant to Article 40, Paragraph 2, Clause 1 of the Basic Law, is the holder of the domiciliary rights and the police force in the Reichstag building is still eligible to party . The President of the Bundesrat , to whom Art. 52 Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law grants a legal position, is also able to participate. The individual member of the Bundestag does not represent a part of a body as a member of a supreme federal body. This results from the fact that Section 22 (1) sentence 2 BVerfGG expressly does not regard members as part of the body.

Art. 93 paragraph 1 number 1 GG

According to its wording, Paragraph 63 of the BVerfGG is sometimes narrower than Art. 93 (1) number 1 of the Basic Law, which also sets out requirements for party eligibility. Since the Federal Constitutional Law court in the hierarchy is subordinate to the constitution, § 63 BVerfGG by numerous scientists right is made as to widen designed that the parties referred to only in Art. 93 paragraph 1, number 1 GG are a party to. Others consider § 63 BVerfGG to be partially unconstitutional and void.

According to Art. 93, Paragraph 1, Number 1 of the Basic Law, all the highest federal organs are capable of forming a party. In addition to the bodies mentioned in § 63 BVerfGG, these include the Joint Committee ( Art. 53a GG), the Federal Assembly ( Art. 54 GG) and the Federal Audit Office ( Art. 114 GG). The Federal Constitutional Court is not party to any party: although it is a supreme federal body, it should not have to decide on its own dispute in which it is itself involved.

Other parties involved are eligible to participate as long as they have their own rights under the Basic Law or the rules of procedure of a supreme federal body. According to the prevailing view in jurisprudence, the concept of the other party is to be interpreted restrictively in such a way that it only covers bodies that have a similar meaning to a supreme federal body.

According to Art. 93, Paragraph 1, Number 1 of the Basic Law, individual members of the Bundestag are eligible to participate, since the Basic Law attaches numerous rights to the status of a member. This includes in particular the free mandate , which follows from Article 38, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2 of the Basic Law and forms the basis of the parliamentary activity of the Member. The free mandate is concretized by numerous provisions in the GOBT, such as Section 16, Paragraph 1, Clause 1 of the GOBT, which grants the MPs the right to inspect and submit files .

Art. 21 GG gives political parties an organizational legal status . This guarantees the right to set up and operate freely. Art. 21 GG also guarantees equal treatment compared to other political parties.

The President of the Bundestag ( Art. 40 GG), the President of the Bundesrat ( Art. 52 GG) and the members of the Federal Government ( Art. 63 - Art. 65a ) are also eligible to participate . Minorities within an organ are also eligible to participate, provided they have their own rights. This applies, for example, to the minority of a quarter of the members of the Bundestag who, according to Article 44, Paragraph 1, Clause 1 of the Basic Law, have the right to have the Bundestag set up a committee of inquiry . The mediation committee , to which Art. 77 paragraph 2 GG grants its own rights, is also capable of taking part .

The states are not party to any dispute, as the federal-state dispute is the priority procedure for disputes between the state and the federal government . The same applies to private individuals who can enforce their rights by filing an individual constitutional complaint.

Process capability

The process capability refers to the ability to perform within a trial process actions. Unlike other procedural codes, the Federal Constitutional Court Act does not contain any relevant provisions. Since the process capability in other processing needs with the capacity corresponds, the general view assumes in jurisprudence that legal capacity are competent to stand trial even before the Federal Constitutional Court. Associations of persons and state bodies are represented in the process by their legal representatives .

Postulation ability

According to § 22 Paragraph 1 Clause 1 BVerfGG, the parties must be represented by lawyers or law teachers at a university with a qualification for judicial office during the oral hearing in court . Certain state bodies can also be represented by their members or civil servants in accordance with Section 22 Paragraph 1 Clause 2 and 3 BVerfGG .

Subject of dispute

Pursuant to Section 64 (1) of the BVerfGG, the organ dispute proceedings concern an action or omission on the part of the respondent. The refusal of the federal government to answer a parliamentary request for information is, for example, a typical subject of the application. The failure of the Bundestag to participate in a decision is also a recurring subject matter. Furthermore, the enactment or non-enactment of a law can represent a suitable subject matter.

The demarcation between action and omission can cause considerable difficulties in individual cases. The Federal Constitutional Court therefore refrains from requesting a demarcation by the applicant.

In the opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court, it is necessary for the acceptance of a suitable subject of dispute that the challenged measure or omission is legally relevant. This applies if the behavior of the respondent is likely to impair the constitutional position of the applicant. This can be missing, for example, in the case of mere expressions of opinion . An omission is only legally relevant if there is a possibility that the respondent is obliged to act. For example, Article 82, Paragraph 1, Clause 1 of the Basic Law gives rise to the obligation of the Federal President to draft a law. Failure to draft a law by the Bundestag can also constitute a suitable subject of dispute, provided that the law serves to protect rights conveyed by the constitution.

Authority to apply

Pursuant to Section 64 (1) BVerfGG, the admissibility of an application in organ dispute proceedings also requires that the applicant asserts that he or the organ to which he belongs has violated the rights and obligations assigned to him by the Basic Law through a measure or omission by the defendant or is in immediate danger.

The feature of the authority to file an application expresses that the Organstreit proceedings do not aim at an objective review of legality, but serve to protect the rights of organs. It serves in particular to reject applications that are unsuccessful from the outset as inadmissible and thus to spare the Federal Constitutional Court a time-consuming examination of the merits.

If the applicant objects to an act, he must demonstrate that he is entitled to a legal position that the respondent violates. If, on the other hand, he attacks an omission, he must assert that he has a right to the action of the defendant. The relevant right of the applicant must be rooted in the Basic Law. It is therefore not sufficient if a legal position results only from simple law. It is therefore necessary that the parties involved quarrel within the framework of a constitutional relationship.

