Federalism reform

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The federalism reform , also known as the federalism reform I since the implementation of the Federalism Reform II , is an amendment to the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany , which affects the relations between the Federation and the Länder . It was passed in June and July 2006 by the German Bundestag and the Bundesrat with the necessary two-thirds majority and came into force on September 1, 2006.

Federalism Commission

Due to the lengthy decision-making processes in German legislation , the increasing centralization of competencies at the federal level and the resulting concentration of consent laws in the German Bundesrat - which also led to the respective opposition using the Bundesrat to block bills from the federal government motivated by party politics - and the In the absence of transparency in democratic decision-making processes and responsibilities, the German Bundestag and the Bundesrat agreed on October 16 and 17, 2003, respectively, to set up a “ Commission of the Bundestag and Bundesrat for the modernization of the federal order ”.

The heads of government of the federal states had already decided in December 1998 to subject the federal system (distribution of tasks, expenditure and income) to a critical review. The lead stood at Bayern and Bremen . However, this project was initially postponed because a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court of 1999 on a reform of the state financial equalization system had to be implemented. Negotiations about this dragged on until June 2001. The financially strong states put their criticism of the existing state financial equalization back in favor of a solution that remained committed to traditional federal solidarity with the financially weak states, but in particular allowed the east German states to extend the solidarity pact funds. To compensate for this, however, they called for a federalism reform that should strengthen the position of the states. At a Prime Minister's Conference in October 2001 they decided to start negotiations with the federal government; in December 2001 the federal and state governments agreed to start this immediately and to complete it by 2003.

The federal states' guidelines for negotiations with the federal government were adopted on March 27, 2003. At the same time, the state parliaments drafted a “Commitment to federalism and subsidiarity - strengthen state parliaments”. Finally, on April 9, 2003, a federal position was adopted. A government commission from the federal and state levels should draw up draft laws on this basis. On June 18, 2003, however, Franz Müntefering , chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, suggested that the Bundestag set up a constitutional commission of the Bundestag and Bundesrat and that a comprehensive debate on modernizing the federal order should begin with the Bundesrat in the autumn of that year. On October 16, 2003, at the request of the parliamentary groups of the SPD, the CDU / CSU , Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen and the FDP, the Bundestag decided to set up a joint commission of the Bundestag and Bundesrat to modernize the federal order.

Under the chairmanship of Edmund Stoiber (CSU) and Franz Müntefering, the members should work out proposals on how the federal and state level can improve the ability to act and make decisions , how the political responsibilities can be sensibly organized and the efficiency of task fulfillment can be increased.

The Federalism Commission failed on December 17, 2004 due to the reorganization of competencies in education policy , but the level of negotiations it had reached up to then formed the basis for further development.

The then Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder as well as Joschka Fischer , Edmund Stoiber and Angela Merkel agreed at the “job summit” on March 17, 2005 to resume work on the reform, but due to the unscheduled election campaign for the 2005 Bundestag elections , this was no longer pursued.

New attempt in the grand coalition of 2005

In the negotiations for the formation of a grand coalition in autumn 2005, which was historic at that time (the last such government alliance existed in 1969), the CDU / CSU and SPD agreed "on the basis of the preparatory work in the Federalism Commission" to rapidly modernize the federal system to be decided in Germany. The coalition agreement contained an annex which - with almost complete adoption of a paper drawn up by Müntefering and Stoiber within the framework of the Federalism Commission - already contained a detailed proposal for the amendments to the Basic Law.

After final deliberations in the Federal Cabinet, the coalition groups and the Prime Minister's Conference on March 6th, the grand coalition's draft laws entered the parliamentary debate on March 10th, 2006 and were discussed simultaneously in the Bundestag and Bundesrat.

The two draft bills, the “draft law amending the Basic Law” and the “draft federalism reform accompanying law”, concerned the distribution of legislative competences between the federal and state governments as well as the responsibilities and rights of the states to participate in federal legislation.

In particular, the proposals in the areas of environmental and educational policy have met with criticism from specialist politicians; There are also general reservations about the reform, justified by the fact that it is intended to pave the way from a more cooperative to a more competitive federalism in Germany.

In the legislative process, a hearing was held by the Bundestag Legal Committee. Some of the experts expressed criticism of the above. Areas. In addition, the shift in legislative competence for the penal system, notarial services, civil servant salaries and home law was viewed critically. In the area of ​​education policy there were therefore changes and the legislative competence for the notary's office was not shifted to the federal states.

