Article 33 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany

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Article 33 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (GG) belongs to the second section of the Basic Law, which regulates the structural basis of the Federation and the Länder . The regulation determines the basis of the German civil service law and contains several guarantees, most of which give a certain group of people a subjective right . According to Art. 93, Paragraph 1, Number 4a of the Basic Law, its violation can be criticized with a constitutional complaint before the Federal Constitutional Court . Thus Art. 33 GG is a right that is equal to fundamental rights .

Art. 33 Paragraph 1 and 3 of the Basic Law contain equal treatment requirements: Art. 33 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law guarantees equality of citizenship in every federal state. According to Article 33, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law, discrimination based on religion or belief is inadmissible.

Art. 33 paragraph 2 regulates access to public offices. This is based solely on the suitability, professional performance and ability of the applicant.

Furthermore, the standard contains basic statements about the civil service. Art. 33 paragraph 4 GG provides that the exercise of sovereign powers is usually carried out by civil servants. Article 33 (5) of the Basic Law obliges the state to regulate and further develop civil service law, taking into account the traditional principles of the professional civil service.

Normalization

Article 33 of the Basic Law has read as follows since its last amendment on September 1, 2006:

(1) Every German has the same civil rights and duties in every country.

(2) Every German has equal access to every public office according to his or her suitability, qualifications and professional performance.

(3) The enjoyment of civil and civic rights, admission to public office and the rights acquired in the public service are independent of religious beliefs. No one should suffer a disadvantage from belonging or not belonging to a creed or a worldview.

(4) As a rule, the exercise of sovereign powers is to be assigned to members of the public service who are in a public service and loyalty relationship.

(5) The law of the public service is to be regulated and further developed taking into account the traditional principles of the professional civil service.

History of origin

The regulatory objectives of Art. 33 GG are based on different historical developments.

Guarantee of civic equality

Art. 33 paragraph 1 GG guarantees civil equality. The Paulskirche constitution (PKV) of 1849 already contained a comparable guarantee. According to § 132 PKV, every German was allowed to exercise his civil rights in any country. In addition, section 134 of the PKV obliged public authorities to treat all Germans equally. However, the Paulskirche constitution did not become legally binding due to the resistance of numerous German states. The Bismarckian constitution of 1871 contained no such guarantee, but provided for a common indigenous group in Article 3 . According to this, everyone was considered a citizen of the German Empire who belonged to a federal state. As a result, he had to be treated as a resident in the other German states. The Weimar Constitution (WRV) of 1919, on the other hand, guaranteed equal rights for all Germans with regard to their civil rights in its Article 110, Paragraph 2. Article 33 (1) of the Basic Law is linked to this provision.

Access to public office

The performance principle laid down in Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law is rooted in the constitutions of some southern German states. The standardization of this principle should prevent nobles or the wealthy from being preferred because of their position in the allocation of public offices. Together with Article 33 (1) of the Basic Law, the Parliamentary Council , which drafted the Basic Law between 1948 and 1949, originally wanted to insert these provisions into the section on fundamental rights . However, they were later included in the section on general state structure provisions, which contained further provisions relating to the public service.

Art. 33 paragraph 3 GG aims to protect against religious and ideological disadvantage in the allocation of public offices. The standard is based on Art. 136 Paragraph 2 WRV, which is largely formulated identically.

Position of the professional civil service

Art. 33 paragraph 4, 5 GG protects the professional civil service from arbitrary influence by the government. This aims to secure the independence of state officials and thus to promote the separation of powers. Regulations that pursued this concept of protection emerged in numerous German states in the 19th century. In the empire these were taken up by the law on the relations of the imperial civil servants.

According to Art. 33 Paragraph 4, sovereign powers must generally be exercised by civil servants. The Parliamentary Council wanted to ensure that essential state tasks are carried out by civil servants, but that the state can, as an exception, instruct other people to do so.

