User-investor dilemma

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The user-investor dilemma describes the fact that investments are not made because the investor cannot achieve any return on his investment in the long term, whereas the user does not have to pay the benefit.

It also appears in the public discussion under the designation investor-user dilemma , tenant-landlord dilemma , owner-user problem or cost-benefit dilemma (see also principal-agent theory ). It is the result of a market failure .

The user-investor dilemma in German rental housing

The user-investor dilemma is often mentioned in connection with politically wanted investments in environmental protection when renting apartments, whereby the legislature at the same time does not allow the investor any long-term income from it through the provisions of Section 559 of the German Civil Code (BGB) on rent. The modernization levy allows investments of up to 8% of the investment sum per year to be passed on to the tenant for an unlimited period of time. However, this surcharge may only be required of tenants by law until a rent increase, which is customary anyway , must not exceed the local comparative rent according to § 558 BGB (see rent index ). An investment would have to pay for itself in a short time, which is usually not possible with investments in residential construction. Regular rent increases could also have taken place during this period, so that landlords who do not make any investments achieve higher income. Often the fact that a rent increase cannot be achieved on the market stands in the way of a rent increase. Tenants who live in refurbished rental apartments can save considerable energy costs, but pay the same rent over the long term as tenants of unrenovated properties.

Sample calculation

Graphic for example calculation

The landlord of an apartment building with 500 m² of living space wants to install a solar thermal system (according to the EEWärmeG of the federal state of Baden-Württemberg, this is mandatory when replacing heating). The system costs amount to € 15,000. He will receive government funding of € 3,000 for the system.

With the system, 20% of the energy consumption (natural gas, heating oil, etc.) can be saved. Of the current 80,000  kWh per year, 16,000 kWh of energy are saved. The energy costs saved amount to 0.07 ct / kWh per year 16,000 = € 1,120.

The landlord can pass on the investment costs minus the subsidy to his tenants. 12,000 € 11% = 960 € can be reclaimed annually from his tenants. With the local rental price of currently € 6 / m², this means a surcharge of € 960/12 months / 500 m² = € 0.16 to € 6.16 per month, i.e. a rent increase of 2.7%. In return, the tenants save almost the same amount of energy costs.

After 2 years, the landlord now wants to increase the rent within the framework of the local comparable rent. According to the rent index, a rent increase of 3% to € 6.18 / m² per month would be possible. He could have asked for this increase even without modernization measures. But since the rent increase through modernization has now become part of the rent, he is no longer allowed to demand the surcharge for the solar system. He would have to bear most of the costs of the system himself, but the tenants save 20% of the energy costs after two years. In addition, it is questionable whether a rent increase is allowed at all, since there is no energy saving in the sense of the BGB, but “only” an environmentally friendly primary energy and cost saving.

It can also be observed that a state subsidy significantly reduces the cost of the measure for the tenant, but actually worsens the profitability for the investor.

Only in the case of much more expensive renovation measures, with low rents or low inflation rates, the landlord could possibly refinance the investment over a very long period of time. The often recurring claim that the owner's investment would have amortized after 9 years with an 11% BGB rent increase according to the old legal situation is in any case untenable. This is because aspects such as the described limitation by the comparable rent, but also investment reserves, depreciation, capital costs and inflation are disregarded.

consequences

For years, the problem has led landlords to regularly only take the measures required by law on rented buildings. The tenants, on the other hand, may have to accept high energy costs, as these can be passed on to the tenant by the landlord in unlimited amounts as levies. Refurbishments that are neutral in terms of heating rents often cannot be implemented, i. H. the possible rent increase exceeds the savings on the tenant side. But even if renovations were sensible from an economic point of view, they will not be carried out. State subsidies reduce the burden on tenants, but reduce refinancing prospects (see example).

Possible solutions

If one assumes a market failure , the aspect of asymmetrical information can be mitigated by giving the user the opportunity to recognize and evaluate the object used by its properties. The legally prescribed energy certificate could provide guidance here, although it does not allow any conclusions to be drawn about the actual energy consumption and the assessment is based on different methods.

To eliminate the market failure caused by the barriers to tenancy law described and justified by the breakup between user and investor, u. a. observe the following approaches:

Warm rent or partial warm rent

Here, the landlord should be given the opportunity to generate additional income through energy-saving measures, since the warm or partial warm rent is an integral part of the net rent. Both solutions suffer again from the disintegration of user and investor: the incentive for the user to be economical is reduced, the costs have to be borne by the landlord. There are additional problems with the partially inclusive rental, including: a .: Which part is billed independently of usage, which part is not? An intervention in the rental legislation is also necessary here.