After the hearing in the Legal Affairs Committee, the Bundestag passed the law amending the Basic Law and the Federalism Reform accompanying law on June 30, 2006 with 428 votes in favor, 162 against and 3 abstentions . This means that at least 20 members of the government coalition, mainly from the SPD parliamentary group, have refused to approve the constitutional amendment. On July 7, the Federal Council also approved the reform with 62 out of 69 votes. Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania rejected the legislative package and Schleswig-Holstein abstained from voting. The federalism reform was issued by the Federal President on August 28, 2006, announced in the Federal Law Gazette on August 31, 2006 and came into force one day later, i.e. September 1, 2006.

The new regulation of financial relations between the federal government and the federal states should only be adapted to the changed framework conditions inside and outside Germany in a second step; A resolution on this was issued by the Bundestag in December 2006.

Key points of the federalism reform

Legislative competence

The distribution of responsibilities in German cooperative federalism is administrative, not regulated in two ways: Most policy areas are subject to competing federal and state legislation. Until then, that meant that the federal government created the framework, the states supplemented them with their own laws; but above all they are the bearers of state administration. The difficulty with such a state structure is to limit the depth of detail of the central decisions in such a way that there is sufficient leeway for individual decisions and laws at the level of the member states, i.e. the states. Such a distribution must therefore always be rebalanced under changing circumstances. The legal distribution of competences is overlaid by the question of financial distribution, which is decisive for the factual fulfillment of competencies.

Against this background, the requirement for approval of federal laws has been expanded more and more. The growing criticism of German federalism was directed towards unitarization, political interdependence and the so-called participation federalism of the executives at the expense of parliaments.

In order to clean up the increasing interdependence of the federal government and the states, the framework legislation of the federal government (formerly Art. 75 GG old version) was abolished. Their matters now either belong to the exclusive or competing federal legislation or they are to be regulated by the states. In addition, the requirement for consent was significantly restricted. It was regulated in Article 84 (1) of the Basic Law, old version, according to which the consent of the Bundesrat was required if the federal law also contained regulations on the administrative procedure. This approval requirement will no longer apply in future; however, the Länder can then adopt different procedural regulations. If the federal government wishes to exclude such deviating state legislation as an exception, the approval of the Bundesrat is required. A key point is the abolition of federal intervention in the municipalities through the reform of Article 84.1 sentence 7 of the Basic Law: Since 2006, the federal government has no longer been allowed to delegate tasks to the municipalities; Tasks are to be understood here as obligations that cause costs. Under the motto “Whoever orders, pays”, the municipalities had long made this their demand. Now tasks to the municipalities may only be carried out in accordance with the respective state constitution through state laws.

The legislative process is to be accelerated and made more transparent. To this end, the number of laws requiring approval is to be reduced from currently around 60% to around 35% to 40%. The Bundestag is therefore less often dependent on the approval of the Bundesrat and blockades of government legislative initiatives by the opposition should be made more difficult. However, the Federal Council must continue to approve laws that cause considerable costs in the federal states.

In return for this waiver by the states of participation in the national legislative process, they should in future have exclusive legislative competence for the service, salary and pension law of state and local civil servants , the penal law - albeit without the dogmatically associated substantive criminal law - and the home law without the associated Health law , shop closing and restaurant law , the right of assembly and the right to press . In addition, in the area of ​​environmental and educational law, the federal states receive a so-called "right of deviation", through which they can pass their own laws that deviate from federal regulations. The originally planned transfer of the legislative competence for the notary's office (without the authentication procedure) was dropped again due to the unanimous concerns of the experts heard in the legislative procedure.

In the future, the federal government will be solely responsible for reporting and identification , nuclear energy , weapons and explosives law , the law on the consequences of war, notary law and the "protection of German cultural assets against migration abroad".

Educational policy

The education policy is largely the states. The federal government only retains the powers to regulate university admission and university degrees - from which the federal states can deviate - as well as those for the company-based part of vocational training in the dual system. The previous joint task of building higher education is now being transferred to the autonomy of the federal states, as is the joint task of educational planning. The federal government is thus withdrawing from the financing of university construction and direct financial aid in the school sector. The relevant provisions are often referred to as "prohibition of cooperation ".

