Operation Phoenix

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The Operation Phoenix , including Phoenix program was between June 1967 and March 1973, a covert operation of US foreign intelligence service Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Vietnam War . It was used to locate, identify and kill or capture enemy Vietnamese guerrilla units of the FNL ( Viet Cong ).

background

In South Vietnam , a secret network existed for the military and political support of the National Liberation Front during the 1960s and early 1970s . The so-called Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) (so named by the USA) stored food and equipment for North Vietnamese armed forces and guerrilla groups seeking refuge , provided guides and messages for North Vietnamese and controlled many villages in South Vietnam.

This communist apparatus worked in Vietnam for many years and was trained in secret operations. To wage war on this level, the South Vietnamese government developed a special program called Phung Hoang , or the Phoenix program. The government published it on the grounds that it was necessary to protect the population against terrorism and urged citizens to help obtain information.

Since the FNL was a highly developed and experienced opponent, experts were needed to fight it. Prior to 1968, the intelligence operations against the guerrillas were coordinated by the Commander of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) in a civil and military advisory role called Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX). Initially, this program received little official government attention and support. The program was officially supported from mid-1968 to bring the police, the military and other government organizations together so that they could exchange their knowledge and take action against the hostile institutions. The result was that members of the enemy apparatus were captured, surrendered voluntarily, executed in groups or killed in firefights.

Goal setting and methods

The aim of the program was, cadres of the FNL in South Vietnam to identify and "neutralize" . This euphemism was used to describe the capture or killing of members of the insurgent guerrilla movement. The Phung Hoang actions were officially initiated on July 1, 1968 by a decree of the Vietnamese government; in fact, the program had already been started by the CIA. It was later expanded to include the US Army and the South Vietnamese Army . In the course of the "Vietnamization" , in which the South Vietnamese army was re-equipped and trained while the American troops left the country, the program was handed over to the Vietnamese government.

The South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu lifted the secrecy and confirmed the existence of the program on October 1, 1969 in order to achieve wider acceptance and cooperation with the South Vietnamese citizens. It was eventually classified as a failure by both the US and Vietnamese governments.

Calls

The program attempted to locate specific targets within the FNL through bribery or interrogation. One method the US Army used to locate the guerrillas was to cordon off a village that was suspected of being used as a base, and to interrogate and then evacuate every resident . Some Phoenix operations, such as setting up ambushes to stop a squad of armed assassins between two villages, were military in nature.

Provincial Interrogation Centers (PIC) (German: Regional Interrogation Centers ) were set up in each of the 44 South Vietnamese provinces. Most of the countermeasure experts belonged to the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) (German: Regional Enlightenment Units ). Cambodian and Chinese mercenaries were even deployed along with defectors and members of the South Vietnamese army . These units of around 118 men each were recruited, trained and paid for by the CIA with the help of special units of the US armed forces.

Those responsible for the program set minimum quotas that had to be met by the provincial officials in order to improve participation and the effectiveness of the Phung Hoang program. At the end of 1969 the required quota was 1,800 people per province.

In January 1970, 450 US military advisers were employed as aides to the South Vietnamese government with the Phoenix program.

Criteria for success and failure

It was a program that led to many civilian refugees and great dissatisfaction among the population. It was dangerous because it was used against political opponents of the regime, regardless of whether they were members of the FNL. The program also contributed significantly to increasing corruption. Some local politicians demanded payment with the threat of arresting those affected under the rules of the program if they did not pay, or they released actual FNL members in exchange for payment. Some military experts suggested that the Phoenix program did more than harm the insurgents. By jailing mostly small workers - often just people forced to work for the FNL - the government alienated itself from a large part of the population.

See also

literature

  • Mark Moyar: Phoenix and the birds of prey. The CIA's secret campaign to destroy the Viet Cong , Annapolis, Md (Naval Institute Press) 1997. ISBN 1-55750-593-4
  • Keyword Phoenix program , in: Ian FW Beckett: Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare , New York (Checkmark Books) 2001, p. 188. ISBN 0-8160-4601-8
  • Douglas Valentine: The Phoenix Program. William Morrow & Company, New York 1992, ISBN 978-0-688-09130-9 , ( online )

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