Max Egon zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg

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Maximilian Egon Maria Erwin Paul Prince zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg (born November 19, 1897 in Rothenhaus near Komotau , Bohemia, Austria-Hungary ; † August 13, 1968 in Marbella , Málaga , Spain ) belonged to the European nobility .

In the Sudeten crisis in 1938 he acted as mediator with the aim of preventing war. During the Second World War he tried many times to establish peace contacts for Hermann Göring and Heinrich Himmler . Here his skillful demeanor and his diverse contacts came in handy: He was welcomed by Pope Pius XII. received, knew Adolf Hitler , Winston Churchill , Carl Jacob Burckhardt , diplomats, German and British high officials and many others.

Personal

Prince Max Egon came from a Catholic branch of the House of Hohenlohe-Langenburg that emerged in the late 18th century . The headquarters of the line was in Rothenhaus near Komotau in Bohemia. His parents were Gottfried, Prince of Hohenlohe-Langenburg (1860–1933) and Anna, née Countess von Schönborn-Buchheim (1865–1954). His parents' marriage resulted in another five siblings, including an older sister, two older brothers and two younger brothers. Prince Max Egon's grandfather Ludwig Karl Gustav zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg died in the Battle of Königgrätz in 1866. Prince Max Egon's cousin, the writer Max Karl zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg , was an exposed critic of the Nazi regime.

Prince Max Egon was married to María Piedad de Iturbe , the daughter of a Spanish grandee. He was wealthy in the Sudetenland , Spain and Mexico . In 1922 he acquired Liechtenstein citizenship and later Spanish. His sons Alfonso zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg and Max von Hohenlohe became famous .

Attempts to mediate in the Sudeten crisis in 1938

Even before the Sudeten crisis, Hohenlohe campaigned for equality for the German population in Czechoslovakia , i. H. of the Sudeten Germans . He brokered a conversation between Konrad Henlein , the chairman of the Sudeten German Party (SdP) and the Czechoslovak Prime Minister Milan Hodža and took part in it himself. Hodža showed understanding for Henlein's complaints, but also referred to his limited political leeway. Nevertheless, he wanted to work for a “generous solution” that would then also avert the danger of war.

The following year, 1938, the Sudeten Crisis occurred , in which Hitler intended to smash Czechoslovakia and incorporate its Czech part into the German Reich . For the public, however, it was only a matter of ending the discrimination against the Sudeten Germans by integrating the Sudetenland into the German Empire.

The British Government viewed this crisis with great concern. She feared that this would result in a European war for which Britain was not prepared. In July 1938 Hohenlohe visited Henlein's Robert Vansittart , who until recently was the highest official in the British Foreign Office and is now an advisor to the Foreign Minister. He exposed Hitler's secret plans that could lead to a world war before September. He described Henlein's worries. Its goal was a referendum. That would lead to a connection to the German Reich. Still, he hoped to keep his independent position.

Hohenlohe himself suggested a British mediation. This is exactly what the British government was already planning. An “unofficial” delegation was headed by Lord Walter Runciman , who was supposed to find a negotiated solution between the Czechoslovak government and the Sudeten Germans. During another visit a few days later, Hohenlohe welcomed this very much and also conveyed Hodža's wish that massive British pressure should make the reluctant Czech politicians willing to compromise. Then he and a British negotiator managed to get Henlein to support the Runciman mission for at least four weeks. Hohenlohe did not know that Henlein had agreed with Hitler that negotiations would only appear to be approved.

Runciman stayed in Czechoslovakia from August 2 to September 16, 1938. During this time Hohenlohe became an important informant and contact person for Runciman and his delegation. He also pointed out the difficulties of mediation: a wavering Henlein was urged by his more radical surroundings to insist on the connection. He brought about a number of meetings between Runciman and Henlein, the first taking place on August 18th in his Rothenhaus Castle. Henlein was willing to compromise.

In view of the increasing tensions, the Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš made a compromise proposal on August 22 , which for the first time provided for limited regional autonomy. However, Hodža had to find out the content afterwards from Hohenlohe. He had already traveled to Berlin beforehand and informed the State Secretary in the Foreign Office , Ernst von Weizsäcker , about the Czechoslovakia's willingness to negotiate. However, the SdP insisted on its original demands.