The amended Heating Costs Ordinance allows a warm rent, but only for passive houses , where the billing costs are higher than the actual heating costs due to the low heating costs.

Heat contracting

The user-investor dilemma caused many landlords to improve the energy standard in the form of the sometimes problematic heat contracting . For tenants, this procedure is usually associated with cost disadvantages, since the contractor naturally acts in a profit-oriented manner.

In addition, this approach is limited to the system technology and thus only opens up a small part of the savings potential in existing buildings. A report puts the maximum possible savings through pure plant renovation at around 20%, which would then correspond to an energy consumption of around 14 liters of heating oil m² / year instead of around 18 liters. So-called "7-liter" houses are currently considered economically feasible for renovations.

In the case of a complete renovation, the above mentioned. Substantial savings potential through plant renovation. The heat contracting of small systems is currently not offered either, so that only 20% of the housing stock could be considered for contracting.

Legal requirements

The Energy Saving Ordinance contains numerous retrofitting obligations , in the state of Baden-Württemberg an obligation for the introduction of solar thermal systems has been introduced. In principle, there is always the risk that the investor will only meet the obligation instead of striving for an optimal solution if he is not able to amortize. There is additional bureaucracy for compliance and verification.

Rent index

In Germany, rents are often levied on the basis of a locally applicable rent index . If energetically refurbished and non-refurbished properties are treated equally for determining rent, this even exacerbates the user-investor dilemma.

The basic idea is to charge a surcharge for apartments that meet a certain standard. This is to ensure that landlords of energetically renovated properties receive permanent compensation.

This approach is problematic because a rent index is not a political instrument, but is intended to reflect the market situation "according to scientific principles". If there is no or only a small surcharge depending on the market situation, the user-investor dilemma remains. The influence of the actors involved, tenant and owner associations and city administrations should also not be underestimated. In the field of tension between interests, there are always compromises that run counter to a solution to the user-investor dilemma.

The legislature has so far failed to set criteria in a rent index ordinance, although BGB 558c would give it the opportunity to do so. It can be observed that a large number of different assessment criteria are developing in this regard in communities.

A rent index is unsuitable for secure refinancing of an energetic renovation. Any additional income that may result from this is not related to expenses and can change every two years due to changes in the rent index.

Surcharge for individual measures

The rent index currently includes criteria such as:

If a building meets these criteria, a surcharge may be levied. The advantage of this method is that the owner is also rewarded with individual measures in the existing building, i.e. inexpensive but recognized efficient technology is also used in comparison to a costly total renovation.

Surcharge for achieving good energy demand / energy consumption values

For the first time, the energy certificate offers the possibility of evaluating buildings energetically using standardized procedures. If a building reaches an arithmetical value that results from the energy consumption or the arithmetically determined requirement, the landlord may raise a surcharge.

However, if the evaluation is based solely on demand or consumption values, the user-investor dilemma arises in a new form. Because if the effort to achieve rent index relevance is too great, meaningful partial measures may not be available at all. Even after a limit value has been reached, there is no longer any incentive to carry out further measures on the building.

The problem with taking into account the primary energy requirement is that it no longer correlates with the amount of energy paid for . For example, a wood pellet heating system achieves a significantly lower primary energy requirement than heating with fossil fuels, but not necessarily lower costs. The surcharge becomes an environmental policy instrument.

Another serious problem is the existence of three different forms of identification. Currently (2010) three different IDs can be created for the same building: One ID based on energy consumption and two IDs based on theoretical energy requirements (according to [EnEV] 2007, EnEV 2009). However, not all passes are permitted for all types of building. Since a comparison of the results is often not possible, this means in practice that the ID cards for a rent index survey cannot usually be used.

Examples

For years, a surcharge has been possible in many rental tables for energy-saving windows. It is becoming apparent that the consideration of the different energy certificates is problematic and that a wide variety of conversions must be provided when considering them.

The 2003 rent index in Darmstadt introduced good thermal properties as a characteristic of an apartment for the first time . A rent surcharge of € 0.37 per m² of living space and month could be levied if the primary energy requirement of the building fell below 175 kWh per m² and year.

According to the Darmstadt rent index 2008, the following surcharges are possible: with an adjusted primary energy value of less than 175 kWh per m² and year, an additional € 0.49 per m² and month may be charged to the tenant. If the value is below 250 kWh per m² and year, a surcharge of 0.37 € per m² and month is possible. Only energy requirements certificates according to the 2007 Energy Saving Ordinance are permitted.

