Rearmament discussion
The rearmament discussion lasted from 1949 to 1956 and dealt with the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany . Shortly after the end of the Second World War , this was hotly debated because of the continuing exhaustion from war and the growing peace movement .
Historical background of the armament discussion
Germany's collapse towards the end of World War II led to the unconditional surrender of the Wehrmacht on May 8, 1945 . As a result, the victorious powers did not reach an agreement on a German right to self-determination, either in the Paris peace treaties or the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference . The differences on this question and on the question of the reform of the state increased further when the Truman Doctrine ( "containment" or "containment" of communism ) was published. The best-known part of this doctrine today is probably the Marshall Plan , which proposed a European reconstruction program through US deliveries of goods and materials as well as financial aid and which was rejected by the leadership of the USSR as an "instrument of dollar imperialism" .
As a consequence of this divided political situation, the military governors of the Allied occupying powers were replaced by High Commissioners in West Germany in 1949 and the first German Bundestag was elected in August 1949 . The most urgent goal of the government coalition formed under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer consisting of the Union , FDP and DP was to integrate the newly built Federal Republic into the new alliance system. In this first electoral term, Germany joined the newly founded Council of Europe in 1950 and in 1952 joined the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC or Mining Union) formed on the initiative of France . In addition to these economic and political advances to consolidate the economic and foreign policy situation, more and more efforts were made to participate in the European Defense Community (EDC) or the North Atlantic Pact , not least because of the outbreak of the Korean War . With the near past in mind, this led to violent disputes between the government and the opposition, but also to differences within the party. In October 1950, Interior Minister Gustav Heinemann resigned in protest against the government's "remilitarization policy".
After the occupation statute was repealed by the Germany Treaty in 1952 and the way for "rearmament" was paved, a sharp discussion broke out in the Bundestag. The outcome of the debate and the consequences of it are well known: Germany joined the European Defense Community and NATO in 1952 and 1956, and also began building the Bundeswehr in 1956 under Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss . In 1954 the GDR was granted its sovereignty by the Soviet Union and the establishment of the NVA began two years later .
Reasoning models
The analysis of stigma words such as “rearmament”, “military contribution” and “remilitarization” shows that the discussion was conducted on many levels and that different ambitions influenced the choice of words. In today's linguistic usage, despite the originally negative deontic occupation, the expression "rearmament" is used, as is the term "military contribution", which also shaped the name of the Bundeswehr .
Per arguments
Threat from communism
The best way to justify rearming has been to stir up fear of an aggressive Soviet Union . In order to support this thesis, arguments were made on different levels.
The most important argument used by both parties for rearmament was the reference to the foreign policy of the other , which had been declared imperialist . In his speeches, Konrad Adenauer spoke of “subjugation” and the “defense of Christian values of the West ”. He described the communist state system with words such as “ slavery ” and “ exploitation ”. The Korean War was cited in 1952 as the most important evidence of the aggressiveness of communist-led nations and parallels between divided Korea and divided Germany . Furthermore, the establishment of paramilitary people's police units in the Soviet occupation zone was seen as preparation for an attack on the young Federal Republic.
The mediation of a system similarity between the Communist Soviet Union and National Socialist Germany was another important argumentation approach that many speakers used. The threat posed by Hitler was transferred to one's own foreign policy situation. Keywords such as totalitarianism made it possible for the protagonists to establish this connection and thus create the image in the general public that the military weakness of Germany was being exploited by the Soviet Union to subject the Federal Republic to its control.
German Reunification
The argument of German reunification was also used by proponents of rearmament . It was argued that the rearmament of the Federal Republic should be seen as a sign of a "policy of strength". Here one can find argumentative parallels to the logic of totalitarianism, according to which the Russians would have to be forced into negotiations through “strength”. This line of reasoning is a forerunner of the deterrence theory.
European integration and state sovereignty
The population's need for political and economic stability was addressed by the demand for European integration . The clear political orientation towards the west offered hope for a better economic situation for the population of Germany plagued by destruction and refugee problems. Therefore, a German contribution to the European Defense Community (EVG) founded in 1952 was presented as an alliance consolidation. In addition, so the conclusion, equality of rights for Germany will be achieved and the state sovereignty of the Federal Republic fully restored.
