Pleven plan

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With the Pleven Plan of October 24, 1950, the French Prime Minister René Pleven made a proposal for a European Army under the command of a European Defense Minister, to which German battalions should also belong. These were to be integrated into Allied troop units under Allied command. He presented the plan to the National Assembly in a government statement.

Despite considerable disadvantages for the young Federal Republic, which the Pleven Plan was supposed to prevent from joining NATO , Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer agreed in principle to this.

After difficult negotiations that dragged on for almost 18 months and led to a large number of modifications to the original version of the Pleven Plan, an agreement was reached on the establishment of a European Defense Community (EDC), which was signed by the foreign ministers of Germany , France and Italy and the three Benelux countries on May 27, 1952.

Nevertheless, the plan failed on August 30, 1954, due to the vote of the French National Assembly. One reason for this was the participation of the Federal Republic in the European Defense Community , the former enemy state would have been almost equal to the other member states. In addition, members of the National Assembly criticized the loss of national sovereignty and expressed the fear that the US could receive an excuse to withdraw troops in the EDC and leave the defense of Western Europe against the Soviet Union exclusively to the Europeans.

For Adenauer, the failure of the EVG was, in his own words, one of the greatest disappointments of his chancellorship.

backgrounds

After the Second World War , Germany was completely demilitarized as part of the Potsdam Agreement . Since the USA saw a threat to the security of West Germany and thus all of Western Europe after the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany and the establishment of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the Soviet Union , they could not withdraw their troops without conquering West Germany through the GDR to have to fear stationed Soviet troops.

Due to the Korean War , however, the Americans needed the troop contingents stationed in Germany, and domestic pressure on the government of President Harry S. Truman increased due to the high costs that continuing the occupation to this extent meant for the American taxpayers.

For this reason, on February 7, 1951, the US government spoke out in favor of rebuilding German armed forces so that they could take over part of the defense.

The French were extremely critical of the rebuilding of a German army, as three wars in less than 100 years ( Franco-German War 1870–1871, First World War 1914–1918 and Second World War 1939–1945) of which, according to the French interpretation, at least two had started from Germany, the French need for security against Germany in foreign policy had come to the fore.

The Pleven Plan

Since the French could not prevent a new German army due to the American dominance in the negotiations on German rearmament, the Pleven Plan should lead to a threat from Germany being made controllable. For this reason it was proposed that the office of a European Defense Minister and a European Defense Administration should be established. This defense minister should be given much the same powers as a national defense minister normally has. Filling this post with a French would have guaranteed extensive control over the European army. Further control should be exercised by making the European Defense Minister answerable to a European assembly. The French government demanded that there should be nationally homogeneous combat units with a maximum size of 5000 men. Furthermore, only a part of the existing national armed forces should be integrated into the European army. If the European Defense Community had been established, France would have had larger troop contingents available and Germany, in contrast to the other signatory states - France, Italy and the Benelux countries - would not have had a national army. Furthermore, the Federal Republic of Germany should not have any floating units and should only be able to dispose of flying formations at a later date. West Germany's membership in NATO was categorically excluded in the Pleven Plan.

On February 15, 1951, the French government published a memorandum which specified the content of the Pleven Plan. The goal is a European army with the same cohesion as any national army within its state. This European army should be the military instrument of a politically and economically united Europe, which should be created at the same time. The formation of this army is divided into two phases. In the first phase, the allied troops already available would be placed under a European Defense Commissioner, while small German units would be set up under the supervision of the offices of the occupying powers. In the 2nd phase, the troop contingents, which were previously nationally separated, were to be converted to European, i.e. H. nationally mixed associations are "merged". The commissioner, who would be upgraded to European defense minister at this stage at the earliest, should only be able to exercise all of the powers such as control of the recruitment and deployment of troops through the German troops. The national associations of the other states would only report nominally to the commissioner.