Finally, on September 5, Beneš submitted another plan that almost completely covered the Sudeten German demands. It was Hohenlohe who brought this to the party leadership of the SdP. This could not refuse, but was skeptical about the implementation and sometimes had ulterior motives. A negotiated solution now seemed in sight. However, on September 7th, The Times proposed the separation of all non-Czech majority areas. This was a private opinion but was understood to be the opinion of the British government. After unrest in the Sudetenland - staged from Germany - and clashes with the police, Henlein broke off the negotiations and only asked for the Anschluss. Hohenlohe now also saw this as the only remaining solution. Runciman joined them. But the Munich Agreement was needed to - temporarily - dissuade Hitler from his plans of attack.

During this crisis Hohenlohe showed how he - without an official function - could move effortlessly in a wide variety of circles: with the British Foreign Office, with his compatriots, with the Czech President and Prime Minister, with the State Secretary in Berlin, with the British delegation. He always tried to bring interlocutors together, to revive stalled negotiations, always with the aim of preventing a war.

Preserving the Peace

In the summer of 1939, Hitler assured those around him that England and France would not intervene in an attack against Poland. Hohenlohe tried to destroy this illusion. He knew the mood in England from his own experience and from conversations with the Foreign Office. He found open ears with Hermann Göring when he introduced him to Lord Runciman's son, Leslie, on August 12th. His warnings were also sent to Walter Hewel , the Foreign Office's liaison officer with Hitler. The latter, of course, could not be influenced.

No expansion of the fighting

While the Wehrmacht overran Poland in a few weeks in September 1939 (see Attack on Poland ), Hohenlohe tried to prevent the fighting from spreading. During a conversation with an unknown Englishman in Bern it became clear that there would be no negotiations with Hitler. Goering, however, seemed acceptable. Hohenlohe conducted similar explorations on October 25, 1939 with the British Group Captain Malcolm C. Christie (1881–1971), an excellent expert on Germany who prepared reports for both the Foreign Office and the secret service. Further discussions should follow. In December he met the new British ambassador to Switzerland, Sir David Kelly (1891-1959), this was also the first meeting of several. In these and other contacts, Hohenlohe always followed the line that Germany must withdraw from its conquests and that Hitler must be disempowered. He also warned the German side that the war would last a long time and that the entry of the United States would make it hopeless.

Peace or Invasion of England?

After the occupation of Denmark and the conquest of Norway in April 1940 (see Enterprise Weser Exercise ), contacts initially broke off. With the western campaign in May and June 1940, the military situation changed dramatically: France, Belgium and the Netherlands were occupied, and England was threatened by an invasion. Hitler now awaited England's offer of peace. But that did not happen. On July 14th, Hohenlohe met Kelly and brought him a letter from Hewel stating that the British Empire would not be dismembered. Kelly accepted this eagerly - but in the Foreign Office the skepticism remained. After Hitler's offer of peace on July 19 and its immediate rejection by Churchill, this thread was also broken.

Disempowerment of Hitler?

In December 1940 Hohenlohe was given a certificate from the SS , according to which he was traveling to Switzerland on their behalf. It is unclear who his interlocutor in the SS was at the time; it was probably Reinhard Höhn . From 1942 it was Walter Schellenberg at any rate and in 1943 at the latest, probably earlier, Heinrich Himmler . Again he had several conversations with Kelly.

After a long break, he came into contact with the British military attaché Torr in Madrid in May 1942. Hohenlohe indicated that Himmler and his SS would be able to eliminate Hitler and Göring. Torr, on the other hand, could not imagine the so much hated Himmler as a negotiating partner. Hohenlohe gave in: Himmler could be dropped after a coup.

Six months later, in December 1942, Carl Langbehn was able to establish contact with the American secret service, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Bern, headed by Allen Dulles, on behalf of Himmler . Hohenlohe also held several talks here between January and December 1943. Himmler's negotiators again argued that the SS would be able to eliminate Hitler and would then remain as an important force for order. A separate peace was to be concluded with the Western powers, but the war against the Soviet Union was to be continued. Dulles was interested: he feared that after a German defeat, large parts of Europe would fall to the Soviet Union. Therefore Germany should be preserved as a bulwark against Bolshevism. The American government, however, had a different goal: total surrender.

