Article 21 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Article 21 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (GG) contains several basic statements on the law of political parties in Germany . The norm is standardized in the second section of the Basic Law, which regulates the structural basis of the federal and state governments .

A party is an association of citizens under private law with sufficient organization, the aim of which is to influence political events at federal or state level in the long term. According to Art. 21, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2 of the Basic Law, every natural person is free to found such an association free of sovereign interference. Art. 21 GG further determines which structural requirements a party must meet, which rights and obligations it has and under which conditions it can be banned .

Art. 21 GG forms the basis of the law on political parties (PartG), which defines the law of the parties in more detail and in particular specifies the requirements of Art. 21 GG.

Normalization

Art. 21 GG has read as follows since its last amendment on June 20, 2017:

(1) The parties participate in the formation of the political will of the people. Its establishment is free. Their internal order must correspond to democratic principles. They have to give a public account of the origin and use of their funds as well as their assets.

(2) Parties which, according to their goals or the behavior of their supporters, aim to impair or eliminate the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany are unconstitutional.

(3) Parties which, according to their goals or the behavior of their supporters, are geared towards impairing or eliminating the free democratic basic order or endangering the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany are excluded from state funding. If the exclusion is established, these parties are also no longer entitled to tax benefits and benefits to these parties.

(4) The Federal Constitutional Court shall decide on the question of unconstitutionality under paragraph 2 and the exclusion of state funding under paragraph 3.

(5) The details are regulated by federal laws.

Art. 21 GG gives constitutional status to political parties and recognizes them as important components of democratic events. According to this, parties have the function of helping to shape the political will of the people. The standard specifies the structural requirements for political parties and determines the way in which parties may be sanctioned that pursue anti-constitutional goals. The rules only apply to parties, not political associations or similar organizations. However, they are expressly not excluded from the formation of political will in the sense of the entire process, which may lead to changes in the law.

According to Article 21 (5) of the Basic Law, the federal government has extensive, exclusive legislative competence to regulate party law. Due to the special function of the parties within a democracy, the legislature is even obliged to create an appropriate legal framework. The federal states have the competence to enact regulations with reference to parties, provided that these are sufficiently relevant to a state competence. This applies, for example, to the broadcasting law provisions on the position of parties in broadcasting, which are based on the national competence of broadcasting law.

Art. 21 GG is closely systematic to the principle of democracy protected by Art. 20 paragraph 1 and 2 GG . Therefore, elements of Art. 21 GG are also protected by the principle of democracy and thus by the eternity guarantee of Art. 79 Paragraph 3 GG. This makes them inaccessible to a change in the Basic Law. This applies, for example, to the right to form a party free from government interference.

The functions of Article 21 of the Basic Law and its relationship to other constitutional provisions have not yet been conclusively clarified in jurisprudence, as this standard includes numerous different regulations: it partly contains principles of state organization law , partly subjective public rights of the citizen and the party, partly also structuring mandates to the legislature. The lack of clarification of the position of Art. 21 GG results in numerous disputes about the interpretation of Art. 21 GG. This is influenced by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which has made numerous decisions on the legality of party bans. The ECHR is international law, which according to Art. 25 GG only has the rank of a federal law subordinate to the constitution, but due to the international law friendliness of the Basic Law it also has an influence on the application of constitutional law.

History of origin

Art. 21 GG is a new development of the Parliamentary Council , which drew up the Basic Law between 1948 and 1949: The Weimar Reich Constitution (WRV) of 1919 only considered parties in Art. 130 WRV, which stipulated that civil servants should not belong to a party, but served the whole. The development of Art. 21 GG was largely driven by Carl Spiecker , a politician of the Center Party and the CDU .

The standard came into force on May 24, 1949. Its wording at the time was:

(1) The parties participate in the formation of the political will of the people. Its establishment is free. Their internal order must correspond to democratic principles. They have to give a public account of the origin of their funds.

(2) Parties which, according to their goals or the behavior of their supporters, aim to impair or eliminate the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany are unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court decides on the question of unconstitutionality.

(3) The details are regulated by federal laws.

Article 21 of the Basic Law was changed for the first time with effect from January 1, 1984. In the course of this, the legislature added Article 21, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law to include the obligation not only to give an account of the origin of their financial resources, but also of their use. This should increase the transparency of the parties when dealing with funds.

Another amendment to Art. 21 GG took effect on July 20, 2017. The legislature created the possibility in Art. 21 Paragraph 3 GG to deny state funding to parties that are hostile to the basic democratic order.