Civil service law

The general competence of the federal government will be abolished. With the addition of No. 27 to Article 74, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law, elements of the previous framework legislative competence are transferred into the competing legislative competence. The federal government now has the legislative competence for basic status matters, but is limited to the area of ​​status rights and obligations with regard to state officials. With the dissolution of Art. 74a of the Basic Law (old version), the previously competing legislative competence to regulate the salaries , benefits and service law of state officials falls under the exclusive legislative competence of the states. On January 12, 2007, the federal government passed a draft of a civil service status law and forwarded it to the Bundestag and the Bundestag for approval.

Due to the law amending the Basic Law (GG) of August 28, 2006 ( Federal Law Gazette I, p. 2034 ), the federal government's framework for enacting the Civil Service Framework Act (BRRG) is no longer applicable. Due to the general competence of the federal government according to Art. 75, Paragraph 1, Clause 1, No. 1 of the Basic Law (old version), the federal states were previously obliged to align their state civil servant laws to the requirements of the BRRG.

In place of the previous framework legislation for the general legal relationships of state and municipal employees, the federal government has competing legislative powers. After Art. 74 para. 1 no. 27 of the Basic Law, the federal government now has the power to regulate the status and duties of the civil servants of the states, municipalities and other public bodies, in a service and loyalty ratio standing with Except for careers, salaries and pensions. The laws to be enacted hereunder require the approval of the Federal Council.

The federal government's draft law of January 12, 2007 uses the competence of the federal government and uniformly regulates the status rights for state officials and municipal officials. The aim of the law is to define the basic civil service structures to ensure the necessary uniformity of service law, in particular to ensure the mobility of civil servants when there is a change of employer . With the Civil Service Status Act, the prerequisites for modern and uniform personnel management in public administration are aimed for through clear structures and the dismantling of bureaucratic obstacles. By Art. 33 the necessary uniformity in the state of public service is guaranteed, para. 5 GG.

Law that was enacted as federal law, but could no longer be enacted as federal law because of the repeal of Art. 75 GG old version, continues to apply as federal law according to Art. 125a GG. Based on the new competing legislative competence, the draft law replaces the BRRG enacted according to Art. 75 GG old version. Therefore, the Civil Service Framework Act will largely be repealed with the entry into force of the Civil Service Status Act. Chapter II and Section 135 BRRG remain in place for the time being. These provisions concern the uniform and directly applicable provisions of the BRRG, which are already largely but not yet fully contained in the Civil Service Status Act for the federal states and continue to apply for the federal government until the Federal Civil Service Act is amended and for the federal states until their own regulations are issued. This also applies to § 135 BRRG for religious societies under public law , as a corresponding regulation is no longer contained in the Civil Service Status Act. A standardization and modernization of the basic legal status structures are planned in order to guarantee mobility, especially when changing employers. This includes:

  • Nature, prerequisites, legal form of the justification, types, duration and reasons for nullity and withdrawal of the civil servant relationship,
  • Secondments and transfers of civil servants between the federal states and between the federal government and the federal states, assignment of an activity to other institutions and transnational restructuring of corporations,
  • Conditions and forms of termination of the civil service relationship,
  • status-defining duties of civil servants and consequences of non-fulfillment,
  • essential rights of civil servants,
  • Determination of the employer's ability,
  • Case of tension and defense and
  • Uses abroad.

The Länder are given leeway to take their regional characteristics into account.


As the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 22 GG designates Berlin in the Basic Law. This is the first time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany that a city has been constitutionally designated as the capital, which so far has only been done by law. The representation of the entire state in the capital is the responsibility of the federal government.

In cases where there is a transnational risk, the federal states cede responsibilities to the Federal Criminal Police Office . Defense against terrorist threats is therefore exclusively the responsibility of the federal government. The federal states are given more competencies in disaster control .

Furthermore, the budgets of the municipalities are protected by inserting Article 85.1 sentence 2 of the Basic Law. In future, federal law will not be allowed to delegate any tasks to the municipalities and municipal associations.

Environmental law

In the area of ​​environmental law, material deviating legislation ( Article 72 (3) of the Basic Law) will be introduced for the areas of environmental law that were previously framework legislation . This means that the states can "access" certain, precisely defined parts of federal laws through a state law. The rule “ federal law breaks state law ” no longer applies in these cases, instead priority is given to the state laws. The relevant federal law remains in force and continues to apply in those countries that are unwilling or unable to actually enact deviating laws. It remains to be seen whether legal fragmentation will occur. The derogation legislation gives the opportunity to maintain or expand federal competences without necessarily requiring the approval of the Federal Council, as the states have their own competencies in the relevant area. In the Federal State Commission, the introduction of a material right of access for other policy areas was initially discussed; the former areas of framework legislation in environmental and education policy could have a door opener function in the event of positive experiences.

