Battle of Delion
schematic representation of the course of the battle
| date | 424 BC Chr. |
|---|---|
| place | Delion, near the Strait of Evia |
| output | Victory of Boeotia (Thebes) |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
|
Athens |
Boeotia (Thebes) |
| Commander | |
|
Hippocrates |
|
| Troop strength | |
| approx. 7000 hoplites, 300 riders |
Approx. 7,000 hoplites, 1,000 horsemen, 500 peltasts, 10,000 lightly armed men |
| losses | |
|
about 1200 killed |
about 500 killed |
Sybota - Potidaia - Spartolus - Stratos - Naupactus - Plataea - Olpai - Tanagra - Pylos - Sphacteria - Corinth - Megara - Delion - Amphipolis - Mantinea - Melos - Syracuse - Miletus - Syme - Eretria - Kynossema - Abydos - Kyzikos - Ephesus - Chalcedon - Byzantium - Andros - Notion - Mytilene - Arginus - Aigospotamoi
The Battle of Delion took place during the Peloponnesian War in 424 BC. Instead of. In it the Athenians and the Boeotians faced each other.
Operational intention and starting position
In 424 BC The Athenian generals Demosthenes and Hippocrates wanted to invade Boeotia with a pincer attack from sea and land. Demosthenes, the leader of the expedition fleet, sailed too early. He landed at Siphai, on the Boeotian coast of the Gulf of Corinth. Since the Boeotians learned of his arrival before Hippocrates could arrive with the hoplite army, the plan had to be abandoned and Demosthenes had to withdraw.
Finally, Hippocrates reached Boeotia with his army and established a fortified position at the temple of Delion in the east of Boeotia, not far from Tanagra . After five days the fortification work was completed and Hippocrates laid a garrison at Delion while he sent the rest of the army, around 10,000 lightly armed, home. In the meantime the Boeotian army also arrived in front of Delion. Pagondas von Thebes, the military commander, urged an attack because he was convinced that the Athenians would otherwise return and establish a strong base on Boeotian soil in Delion.
He therefore took up position with his army on a hill. The right wing , presumably against a natural obstacle (bushes, rubble, etc.) was formed by the Thebans . Pagondas set them up against the usual phalanx structure of eight men deep with a depth of 25 men. In the center, troops from Haliartus , Koroneia and Kopai followed, while the left wing was occupied by troops from Thespiai , Tanagra and Orchomenos . They were later joined by the Lokrians .
While the cavalry had to cover the vulnerable deep flank of the right wing, it is assumed that the lightly armed men were behind the front because of the cramped conditions. The Athenians had about the same number of hoplites, but only about 300 horsemen and only a few lightly armed men, most of whom were provided by the allies and most of them had already been released before the battle. Since they formed their phalanx according to the usual pattern, they had a significantly larger front width (approx. 880 meters) than the Boeotians (approx. 700 meters without cavalry). The information about the use of the minor Athenian cavalry is contradictory (covering the camp in Delion or setting up on the two wings of the phalanx), but they did not intervene in the battle.
Course of the battle
The Athenians attacked the Boeotian army and, despite the uphill run, managed to push back the Boeotian left wing with their traditionally stronger right wing. The able-bodied population of Thespiai was almost completely destroyed. According to the report of Thucydides , the left wing of the Boeotians was on the verge of defeat, but when the Athenians had already embraced the enemy, they inflicted losses on themselves. As a result of the pivoting movement of the enclosure, the outer edges of two army detachments presumably came into a position that made it seem obvious to face a front extension of the enemy. At that time the fighters of a party did not yet have uniform shields; this did not become common until after the Second Battle of Mantineia (362 BC). While the Athenians pressed in and embraced their own left wing, Pagondas attacked the Athenians' left wing downhill with his particularly powerful, deeply articulated right wing, pushing it back further and further with ease and threatening to break through it. Since his left wing was already embraced and threatened with an attack against the back of the center of his front, he was on the verge of defeat.
His cavalry had so far only been assigned as a reserve to cover the right flank of the deep Theban phalanx, and was thus unbound due to the success of the battle on this wing. Pagondas saw his chance and used parts of this mobile reserve to support the left wing. When the hoplites of the right wing of Athens, who already saw themselves victorious, saw fresh enemy cavalry riding up and intervening in battle, they lost their courage. The exertions of the uphill storm, the subsequent struggle, and the hopes of tangible victory and the end of the battle did not allow renewed strain. At the same time, Pagondas on the other wing (less than 800 meters away!) Pushed the Athenians back further and further and was about to break through into the rear of the Athenian army. In this situation the Athenians could only flee. Around 500 Boeotians and 1,000 Athenians, including the Athenian general Hippocrates, were killed in the battle.
The Boeotians pursued the Athenians until sunset. The refugees managed to save themselves in their fortified camp in Delion, but the Boeotians informed them that they considered the temple grounds as a sacred place that the Athenians had to leave. The Athenians replied that they had won the place with the right of the conqueror, that it was now sacred to them and that they were only acting in self-defense. They stood face to face for two weeks, but in the meantime the Boeotians were reinforced by 2,000 Corinthian hoplites. The Corinthians then, according to Thucydides, set fire to the position of the Athenians with a kind of flamethrower ; about 200 Athenians were killed; the rest were granted free withdrawal. Now Demosthenes, the unfortunate leader of the sea expedition, arrived, but since the situation had meanwhile fundamentally changed to the disadvantage of the Athenians, he could no longer achieve anything and was quickly driven out by the Boeotians.
Importance of the battle
The Boeotian-Theban victory at the Battle of Delion had no strategic implications. Athens could get over the relatively small losses more easily than the moral shock of defeat. Sparta, Athens' real opponent in the Peloponnesian War, had no noticeable advantages. The importance of battle lies in the tactical field. Pagondas, as the responsible general, had introduced some innovations that should prepare for groundbreaking developments. In part, the importance of the battle lies in the fact that, for the first time, tactical developments can be demonstrated from its well-documented course, which perhaps already existed at an earlier point in time, but were not recorded.
- Pagondas' asymmetrical setup became the model for the Theban general Epaminondas , who gave it a decisive modification (reinforcement of the left instead of the right wing), with which he would later achieve a brilliant success in the Battle of Leuctra . However, it is not a forerunner of the Leaning Order of Battle , as Pagondas did not hold back wings, but sought and struck the usual parallel battle .
- It was the first proven battle-decisive deployment of a reserve .
- Through the use of cavalry to defend against a hoplite formation, the role of cavalry was sustainably upgraded and the later development of the cavalry by the Macedonians was prepared.
- In the warfare of ancient Greece, the pursuit of a defeated enemy was frowned upon until the Battle of Delion, although this is the only way to achieve lasting victories.
Aside
- Athenian participants who later became prominent in the battle were the philosopher Socrates and the later general and politician Alkibiades as well as the former general Laches , who fought as a simple hoplite.
- The tragedy of Euripides , Hiketiden ("The Protectors"), 423 BC. Written in Athens BC, was prompted by the disgusting treatment of the Athenian dead at Delion at the time.
- Theben's city center experienced an artistic and architectural renaissance thanks to the sale of artifacts captured by fallen and retreating Athenians.
swell
- Plato: Laughs .
- Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War , 4, 90–98.
literature
- Hans Delbrück : History of the Art of War. Antiquity . ISBN 978-3-937872-41-4 .
- Victor Davis Hanson: The War in Ancient Greece . o. O. 2001 / London 1999
- Hans-Joachim Diesner: Wars of Antiquity . ISBN 3-926642-04-1 .
Web links
Remarks
- ↑ Cf. Plato: Laches , p. 181.