Legal status of the party

Term of party

Art. 21 GG relates to political parties . According to Section 2, Paragraph 1, Clause 1 of the PartG, this is an association of citizens who want to influence political decision-making at federal or state level. This simple legal definition is a concretization of the constitutional concept of party that is permissible according to Art. 21 Paragraph 5 of the Basic Law, which is why the lower-ranking party law determines the content of the constitutional concept of party .

For a political association to attain party status, it must be organized in a way through which it can seriously pursue this goal. This requires the association to have basic organizational structures that enable it to participate in the formation of public opinion. Often parties have the legal form of an unincorporated association according to Section 54 of the German Civil Code (BGB)

Furthermore, the association must be designed for the long term. This applies if it does not focus its activities on individual cases. Closely related to the long-term characteristic is the requirement that the association must strive to become a member of a parliament . Due to this requirement, associations that only want to operate at the municipal level are not parties. If a party does not take part in a Bundestag or Landtag election with its own nominations for six years, it loses its legal status as a party in accordance with Section 2 (2) sentence 1 of the PartG.

Tasks and organization

According to Article 21, Paragraph 1, Sentence 1 of the Basic Law, a party has the task of participating in the political decision-making process of the people. This is done on the one hand by formulating theses and presenting them for public discussion. This is done in particular by drawing up a party program in which a party should show the way in which it wants to work towards the common good. On the other hand, it influences the decision to fill political offices, which enables it to implement the will of the people. The party thus takes on a mediator role between citizens and the state.

According to Art. 21, Paragraph 1, Clause 3 of the Basic Law, the internal organization of a party must conform to democratic principles. This requirement is based on the fact that a party is an association that directly influences the actions of state organs that are committed to the free democratic basic order. The consequence of this is that a party has to structure itself according to the guiding principles of the democratic principle. From this follows the requirement that the formation of will within a party starts from its base, for example through the regular election of the party leadership and the division of a party into regional associations. The organizational requirements that the law places on a party are specified in more detail in § 6 - § 16 of the PartG. If the organization of a party violates a democratic principle, for example through the appropriate design of its statutes , the norm in question is void according to § 134 BGB.

Art. 21 paragraph 1 sentence 4 GG obliges parties to create transparency about the origin and use of their financial resources. This is intended to reveal the influence of third parties on a party in favor of the voter. The way in which a party must create transparency is determined in detail in accordance with § 23 - § 31 PartG. According to Section 23 (1) sentence 1 of the PartG, for example, a party must prepare an annual report. In accordance with Section 25 (3) of the PartG , it must include the name of the donor for donations and contributions over 10,000 euros.

Warranties

Freedom of establishment and activity

Article 21 (1) sentence 2 of the Basic Law guarantees the right of every citizen to set up parties free of state influence or control. The right to free formation includes the self-determined organization of the party, the independent development of a program and the decision on the admission and exclusion of members. The latter aspect is specified in Section 10 of the PartG.

According to the prevailing view in jurisprudence, freedom of establishment and activity is a fundamental right to which the individual and the party are entitled. Art. 21 GG is outside the section on fundamental rights, but the norm is a special expression of the fundamental right to freedom of association ( Art. 9 GG).

Art. 21 paragraph 1 sentence 2 GG continues to protect the free activity of a party. This includes, for example, the freedom to woo voters free of government interference and to dispose of their financial resources independently.

equal opportunity

Furthermore, Art. 21 Paragraph 1 guarantees equal opportunities in political competition. According to this, all parties must have the same chance of being noticed by the citizens, especially in the election campaign. This right is of great practical importance in election campaigns . In this context, the protection of equal opportunities is additionally strengthened by the general principle of equality of Art. 3 Paragraph 1 GG and the electoral principles of Art. 38 Paragraph 1 Sentence 1 GG.

The right to equal opportunities obliges sovereigns to treat parties in the same way. This forbids arbitrarily denying a single party access to public facilities, such as a town hall. Unequal treatment is permitted, however, provided that it occurs for an objectively compelling reason and does not lead to an existing inequality between the parties being increased. For example, a discussion of several candidates for chancellor may be limited to those participants who have a reasonable chance of being elected chancellor. However, other parties must be given the opportunity to adequately express themselves elsewhere. Broadcasters are only allowed to check election advertisements for obvious violations of criminal law. You are not allowed to reject a broadcast because it does not contain illegal anti-constitutional statements.

The Federal Constitutional Court considers threshold clauses to be permissible insofar as they are necessary to maintain the functioning of the elected body. This applies to the election of legislative bodies. In contrast, threshold clauses at the municipal level are generally not required.