For the city of Bochum , surcharges for insulation of € 0.25 per m² and month, condensing technology € 0.23 per m² and month are added in the rent index 2012. Taken together, these surcharges can amount to up to 10% of the rental price in Bochum. The consideration of energy certificates in the rent index 2008 has been reversed.

The 2010 rent index of the city of Regensburg takes into account consumption and requirement certificates in the same way.

The rent index 2010 of the city of Frankfurt am Main takes windows and heating systems into account when determining the rent with a surcharge of up to € 0.44 per m² per month.

The rent index 2011 in Berlin takes into account surcharges and discounts on the basis of a consumption energy parameter when determining the rent.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ BGH judgment Az. VIII ZR 331-06.
  2. ^ Franz-Georg Rips: Protocol 16/52 . German Bundestag, pp. 18–19.
  3. ↑ Norbert Eisenschmid: "Energy saving in the sense of §§ 554, 559 BGB", WuM 2006, p. 119
  4. ↑ Ways out of the landlord-tenant dilemma , InWIS, concept study 2011 p. 112 (PDF; 485 kB)
  5. ↑ Final report Ifeu Institute (PDF; 2.9 MB), December 2, 2005
  6. ↑ BMU: Supplementary investigations and in-depth analyzes on possible design variants of a heating law ( memento of the original of September 21, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.bmu.de archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 1.8 MB) , final report on behalf of the BMU, 2009, p. 187 ff.
  7. ↑ BMU: Supplementary investigations and in-depth analyzes on possible design variants of a heating law , final report on behalf of the BMU, 2009, p. 187 ff. ( Memento of the original from September 21, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 1.8 MB) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.bmu.de
  8. ↑ Mieterverein Hamburg eV: The CO2 minimization program ... BUND ( Memento of the original from June 28, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , July 2, 2007 @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.mhmhamburg.de
  9. ↑ Beyer, Lippert: Expert opinion of the University of Jena on heat contracting on behalf of the ZVEI  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , 2007@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.energiecontracting.de  
  10. ↑ Stefan Klinski: Statement on the EEWärmeG. April 16, 2008, p. 24 ff.
  11. ↑ Ulrich Zawatka-Gerlach: Stop the increase in rents by law . Der Tagesspiegel , November 17, 2008
  12. ^ Felix Ekardt, Christian Heitmann: Energetic renovation and the EEWärmeG. Can the investor-user dilemma be resolved ecologically and socially? (PDF; 74 kB) Law of the Energy Industry, 2009, p. 118 ff.
  13. ↑ Does climate protection slow down the supply of living space ?, Haus und Grund Reutlingen, panel discussion of March 29, 2010  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 78 kB)@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.hausundgrund-reutlingen.de  
  14. ↑ Andreas Pfnür (Ed.): Profitability Calculations of Climate Protection Investments in the Housing Industry , Working Papers on Real Estate Research and Practice, Volume No. 18 (PDF; 3.9 MB), November 2009.
  15. ↑ Energy efficiency - a new task for state regulation? - ZEW , 2008
  16. ↑ Forecast study - BMWI ( Memento of the original from March 19, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 3.0 MB) 2007 @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.bmwi.de
  17. ↑ Possibilities under tenancy law for implementing energy-saving measures in existing buildings - IWU study (PDF; 764 kB), 2001
  18. ↑ Ruhland, Herud: "Forecast of the market penetration of contracting in the German housing industry", report by the University of Jena on behalf of the ZVEI, 2008, p. 32 ff. ( Memento of the original from December 3, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was used automatically and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.rewi.uni-jena.de
  19. ↑ McKinsey study: "Costs and Potentials of Greenhouse Gas Avoidance in Germany", 2009, p.37 ff.  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 3.0 MB)@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.klimaktiv.de  
  20. ↑ Holzweg Contracting , Haus und Grund Report, January 2009 edition
  21. ^ In search of SZ from June 26, 2009
  22. ↑ Integration of energetic differentiation features in the rent index BBSR-Online-Publication, No. 04/2010 ( Memento of the original of March 2nd, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , ISSN 1868-0097 @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.bbsr.bund.de 
  23. ↑ Mietspiegel Darmstadt 2003  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 9.9 MB)@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.relaw.de  
  24. ↑ Rent index Darmstadt 2008 (PDF; 2.8 MB)
  25. ↑ Rent index Bochum 2012 (PDF; 1.5 MB)
  26. ↑ Rent index of the city of Regensburg 2010 ( Memento of the original from August 12, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.regensburg.de
  27. ↑ Rent index of the city of Frankfurt am Main 2010 ( memento of the original from June 26, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 1.6 MB) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de
  28. ↑ Berliner Mietspiegel 2011 ( Memento of the original from June 26, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 1.6 MB) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de

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