Contra arguments
Pacifist leitmotif
The “without me” slogan emerged as a pacifist leitmotif in the initial phase of the armaments discussion. This bold slogan was based on the conclusion that arming would lead to war . The idea that this could be a preventive war or a war of reconquest, and most likely a civil war on German soil, was enormously terrifying for many. It was not only feared that Germany would be crushed between the power blocs if the Cold War escalated , but also wanted to prevent the newly defeated German militarism from reviving. Then there was the question of who one should be willing to make this sacrifice for. From the public's point of view , arguing for foreign interests had to be avoided in any case.
Political and legal concerns
Probably the most important argument was the unanswered question about German reunification . It was seen as endangered by an excessively strong orientation to the west and prevented in the long term by hasty rearmament. The opponents of rearmament cited possible neutrality or the system of collective security as an alternative route . The latter should have a de-escalating effect by trying to build a European security system with the participation of all victorious powers. A constitutional lawsuit filed on June 10 was dismissed by the Federal Constitutional Court on July 30 .
Financial burdens
Another reason against re-armament was for far more pragmatic reasons. Germany found itself in a poor economic situation with an uncertain future, the municipalities had problems integrating the refugees and there was an extreme housing shortage .
Development of the rearmament debate until 1950
The discussion on the topic began in 1948, when British and American strategists were looking for ways to contain the Soviet sphere of influence and were considering a West German rearmament . The following article appeared in a CDU magazine at the time:
"[...] if the youth of Western Europe no longer separated according to nationality, but united in a common defense. In such a Western European army, West Germany could make a contribution [...]. "
The words defense and contribution are characteristic of the proponents' side . On the one hand, they assume a concrete threat that needs to be averted and represent the armament as a legitimate alliance obligation. Although there was discussion abroad about integrating Germany militarily into alliance systems, this probably did not result in any mandatory obligation for the Federal Republic. The opposition's first rejection word , “rearmament”, which implicitly assumes through the prefix Wieder that a new Wehrmacht could emerge, is accordingly avoided and even denied. Adenauer expressed himself to the dpa on December 4, 1949 as follows:
"It must be made clear to the public once and for all that I am in principle against rearmament in the Federal Republic of Germany and thus also against the establishment of a new German armed forces."
Adenauer tried to reject the terms in accordance with public opinion, while at the same time promoting the formation of a German army on the foreign policy floor. The "remilitarization" introduced by Adenauer as a differentiating designation (based on the " demilitarization " of Germany by the Allies after the end of the war) was not able to assert itself in its distinction and, like "rearmament", had a deontically negative connotation in public discussion. Therefore, in the following speeches, phrases such as “contribution to the defense of Europe” or “German contingent in a European army” were used to portray the efforts as a contribution to integration in the West. In a lecture note from the Blank office , a staff that had been deployed to prepare military measures, it says:
“The term remilitarization should be avoided because of its proximity to the term 'renazification'. [...] Better: 'Integration into the European defense front out of self-defense'. "
Despite these efforts, it was not possible to ban the term from public discussion by the end of the discussion, as it offered the opposition a wonderful point of attack, created by the CDU itself. Significant complicity in the resistance to remilitarization was the already mentioned thorough demilitarization policy of the Allies. In particular, the former soldiers of the Wehrmacht, who were given the impression that they embodied militarism as a whole , were vehemently opposed to military service for the Federal Republic, as they had not had good experiences with it in the past. The Frankfurter Hefte highlighted this contradiction in September 1950 as follows:
“The remilitarization of West Germany presupposes: five years of the Allied 'Law for the Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism' must be declared as an error and reversed. [...] German generals and soldiers should be valiant allies despite Nuremberg and Landsberg. "
The attempt to transform the “student of democracy” into a “ non-commissioned officer of freedom” has been satirically commented on by radio and press. What is emerging is what should become characteristic of the whole debate, namely the linking of rearmament to certain conditions. Here the demand for a “restoration of honor” of the German soldier was demanded as a necessary condition. Uwe Schumacher characterizes the development of the conflict as follows:
“The big argument does not take place between the remilitarizers per se and some absolute pacifists [...]. The big argument takes place between those who, under today's circumstances, simply want to push through their will to remilitarize, and those who demand a fixed national and international prerequisite for it [...]. "
On May 2, 1950, the United States' Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a statement to their government on western Germany policy:
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly believe that, from a military point of view, the adequate and early rearmament of West Germany is of fundamental importance for the defense of Western Europe against the USSR. To ensure that the workforce and raw materials of the German people become a source of constructive strength for the free world, rather than a threat in turn - alone or even jointly with the USSR - the current policy of disarmament and demilitarization with regard to West Germany should be changed. "
On May 17, 1950, the United Chiefs of Staff issued a statement on the question of a federal police force in West Germany: The United Chiefs of Staff [...] agreed to recommend to the Council of Foreign Ministers that West Germany should be allowed to have 5,000 federal police officers, the “State Security “(Republican Guard) should be called. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urge the Foreign Ministers to comply with this recommendation, as such a force could very well be the first step towards a later rearmament in Germany.