In the PartG, the right to equal opportunities with regard to the award of public services is standardized in Section 5 , which allows for a gradual treatment of the parties, taking into account previous election results. Because of the strong influence of past election results, some voices in law question the constitutionality of this norm. The Federal Constitutional Court considers this standard to be constitutional.

Party funding

Parties are funded by the state in several ways. This is done directly through grants to parties, indirectly through tax relief for party donations ( Section 10b (2), Section 34g of the Income Tax Act ). The scope and limits of party funding are largely determined by the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court.

Only a fraction of the parties are allowed to finance themselves directly through state grants, as otherwise there is a risk that they will become dependent on the state. This form of financing is detailed in § 18 - § 21 PartG. In jurisprudence it is disputed whether parties are entitled to state funding. Opponents argue, for example, that parties, as civil-law associations, are not part of the state and that the law does not provide any indication of a corresponding claim. The Federal Constitutional Court expressed itself differently on this.

With regard to indirect party financing, the Federal Constitutional Court imposes limits on the scope of tax relief for donations in order to prevent particularly wealthy donors from exerting particularly great influence on parties. According to this, donations by associations of persons may not be tax-favored. Donations from individuals may only be favored to the extent that they are within the scope that an average citizen could raise as a donation.

Litigation position

According to Section 3 Clause 1 of the PartG, a party can sue and be sued in their name. According to § 13 of the Courts Constitution Act, the civil courts are responsible for civil law proceedings .

It can also lodge a constitutional complaint before the Federal Constitutional Court on the grounds of the violation of a fundamental right or a right equivalent to a fundamental right , provided that it is capable of appealing under Article 19 (3) of the Basic Law. In jurisprudence, the ability of a political party to be a party in organ dispute proceedings is disputed . In the course of such a procedure, constitutional organs argue about the scope of their rights and obligations. In the opinion of the jurisprudence, the political party is capable of forming a party because it has rights and obligations that are specifically tailored to participation in political events. Organ disputes and constitutional complaints are mutually exclusive within a procedure: In principle, a constitutional complaint is a permissible legal remedy. However, if the party sees itself violated by a state body in a party-specific law following from Art. 21 GG, the organ dispute is the relevant type of procedure. In legal doctrine, the view of jurisprudence is judged to be dogmatically inconclusive, predominantly negative. Rather, only the constitutional complaint is permissible.

Party bans and withdrawal of state party funding

Article 21 is one of the few articles of the Basic Law in which the question of a ban is defined. The reason for this specification, retained in the original version, is based on the history of the parties of the Weimar Republic. By the constitutional legislator finally normalized the conditions under which one party must be banned, he wanted to prevent parties are arbitrarily banned as after the seizure of power was done by the Nazis. In particular, the protection of parties belonging to a minority is given special protection by the Basic Law, since a majority decision by the legislature is not sufficient to ban a party.

Requirements for a party ban

According to Art. 21, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law, a party is unconstitutional if, according to its goals or the behavior of its supporters, it seeks to impair or eliminate the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany. This presupposes that the party rejects the basic principles of the constitution and expresses this through an aggressive stance.

According to Art. 21 Paragraph 4 of the Basic Law, the Federal Constitutional Court alone decides on the prohibition of a party. As long as such a decision is not made, a party is therefore considered to be constitutional, which is why it may not be treated differently from other parties by sovereigns, for example by not granting benefits. In jurisprudence, this is known as the party privilege. This serves to protect the freedom of party activity. According to case law, however, the privilege does not prohibit membership of a party that is considered unconstitutional to be judged as a fact that speaks against suitability for holding public office. In legal doctrine, this view is rejected by many voices as a violation of Article 3 (3) sentence 1 of the Basic Law.

The requirements of Art. 21 Paragraph 2 GG are limited to parties. It therefore does not apply to associations without party status. Bans do not have to be issued by the constitutional court, a ban is carried out by the responsible interior minister in accordance with the regulations of the association . In local elections , however, such associations are equated with political parties.

Implementation of a prohibition procedure

A closure case is initiated by application to the Federal Constitutional Court. According to Section 43 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (BVerfGG), the federal government , the Bundesrat and the Bundestag as well as the government of the respective federal state also have the necessary authorization to submit applications . The respondent must be a party. There is no application deadline. Before the court examines the admissibility and merits of the application, the opposing party has the opportunity to comment on the application in accordance with Section 45 BVerfGG.

If the Federal Constitutional Court finds the opponent to be unconstitutional, the application is well founded. According to § 46 BVerfGG, this has the consequence that the party is dissolved and substitute organizations may not be created. In addition, the court can order that the party's assets be confiscated.