As the largest "nationally homogeneous" troop formation, Paris proposed the "Kampfgruppe", of which there should be four types (infantry, tanks, border guards, fortresses). A “European” division would consist of three of these combat groups, which, according to the memorandum, must by no means come from the same nation. This approach should prevent German formations from acting independently. The Pleven Plan would in fact have led to predominantly Franco-German divisions, since tactical-operational cooperation between German troops and American, British or other armed forces was not provided. In addition to the land forces, a common air defense was to be established, whereas the establishment of European naval forces was not the aim.

By the end of the 2nd phase, 30 “European” divisions with a German share of 250,000 to 300,000 men should be created. The European Army should be based on conscription. Based on the experiences from the Second World War, France wanted to prevent a professional army in the near future. Therefore, Paris demanded that professional soldiers, temporary volunteers and conscripts be represented in equal proportions. The military substitute system necessary for German contingents should in practice be subordinate to the occupying powers. All of these restrictions would have meant that, apart from Luxembourg, only the Federal Republic of Germany would have been a member state with purely European armed forces.

The explanations in this memorandum should form the basis for the French position during the negotiations on the formation of the EDC.

The German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer expressed interest in the Pleven Plan because he wanted to regain the sovereignty of Germany, which still had the status of an enemy-occupied country, by rearming West Germany. For this reason he demanded an end to the occupation statute in return for a ratification of the treaty on the European Defense Community in the Bundestag .

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Heinz Rebhan: Development and organization of the air force 1955 to 1971. In: Bernd Lemke , Dieter Krüger , Heinz Rebhan et al. (Ed.): The air force 1950 to 1970. Concept, structure, integration. Published by the Military History Research Office. Volume 2, Munich 2006, p. 561.
  2. ↑ Dieter Krüger: The EVG - A Model for a Future European Army? In: Werner Hoyer, Gerd F. Kaldrack (Ed.): European Security and Defense Policy (ESVP). The way to integrated European armed forces? Inner Leadership Forum, Baden-Baden 2002, p. 48.
  3. ↑ Dieter Krüger: The EVG - A Model for a Future European Army? In: Werner Hoyer, Gerd F. Kaldrack (Ed.): European Security and Defense Policy (ESVP). The way to integrated European armed forces? Inner Leadership Forum, Baden-Baden 2002, p. 48.
  4. ↑ Klaus A. Maier: The international disputes about the western integration of the Federal Republic of Germany and about their arming within the European defense community. In: Lutz Köllner, Klaus A. Maier , Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg et al. (Eds.): The EVG phase. Beginnings of West German Security Policy. Published by the Military History Research Office. Volume 2, Munich 1990, p. 15.
  5. ^ Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg: The planning of the defense contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany in the context of the EVG. In: Lutz Köllner, Klaus A. Maier, Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg et al. (Eds.): The EVG phase. Beginnings of West German Security Policy. Published by the Military History Research Office. Volume 2, Munich 1990, p. 651 f.
  6. ^ Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg: The planning of the defense contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany in the context of the EVG. In: Lutz Köllner, Klaus A. Maier, Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg et al. (Eds.): The EVG phase. Beginnings of West German Security Policy. Published by the Military History Research Office. Volume 2, Munich 1990, p. 652.
  7. ^ Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg: The planning of the defense contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany in the context of the EVG. In: Lutz Köllner, Klaus A. Maier, Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg et al. (Eds.): The EVG phase. Beginnings of West German Security Policy. Published by the Military History Research Office. Volume 2, Munich 1990, p. 652.
  8. ^ Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg: The planning of the defense contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany in the context of the EVG. In: Lutz Köllner, Klaus A. Maier, Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg et al. (Eds.): The EVG phase. Beginnings of West German Security Policy. Published by the Military History Research Office. Volume 2, Munich 1990, p. 652.
  9. ^ Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg: The planning of the defense contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany in the context of the EVG. In: Lutz Köllner, Klaus A. Maier, Wilhelm Meier-Dörnberg a. a. (Ed.): The EVG phase. Beginnings of West German Security Policy. Published by the Military History Research Office. Volume 2, Munich 1990, p. 653 f.