Section 64 (1) BVerfGG allows members of the organs to assert a right of the organ to which they belong by means of litigation . This serves to protect minorities. This option is only available to the applicants named in Section 63 VerfGG. For example, a parliamentary group in the Bundestag can assert rights of the Bundestag in the organ dispute proceedings. For the purpose of effective protection of minorities, this can also be considered if the majority in the Bundestag does not want to initiate an organ dispute procedure. Individual members of the Bundestag, on the other hand, are denied the possibility of standing in litigation, since they are only capable of taking part in a party in accordance with Art.

There is no authorization to submit an application if the alleged infringement is obviously ruled out. It therefore only exists insofar as the infringement appears at least possible. This requires a conclusive presentation by the applicant.

Form and deadline

An application for organ dispute proceedings must be submitted in writing to the court in accordance with Section 23 (1) sentence 1 BVerfGG. This requires a signature by the applicant. According to Section 23 (1) sentence 2 BVerfGG, he must also provide a reason. Paragraph 64 (2) of the BVerfGG stipulates that the applicant must name the legal norm of which he is complaining about being violated.

The application deadline is six months in accordance with Section 64 (3) BVerfGG. Legal peace is to be promoted through the binding of deadlines . The calculation of the deadline is carried out analogously to § 187 - § 193 of the Civil Code . The period begins at the moment when the applicant becomes aware of the challenged act or omission of the defendant. If the applicant fails to do so, this usually occurs if the respondent shows that he does not want to take the action requested by the applicant. A reinstatement in the previous status is excluded.

Need for legal protection

The need for legal protection is an unwritten admissibility requirement for the application. It is present when the applicant has a legitimate interest in judicial protection. As a rule, the existence of the need for legal protection is indicated by the existence of the authorization to apply. As an exception, it is missing if the applicant could have avoided the stated violation through his own political action, if he can implement his right more quickly and easily in another way or if a court decision ultimately does not result in any advantage for the applicant.

Justification of an application

If the application in organ dispute proceedings is admissible, the Federal Constitutional Court examines its merits. This occurs if the subject of the application violates a constitutional right of the applicant.

The subject of the application is action

If the applicant attacks an act, this constitutes a violation of the law insofar as the opponent has interfered with a right of the applicant and this interference is not justified.

If, for example, the Federal President dissolves the Bundestag as a result of a failed vote of confidence , he thereby encroaches on the MP's right under Article 38 (1) sentence 2 GG in conjunction with Article 39 (1) sentence 1 GG to belong to the Bundestag during the current legislative period .

The possibility of justifying an interference can result expressly from a standard of the Basic Law or from its interpretation. In the case of the dissolution of the Bundestag, there is an express justification, for example, from Article 68, Paragraph 1, Sentence 1 of the Basic Law, provided that the factual requirements of this norm are met and the dissolution corresponds to the purpose of the norm.

The subject of the application is omission

If the applicant attacks an omission, the application is justified insofar as he has a right to the action of the opponent.

The basis for claims results from the Basic Law as well as from simple laws which substantiate a claim laid down in the Basic Law. For example, results from 44 Art. GG and the rules of PUAG a right to information a committee of inquiry to organs of the executive branch . According to Art. 82, Paragraph 1, Clause 1 of the Basic Law, legislative bodies have the right to have the Federal President draw up a law. Finally, from Article 38, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2 of the Basic Law, the MP has a right to information against the Federal Government.

The asserted claim exists if all of the factual requirements of the basis of the claim are met and the defendant is not allowed to refuse fulfillment. For example, the addressee of a parliamentary request for information can refuse to provide information if the request touches on a matter that falls within the core area of ​​executive personal responsibility .

Decision of the court

In accordance with Section 67 sentence 1 BVerfGG, the Federal Constitutional Court determines in its decision whether the subject of the application violates a provision of the Basic Law. The decision is limited to a determinative effect, so it has no legal character. However, since a judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court is binding on the entire state authority in accordance with Section 31 (1) of the Basic Law, it regularly forces the defendant to react if it is successful.

Federal-state dispute

The federal-state dispute is an adversarial procedure between the federal government and a federal state. It serves to protect the federal structure of Germany. Structurally, it is closely related to the organ dispute procedure, as it also has a dispute about the delimitation of competencies as its subject. While the parties involved in the organ dispute argue about organ competencies , there is disagreement between the parties involved in the federal-state dispute about the authority of the association . Such a dispute can arise, for example, with regard to the federal authority to issue instructions within the framework of federal contract administration under Article 85 (3) sentence 1 of the Basic Law.

The main features of the federal-state dispute are regulated in Article 93 (1) number 3 of the Basic Law and Section 13 (1) number 7 of the BVerfGG. These provisions are specified in § 68 - 70 BVerfGG.

According to Section 69 BVerfGG, the admissibility requirements for the federal-state dispute largely correspond to those of the organ dispute proceedings. Only the federal government and one state are eligible to participate. The federal and respective state governments act as their representatives in the process in accordance with Section 68 BVerfGG.

The application is justified if the respondent has violated a right of the applicant through an act or failure to act. The constitutionality of an instruction from a supreme federal authority presupposes, for example, that it is responsible for the subject area concerned, that the assigned supreme state authority is heard beforehand, that the instruction is clear, complies with the contractual relationship and does not constitute a gross violation of the constitution.

Abstract norm control

As part of an abstract review of norms, the Federal Constitutional Court examines the compatibility of a legal norm with higher-ranking law, independently of an individual case . The purpose of this process is to promote legal certainty and peace. The abstract control of norms was already provided for in the Paulskirche constitution of 1849. However, it was only explicitly included in a German constitution when the Basic Law came into force.

Admissibility of an application

The abstract control of norms is regulated in its main features in Art. 93 (1) number 2 GG and Section 13 (1) number 6 BVerfGG. These provisions are made more concrete by § 76 - § 79 BVerfGG.

