Structural break thesis
In federalism research, the structural break thesis is a guiding principle on the interrelationship between the federal order and party competition in Germany, which goes back essentially to the political scientist Gerhard Lehmbruch from Constance . It says that the bipolar party competition since 1949 represents a structural break with the federal order with its political mechanisms based on consensus, cooperation and negotiation in the history of development since Bismarck. The thesis found in bicameral political systems , ie in States with two parliamentary chambers and imperative mandate in the second chamber application and builds on the policy integration thesis of Fritz Scharpf on.
Basic empirical observations
Lehmbruch bases his thesis on numerous observations in the behavior of parties and federal and state institutions in the history of the Federal Republic.
Political background
The first reason to consider a structural break was the political situation in 1976, when a social-liberal government alliance made up of the SPD and FDP in the first Schmidt cabinet was confronted with a CDU majority in the state chamber. Since the formation of the first social-liberal coalition under Willy Brandt in 1969, the CDU had succeeded in gaining an absolute majority in several state elections, including 1970 in Saarland , 1971 in Schleswig-Holstein and Rhineland-Palatinate and 1972 in Baden-Württemberg . It outdid the parties of the coalition government at the federal level, the SPD and FDP, with whom it had previously formed a coalition in some state governments and which could have neutralized their voting behavior in the Federal Council in the interests of the federal government.
More recent phenomena
The spectacular failure of the tax reform of 1997/1998 gave rise to a broad-based discussion about the political instrumentalisation of the Federal Council. Another case study opened up in the 15th electoral period between 1998 and 2005 under the red-green federal government. When the SPD lost the state election in Saxony-Anhalt in 2002, the majority in the Bundesrat changed in favor of the opposition parties in the Bundestag, CDU / CSU and FDP. This was a red-green majority in the Bundestag against a black and yellow majority in the Bundesrat. In the period that followed, the Schröder cabinet was only able to implement legislative proposals with, in some cases, significant changes to the financing regulations and the implementation provisions; the Hartz I to IV labor market reforms serve as an example .
Basic assumptions
On the basis of these observations, the structural break thesis assumes certain regular behavioral patterns of political institutions and parties. In the case of a party-political harmony between the two parliamentary chambers, as prevailed under Konrad Adenauer's chancellorship and at the time of the change of government from Schmidt to Kohl in 1982 and from Kohl to Schröder in 1998, an increase in the importance of the federal-state conflict dimension can be observed, since state governments then strive to incorporate their regional interests into the political process.
Consequences for policy outcomes
- A structural break between federal institutions and party competition can lead to a paralysis of political operations due to opposing, sometimes canceling out logic of action . Towards the end of the last legislative period of the Kohl government , the term “ reform backlog” dominated the public political debate, also against the background of an economic recession and political stagnation .
- If the Bundestag and Bundesrat are also dominated differently in party politics, the opposition in the Laender Chamber can have an ex ante effect on the qualitative work of the Federal Government. In the negotiating democratic atmosphere, the cabinet, for its part, endeavors to introduce drafts that have been agreed with the opposition into the legislative process. As a consequence, mediocre political results can be achieved, which may stand in the way of far-reaching reforms that may be necessary. An example of this is provided by the debate about the 1971 Urban Development Promotion Act.
"The Federal Government is well advised when it finally realizes that with its weak majority in the Bundestag it cannot cram all the laws through, but has to reckon with our majority in the Bundesrat."
criticism
The criticism of the structural break theory focuses on two points.
- Lehmbruch misinterpreted the functional position of the parties in West German federalism. Thanks to considerable vertical integration efforts, they did not function as a “brake”, but rather as a “motor” in the political process in the Federal Republic of Germany. This thesis is mainly represented by the Magdeburg political scientist Wolfgang Renzsch . It can be countered by the fact that internal party or coalition and cross-governmental integration weakens the cross-party compromise between government and opposition.
- An important second objection is that Lehmbruch's analysis is out of date. The differentiation of the West German party landscape into a five-party system through the entry of the Greens and, from 1990, also the PDS and later the Left in the Bundestag relativized the structural break thesis. Together with the growing diversity of coalitions at the level of the state governments, it makes the "polarized stalemate" noted by Lehmbruch less and less likely. Proponents of this thesis are z. B. the Erlangen political scientist Roland Sturm . It can be countered that there are still two polarized party camps with strong coalition affinities (SPD, Bündnis90 / Die Grünen and Die Linke versus CDU / CSU and FDP). Furthermore, it was precisely the fear of a “polarized stalemate” with a two-thirds majority in the Federal Council for the opposition parties that was decisive in 2005 in the decision of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his red-green federal government to bring about an early election.
literature
- Gerhard Lehmbruch: Party competition in the state. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1976. 2nd, revised edition: Westdeutscher Verlag, Wiesbaden 1998. 3rd edition: Westdeutscher Verlag, Wiesbaden 2000. (reference title).
- Klaus von Beyme : The political system of the Federal Republic of Germany. 10th updated edition, VS, Wiesbaden 2004, p. 343ff.
- Clemens Jesenitschnig: Gerhard Lehmbruch - life and work. A critical appreciation. Tectum, Marburg 2010, pp. 103-144.
- Manfred G. Schmidt : The political system of the Federal Republic of Germany. Beck, Munich 2005, pp. 87ff. (Overview display).