As part of the federalism reform of 2006, the only change to Art. 33 GG so far took place. This concerned the protection of the principles of the professional civil service through Article 33 paragraph 5 of the Basic Law. In addition to maintaining these principles, the legislature was also given the task of developing them further. The legislature primarily pursued an interest in clarification: Even under the validity of the earlier wording, it was generally recognized in jurisprudence that the legislature was allowed to further develop the principles of the professional civil service.

Citizens' rights and obligations, Art. 33 Paragraph 1 GG

According to Article 33 (1) of the Basic Law, every German has the same civil rights and duties in every federal state. According to this, it is forbidden for sovereigns to discriminate on grounds of national origin. According to Article 93, Paragraph 1, Number 4a of the Basic Law, this provision represents a right that is equal to fundamental rights. Therefore, its violation can be criticized by means of a constitutional complaint before the Federal Constitutional Court. Compared to the general principle of equality of Art. 3 Paragraph 1 GG, Art. 33 Paragraph 1 GG represents a more specific regulation.

According to the wording of the norm, every German is entitled to the right contained in Article 33 (1) of the Basic Law. Pursuant to Article 116, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, a German is a person who is a holder of German citizenship . A foreigner is therefore only protected by Art. 3 Paragraph 1 GG. However, it is controversial in jurisprudence whether Article 33 (1) of the Basic Law must be interpreted in such a way that it also protects EU foreigners because of the prohibition of discrimination under EU law under Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

The standard covers all rights and obligations that result from the public law relationship between citizens and the state. If a sovereign discriminates against one person in relation to another with regard to a right or an obligation due to reasons of nationality, this requires constitutional justification.

Article 33 (1) of the Basic Law does not provide for the possibility of restricting its warranty content. However, this can be justified by conflicting constitutional law. This possibility of restriction is based on the fact that constitutional provisions, as rights of equal rank, do not displace one another, but are brought into a relationship of practical concordance in the event of a collision . For example, Article 36, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law is a conflicting constitutional law . According to this, the highest federal authorities must be filled in such a way that officials from all countries are represented in an appropriate proportion.

In legal practice, the scope of Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law is small, since there is no nationality and there is hardly any distinction between nationality and nationality.

Principle of the best selection, Art. 33 Paragraph 2 GG

According to Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law, every German has equal access to every public office according to his or her suitability, ability and professional performance. The standard grants those who apply for public office the right to have the employer observe the criteria mentioned. This claim can be enforced before the specialized courts . In addition, as with Article 33 (1) of the Basic Law, it is a right that is equal to fundamental rights, the violation of which can be criticized by a constitutional complaint. Finally, Article 33 (2) of the Basic Law instructs the state to fill public offices according to the performance principle . Art. 33 Paragraph 2 GG replaces the general principle of equality of Art. 3 Paragraph 1 GG as a lex specialis.

Article 33 (2) of the Basic Law obliges sovereigns to focus exclusively on the suitability, ability and professional performance of the applicants when filling a public office. This is what law describes as the principle of selecting the best. This is to ensure that public offices are held by applicants who are as capable as possible.

Warranty content

Every German is entitled to the right under Article 33 (2) of the Basic Law. As with Article 33 (1) of the Basic Law, it is disputed whether Union citizens can also invoke the norm. Associations of persons cannot be the bearers of the right equal to fundamental rights, as it cannot be transferred to them in terms of content.

A public office is any activity with a sovereign based on a public service and loyalty relationship or a private employment contract . The standard extends to the recruitment of an applicant as well as their promotion and promotion. Furthermore, Article 33 (2) of the Basic Law also covers the decision to withdraw a public office.

The term skill refers to skills that are rooted in the person. This applies to training and experience, for example. Professional performance includes knowledge that relates to the respective subject. Finally, the concept of suitability includes all other qualities that are important for the exercise of an office. Which properties are included in this depends largely on the nature of the respective office. According to the prevailing view in jurisprudence, it is a necessary quality for numerous offices to stand up for the constitution and to keep one's distance from anti-constitutional groups. Otherwise, political views may only be taken into account in political offices.