In environmental law, the federal government had massively demanded the introduction of a federal environmental code (UGB) in the federal state commission and, in addition, a cross-sectional competence “environmental protection” in the competing legislation. The federal states wanted to keep as many of their own competencies as possible; it was then essentially a matter of dividing individual areas of competence in environmental law between the federal and state governments. A solution was offered by the above-mentioned material right of deviation, but the breadth of the respective areas in which deviations should be possible was also controversial. Now, individual areas of environmental law are assigned to deviating legislation (“competing legislation with the right to deviate from the Länder”), while others are assigned to competing legislation.

The federal government thus has competing legislation everywhere (also in the areas of nature conservation, water balance, soil, in which it previously only had framework legislation); Depending on the subject matter, this competing legislative competence is endowed with a right of derogation from the federal states. This enables the federal government to implement all EU directives in the environmental field - previously the states were responsible for implementation in the field of framework law, which could lead to delays. In the environmental sector, it is estimated that 80% of the regulations come from the EU, which means that this federal implementation law is important. Depending on whether the matter is endowed with a substantive right of deviation, the states can then deviate from federal law. However, they are also bound by EU law, so that basically all of the environmental law initiated by the EU can be counted among the “non-deviant cores”.

In addition, the new regulation also enables the creation of an environmental code (UGB). Attempts in the direction of the UGB were ended in the 1990s with no result. According to the more recent case law of the Federal Constitutional Court on the necessity clause of Article 72 (2) of the Basic Law, the federal government would have no longer had any competence to create a UGB in the areas of framework legislation. The new regulations of the federalism reform now allow this, because the entire environmental matter belongs to the competing federal legislation.

Penal system

According to the original regulation of the Basic Law ( Art. 74, Paragraph 1, No. 1 of the Basic Law, old version), the penal system (like criminal law) belonged to competing legislation. Since the federal government exercised its legislative right with the enactment of the Prison Act, the states had no possibility of legislating in this area. This has changed fundamentally with the federalism reform, since the states are now solely responsible for the penal legislation. On the one hand, this means that the federal states can create their own penal law. As long as they do not do this, the previous (federal) penal law remains in effect, so that there is no time pressure for the individual federal state on this issue. This results from Art. 125a GG, in which it says: “Law that was enacted as federal law but could no longer be enacted as federal law because of the amendment to Article 74, Paragraph 1 [...], continues to apply as federal law. It can be replaced by state law. ”The federalism reform has led to considerable legal complexity / confusion in the penal system, which is likely to persist for a long time. This is paradoxical because it is difficult to justify such a total shift of enforcement to the federal states. This has been shown in the breadth of resistance to this reorganization: All major organizations of German criminal law practitioners (from the German Association of Judges to the German Association for Juvenile Courts and Juvenile Court Assistance eV to the Federal Association of Institution Directors in Prisons ) opposed it, as did a large number of university professors in criminal law.


With the regulation on the participation of the federal states in matters of the European Union by Art. 23 GG old version at the beginning of the 1990s, the existing interdependent structures had doubled; As has long been practiced in legislation between the federal and state governments, the logic of “transfer of competencies against rights of participation” was applied. European integration also affects the federal system insofar as there is now hardly a political area in which all three levels of the European multilevel system, i.e. the European Union, the federal government and the states, do not have competencies of some kind, which is only the German system Considering “unbundling” made more difficult.

In terms of the participation of the states in European affairs, the federal side in the federal state commission demanded a sole right of representation for the federal government in the interests of clearer and more efficient conduct of negotiations in Brussels and the elimination of the possibilities of the states to influence national European policy according to Art. 23 GG, depending on the extent to which they are affected . The Länder, on the other hand, insisted on their existing rights, pointing out that this was the only area since 1949 in which the position of the Länder had been strengthened.

The compromise found aims to improve Germany's negotiating position through better cooperation between the levels (and also between the actors within the levels among themselves). The doubling of the structure of the political integration (according to the formula: transfer of authority against participation) is not broken by this. The only restriction of the state rights is that the rights of the states according to Article 23, Paragraph 6 of the Basic Law (i.e. the right to bring the all-German interest in areas of exclusive legislative powers of the states in Brussels through a state representative) were limited to a few policy areas (broadcasting for example).