Eligibility to apply

Pursuant to Section 76 (1) BVerfGG, the federal government, a state government and a quarter of the members of the Bundestag are entitled to apply. The parliamentary group membership of the parties involved is irrelevant for the eligibility of the members of the Bundestag. The governments are only entitled to apply as a whole, which is why an application requires a corresponding cabinet decision.

Since the abstract norm control procedure is an objective complaint procedure, there is no defendant.

Subject of the application

Any legal norm can be the subject of an application for an abstract norm review. Federal or state laws in particular come into question . This also includes only formal laws , such as budget laws . Sub- legal norms are also a suitable subject matter. These include statutory ordinances and statutes . State constitutional law can also be checked with the help of an abstract norm control. Also common law may be the subject of a standard control request, as the reparation of enteignendem engagement . Also general rules of international law may be an abstract subject of judicial review, as this according to Art. 25 sentence 1 of the Basic Law shall apply as federal law. Finally, collective agreements be reviewed in the context of a judicial review, in accordance with § 5 of the Collective Agreement Act for generally binding were. On the other hand, administrative provisions that do not have the quality of a legal norm due to a lack of external impact are not a suitable subject of the application . Even international treaty law cannot be examined within the framework of the abstract control of norms.

In principle, a standard can only be checked as soon as it has become valid, which is to be assumed in any case as soon as the standard has come into force. Before it comes into force ( vacatio legis ), the norm can be checked as soon as it has been countersigned in accordance with Art. 82, Paragraph 1, Clause 1 of the Basic Law and has been announced in the Federal Law Gazette, i.e. the norm makes a claim to validity. A preventive control of norms is therefore excluded, i.e. the review of the norm while the proposed law can still be shaped by those involved in the constitution. Since the Federal President has no substantive influence on the proposed law, but has the authority to review evident deficiencies with regard to its constitutionality, the standard can only claim validity once it has passed the legislative procedure by way of execution and promulgation. The case is different with an act of consent to an international treaty: A norm review procedure is permitted against this as soon as all essential resolutions, i.e. the resolutions of the Bundestag and, if necessary, the Bundesrat, have been passed in the legislative process. This exception is based on the fact that with the entry into force of the Consent Act, a binding effect under international law is created that can no longer be lifted by a later judicial review.

Reason for application

A reason for the application is required for the application to be admissible. According to Art. 93, Paragraph 1, Number 2 of the Basic Law, this exists if the applicant presents differences of opinion or doubts about the constitutionality of the challenged legal norm. The applicant's application must therefore give rise to an interest in the Federal Constitutional Court deciding on the constitutional conformity of the legal norm.

The requirement of Art. 93 Paragraph 1 Number 2 GG is taken up and refined in Section 76 Paragraph 1 BVerfGG. The regulation distinguishes between the application for rejection of the standard and the application for confirmation of the standard.

Pursuant to Section 76 (1) No. 1 BVerfGG, the application for rejection of the norm requires that the applicant consider the norm to be null and void. The prevailing view in jurisprudence considers the existence of disagreements or doubts to be sufficient, however, since the Basic Law is above the Federal Constitutional Court Act in the hierarchy of legal norms. In contrast, the Federal Constitutional Court sees Section 76 (1) number 1 BVerfGG as a permissible specification of Article 93 (1) number 2 GG.

According to Section 76 (1) No. 2 BVerfGG, the application for confirmation of the standard requires that the applicant considers a standard to be valid even though a court or authority did not apply a standard because it assumed that it violated the Basic Law or simple federal law. In legal practice, the standard confirmation procedure is extremely rare.

Clarification interest

The clarification interest exists if there is a legitimate interest in the judicial review of the standard. This is lacking, for example, if the challenged norm has no legal effect or if its constitutionality has already been checked.

Form and deadline

A proper application to the Federal Constitutional Court is required for an abstract review of norms. This must be done in writing in accordance with Section 23 (1) BVerfGG and include a reason. In this, the applicant must explain why he assumes that the challenged legal norm is incompatible with higher-ranking law. A deadline bond is not due to the nature of abstract judicial review as an objective complaint procedures.

Justification of an application

An application for an abstract norm review is justified if the norm in question is incompatible with higher-ranking law. If the application is directed against federal law, the court will review its compatibility with the Basic Law. When checking state law, the examination extends to the compatibility of the legal norm with the entire federal law. A norm is compatible with higher-ranking law, provided it does not contradict this.

For example, the constitutionality of a formal law requires that it is formally and materially compatible with constitutional law. A legal sentence is formally constitutional if the normative authority had the legislative competence , a proper legislative procedure was carried out and it was promulgated according to the formal requirements. Materially constitutional is a norm that does not conflict with the constitution in terms of content. In the case of constitution-amending laws , the substantive examination according to Art. 79 Paragraph 3 GG is limited to the compatibility with the fundamental constitutional principles of Art. 1 GG and Art. 20 GG.

Decision of the court

If the challenged norm turns out to be formally or materially unconstitutional, the court decides in the operative part of its decision in accordance with § 78 Paragraph 1 BVerfGG that the norm is unconstitutional and therefore void since it came into force . If the breach only affects a part of the law that can be separated from the rest of the law, the court can determine that only this part is void. In the event of a violation of a procedural provision of the Basic Law, the court only makes a declaration of invalidity if the error is obvious. If this is missing, the court will determine that the norm is not compatible with the Basic Law. The court also restricts itself to such a determination if the subject of the application violates an equality law, since the standard giver can remedy such a violation in different ways. If the subject of the application proves to be constitutional, the Federal Constitutional Court will expressly state this. The court makes a corresponding determination after reviewing state law to determine whether it is compatible with federal law.

The court decision has the force of law in accordance with Section 31 (2) sentence 1 BVerfGG.