Hohenlohe was not just the mouthpiece of Goering or Himmler. Rather, he acted as an independent mediator, full of initiative, with his own views, which he presented to both sides. However, his peace efforts had to be unsuccessful because neither side was ready to end the war.

literature

  • Heinz Höhne : The order under the skull. The history of the SS. Bertelsmann, Gütersloh 1967 (reprint: Orbis, Munich 2002, ISBN 3-572-01342-9 ).
  • Ian Kershaw : Hitler. Volume 2: 1936-1945. Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, Munich 2002, ISBN 3-423-30842-7 .
  • Bernd Martin : Peace Initiatives and Power Politics in the Second World War 1939–1942. Droste, Düsseldorf 1974, ISBN 3-7700-0359-4 .
  • Helmuth G. Rönnefarth: The Sudeten Crisis in International Politics: Origin - Course - Impact. 2 volumes. Steiner, Wiesbaden 1961.
  • Ulrich Schlie : No peace with Germany. The secret talks in the Second World War 1939–1941. Langen Müller, Munich 1994, ISBN 3-7844-2467-8 .
  • Ulrich Schlie: Max Egon Prince of Hohenlohe-Langenburg. Political scientist, landowner and private diplomat in the Third Reich, 1897–1968. In: Life pictures from Baden-Württemberg. Volume 23, Stuttgart 2010, ISBN 978-3-17-021529-0 , pp. 444-471.
  • Reinhard Spitzy : That's how we gambled away the empire. Confessions of an illegal. 3. Edition. Langen Müller, Munich 1988, ISBN 3-7844-2132-6 .
  • Paul Vyšný: The Runciman mission to Czechoslovakia, 1938. Prelude to Munich. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire u. a. 2003, ISBN 0-333-73136-0 .
  • Karl-Günter cell: Hitler's doubting elite: Goebbels - Göring - Himmler - Speer. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2010, ISBN 978-3-506-76909-1 .
  • Lothar Höbelt : Prince Max Egon zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg (1897–1968). An untimely prophet of Western ties. In: Alma Hannig, Martina Winkelhofer-Thyri (eds.): The Hohenlohe family. A European dynasty in the 19th and 20th centuries. Böhlau, Cologne 2013, ISBN 978-3-412-22201-7 , pp. 287-306.

Web links

About the family: Maximilian Egon, Prince of Hohenlohe-Langenburg Geneall.net

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Martin, 1974, p. 85, FN 15.
  2. ↑ Rönnefarth, 1961, Volume 1, pp. 167-170.
  3. ↑ Kershaw, 2002, Volume 2, pp. 153, 161.
  4. ↑ Vyšný, 2003, pp. 62 ff., 116 f.
  5. ↑ Vyšný, 2003, p. 118 f .; Rönnefarth, 1961, pp. 218-219.
  6. ↑ Vyšný, 2003, pp. 147–171.
  7. ↑ Vyšný, 2003, pp. 172–216; Files on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945. Series D Volume 2. Imprimerie Nationale. Baden-Baden 1960, Doc. 376, p. 475.
  8. ↑ Vyšný, 2003, pp. 263–280; Rönnefarth, 1961, pp. 491-495.
  9. ↑ Martin, 1974, p. 85; Schlie 1994, p. 103.
  10. ↑ Biographical data s. Janus: The Papers of Group Captain Malcolm Christie
  11. ↑ Martin, 1974, p. 86; 102 f .; Schlie, 1994, pp. 103-107, 227-229.
  12. ↑ Kershaw, 2002, pp. 403-404, 410-411; Schlie, 1994, pp. 231-232.
  13. ↑ Martin, 1974, p. 294.
  14. ↑ Cell, 2010, pp. 222-223.
  15. ^ Cell, 2010, pp. 224, 227-228.
personal data
SURNAME Hohenlohe-Langenburg, Max Egon too
ALTERNATIVE NAMES Hohenlohe-Langenburg, Maximilian Egon Maria Erwin Paul Prinz zu (full name)
BRIEF DESCRIPTION Nobleman
DATE OF BIRTH November 19, 1897
PLACE OF BIRTH Rothenhaus near Komotau , Bohemia, Austria-Hungary
DATE OF DEATH August 13, 1968
Place of death Marbella , Málaga , Spain