With regard to the assessment of aptitude, aptitude and professional performance of the respective applicant, the employer has a margin of appreciation . Therefore, this assessment can only be checked in court to a limited extent: The court can, for example, check whether the employer is based his decision on correct facts and whether he is observing the legal framework set for him. On the other hand, whether previous work performance and qualifications make an applicant appear suitable for an office is a question that, for real reasons, only the employer can assess: the court is not in a position to get an impression of the applicant like the employer. The relevant assessment is therefore withdrawn from judicial review.

The applicant's claim under Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law is basically aimed at carrying out an error-free selection process. If an applicant is noticeably better qualified than his / her competitors, this right can be condensed into a right to recruitment due to a reduction in discretion to zero . If this is not the case, the applicant can only request that the employer carry out a new, error-free procedure in the event that the procedure is incorrect. In the court process, the applicant pursues this goal in the context of a competitor lawsuit , which is usually linked to an administrative court emergency legal protection procedure according to § 123 paragraph 1 of the Administrative Court Code (VwGO). The need for emergency legal protection arises from the principle of office stability . According to this, an applicant's legal remedy cannot result in the cancellation of a competitor's appointment. The applicant can therefore only achieve his own appointment by preventing the appointment of a competitor. Within the urgent procedure, the applicant must credibly demonstrate that the current procedure is flawed. It is not necessary, however, that the applicant also credibly demonstrates that he himself had good prospects of being hired. This violated the guarantee of effective legal protection under Article 19, Paragraph 4 of the Basic Law.

In order to implement the right of Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law, case law requires that the application process be designed in such a way that an assessment is only made on the basis of the criteria specified in the standard. As a rule, the public advertisement requires a position. In this, the employer must show the requirements that he places on the applicants. He must also collect appropriate information about suitability, competence and professional performance, for example by reading reviews. If the employer decides on an applicant, he must justify this in writing. If the employer cancels the application process, he must provide a sound factual reason for this.

impairment

An impairment exists if a sovereign within the scope of Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law can be influenced by a criterion other than that specified in the standard. However, there is no interference with Art. 33 GG if the employer uses other criteria because several applicants have equivalent qualifications with regard to professional performance, suitability and qualifications. In this case, for example, preference based on a disability or based on gender may be permissible.

If an employer interferes with the guarantee of Art. 33 Paragraph 2 GG, this is lawful if it is constitutionally justified. As with Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, this can only be done on the basis of a parliamentary law protecting conflicting constitutional law. If an employer violates Article 33, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law in favor of an applicant, further applicants cannot demand that the latter violate the provision in their favor. Accordingly, there is no entitlement to equal treatment in the wrong .

Prohibition of unequal treatment on grounds of religion or belief, Article 33 paragraph 3 GG

According to Article 33 (3) of the Basic Law, a sovereign may not treat several people equally in the area of ​​civil and civic rights as well as the public service for reasons of religion or belief . This right is an equality right that is equal to fundamental rights and that supersedes Article 3 (3) of the Basic Law. The relationship between this provision and freedom of belief ( Art. 4 GG) has not yet been clarified in jurisprudence. The violation of Article 33 (3) of the Basic Law can be criticized with a constitutional complaint before the Federal Constitutional Court.

Everyone can refer to Article 33 paragraph 3 GG. The prohibition of unequal treatment with regard to religion and belief is applicable to associations of persons in accordance with Article 19 paragraph 3 of the Basic Law.

The terms religion and ideology correspond to those of Art. 4 GG. A religion is an inner conviction that refers to a transcendent power and that the individual feels as binding for himself. A world view represents a comparable belief that dispenses with transcendent references. In particular, direct discrimination on the basis of religion or ideology violates Article 33 (3) of the Basic Law. For example, it is inadmissible to link the award of an office to the taking of a religious oath.