Competence control procedure

The competence control procedure according to Art. 93 Paragraph 1 No. 2a GG, § 13 No. 6a BVerfGG represents a sub-form of the abstract norm control. This procedure was introduced by law of October 27, 1994. It ties in with the needs competence of the federal government according to Art. 72 paragraph 2 GG. According to this, the federal government only has legislative competence in selected matters if there is a need for a uniform federal regulation. As part of the competence control procedure, a law is checked to determine whether such a need exists. According to Section 76 (2) BVerfGG, it can also be checked whether a law is moving within the framework of the legislative competence under Article 75 (2) of the Basic Law, which was abolished in the course of the federalism reform of 2006 .

According to Section 76 (2) BVerfGG, the Federal Council, a state government and a state parliament are entitled to apply. The subject of the application is a formal federal law. A reason for an application exists if there are differences of opinion between the applicant and the federal government about the existence of the need. An application in the competence control procedure is justified if the requirements of Art. 72 Paragraph 2 and Art. 75 Paragraph 2 GG are not met.

Concrete control of norms

As part of a specific norm control, a legal norm is examined for its compatibility with higher-ranking law. This procedure is the most common in judicial practice after the constitutional complaint. The concrete norm control differs from the abstract norm control in that the application comes from a court, which has to decide on an individual case. As part of the specific review of norms, it can check whether a norm that is important in decision-making is effective by submitting it to the Federal Constitutional Court for review. The control procedure before the Federal Constitutional Court is necessary, since this alone is entitled to declare formal federal law unconstitutional.

The basic control of norms is regulated in Art. 100, Paragraph 1, Clause 1 of the Basic Law and Section 13, Paragraph 1, Number 11 of the BVerfGG. These provisions are specified in § 80 - § 82a BVerfGG.

Every German court is entitled to apply. Any law that cannot be rejected by specialized courts can be considered as the subject of the application. This applies to formal federal and state laws. The subject of specific norm control can only be norms that were enacted after the Basic Law came into force or that were subsequently confirmed by the legislature. According to Art. 100, Paragraph 1, Clause 1 of the Basic Law, the referring court must continue to consider the norm to be unconstitutional. In the case of state law, there may also be an incompatibility with other federal law. Sufficient conviction of the ineffectiveness of the standard presupposes that there is no possibility of interpreting the legal standard in a compliant manner. After all, the norm must be relevant to the decision of an ongoing legal dispute in the court. This is true if the court were to make a different decision, the norm would be ineffective. In its application, the court must explain this in accordance with Section 80 (2) BVerfGG, with a comprehensive discussion of the applicable legal situation.

If the submitted norm turns out to be unconstitutional, the Federal Constitutional Court declares it null and void, as in the case of an application for an abstract norm review, or establishes its incompatibility with the Basic Law. The same applies to the review of state law against the standard of other federal law.

Individual constitutional complaint

With an individual constitutional complaint, a person can complain that he has been violated by an act of public authority in a fundamental right or a right equivalent to fundamental rights . This procedure aims to ensure that these rights are enforced and developed as effectively as possible. The constitutional complaint is by far the most frequent procedure before the Federal Constitutional Court. It takes up around 96% of all pending proceedings there. Its number rose to just under 6,000 per year by 2017.

Admissibility of an application

The basic features of the individual constitutional complaint are regulated in Art. 93 (1) No. 4a of the Basic Law and Section 13, No. 8a of the BVerfGG. These provisions are specified in § 90 - § 95a BVerfGG.

Ability to complain

Anyone who is the bearer of the fundamental right or the equivalent of a fundamental right can appeal. Fundamental rights include all subjective rights that are guaranteed in the first section of the Basic Law (Art. 1-Art. 19 GG), such as freedom of occupation ( Art. 12 Paragraph 1 GG) and the guarantee of property ( Art. 14 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 GG) . The rights that stand outside the first section of the Basic Law and guarantee subjective rights are equal to fundamental rights. This applies, for example, to the right of resistance ( Art. 20, Paragraph 4, Basic Law) and the right to conduct a lawful selection procedure when awarding public offices ( Art. 33, Basic Law).

Some fundamental rights are open to every natural person. Others only protect Germans. According to Art. 19 Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law, an association of persons is capable of fundamental rights if it has its seat in Germany and the asserted right can be meaningfully transferred to it in terms of content. No fundamental rights holders are sovereign holders, since they are obliged to fundamental rights. Members of parliament have fundamental rights as long as they do not defend their parliamentary status but rely on subjective rights. Such is the case, for example, in Article 47 sentence 1 of the Basic Law, which grants the delegate the right to refuse to testify .

Subject of the complaint

According to Article 1, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law, the basic rights bind the entire public authority. Therefore, any act of public authority, i.e. measures or omissions by the legislature, executive and judiciary, can be considered as the subject of a complaint.

Authority to complain

The complainant is entitled to lodge a complaint if he claims that he has been violated by an act of public authority in a fundamental right or a right equivalent to fundamental rights. The right to lodge a complaint does not apply if a violation of the law is obviously excluded.

The principle of subsidiarity

Before the complainant files a constitutional complaint, he must have exhausted all legal recourse available to him. If his complaint is directed against an administrative act , for example , he must have previously unsuccessfully attacked it through the entire administrative process. If he complains about the violation of the guarantee of the right to be heard ( Art. 103 (1) GG), he must first raise a complaint against the hearing . If he complains about the duration of the proceedings, he must first defend himself against this with an action for compensation. There is no legal recourse against formal laws.

According to the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, the constitutional complaint should be the ultima ratio. It therefore demands that the complainant has exhausted all possibilities beyond taking legal action to enforce his interest. If the constitutional complaint is directed against a law, for example, the complainant must first work towards an incidental review of the norm by a specialized court.

Form and deadline

The constitutional complaint is subject to a time limit. If the complainant attacks a final and final court decision, the deadline pursuant to Section 93 (1) sentence 1 BVerfGG is one month from the notification of the decision to the complainant. If he attacks a law, this is possible within one year from the promulgation of the law in accordance with Section 93 (3) BVerfGG.

