Battle of Naupaktos
date | 429 BC Chr. |
---|---|
place | Naupaktos |
output | Athens wins |
consequences | Dispatch of Spartan reinforcements |
Parties to the conflict | |
---|---|
Athens |
Corinth |
Commander | |
Agatarchidas, Machaon, Isocrates |
|
Troop strength | |
20 ships | 47 ships |
losses | |
no |
at least 12 ships |
date | 429 BC Chr. |
---|---|
place | Naupaktos |
output | Athens wins |
consequences | Abandonment of the Spartan fleet plans |
Parties to the conflict | |
---|---|
Athens |
Sparta, Corinth, Leukas |
Commander | |
Phormio |
|
Troop strength | |
20 ships, Messenian infantry |
77 ships, Peloponnesian hoplites |
losses | |
1 ship |
6 ships |
Sybota - Potidaia - Spartolus - Stratos - Naupactus - Plataea - Olpai - Tanagra - Pylos - Sphacteria - Corinth - Megara - Delion - Amphipolis - Mantinea - Melos - Syracuse - Miletus - Syme - Eretria - Kynossema - Abydos - Kyzikos - Ephesus - Chalcedon - Byzantium - Andros - Notion - Mytilene - Arginus - Aigospotamoi
The Battle of Naupaktos comprises two naval battles in the course of the Peloponnesian War that took place in 429 BC. Chr. Between the Athenians on one side and the Corinthians and Spartans were held together with other allies on the other side.
prehistory
In western Greece, Ambrakia and Chaonia (located on the Gulf of Ambrakia and across from Kerkyra) had asked the Spartans to send a fleet to attack Akarnania, an alliance with Athens . The Spartan strategists therefore decided on a campaign in the course of which they hoped to attack the Athenian naval base Naupaktos on the north coast of the Gulf of Corinth by land via Aitolia . In fact, the Spartans, under their general Knemos, managed to land in Akarnania with a fleet and 1,000 hoplites and haunt the country. However, their further advance was stopped at the gates of the capital of Aitolia, where the Spartans and the barbarians allied with them suffered a heavy defeat in the Battle of Stratos . While this was happening in Acarnania and Aitolia, the Athenian fleet under Phormion held the position before Naupaktus to prevent a union of the Corinthian fleet with the Spartans.
The first battle
The Corinthians had 47 ships under the command of Machaon, Isocrates and Agatharchidas, but did not dare to battle the 20 Athenian ships, as it was their task to deliver supplies to the troops of Knemos. But the Athenians pursued the Corinthians and stayed on their heels. The Corinthian warships then lined up in a circle in such a way that they shielded the unarmed supply ships from the Athenians. The Corinthians circumnavigated them in skilful maneuvers, so that the Corinthians, who were moving closer and closer together and who feared that they would be rammed by the Athenians, finally had little room to develop. The Athenians used this for a decisive attack, in which they captured 12 enemy ships and sank numerous others, but some Corinthian ships also escaped and were able to break through to the Spartans under Knemos.
The second battle
Phormion pursued the Corinthians further, which could now unite with a Spartan fleet under Timocrates, Brasidas and Lycophron. Although the Athenians sent another 20 ships under Nikias to the Phormion, these ships had to go to Crete with an order. After the first battle was fought off Naupaktos, the Corinthian-Spartan fleet consisting of 77 ships anchored for a week at the entrance to the Corinthian Gulf, opposite the Athenian ships. While the Corinthians, who had already felt the experience of the Athenians in sea battles several times, still hesitated, the Spartans pressed for battle in view of their numerical superiority. The Athenian fighters also feared defeat against the obvious superiority of their opponents, but, according to Thucydides' report, Phormion was able to reawaken their courage to fight. When it finally came to a second battle, the Peloponnesians were initially able to capture nine Athenian ships, the remaining eleven turned to flee, pursued by their opponents. Ten of the Athenian ships escaped to their base in Naupaktos, the eleventh drove around an anchored cargo ship on the open sea and rammed one of the Peloponnesian ships. This unexpected course of events unsettled the Peloponnesians, so that the Athenians took advantage of the situation to attack again. They were able to capture six of the enemy ships and drive the rest to flight, freeing eight of the previously captured Athenian ships. Fearing the 20 ships of the Nicias that arrived shortly afterwards, the Peloponnesians finally withdrew to Corinth in the Gulf of Krisa.
Aftermath
A few months later, the Spartans under Knemos and Brasidas launched a surprise attack targeting Piraeus . When they left Nisaia, however, they got scared and instead devastated the island of Salamis . Meanwhile, Athens was warned by fire signals there. After the Athenians mobilized their city guards and sent them to the island, the attackers withdrew. Athens took measures that such an action should not be repeated in the future. Thucydides - according to Donald Kagan - believed that the attack on Piraeus could have been successful.
literature
- Thukydides , Helmut Vretska (Ed.): The Peloponnesian War . Reclam, Stuttgart 2002, ISBN 3-15-001808-0 .
- Donald Kagan : The Peloponnesian War: Athens and Sparta in Savage Conflict 431-404 BC . Harper, London 2003, ISBN 0-00-711506-7 .
- Lawrence A. Tritle: A new history of the Peloponnesian War , Hong Kong 2010. [1]
Individual evidence
- ↑ Thucydides, II, 80 (1)
- ↑ Thucydides, II, 80 (4)
- ↑ Thucydides, II. 83 (3)
- ↑ Thucydides, II. 84 (1)
- ↑ Thucydides, II. 84 (4)
- ↑ Thucydides, II. 85 (5)
- ↑ Thucydides, II. 86 (4-5)
- ↑ Thucydides, II. 88 (3) -90 (1)
- ↑ Thucydides, II. 90 (5)
- ↑ Thucydides, II. 91 (3)
- ↑ Thucydides, II. 92 (1)
- ↑ Donald Kagan: The Peloponnesian War . Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-14-200437-1 , pp. 95 .
- ↑ Thucydides, II. 93 (1)
- ↑ Thucydides, II. 93 (4)
- ↑ Thucydides, II. 94 (3)
- ↑ Thucydides, II. 94 (4)
- ↑ Kagan, p. 96