The guarantee of Article 33 Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law can be limited by conflicting constitutional law. For example, when appointing offices in a denominational school, the denomination of the applicant may be taken into account. In law, it is controversial whether theological faculties can proceed accordingly.

Reservation of function, Art. 33 Paragraph 4 GG

According to Article 33, Paragraph 4 of the Basic Law, sovereign powers are usually exercised by members of the public service who are in a public service and loyalty relationship. Legal science describes this as a functional reservation of the professional civil service. The standard obliges sovereigns to occupy essential functional areas of their activity with civil servants and not with employees or loaned persons . According to the prevailing view in jurisprudence, this provision is exclusively a regulation under state organization law, from which the individual citizen cannot derive his own legal position.

The term sovereign powers refers to areas of regulation that are important for the exercise of fundamental rights . This applies in particular to the intervention management , which includes the police and the regulatory authorities . The administration of benefits , which is responsible for services of general interest , also influences the exercise of fundamental rights in many cases. It therefore regularly exercises sovereign powers. On the other hand, the state does not exercise any sovereign powers if it acts as a legal entity on an equal footing with the citizen. This is the case, for example, in the area of fiscal administration . Furthermore, in the opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court , teachers generally do not exercise any sovereign powers.

Article 33 paragraph 4 GG allows sovereign powers to be exercised in exceptional cases by someone other than an official. This requires a viable reason to deviate from the rule. A reason that results from the particularities of the respective activity is viable. For example, it is not sufficient to consider that the work of a non-civil servant is cheaper. The transfer of a sovereign task to an official still requires an authorizing law.

Principles of the professional civil service, Article 33 paragraph 5 GG

Article 33 (5) of the Basic Law obliges the legislature to take into account and develop the traditional principles of the civil service. From a systematic point of view, the norm is a state structure determination that imposes obligations on the legislature and a design mandate. At the same time, it represents a civil servant's right equal to fundamental rights, the violation of which can be criticized with a constitutional complaint.

Warranty content

Professional civil servants as well as judges and state notaries who hold this position for life are bearers of the fundamental right . Soldiers and other state employees are not covered by Article 33, Paragraph 5 of the Basic Law.

The Federal Constitutional Court defines the basic principles of the civil service as the "core set of structural principles which have been recognized and maintained as binding in general or at least predominantly and for a longer period of time, at least under the Weimar Constitution".

Legal structure of the civil servant relationship

A principle of the professional civil service states that the basis of the civil service relationship is regulated by law. This applies, for example, to age limits and entitlement to benefits. According to this, individual private law agreements between employer and civil servant are just an exception.

Official duty of loyalty

The civil servant is obliged to be loyal to his employer. He must therefore exercise his office in a way that is oriented towards the common good and behave politically as neutrally as possible. For example, Section 60 (2) BBG contains a moderation requirement for federal civil servants. Furthermore, he has to make all of his labor available to his employer.

After all, the officer is not allowed to strike . Influenced by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights , however, argued in jurisprudence increasingly a question of whether a general ban on strikes with the guarantee of freedom of association by Art. 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights is compatible.

Alimentation principle

Furthermore, the state is obliged to its civil servants properly alimony . To do this, he must provide them with funds that enable them and their relatives to enjoy an adequate standard of living . Remuneration is also granted in the event of illness , incapacity for work and after leaving the service . If the civil servant dies, his surviving dependents are entitled to pension claims.

Alimentation is primarily not a remuneration for work. Rather, it represents the consideration for the fact that the civil servant is permanently in the service of the state. The amount of the remuneration to be granted depends on the rank and responsibility of the civil servant in his office. As a rule, a higher rank is associated with higher salaries. The legislature has a lot of leeway when determining the reference amount. The courts therefore only check whether the necessary minimum is obviously not being reached.

It is incompatible with the alimentation principle, for example, to employ the civil servant only with part-time work without an application, without giving him the opportunity to switch to full employment.