Justification of an application

The constitutional complaint is well founded if the challenged measure violates a fundamental right or a right of the complainant that is equivalent to fundamental rights. If he complains about the violation of a right to freedom, this is violated if there is interference in its area of ​​protection and this is not justified. If he complains about the violation of a right of equality, it is justified if there is unequal treatment for which there is no sufficient legal reason.

If the complainant attacks a legal clause, the Federal Constitutional Court checks whether it is compatible with fundamental rights. Here the court carries out a comprehensive examination of the legal principle, since an unconstitutional law that burdens the complainant violates at least Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law.

When reviewing a court judgment, the Federal Constitutional Court restricts itself to examining the violation of constitutional law. Unlike specialized courts, the Federal Constitutional Court does not carry out checks based on the constitution of subordinate law. A court violates constitutional law to the extent that it bases its judgment on an unconstitutional law. It is also unconstitutional if it fails to recognize the thematic relevance of a fundamental right or applies it incorrectly.

Decision of the court

If the subject of the complaint violates a fundamental right or a right equivalent to a fundamental right, the Federal Constitutional Court shall determine this in accordance with Section 95 (1) sentence 1 BVerfGG. In the event of a successful constitutional complaint, the court will revoke the challenged decision in accordance with Section 95 (2) BVerfGG and refer the matter back to a competent court. If a legal sentence proves to be unconstitutional, the Federal Constitutional Court declares it null and void in accordance with Section 95 (3) BVerfGG.

Local constitutional complaint

The municipal constitutional complaint is based on the individual constitutional complaint. It enables municipalities and municipal associations to take action against violations of the guarantee of local self-government . This guarantee is guaranteed at federal level by Article 28, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1 of the Basic Law. It ensures that the community regulates local community affairs on its own responsibility.

Election review complaint

The election review complaint is used to check the validity of an election. According to Art. 93 Paragraph 1 Number 5, Section 13 Number 3 BVerfGG, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court. It is elaborated in more detail in Art. 41 GG and Section 48 BVerfGG.

According to Article 41, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law, the election review complaint is linked to prior control of an election by the Bundestag. Before the complainant turns to the Constitutional Court, he must appeal against the election to the Bundestag. In accordance with Section 48 (1) of the BVerfGG, the complaint can be lodged by a member of parliament whose membership in the Bundestag is disputed, a Bundestag minority of at least 10%, a parliamentary group and a person entitled to vote or a group of them. The subject of the appeal is the rejection of the objection to the election. In accordance with Section 48 (1) BVerfGG, there is a two-month period for the election review complaint, the expiry of which begins with the adoption of the Bundestag resolution. Furthermore, there must be a legal interest in reviewing the election. This is missing if a decision can no longer influence the distribution of seats in the Bundestag, for example because the legislative period ends.

An election examination complaint is justified if there is an election error. Such can result from the wrong application or from the unconstitutionality of federal electoral law. For example, the case law assessed the use of voting computers as an election error , the functioning of which could not be adequately controlled by the public. If there is an election error, this is only significant if it has affected the distribution of mandates.

If there is a considerable error in the implementation of the election, the election must be repeated in the constituency concerned . If, however, the right to vote is unconstitutional, the right to vote must be changed and a new election carried out. However, this is unnecessary if a new election does not take place within the next six months.

Presidential charge

The main features of the presidential indictment are laid down in Art. 61 and are further elaborated in § 49 - § 57 BVerfGG. The German Bundestag and the Bundesrat can use it to attack an intentional violation of the Basic Law or another federal law by the Federal President . According to Article 61 (2) sentence 1 of the Basic Law, the procedure can result in the Federal President being removed from his office. It is the only procedure that enables this. In accordance with Section 5 of the Federal President's Pension Act , in the event of a presidential charge, the Federal Constitutional Court decides whether and in what amount the pension will be paid.

So far there have been no proceedings in legal practice under Article 61 of the Basic Law. In the course of the Wulff affair , a public discussion about the presidential charge was initiated for the first time in early 2012. With the resignation of the Federal President shortly afterwards, this discussion ended immediately.

Fundamental rights enforcement proceedings

Art. 18 GG provides for the possibility that selected basic rights can be forfeited because theyare abusedto fight against the free democratic basic order . This requires a prognosis to the effect that the defendant poses a threat to the constitutional order. So far, four unsuccessful applications for the forfeiture of fundamental rights have been made.

Prohibition of party proceedings

According to Art. 21, Paragraph 2, Clause 2 of the Basic Law, Section 13, No. 2 of the BVerfGG, the German Bundestag, the Bundesrat and the Federal Government can initiate proceedings to prohibit parties before the Federal Constitutional Court. This is justified if the activity of a party leads to a concrete danger for the existence of the free democratic basic order.

Since the Basic Law came into force in 1949, there have been two successful party prohibition proceedings. In 1952 the Socialist Reich Party (SRP) was banned, in 1956 the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). In both cases, the goals of the parties were judged to be unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court. In 2001 prohibition proceedings were initiated against the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), but due to procedural errors. A second prohibition application was rejected in January 2017 to be unfounded: the NPD was indeed unconstitutional , essentially related with the Nazism and wanted " the existing constitutional order by one on the ethnically defined national community oriented authoritarian nation-state replace ", but make currently considering its insignificance in the political process not represent a concrete threat to the free democratic basic order.

Judge charge

According to Art. 98 (2) GG, § 13 No. 9 BVerfGG, the Federal Constitutional Court decides on the indictment of a federal judge. Such a decision can be issued if a judge violates the principles of the Basic Law or the constitutional order of a country. in this case the Bundestag can request that the judge be given early retirement or, in the case of willful conduct, dismissed. According to Art. 98, Paragraph 5 of the Basic Law, the states can provide that regional judges can also be indicted before the Federal Constitutional Court.

Complaint about the establishment of a committee of inquiry

According to § 13 number 11a BVerfGG, § 36 paragraph 2 PUAG, the Federal Constitutional Court decides whether a decision by the Bundestag on the establishment of an investigative committee is compatible with the Basic Law.

