NFR-90

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NFR-90 class
Overview
Type frigate
units 59 (planned)
Shipyard

various

Technical specifications
displacement

5,400 t

length

130 m

width

15.9 m

Draft

4.8 m

Range

5,000 nm

The NFR-90 project , which stands for N ATO F rigate R eplacement for the 19 90 s and in German means something like NATO frigate replacement for the 1990s , was a NATO armaments project in the 1980s to develop a uniform frigate for the navies of eight member states. It should have been the world's largest armaments project in the maritime sector, but failed in 1990 due to the various interests.

idea

Starting position

In the late 1970s, a large number of NATO navies had a need for new frigates. According to the NATO doctrine of the time, the focus was on submarine hunting , as the Soviet submarine fleet was seen as the main threat. In particular, it should be possible to secure convoys with American troops and armaments for the continental European land front. In a secondary role, the ships should have anti-aircraft and sea targeting capabilities. Specifically, the following classes should be replaced:

  • The German Navy was looking for a replacement for the four Hamburg- class destroyers under the project name Frigate 124 .
  • The US Navy was looking for a replacement for the 39 Farragut and Charles F. Adams class ships .
  • The Canadian Navy was looking for a replacement for its 20 companion destroyers of the St. Laurent, Restigouche, Mackenzie and Annapolis classes as part of the Canadian Patrol Frigate Project .
  • The Royal Navy was looking for a successor to the twelve Sheffield-class destroyers .

Merger

The main reason why international cooperation was considered was the expected cost savings with the significantly increased costs for the increasingly complex armaments during this period. Even if the ships should have been built nationally, considerable savings should be achieved in construction (particularly in terms of standardized equipment), maintenance and training by utilizing so-called economies of scale . Accordingly, a project group - the Project Group 27 , PG / 27 for short - was set up in 1979 by the following seven countries :

Spain ( Armada Española ) became the eighth country to join the project group in 1982.

Development of the program

Feasibility study

In 1981 a preliminary investigation was carried out in the form of a study, which came to the conclusion that an international frigate building program was possible and would not involve any particular risks. It was also determined that the national needs could be met by a platform of around 3,500 t of water displacement, which was to be designed in such a way that it could be equipped with various weapon and sensor systems on its own national initiative. In 1984, based on this, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a detailed feasibility study was signed. Around 18 months later, in October 1985, the 10,000-page paper was presented. The feasibility was still assessed positively, the proposed ship platform had now grown significantly with about 5,000 t of water displacement.

Two organizations were founded to continue the program, both based in Hamburg :

  • On the part of the navies, the Project Management Organization , or PMO for short, was founded under the leadership of the British Rear Admiral Marsh.
  • The Internationale Schiffsstudiengesellschaft mbH , ISS for short, was founded by industry.

Definition phase

In January 1988 the Memorandum of Understanding for the definition phase could be signed. In doing so, the final design should be determined and the prerequisites for later construction should be determined. However, there were considerable differences of opinion between the navies in various areas:

One point of contention was the degree of national diversifiability and the weight reserves to be kept for it. For example, Germany attached great importance to the possibility of being able to equip a towing sonar. Further sticking points were the crew size, whether four or five decks were better, whether a CODOG or a CODAG propulsion system was to be preferred and which of the two competing anti-ship missiles Exocet and RGM-84 Harpoon should be used. In addition, Great Britain insisted on the installation of a short-range defense system due to the disastrous experiences in the Falklands War . By far the most serious dispute was triggered by the air defense system: France and Italy insisted on the use of a European FAMS ( Family of Anti Air Missile Systems ) air defense system , while Germany, the Netherlands and Canada insisted on the US-dominated NAAWS (NATO Anti Air Warfare System). supported.

In September 1989, the participating states were finally presented with the draft for a so-called baseline ship , which should have been specified more precisely in the subsequent detailed design phase and would have left a certain amount of leeway for national modifications. With a length of 130 m and a width of 15.9 m, the ship would have had four decks, a draft of 4.8 m and a displacement of around 5,400 t. The propulsion power was set at around 30 MW and the range should be around 5,000 nm. However, issues such as the air defense system had still not been resolved.

At that time, the eight navies wanted to procure a total of 59 frigates, with a unit price of 350 million ECU , which would have been around 730 million DM or 365 million euros.

fail

Just a month later, in October 1989, Great Britain, France and Italy left the project. According to other sources, the UK had already left the project in September. With the disappearance of these three nations, the remaining nations regarded the project as pointless and Germany and Spain left the project in December of the same year. A month later, the project was finally shelved by the remaining three countries - the USA, the Netherlands and Canada. The reasons for the failure are likely to have been varied:

  • The most obvious reason may have been industrial policy considerations.
  • The dispute over the air defense system had split the team into two groups.
  • From the beginning, the US Navy had little enthusiasm for the relatively small and relatively limited-use frigates.
  • The rigid insistence on a uniform design in questions of detail with little leeway for the individual states.

Alternatives

Great Britain, France and Italy continued the cooperation in the trinational project Horizon CNGF , whereby Great Britain also withdrew from it and built the purely national Daring class . Both classes no longer focused on submarine hunting, but on association air defense. As a short-term replacement for the Hamburg- class, Germany built four Brandenburg -class submarine hunting frigates . In addition, were together with the Netherlands and Spain as part of the Frigate Cooperation Trilateral the Saxony - , De Zeven Provinciën - and Álvaro de Bazán class developed, with the cooperation in this case was far less extensive than planned at the NFR. In these three classes, too, the focus was no longer on anti-submarine hunting, but on association air defense. With the Arleigh Burke class , the United States demonstrated what it actually had in mind: multi-purpose ships almost twice as large with capabilities for unit air defense and land attack. Apart from the German Brandenburg -class, only the Canadians remained loyal to the concept of the anti-submarine frigate and built twelve units of the Halifax -class .

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