Political integration

Political entanglement is a political science term from research on federalism coined by Fritz W. Scharpf to describe multilevel political systems . Political integration exists if:

essential public tasks are not performed autonomously by political-administrative actors at the central or federal level, the state or regional level and the municipal level, but rather in a network with the participation of actors from several levels or in cooperation with several actors at one level and
In addition to the formal and usually hierarchical relationships between political-administrative institutions at the various levels, informal forms of horizontal (between member states or between municipalities) and vertical cooperation (e.g. between central and member states) for coordinating decisions can be observed .

Political integration in the Federal Republic of Germany

In German federalism , the political integration between the federal political and administrative institutions federal , states and municipalities particularly pronounced, with the integration has greatly increased. The reasons for this were in particular:

the fact that federal laws are predominantly implemented by the states "as a separate matter" ( Art. 83 GG),
the increase in policy areas in which laws of the Bundestag require the consent of the Bundesrat for constitutional reasons , as well as the expansion of the scope of the competing legislation ( Art. 72 and Art. 74 GG),
the introduction of joint tasks and mixed financing, e.g. B. in the areas of regional economic development and university building.

In general, there is a connection between a shift in competencies in favor of the federal level and a strengthening of political integration; because the state governments have usually insisted on being involved in legislation at least through the Federal Council as compensation for a loss of independent state powers. While the state governments were at least partially able to maintain their political influence, this was accompanied by a loss of function of the state parliaments.

Another characteristic of Germany’s political integration is the overlapping of national interests with party interests. It is true that the Bundesrat should “act as a corrective to the Bundestag and thereby emphasize the point of view of the states and the specific element of administration” (the latter in particular in view of the implementation of federal laws by the state executives); However, it can become the most important power-political instrument of the opposition at the federal level if it has a majority of the votes in the Bundesrat. This was the case from 1972 to 1982, from 1994 to 1998 and from 2002 to 2005. Since December 2012, the majority of votes in the Federal Council has also shifted in favor of the opposition. Initiatives of the federal government or the majority parliamentary group (s) in the Bundestag can then in many cases be blocked by the opposition, although the Bundesrat should explicitly not decide on the basis of party interests. In popular science, this blockade is often incorrectly equated with the term “political entanglement trap”. Especially when the majority in the Bundesrat is tight, state elections can, under certain circumstances, take on the character of "Bundesrat elections", and the election campaigns are dominated by federal political issues.

It was not until the constitutional reform of 1994 and the federalism reform of 2006 that efforts were made towards unbundling in the sense of a clearer separation of tasks and greater autonomy at the respective levels.

The political entanglement trap

The concept of the political entanglement trap indicates that not only is there a deadlock in factual decisions in the given interweaving structures, but that institutional changes that would result in unbundling of the multilevel system are also impossible.

This is due to the fact that in the event of an upcoming constitutional amendment, those actors who benefit from the interdependence appear as potential veto players - in German federalism, these are specifically the state governments. The political entanglement trap is therefore not the blockade by veto players in daily decision-making, but the inability of the political system to bring about institutional changes to resolve these blockages.

From a normative point of view, the advantages and disadvantages of the existence of this interwoven structure can be identified: One disadvantage is the inefficient decision-making, as there is a status quo orientation due to the frequent blockages. Proponents of the separation of powers, however, object that the existence of many potential veto players is linked to the stability of the political system. The complex interwoven structure provides for “checks and balances” against frivolous constitutional changes and for the continuity of a democratic political order.

Arthur Benz names a few possible strategies for promoting decision-making and innovation in politics: "Level shifting", the "establishment of parallel institutions", "opting-out clauses" and the informalization of conflict resolution in unofficial expert committees or networks.