Standard verification procedure

The main features of the standard verification procedure are regulated in Art. 100 Paragraph 2 GG, § 13 No. 12 BVerfGG. It can be used to check whether a general rule of international law exists and whether it is legally binding. According to Art. 25 sentence 1 GG, general rules of international law have the rank of federal law, but take precedence over other laws. Verification proceedings can be initiated by a court which, in order to resolve a legal dispute, is dependent on the decision on the validity of a rule of international law.

Provisional order

According to Section 32 (1) BVerfGG, the Federal Constitutional Court can issue an interim order as part of a procedure . This is an addition to another procedure called the main thing. This can prevent the current situation from changing until the decision of the court in the main matter in such a way that the decision has no or only reduced value for the applicant.

Admissibility of an application

An application for the issuance of an interim order is permissible if there is a dispute which is the responsibility of the Federal Constitutional Court to clarify. A dispute exists if a constitutional dispute has become so condensed that it can be expected that it will be resolved by an application before the Federal Constitutional Court.

The eligibility to apply in the procedure according to § 32 BVerfGG is assessed according to the eligibility to apply in the main matter. There is a reason to apply if the temporary injunction is urgently required in order to prevent significant disadvantages.

Finally, the issue of an interim order must not lead to the main issue being anticipated. Exceptionally, this is permissible if the order is necessary to enable effective legal protection.

Justification of an application

An application for a temporary injunction is justified if there is a reason for the injunction. The Federal Constitutional Court regularly examines its existence in two steps: First, it examines whether the main application is obviously inadmissible or unfounded. If neither is the case, the court will weigh up the consequences. In doing so, it compares the consequences of issuing the order if the main matter is unsuccessful with the consequences of not issuing an order if the main matter is successful.

Decision of the court

If the application is admissible and well-founded, the court will issue an interim order. According to § 31 BVerfGG, this binds the entire state authority. The order remains in force for a maximum of six months in accordance with Section 32 (6) sentence 1 BVerfGG.

Proceedings on differences of opinion about the continuation of law as federal law

According to Art. 126 GG, § 13 No. 14 BVerfGG, the Federal Constitutional Court decides whether law that was enacted before the Basic Law came into force continues to apply as federal law. In legal practice, this procedure was of practical importance in the 1950s and 1960s. The Federal Constitutional Court decided in 1972 on the last procedure under Article 126 of the Basic Law.

Tabular overview of the procedures

Type of procedure Regulation in the GG Number in the catalog of § 13 BVerfGG More details in the third part of the BVerfGG
Fundamental rights enforcement proceedings Art. 18 sentence 2 1 § 36 - § 42
Prohibition of party proceedings Art. 21 paragraph 2 sentence 2 2 § 43 - § 47
Election review complaint Art. 41 paragraph 1 sentence 1, paragraph 2 3 Section 48
Complaint against the non-recognition as a party to the federal election Art. 93 paragraph 1 number 4c 3a Section 96a - Section 96d
Presidential charge Art. 61 4th Section 49 - Section 57
Organ dispute proceedings Art. 93 paragraph 1 number 1 5 § 63 - § 67
Abstract norm control Art. 93 paragraph 1 number 2 6th § 76 - § 79
Abstract control of norms on the prerequisites of Art. 72 Abs. 2 GG Art. 93 paragraph 1 number 2a 6a § 76 - § 79
Abstract norm control over the further existence of the necessity of a federal legal regulation Art. 93 paragraph 1 number. 2 6b Section 97
Federal-state dispute Art. 93 paragraph 1 number 3 7th Section 68 - Section 70
Other public law disputes between the federal government and the states, between different states or within a state Art. 93 paragraph 1 number 4 8th § 71 - § 72
Individual constitutional complaint Art. 93 paragraph 1 number 4a 8a § 90 - § 95a
Local constitutional complaint Art. 93 paragraph 1 number 4ab 8a § 91
Judge charges against federal or regional judges Art. 98 paragraph 2, 5 9 § 58 - § 62
State constitutional disputes by virtue of state law allocation Art. 99 10 § 73 - § 75
Concrete control of norms Art. 100 paragraph 1 GG 11 § 80 - § 82a
Complaint about the establishment of a committee of inquiry - 11a § 80 - § 82a
Procedure for reviewing a rule of international law as part of federal law Art. 100 paragraph 2 12 § 83 - § 84
Proceedings on the interpretation of the Basic Law on presentation of a state constitutional court Art. 100 paragraph 3 13 § 85
Proceedings on differences of opinion about the continuation of law as federal law Art. 126 14th § 86 - § 89
Other cases assigned by federal law Art. 93 paragraph 3 15th

Proceedings before the state constitutional courts

The proceedings before the state constitutional courts are based on the respective state constitution and the state laws of the individual federal states . The procedure on the constitutional complaint before the BayVerfGH essentially corresponds to the procedure before the BVerfG and only differs in the following four points:

  • The deadline for filing a constitutional complaint is two months
  • The BayVerfGH can impose an advance on costs of a maximum of € 1,500.00 on the complainant in accordance with Art. 27 (1) BayVerfGHG . In this case, the proceedings before the BayVerfGH will only be continued if the complainant pays this advance payment.
  • The hearing of the Bavarian Ministry of Justice is mandatory, the Ministry of Justice can comment on the procedure or waive an opinion and finally
  • The decisions of the BayVerfGH must always be justified, even if they are obviously unfounded.

literature

  • Ernst Benda, Eckart Klein, Oliver Klein: Constitutional procedural law: a teaching and manual . 3. Edition. Müller, Heidelberg 2012, ISBN 978-3-8114-8080-3 .
  • Roland Fleury: constitutional procedural law . 10th edition. Franz Vahlen, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-8006-4976-1 .
  • Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional procedural law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 .
  • Christian Pestalozza: Constitutional procedural law . 3. Edition. CH Beck, Munich 1991, ISBN 3-406-33035-5 .
  • Michael Sachs: constitutional procedural law . 4th edition. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2016, ISBN 978-3-8252-4705-8 .

