Battle of Olpai

Battle of Olpai

Part of: Peloponnesian War

date	426 BC Chr.
place	Olpai, on the Gulf of Ambrakia
output	Athens wins

Parties to the conflict
Athens , Acarnania , Amphiloch	Sparta , Ambrakia
Commander
Demosthenes , Aristotle, Hierophon	Eurylochus †, Menedaios, Makarios †
Troop strength
approx. 4,500 hoplites, javelin throwers, riflemen	approx. 6,000 hoplites
losses
approx. 300 fallen	1,000 dead, plus another 1,000 at Idomene

Significant because of its influence on the development of tactics

The Battle of Olpai took place during the Peloponnesian War in 426 BC. Chr. Between the forces of Athens and Sparta instead.

In 426 BC 3,000 hoplites from Ambrakia threatened Argos Amphilochicon, belonging to Akarnania , an ally of Athens, at the eastern end of the Ambrakian Gulf and occupied the nearby fortress of Olpai . Thereupon the Acarnanians called the Athenians for help, who had a fleet of 20 ships under Aristotle and Hierophon nearby and sent an army under Demosthenes . The Ambrakians, however, turned to Sparta, who sent Eurylochos with an army that reached the area without the Akarnanians noticing. Then Demosthenes reached the Gulf of Ambrakia and went ashore below Olpai with 200 hoplites and 60 archers. He united his troops with the Akarnan army and pitched an army camp in a valley opposite the troops of Eurylochus; then both sides prepared for battle for five days. The Ambrakian and Spartan troops were outnumbered, so Demosthenes prepared an ambush with 400 Akarnan hoplites to be deployed at the start of the battle.

Demosthenes occupied his right wing with Athenian and Messenian fighters, while Acarnanians and Amphilochians were used in the center and on the left wing. Eurylochus intermixed his troops, stationed by the Ambrakier predominantly on the right wing, the Mantineier set up to the left of center and himself took the extreme left with the best troops from the Peloponnese. At the beginning of the battle, Eurylochus initially succeeded in outflanking Demosthenes' troops, but then fell into the prepared ambush, where he fell in battle; his death caused panic among the rest of the troops. Nevertheless, the Ambraki on the other wing managed to advance through the ranks of the amphilochian javelin throwers, which could be driven back as far as Argos. But when the Ambrakians returned, they were defeated by the Akarnanians who stayed behind. Demosthenes lost 300 men when the battle ended that evening, but he remained victorious on the battlefield.

The next day Menedaius, who had taken command of the Spartan troops after the death of Eurylochus, agreed an armistice with the Athenians. Demosthenes did not allow all opponents to withdraw - only Menedaios and other leaders as well as notable people and the mantine eggs. However, some of the Ambracian fighters managed to escape together with their generals, since such an agreement cannot go unnoticed in an enclosed army. The Akarnanians followed them, killing 200 of the escaped. This psychological warfare on the part of Demosthenes had the purpose of portraying the Spartans as deceivers and selfish people and was previously unknown in Greek warfare.

Meanwhile, Demosthenes learned that a second army was advancing from Ambrakia. These Ambrakians had not yet learned of the defeat of their fellow combatants the day before. Demosthenes surprised this auxiliary army that night near Mount Idomene. By his Messenian advance sent troops to enable them to Ambrakier in their Doric dialect are aimed at, he deceived the enemy, to be pushed to their Spartan allies who believed. With this ruse he managed to put down most of the Ambrakians. The rest fled over the hills or towards the sea, where they were intercepted by the Athenian ships. Within two days the Ambrakians had lost well over 1,000 men.

Although Demosthenes could have taken Ambrakia without any problems, he did not because the allies were holding him back, who would rather have a weak old enemy than Athens as a new participant in the region. Instead, Akarnanians and Ambrakians signed a 100-year peace treaty.

Remarks

1. ↑ Thucydides , History of the Peloponnesian War III, 109 ( English translation in Wikisource , accessed 10:35, August 26, 2007)
2. ↑ Thucydides , History of the Peloponnesian War III, 109 ( English translation in Wikisource , accessed 10:35, August 26, 2007)
3. ↑ Donald Kagan , The Peloponnesian War: Athens and Sparta in Savage Conflict 431-404 BC , HarperCollins Publishers, 2003 (first published in the USA by Penguin Putnam 2003), p. 134.
4. ↑ Thucydides : The Peloponnesian War . III, 113 (6), translated and edited by Helmut Vretska and Werner Rinner. Reclam, Stuttgart, 2002. ISBN 9783150018088
5. ↑ Thucydides , History of the Peloponnesian War III, 114 ( English translation in Wikisource , accessed 10:35, August 26, 2007)