The joint obligation of the federal government and the states to maintain budgetary discipline and the division of sanctions that might be imposed on Germany on the basis of Art. 126 (11) TFEU (formerly Art. 104 EGV) is specified. In cases in which the European Union imposes sanctions on Germany because it has violated the Stability Pact or the implementation of EU directives or has been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights , the federal government pays 65% and the federal states 35% of the penalty. If necessary, 35% is distributed among the federal states according to residents and 65% according to causation ( Art. 109 (5) GG).

A reform of the financial constitution was largely excluded in this first part of the federalism reform and is only to be tackled in a second step in this 16th legislative period. In particular, the financial equalization of the Länder , which was only reformed in 2001, should not be made the subject of reforms. Also is Solidarity Pact II reaffirmed constitutionally. The reforms are therefore essentially limited to mixed financing situations, which have been restricted in order to also contribute to the unbundling of the competences of the federal and state governments in the area of ​​finance.

In the area of ​​joint tasks, joint educational planning was abolished and replaced by a new joint task to determine the performance of the educational system in international comparison, including reporting ( Art. 91b GG old version). The joint task of university construction was also ended, regulated in the University Construction Promotion Act (HBFG). At universities, however, the federal government and the federal states may in future work together on projects in science and research as well as on research buildings including large-scale equipment ( Art. 91b GG). The joint task of research funding has been redrafted overall, with the federal government and the states still having joint funding competence in non-university scientific research ( Art. 91b GG).

Federal financial aid for mixed financing has also been newly regulated. The previous regulation, which has been in force since the financial reform of 1969 ( Art. 104a Para. 4 GG old version), according to which the federal government was able to grant financial aid to the states for “particularly significant investments by the states and municipalities” in favor of macroeconomic or growth-political goals, is - almost word for word in the new Art. 104b GG. A crucial difference has been introduced: the federal government is only allowed to fund where it has legislative powers - all objects and measures that fall within the competence of the states are no longer eligible for funding. This revision was partially reversed in the second stage of the federalism reform because it made it very difficult for the federal government to take economic policy measures during the global economic crisis. In addition, subsidies are only available for a limited period and are degressive. The area of ​​urban renewal and development ( urban development funding - StBauF) has remained as a mixed-financed investment field , to which federal financial aid to be determined in the budget can continue to be made available. The previous areas of responsibility for community transport financing (partially) and housing construction funding have been transferred to the federal states. However, this is subject to the proviso that the associated loss of the previous federal financial aid to the federal states will be compensated for until 2019, i.e. for a limited period in contrast to urban development funding (compensation clause of (new) Art. 143c GG). They must be spent investing over the entire period; From 2014, however, the earmarking will no longer apply and the use will - after a review - pass into the budgetary autonomy of the federal states. The aim was to reduce the vertical integration between the “professional brotherhoods” and to strengthen the autonomy of the countries.


On the one hand, representatives of the central federal authority fear the end of the solidarity principle in the federal system of the Federal Republic. Surrendering federal competencies to the federal states will lead to competition which the financially strong states prefer unilaterally.

Due to the federal government's extensive withdrawal from education policy (70% of the costs for university building should be borne by the federal states in the future) and its abandonment of uniform civil servant salaries and uniform shop closing times, the federal government is shedding its social obligations and sovereign powers and thus forcing the federal states into competition for the lowest possible cost, including at the expense of students, research institutions and civil servants.

With regard to the regulations on penal law and environmental protection, environmentalists and civil rights activists fear a race for the lowest standards ( race to the bottom ). This could also lead to problems with regard to the EU's environmental legal requirements: It is nonsensical that mandatory supranational requirements should be implemented by 16 state legislative bodies instead of one legislative body ( federal government ). A separation of competencies in substantive criminal law and the penal law based on it is also incomprehensible.

Another point of criticism is the very weak parliamentary legitimation of the Bundestag and Bundesrat commission to modernize the federal order and the very tentative parliamentary and public discussion of the results of the negotiations in the commission.

Some critics predict that the complicated regulations on the countries' right of deviation will fail to achieve the major goal of the reform, according to which the citizen should know who is responsible for what. Compared to before, it will be even more difficult for citizens to find out in future whether federal or state law is to be applied.