Duty of care

Furthermore, there is a particularly close welfare relationship between the civil servant and his employer. By virtue of his duty of care, the employer must protect his civil servant and take his interests into account. He must also give the official an appropriate official title . Furthermore, he must employ the official in an officially appropriate manner.

impairment

An encroachment on Article 33 (5) of the Basic Law exists if the legislature introduces a regulation under civil service law that disregards or does not follow a principle of the professional civil service. In the first case there is a violation of Article 33 paragraph 5 GG. In contrast, non-compliance with a principle can be justified by conflicting constitutional law.

literature

  • Ulrich Battis: Art. 33 . In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  • Klaus Grigoleit: Art. 33 . In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Ed.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  • Christoph Gröpl: Art. 33 . In: Christoph Gröpl, Kay Windthorst, Christian von Coelln (eds.): Basic Law: Study Commentary . 3. Edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-64230-2 .
  • Monika Jachmann-Michel: Art. 33 . In: Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein, Christian Starck (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law. 6th edition. tape 2 . Articles 20 to 82. Vahlen, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-8006-3730-0 .
  • Hans Jarass: Art. 33 . In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Comment . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  • Philip Kunig: Art. 33 . In: Ingo von Münch, Philip Kunig (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 6th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-406-58162-5 .
  • Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf: Art. 33 . In: Horst Dreier (Ed.): Basic Law Comment: GG . 3. Edition. Volume II: Articles 20-82. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2015, ISBN 978-3-16-148232-8 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b Ulrich Battis: Art. 33 , Rn. 6. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  2. ↑ Klaus Grigoleit: Art. 33 , Rn. 1. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  3. ↑ Klaus Grigoleit: Art. 33 , Rn. 2. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  4. ↑ Klaus Grigoleit: Art. 33 , Rn. 3. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  5. ↑ Ulrich Battis: Art. 33 , Rn. 1-2. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  6. ↑ Klaus Grigoleit: Art. 33 , Rn. 4. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  7. ↑ Klaus Grigoleit: Art. 33 , Rn. 5. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  8. ↑ Klaus Grigoleit: Art. 33 , Rn. 6. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  9. ↑ Klaus Grigoleit: Art. 33 , Rn. 7. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  10. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 33 , Rn. 1. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  11. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 33 , Rn. 2a. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Comment . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  12. ↑ Monika Jachmann-Michel: Art. 33 , Rn. 5. In: Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein, Christian Starck (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law. 6th edition. tape 2 . Articles 20 to 82. Vahlen, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-8006-3730-0 .
  13. ↑ Ulrich Battis: Art. 33 , Rn. 15. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  14. ↑ Monika Jachmann-Michel: Art. 33 , Rn. 6. In: Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein, Christian Starck (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law. 6th edition. tape 2 . Articles 20 to 82. Vahlen, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-8006-3730-0 .
  15. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 33 , Rn. 6-7. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Comment . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
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  17. ↑ Ulrich Battis: Art. 33 , Rn. 16. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Commentary . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