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ BVerfGE 20, 18 (23) : Accession in the Organstreit proceedings.
  2. ↑ BVerfGE 126, 55 (67) : G8 summit Heiligendamm.
  3. ↑ a b c BVerfGE, decision of November 7, 2017, 2 BvE 2/11 = New Journal for Administrative Law 2018, p. 51.
  4. ↑ a b BVerfGE 137, 185 : Arms export.
  5. ↑ BVerfGE 67, 100 (124) : Flick Investigation Committee.
  6. ↑ BVerfGE 83, 304 (318) .
  7. ↑ BVerfGE 2, 143 (160) : EVG contract.
  8. ^ Klaus Schlaich, Stefan Korioth: The Federal Constitutional Court: position, procedure, decisions . 10th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-68196-7 , Section 2, Rn. 88
  9. ↑ BVerfGE 90, 286 (343) : Out-of-area operations.
  10. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 333.
  11. ↑ Max-Emanuel Geis, Heidrun Meier: Basic cases for organ dispute proceedings, Art. 93 I No. 1 GG, §§ 13 No. 5, 63ff. BVerfGG . In: Juristische Schulung 2011, p. 699 (701).
  12. ^ Christoph Gröpl: Staatsrecht I: State foundations, state organization, constitutional process . 9th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-71257-9 , Rn. 1504.
  13. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 338-339.
  14. ↑ Andreas Voßkuhle: Art. 93 , Rn. 103. In: Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein, Christian Starck (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law . 6th edition. tape 3 . Articles 83 to 146. Vahlen, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-8006-3730-0 .
  15. ↑ Herbert Bethge: § 63 , Rn. 41. In: Theodor Maunz, Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Franz Klein, Herbert Bethge (eds.): Federal Constitutional Court Act. Basic work . 52nd edition. CH Beck, Munich 1992, ISBN 3-406-35131-X .
  16. ↑ BVerfGE 13, 54 (96) : Restructuring of Hesse.
  17. ↑ Ernst Benda, Eckart Klein, Oliver Klein: Constitutional law: a teaching and manual . 3. Edition. Müller, Heidelberg 2012, ISBN 978-3-8114-8080-3 , Rn. 1007
  18. ↑ BVerfGE 124, 161 (184) : Monitoring of members of the Bundestag.
  19. ↑ Ernst Benda, Eckart Klein, Oliver Klein: Constitutional law: a teaching and manual . 3. Edition. Müller, Heidelberg 2012, ISBN 978-3-8114-8080-3 , Rn. 1012.
  20. ↑ BVerfGE 4, 27 : Political parties' legal standing.
  21. ↑ BVerfGE 110, 403 (405) .
  22. ↑ BVerfGE 44, 125 (136) : Public Relations.
  23. ↑ Hans Klein: Art. 44 , Rn. 61. In: Theodor Maunz, Günter Dürig (Ed.): Basic Law . 81st edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-45862-0 .
  24. ^ Klaus Schlaich, Stefan Korioth: The Federal Constitutional Court: position, procedure, decisions . 10th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-68196-7 , Section 2, Rn. 89.
  25. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 342-343.
  26. ↑ BVerfGE 140, 160 : Evacuation from Libya.
  27. ↑ BVerfGE 118, 277 (317) : Constitutional status of members of the Bundestag.
  28. ↑ BVerfGE 1, 208 (220) : 7.5% blocking clause.
  29. ↑ BVerfGE 137, 185 (223): Arms export.
  30. ↑ BVerfGE 97, 408 (414) : Gysi I.
  31. ↑ a b BVerfGE 103, 81 (86) : Pofalla I.
  32. ↑ BVerfGE 2, 143 (168) : EVG contract.
  33. ↑ BVerfGE 96, 264 (277) : parliamentary group and group status.
  34. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 358
  35. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 361.
  36. ↑ a b c Andreas Engels: The admissibility test in organ dispute proceedings . In: Jura 2010, p. 421 (425).
  37. ↑ BVerfGE 45, 1 (29) : budget overrun.
  38. ↑ BVerfGE 140, 160 (185) : Evacuation from Libya.
  39. ^ Christoph Gröpl: Staatsrecht I: State foundations, state organization, constitutional process . 9th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-71257-9 , Rn. 1513.
  40. ↑ BVerfGE 134, 141 (194) : Observation of Members.
  41. ↑ BVerfGE 129, 356 (365) .
  42. ^ Christoph Gröpl: Staatsrecht I: State foundations, state organization, constitutional process . 9th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-71257-9 , Rn. 1488.
  43. ↑ BVerfGE 129, 356 (370) .
  44. ↑ BVerfGE 102, 254 (295) : EALG.
  45. ↑ BVerfGE 114, 107 (118) : Bundestag resolution II.
  46. ↑ BVerfGE 24, 252 (258) .
  47. ^ Christoph Gröpl: Staatsrecht I: State foundations, state organization, constitutional process . 9th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-71257-9 , Rn. 1516.
  48. ↑ BVerfGE 62, 1 (33) : Dissolution of the Bundestag I.
  49. ↑ Anna-Miria Fuerst, Volker Steffahn: The merits of the organ dispute before the BVerfG . In: Jura 2012, p. 90 (91).
  50. ↑ BVerfGE 114, 121 (145) : Federal Parliament resolution III.
  51. ↑ Anna-Miria Fuerst, Volker Steffahn: The merits of the organ dispute before the BVerfG . In: Jura 2012, p. 90 (91-92).
  52. ↑ BVerfGE 114, 121 (150) : resolution of the Bundestag III.
  53. ↑ a b c Anna-Miria Fuerst, Volker Steffahn: The merits of the organ dispute before the BVerfG . In: Jura 2012, p. 90 (92).
  54. ↑ BVerfGE 67, 100 (134) : Flick Investigation Committee.
  55. ↑ BVerfGE 67, 100 (139) : Flick Investigation Committee.
  56. ^ Christoph Gröpl: Staatsrecht I: State foundations, state organization, constitutional process . 9th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-71257-9 , Rn. 1520.