Since the most important legislative proposals still require the approval of the Federal Council, it was also controversial whether the reform gain for the federal government in terms of avoiding blockades of government proposals by the opposition in the Federal Council is actually as large as claimed.

Another point of criticism is the exclusion of the reform of the financial constitution, which would be fundamental for a real reorganization of German federalism .

Representatives of the federal principle ( subsidiarity ) criticize the fact that in some areas the federal government is not ready to cede substantial competences to the states . So it is hardly understandable that z. B. Hunting law (previously the federal competence of the framework legislation) was moved to competing legislation instead of letting state legislation determine this alone.

Finally, a fundamental point of criticism is that the previous mutual hindrance between the federal and state governments will not be lifted by the amended Basic Law: 1. The state politicians can continue to make decisions on federal law via the Bundesrat, and 2. The federal policy still does not leave the states with sufficient legislative powers which on the one hand received real freedom of design and on the other hand could compete for the best solutions.

First evaluations of the federalism reform

In the meantime, an evaluation of the practical effects of the federalism reform by the scientific service of the German Bundestag is available, which also received the response of the Federal Government to a corresponding request from the FDP parliamentary group and a compilation of the German state parliaments , which was initiated by the state parliament of Rhineland-Palatinate, taken into account and comes to the conclusion:

  • The approval rate fell to 39% from September 1, 2006 to February 28, 2009, compared to an average of 53% in previous years. However, it is still too early for a final assessment.
  • The mediation committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat was called in about 3.3% of the promulgated laws, compared to 22.9% in the 15th electoral term. In this respect, one of the main goals of the reform has been achieved by then.
  • The federal and state governments have largely implemented the new, exclusive legislative powers, although the new rights of derogation, as well as the federal government's ability to exclude derogations, have only rarely been used. Fears about the introduction of a “ping-pong” legislation therefore appear not to be confirmed.


Norms and primary texts

  • Coalition agreement: “Together for Germany - with courage and humanity. Coalition agreement between CDU, CSU and SPD of November 11, 2005 ”, there from p. 168:“ Result of the coalition working group on federalism reform ”( coalition agreement between CDU / CSU and SPD ( Memento of November 25, 2011 in the Internet Archive ); PDF; 2 , 1 MB).
  • State Commission Stenographic Minutes and Working Papers ( online ).
  • Winfried Kluth (Ed.): Federalism Reform Act. Introduction and commentary . Nomos, Baden-Baden 2007.

On federalism reform in general (before entry into force)