Previous prohibition procedures

Since the Basic Law came into force in 1949, there have been two successful party prohibition proceedings. In 1952 the Socialist Reich Party (SRP) was banned, in 1956 the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). In both cases, the goals of the parties were judged to be unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court. The verdict against the KPD is still controversial today, because Konrad Adenauer exerted direct political pressure on the 1st Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court. Today, many constitutional lawyers are of the opinion that an application for a ban against the KPD would not be successful. Two further proceedings against the Freedom German Workers' Party (FAP) and the National List (NL) were rejected as inadmissible because they were not parties.

In 2001 prohibition proceedings were initiated against the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), but due to procedural errors. A second application for a ban was rejected as unfounded in January 2017: The NPD is anti- constitutional , related in nature to National Socialism and wants to " replace the existing constitutional order with an authoritarian nation-state based on the ethnically defined ' national community ' ", but it is currently in view of its insignificance in political terms If there is no concrete threat to the free democratic basic order.

Exclusion from party funding

Art. 21 paragraph 3 GG was created in June 2017 as a reaction to the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court at the beginning of the year not to ban the NPD on the basis of paragraph 2. The judges had stated that the party fulfilled the requirement to impair or eliminate the free democratic basic order, but not the requirement of "going out on it", since it lacks the power to do so. The judges pointed out that the exclusion from party funding could be regulated below a ban .