  57. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 402
  58. ↑ BVerfGE 129, 108 (115) : Legislative dispute on debt brake.
  59. ↑ BVerfGE 104, 249 : Biblis A.
  60. ↑ BVerfGE 81, 310 : Kalkar II.
  61. ↑ BVerfGE 81, 310 (336) : Kalkar II.
  62. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 492.
  63. ^ Simon Kempny: The state financing after the Paulskirche constitution. Tübingen 2011, Mohr Siebeck, pp. 47-50.
  64. ↑ BVerfGE 21, 52 (53) : German Peace Union.
  65. ↑ BVerfGE 1, 208 (219) : 7.5% blocking clause.
  66. ↑ BVerfGE 20, 56 (89) : Party financing I.
  67. ↑ BVerfGE 1, 117 (126) : Financial Equalization Act.
  68. ↑ BVerfGE 103, 111 (124) : Hesse elective examination.
  69. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 502.
  70. ↑ BVerfGE 44, 322 (338) : Declaration of general application I.
  71. ↑ BVerfGE 55, 7 (20) : Declaration of general application II.
  72. ↑ BVerfGE 12, 180 (199) .
  73. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 504
  74. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 506.
  75. ↑ BVerfGE 1, 396 : Germany Treaty.
  76. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 510
  77. ↑ Malte Graßhof: § 76 , Rn. 23. In: Dieter Umbach, Thomas Clemens, Franz Dollinger (eds.): Federal Constitutional Court Act: Employee commentary and manual . 2nd Edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2005, ISBN 3-8114-3109-9 .
  78. ↑ Hans Lechner, Rüdiger Zuck: Federal Constitutional Court Act: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-68258-2 , § 76, Rn. 30th
  79. ↑ BVerfGE 96, 133 (137) .
  80. ^ Christoph Gröpl: Staatsrecht I: State foundations, state organization, constitutional process . 9th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-71257-9 , Rn. 1548.
  81. ↑ Manuel Brunner: The abstract control of norms before the Federal Constitutional Court in case processing . In: Juristische Arbeitsblätter 2014, p. 838 (839–840).
  82. ↑ BVerfGE 128, 1 (32) : Genetic Engineering Act.
  83. ↑ BVerfGE 119, 96 (116) .
  84. ↑ BVerfGE 1, 14 (37) : Südweststaat.
  85. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 534.
  86. ↑ BVerfGE 34, 9 (25) : Salary standardization.
  87. ↑ BVerfGE 1, 14 (64) : Südweststaat.
  88. ↑ BVerfGE 95, 1 (15) : Stendal southern bypass.
  89. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 553-554.
  90. ^ Christoph Gröpl: Staatsrecht I: State foundations, state organization, constitutional process . 9th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-71257-9 , Rn. 1556.
  91. ↑ BVerfGE 1, 184 (197) : Control of standards I.
  92. ↑ BVerfGE 90, 145 (166) : Cannabis.
  93. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 79.
  94. ^ Christoph Gröpl: Staatsrecht I: State foundations, state organization, constitutional process . 9th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-71257-9 , Rn. 1468.
  95. ↑ Receipts by type of procedure. (PDF) Federal Constitutional Court, accessed on February 21, 2018 .
  96. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 104.
  97. ↑ BVerfGE 108, 251 (267) : Office of Representatives.
  98. ↑ BVerfGE 71, 305 (334) : Milk Guarantee Quantity Ordinance.
  99. ↑ Bernd Hartmann: The possibility check in procedural law of the constitutional complaint . In: Juristische Schulung 2003, p. 897 (898–899).
  100. ↑ a b BVerfGE 67, 157 (170) : G 10.
  101. ↑ BVerfGE 122, 190 (198) : G 10.
  102. ↑ BVerfGK 19, 424 (426).
  103. ↑ BVerfGE 112, 50 (60) : Victims Compensation Act.
  104. ↑ BVerfGE 71, 305 (334) : Milk Guarantee Quantity Ordinance.
  105. ↑ BVerfGE 6, 32 : Elfes.
  106. ^ Martin Burgi: Municipal law . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-67566-9 , § 6, Rn. 4-8.
  107. ↑ BVerfGE 85, 148 (158) : scope of elective examinations.
  108. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 778.
  109. ↑ BVerfGE 123, 39 : voting computer.
  110. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 781-782.
  111. ↑ threatening calls could cost Wulff the job
  112. ↑ BVerfGE 11, 282 : Second chairman of the SRP.
  113. ↑ BVerfGE 38, 23 : Editor of the Deutsche National-Zeitung.
  114. ↑ BVerfGE 2, 1 : SRP ban.
  115. ↑ BVerfGE 5, 85 : KPD ban.
  116. ↑ BVerfGE 107, 339 : NPD prohibition proceedings.
  117. ↑ BVerfG, decision of January 17, 2017, 2 BvB 1/13 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2017, p. 611.
  118. ↑ BVerfGE 112, 1 (21) : Land reform III.
  119. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 667.
  120. ^ Christian Hillgruber, Christoph Goos: Constitutional law . 4th edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8114-9363-6 , Rn. 837-841.
  121. ↑ BVerfGE 121, 1 (17) : Data retention.
  122. ^ Daniela Winkler: Current constitutional procedural law. A case law report . In: Journal for legal studies 2011, p. 123 (126).
  123. ↑ Axel Hopfauf: Art. 126 , Rn. 1. In: Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann, Hans-Günter Henneke (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law: GG . 13th edition. Carl Heymanns, Cologne 2014, ISBN 978-3-452-28045-9 .