  • From politics and contemporary history: Föderalismus, Issue 13–14 / 2005 ( PDF ).
  • Bertelsmann Stiftung: Federalism Reform in Germany. A Guide to the Current Discussion and Work of the State Commission , 2004 ( PDF ).
  • Eckhard Behrens: Federalism reform and education policy . PositionLiberal at www.pro-kopf.de.
  • Arthur Benz : No way out of the political entanglement? - Why the Federal State Commission failed, but did not have to fail : In: PVS, 46: 2, 2005, pp. 204–214.
  • Michael Borchard, Udo Margedant (Ed.): Federalism reform: before reform is after reform? A first review of the work of the state commission . Sankt Augustin 2004 ( PDF ).
  • Michael Borchard, Udo Margedant (Hrsg.): German federalism in the reform process . In: Zukunftsforum Politik No. 69, ed. from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Sankt Augustin 2006 ( PDF ).
  • Peter Bußjäger , Rudolf Hrbek (ed.): Projects of the federalism reform - Austria convention and federalism commission in comparison . Series of publications by the Institute for Federalism, Volume 96, 2005.
  • German Bundestag, Bundesrat, Public Relations (Ed.): On Case 1/2005 . Documentation of the commission of the Bundestag and Bundesrat for the modernization of the federal order, Berlin, with a CD-Rom on which all relevant documents are saved. The State Commission documents are available online .
  • Hans-Jörg Dietsche: The "competing legislation with the right to deviate for the states" - on the various models of constitutional design of a new substantive legislative instrument . In: European Center for Federalism Research (Ed.): Yearbook of Federalism 2006. Federalism, Subsidiarity and Regions in Europe . Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2006, pp. 182–199.
  • Felix Ekardt, Raphael Weyland: Federalism Reform and European Administrative Law, New Journal for Administrative Law 2006, pp. 737–744.
  • Annegret Eppler: Federalism reform and European policy . In: From Politics and Contemporary History, APuZ issue 50/2006 , pp. 18–23 ( online ).
  • Annegret Eppler: Federalism reform in Germany: the planned distribution of competencies in environmental policy . In: European Center for Research on Federalism Tübingen (Ed.): Yearbook of Federalism 2006 , pp. 200–219.
  • Annegret Eppler: Federalism Reform and the European Constitutional Treaty in Germany: Negotiating positions and finding compromises in questions of the countries' rights of participation in European affairs . In: Anna Gamper, Peter Bußjäger (Ed.): Applying Subsidiarity: Regions, States, European Union / La Sussidiarietà Applicata: Regioni, Stati, Unione Europea , Vienna, pp. 86-108.
  • European Center for Federalism Research Tübingen (Ed.): Yearbook of Federalism 2005 ( online ).
  • European Center for Research on Federalism (Ed.): Yearbook of Federalism 2006 ( online ).
  • Thomas Fischer: German federalism facing the challenge of a European constitution . In: From politics and contemporary history , HB 29-30 / 2003, pp. 3–5 ( online ).
  • Thomas Fischer: The competence debate in the German Federalism Commission . In: Peter Bußjäger, Rudolf Hrbek (eds.): Projects of the federalism reform - Austria Convention and Federalism Commission in comparison , Vienna 2005, pp. 40–69.
  • Harald Georgii / Sarab Borhanian: German Bundestag, Wissenschaftlicher Dienst, WD 3 - 37/06, "Approval laws after the federalism reform, How would the proportion of approval laws have changed if the proposed reform had already been in force in 1998?" ( PDF ).
  • Martin Große Hüttmann: "We have to get out of the mishmash": The European capability of German federalism . In: Frank Decker (Ed.): Federalism at the crossroads? Options and perspectives of a reform of the federal system. Wiesbaden 2004, pp. 203-222.
  • Martin Große Hüttmann: "Terrorism threatens the whole country": The debate about reforming German security federalism . In: European Center for Federalism Research (Ed.): Yearbook of Federalism 2005. Federalism, Subsidiarity and Regions in Europe . Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2005, pp. 174–186.
  • Martin Große Hüttmann: "German federalism sleeps like a sleeping beauty": The federal reform of the second grand coalition and its long history . In: Petra Zimmermann-Steinhart (Ed.): Federalism - Devolution - Decentralization: Possibilities and Limits of Regional Self-Government in Europe , i. E.
  • Jens Joachim Hesse: The Failure of the Federalism Commission - Can the German Federal State be reformed? . In: Journal for State and European Sciences, Issue 1, 2005, pp. 109–123.
  • Rudolf Hrbek: Double interdependence of politics: German federalism and European integration. The German states in the EC decision-making process . In: Rudolf Hrbek, Uwe Thaysen (Hrsg.): The German countries and the European community . Baden-Baden 1986, pp. 17-36.
  • Rudolf Hrbek: The federal order - aspiration and reality . In: M.-L. Recker, B. Jellonnek, B. Rauls (Ed.): Balance sheet: 50 years of the Federal Republic of Germany . St. Ingbert 2001, pp. 33-68.
  • Rudolf Hrbek, Annegret Eppler: Germany before the federalism reform. A documentation . Tübingen 2003.
  • Rudolf Hrbek, Annegret Eppler: The unfinished federalism reform. An interim review after the failure of the federal government modernization commission in December 2004 . Tübingen 2005.
  • Rudolf Hrbek: A new attempt to reform federalism: the compromise package of the grand coalition . In: European Center for Federalism Research (Ed.): Yearbook of Federalism 2006, Baden-Baden 2006, pp. 139–157.
  • Iris Kemmler: Work and results of the Federalism Commission in the area of ​​financial relations between the federal government and the states . In: European Center for Federalism Research (Ed.): Yearbook of Federalism 2005. Federalism, Subsidiarity and Regions in Europe. Baden-Baden 2005, pp. 118-134.
  • Gerhard Lehmbruch : Federal State Reform as Social Technology? Path dependency and room for negotiation in German federalism . In: European Center for Research on Federalism (ed.), Yearbook of Federalism 2000, Baden-Baden 2000, pp. 71–93.
  • Roland Lhotta, Heinz-Werner Höffken, Jörn Ketelhut: Of frogs, swamps and barter deals: On the logic of the failure of federal reforms in participation federalism using the example of legislation and community tasks . In: Rudolf Hrbek, Annegret Eppler: The unfinished federalism reform. An interim assessment after the failure of the commission to modernize the federal system in December 2004. Tübingen 2005, pp. 15–42.
  • Wolfgang Renzsch : Modernization of the financial constitution: possibilities and limits, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn 1999 ( online ).
  • Wolfgang Renzsch: Financial federalism in the German commission for the modernization of the federal order. In: Peter Bußjäger / Rudolf Hrbek (Hrsg.): Projects of the federalism reform - Austria Convention and Federalism Commission in comparison . Series of publications by the Institute for Federalism, Volume 96, 2005.
  • Stefanie Schmahl: The Federal Constitutional Court readjustment of the federal-state relationship in the area of ​​legislation . In: European Center for Federalism Research (Ed.): Yearbook of Federalism 2006. Federalism, Subsidiarity and Regions in Europe . Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2006, pp. 220–236.
  • Norbert Röttgen : The work of the commission for the modernization of the federal order. An interim report . In: Hermann-Josef Blanke (Ed.): State and perspectives of the German federal state . Tübingen 2005, pp. 99-106.
  • Fritz W. Scharpf: Unused opportunities of federalism reform . MPIfG Working Paper 06/2, May 2006 ( online ).
  • Fritz W. Scharpf: Law and politics in the reform of German federalism . MPIfG Working Paper 05/6, June 2005 ( online ).
  • Fritz W. Scharpf: No Exit from the Joint Decision Trap? Can German Federalism Reform Itself? . MPIfG Working Paper 05/8, September 2005 ( online ).
  • Roland Sturm: Federalism reform: No problem of knowledge, but why a problem of design and decision-making? . In: PVS, 46: 2, 2005, pp. 195-203.
  • Roland Sturm: The federalism reform: will the big hit? . In: Roland Sturm, Heinrich Pehle (Ed.): Ways out of the crisis? The agenda of the second grand coalition . Opladen and Farmington Hills 2006, pp. 113-132.