Influence of the Korean War
After the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, public opinion changed in favor of those who favored armed forces. The reasoning now changed to an advocacy of rearmament using terms such as threat , protection and defense . This line of argument benefited from the similarity of the political situation in Korea and that in Germany. In addition , with the exception of the KPD , the opposition found itself in a dilemma of having to adopt an as well as an attitude, that is, not to reject rearmament, but also not to accept it under the circumstances. The fact that the defensive term “military contribution” had prevailed in the course of the debate and had migrated into use by the SPD had a decisive influence on this development . This had a weakening effect on the argumentation base of the opposition, as it was thus assigned an opaque complexity.
Increasingly, the policy of strength came to the fore, which was exemplified by the Americans. The core of this argument was again the similarity of the system between the Soviets and the National Socialists , whereby it was argued that the Second World War could have been prevented if an appropriate foreign policy had been applied to the Nazi regime . The concept of system similarity implied that a real danger of war must be prevented through concrete action - the politics of strength. Adenauer describes his idea of the Soviet Union at a CDU rally as follows:
“The totalitarian states deny law and order. [...] We know the system of totalitarian states from our past in Germany. We know the danger that a large totalitarian state poses for all of its surroundings. The Soviet Union is an even more powerful and much more totalitarian state than Nazi Germany was. "
Federal Interior Minister Gustav Heinemann (CDU) resigned in 1950 and criticized the planned rearmament in a speech on November 21, 1951:
“In view of the fact that Germany is divided into two parts, the effort towards reunification must be the dominant one. The Chancellor thinks differently about it. For him, West German armament is the lever for gaining West German sovereignty. In it he meets with the conception of the American policy of global armament against the Soviet Union. When the Chancellor's path comes to an end, I foresee a threefold result: One result will be that the Federal Republic of Germany will acquire pseudo-sovereignty. Another result will be the deepening division of Germany and an increased danger of war. West German armament will undeniably be exacerbating and by no means relaxing. Russia will respond. We are faced with the question of whether what is supposed to happen here in West Germany is not just starting the avalanche from which we want to protect ourselves. Russia has repeatedly declared that it will in no way tolerate West German armament. "
In June 1952, there was renewed resistance among MPs in the governing coalition. The foreign policy expert of the FDP parliamentary group, Karl Georg Pfleiderer , suggested that Germany be provided with a national armed force, but that the "buffer" function between the powers should be expanded. Despite this criticism, the outrage smoothed out until the final vote, so that the FDP approved the agreement.
See also
literature
- Martin Wengeler : Leading political vocabulary in the Adenauer era. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1996.
- Martin Wengeler: The language of armament. On the history of the armaments discussion after 1945. Deutscher Universitätsverlag, Wiesbaden 1992.
- Klaus Schubert: Rearmament and West Integration. The internal dispute about the military and foreign policy orientation of the Federal Republic from 1950–1952. German publishing house, Stuttgart 1970.
Individual evidence
- ↑ Manfred Görtemaker: History of the Federal Republic of Germany , ISBN 978-3-406-44554-5 , p. 295 .
- ^ Gustav Heinemann on November 21, 1951. From: Missed Germany policy. Deception and self-deception. Articles and speeches. Voice publishing house, Frankfurt / Main 1969, p. 19 f.