literature

  • Christian von Coelln: Art. 21 . In: Christoph Gröpl, Kay Windthorst, Christian von Coelln (eds.): Basic Law: Study Commentary . 3. Edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-64230-2 .
  • Jörn Ipsen: Art. 21 . In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  • Michael Morlok: Art. 21 . In: Horst Dreier (Ed.): Basic Law Comment: GG . 3. Edition. Volume II: Articles 20-82. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2015, ISBN 978-3-16-148232-8 .
  • Winfried Kluth: Art. 21. In: Christian Volker Epping, Christian Hillgruber (Ed.): Beck'scher Online-Comment GG , 34th Edition 2017.
  • Philip Kunig: Art. 21 . In: Ingo von Münch, Philip Kunig (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 6th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-406-58162-5 .
  • Bodo Pieroth: Art. 21 . In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Comment . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  • Rudolf Streinz: Art. 21 . In: Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein, Christian Starck (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law. 6th edition. tape 2 . Articles 20 to 82. Vahlen, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-8006-3730-0 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. a b c Winfried Kluth: Art. 21 , Rn. 6. In: Christian Volker Epping, Christian Hillgruber (Eds.): Beck'scher Online-Comment GG , 34th Edition 2017.
  2. BVerfGE 1, 208 (227) : 7.5% blocking clause.
  3. BVerfGE 41, 399 (416) : Lump sum for election campaign costs.
  4. Jörn Ipsen: Art. 21 , Rn. 5. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Commentary . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  5. BVerfGE 121, 30 (47) : Party participation in broadcasting companies.
  6. BVerfGE 121, 30 (48) : Party participation in broadcasting companies.
  7. Winfried Kluth: Art. 21 , Rn. 11. In: Christian Volker Epping, Christian Hillgruber (eds.): Beck'scher Online-Comment GG , 34th edition 2017.
  8. Michael Morlok: Art. 21 , Rn. 19. In: Horst Dreier (Ed.): Basic Law Comment: GG . 3. Edition. Volume II: Articles 20-82. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2015, ISBN 978-3-16-148232-8 .
  9. Winfried Kluth: Art. 21 , Rn. 12-16. In: Christian Volker Epping, Christian Hillgruber (Hrsg.): Beck'scher Online-Comment GG , 34th edition 2017.
  10. Jörn Ipsen: Art. 21 , Rn. 1. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  11. Winfried Kluth: Art. 21 , Rn. 5. In: Christian Volker Epping, Christian Hillgruber (eds.): Beck'scher Online-Comment GG , 34th edition 2017.
  12. BVerfGE 111, 382 (409) : Three-State Quorum.
  13. BVerfGE 69, 92 (104) : Donations to municipal voter groups.
  14. BVerfGE 121, 30 (53) : Party participation in broadcasting companies.
  15. Winfried Kluth: Art. 21 , Rn. 1. In: Christian Volker Epping, Christian Hillgruber (Eds.): Beck'scher Online Comment GG , 34th Edition 2017.
  16. Bodo Pieroth: Art. 21 , Rn. 23. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  17. ^ Christian von Coelln: Art. 21 , Rn. 18. In: Christoph Gröpl, Kay Windthorst, Christian von Coelln (eds.): Basic Law: Study Commentary . 3. Edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-64230-2 .
  18. BVerfGE 2, 1 (40) : SRP ban.
  19. BVerfGE 104, 14 (21) : constituency division of Krefeld.
  20. Jörn Ipsen: Art. 21 , Rn. 88. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  21. Philip Kunig: Art. 21 , Rn. 56. In: Ingo von Münch, Philip Kunig (Ed.): Basic Law: Commentary . 6th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-406-58162-5 .
  22. Rudolf Streinz: Art. 21 , Rn. 173. In: Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein, Christian Starck (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law. 6th edition. tape 2 . Articles 20 to 82. Vahlen, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-8006-3730-0 .
  23. BVerfGE 52, 63 (87) : Party donation judgment.
  24. a b Jörn Ipsen: Art. 21 , Rn. 29. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  25. ^ Karl Heinz Seifert: The political parties in the law of the Federal Republic of Germany . Carl Heymanns, Cologne 1975, ISBN 978-3-452-17970-8 , p. 111 .
  26. BVerfGE 25, 69 (78) : Anti-constitutional statements.
  27. BVerfGE 111, 382 (409) : Three-State Quorum.
  28. Jörn Ipsen: Art. 21 , Rn. 32. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  29. BVerfGE 120, 82 (104) : blocking clause local elections.
  30. BVerfGE 114, 107 (115) : Bundestag resolution II.
  31. BVerfGE 120, 82 (105) : blocking clause local elections.
  32. BVerfGE 85, 264 (297) : Party financing II.
  33. BVerfG, decision of August 30, 2002, 2 BvR 1332/02 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2002, p. 2939.
  34. BVerfGE 47, 198 : election advertising broadcasts.
  35. BVerfGE 1, 208 (256) : 7.5% blocking clause.
  36. BVerfGE 120, 82 : blocking clause local elections.
  37. Jörn Ipsen: Art. 21 , Rn. 40. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  38. Jörn Ipsen: Art. 21 , Rn. 41. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  39. BVerfGE 24, 300 : lump sum for election campaign costs.
  40. BVerfGE 85, 264 (285) : Party financing II.
  41. Jörn Ipsen: Art. 21 , Rn. 96. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  42. Bodo Pieroth: Art. 21 , Rn. 13. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  43. BVerfGE 20, 56 (101) : Party financing I.
  44. BVerfGE 85, 264 (285) : Party financing II.
  45. BVerfGE 85, 264 (314) : Party financing II.
  46. Wolfgang Löwer: § 70, Rn. 20. In: Josef Isensee, Paul Kirchhof (ed.): Handbook of the constitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany . 3. Edition. 3: Democracy - federal bodies. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2003, ISBN 978-3-8114-6666-1 .
  47. Ernst Benda, Eckart Klein, Oliver Klein: Constitutional law: a teaching and manual . 3. Edition. Müller, Heidelberg 2012, ISBN 978-3-8114-8080-3 , Rn. 1018.
  48. BVerfGE 4, 27 : Political parties' legal standing.
  49. BVerfGE 7, 99 : Airtime I.
  50. BVerfGE 47, 198 : election advertising broadcasts.
  51. Jörn Ipsen: Art. 21 , Rn. 50-52. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  52. Rudolf Streinz: Art. 21 , Rn. 147. In: Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein, Christian Starck (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law. 6th edition. tape 2 . Articles 20 to 82. Vahlen, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-8006-3730-0 .
  53. BVerfGE 5, 85 (141) : KPD ban.
  54. Bodo Pieroth: Art. 21 , Rn. 31. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  55. BVerfGE 107, 339 (362) : NPD prohibition procedure.
  56. BVerfGE 39, 334 (348) : Decision of extremists.
  57. Thorsten Kingreen, Ralf Poscher: Fundamental rights: Staatsrecht II . 32nd edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2016, ISBN 978-3-8114-4167-5 , Rn. 534.
  58. Jura Schemata by Martin Arends - Article 21 GG
  59. Friderike Stiehr: The party prohibition process . In: Legal Training 2015, p. 994.
  60. BVerfGE 2, 1 : SRP ban.
  61. BVerfGE 5, 85 : KPD ban.
  62. BVerfGE 91, 276 : Concept of parties II.
  63. BVerfGE 107, 339 : NPD prohibition proceedings.
  64. BVerfG, decision of January 17, 2017, 2 BvB 1/13 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2017, p. 611.
  65. Overview of the legislative procedure at the Bundestag