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  23. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 33 , Rn. 11. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  24. ↑ Ulrich Battis: Art. 33 , Rn. 24. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  25. ↑ BVerfGE 117, 382 (387) .
  26. ↑ a b BVerfGE 110, 304 (322) : Attorney notary's office I.
  27. ↑ BVerfGE 92, 140 (151) : special termination.
  28. ↑ BVerfGE 108, 282 (296) : headscarf.
  29. ↑ BVerfGE 39, 334 (346) .
  30. ↑ Philip Kunig: Art. 33 , Rn. 17. In: Ingo von Münch, Philip Kunig (Ed.): Basic Law: Commentary . 6th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2012, ISBN 978-3-406-58162-5 .
  31. ↑ BVerfGE 39, 334 (354) : Decision on extremists.
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  33. ↑ BVerwGE 118, 370 (373).
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  38. ↑ BVerwGE 133, 13 .
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  40. ↑ BVerwGE 138, 102 .
  41. ↑ BVerfGK 12, 284 .
  42. ↑ BVerfGE 122, 147 (150) .
  43. ↑ BVerwGE 86, 244 (249).
  44. ↑ BVerwGE 122, 237 (239).
  45. ↑ BAGE 105, 161 (167).
  46. ↑ BVerfGE 79, 69 (75) : Oath.
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  48. ↑ Christoph Gröpl: Art. 33 , Rn. 41. In: Christoph Gröpl, Kay Windthorst, Christian von Coelln (eds.): Basic Law: Study Commentary . 3. Edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-64230-2 .
  49. ↑ Heinrich Wolff: Art. 4 , Rn. 5. In: Dieter Hömig, Heinrich Wolff (Hrsg.): Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Hand Commentary . 11th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2016, ISBN 978-3-8487-1441-4 .
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  51. ↑ BVerfGE 108, 282 (298) : headscarf.
  52. ↑ BVerfGE 79, 69 : Oath.
  53. ↑ BVerfGE 39, 334 (368) : Decision on extremists.
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  56. ↑ BVerfGE 6, 376 (385) : Suffrage complaint.
  57. ↑ Christoph Gröpl: Art. 33 , Rn. 46. ​​In: Christoph Gröpl, Kay Windthorst, Christian von Coelln (eds.): Basic Law: Study Commentary . 3. Edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-64230-2 .
  58. ↑ BVerfGE 130, 76 (113) : Vitos Haina.
  59. ↑ BVerfGE 119, 247 (267) .
  60. ↑ BVerfGE 130, 76 (114) : Vitos Haina.
  61. ↑ Susann Barisch: Privatization in the German prison . Waxmann, Münster 2010, ISBN 978-3-8309-2255-1 , p. 134 .
  62. ↑ BVerfGE 130, 76 (115) : Vitos Haina.
  63. ↑ BVerwGE 98, 280 (288).
  64. ^ Josef Isensee: § 32, Rn. 62. In: Ernst Benda, Werner Maihofer, Hans-Jochen Vogel (ed.): Handbook of constitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany . 2nd Edition. De Gruyter, Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-11-087506-5 .
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  66. ↑ BVerfGE 8, 1 (17) : Inflation allowance.
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  68. ↑ BVerfGE 8, 332 : Waiting conditions.
  69. ↑ BVerfGE 107, 218 (237) : Salaries for civil servants East I.
  70. ↑ BVerwGE 133, 143 .
  71. ↑ BVerwGE 143, 363 .
  72. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 33 , Rn. 49. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Comment . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  73. ↑ BVerfGE 39, 334 (348) : Decision on extremists.
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  75. ↑ BVerfGE 16, 94 (116) : Wehrmacht pensioners.
  76. ↑ BVerfGE 44, 249 (264) : Alimentation principle.
  77. ↑ Lars Michaelis: The civil service strike ban . In: Juristische Arbeitsblätter 2015, p. 121 (121–122).
  78. ↑ BVerwGE 149, 117 .
  79. ↑ BVerfGE 140, 240 .
  80. ↑ BVerfGE 8, 1 (16) : Inflation allowance.
  81. ↑ BVerfGE 81, 363 (386) : Official baby.
  82. ↑ BVerfGE 70, 69 (80) .
  83. ↑ Andrea Kirsch: Civil service law in the exam . In: Jura 2010, p. 487 (488).
  84. ↑ BVerfGE 4, 115 (135) : Salary Act of North Rhine-Westphalia.
  85. ↑ BVerfGE 130, 263 (292) .
  86. ↑ BVerfGE 56, 146 (164) .
  87. ↑ BVerfGE 130, 263 (295) .
  88. ↑ BVerfGE 119, 247 (272) .
  89. ↑ BVerfGE 43, 154 (167) .
  90. ↑ BVerfGE 38, 1 (12) : Appointments as judges.
  91. ↑ BVerfGE 70, 251 : Headmaster.
  92. ↑ BVerfGE 87, 348 (356) .