Writings published after entry into force

  • Hans-Peter Schneider: The new German federal state. Report on the implementation of Federalism Reform I , Baden-Baden 2013.
  • From politics and contemporary history, balance sheet of federalism reform I, APuZ 50/2006 ( PDF ).
  • Jörn Ipsen : The distribution of competences between the federal government and the federal states after the federal reform , in: NJW 2006, pp. 2801–2806.
  • Ulrich Häde: On federalism reform in Germany , in: JZ 2006, pp. 930–940.
  • Peter Selmer : The federalism reform - a modernization of the federal order? , in: JuS 2006, pp. 1052-1060.
  • Alexander Thiele: The new regulation of legislative competences through the federalism reform - an overview , in: JA 10/2006, pp. 714–719.
  • Hans-Joachim Koch, Susan Krohn: Environment in bad shape? Environmental protection after the federal reform . Natur und Recht 28 (11), pp. 673-680 (2006), ISSN  0172-1631
  • Sascha Arnold: "The federalism reform in case processing", in: Bucerius Law Journal (BLJ) 1/2007, p. 1 ff. ( Www.law-journal.de )
  • Uwe Müller, Benjamin Klein: The New Legislative Competence of "Divergent State Legislation" and the Enactment of a Federal Environmental Code in Germany . Journal for European Environmental and Planning Law (JEEPL) issue 3/2007, p. 181 ff., ISSN  1613-7272 , table of contents
  • Thomas Hilpert: Constitutional requirements for payments under the EntflechtG from 2014 , InfrastrukturRecht Heft 9/2011, p. 202 ff.

Web links

Foreign federalism reforms

Most of the federal state structures are familiar with reforms of the allocation of exclusive competences and the reorganization of the shares in competing competences . In federalism in the United States , modified legal competences have been proposed under the term New Federalism since the 1980s - mostly with the aim of assigning more competencies to the states. In contrast, the reforms through the alliance agreements within the framework of European integration are aimed at assigning greater powers to the European institutions, taking up the principle of subsidiarity , as it is also applied in the German and Swiss federal structure.

See also

Individual evidence

  1. BVerfG, judgment of November 11, 1999, Az. 2 BvF 2, 3/98, 1, 2/99; BVerfGE 101, 158 - Financial equalization III.
  2. Plenary minutes 15/51, p. 4202 B.
  3. BT-Drs. 15/1685
  4. ^ The new power of the opposition Deutschlandfunk from July 8, 2010