Battle of Notion

Battle of Notion

Part of: Peloponnesian War

Ancient Trier , (wall painting in Pompeii )

date	407 BC Chr.
place	at Notion before Ephesus
output	Victory of Sparta
consequences	Deposition of the Alkibiad

Parties to the conflict
Athens	Sparta
Commander
Antiochus †, Alcibiades (absent)	Lysander
Troop strength
80 Trier	70 to 90 trireme
losses
15 to 22 trieres	minimal

The Battle of Notion was a naval battle in the final stages of the Peloponnesian War . It took place in 407 BC. BC off the coast of Asia Minor and was fought between the fleets of Athens and Sparta . The Spartans achieved a tactical victory under Lysander that led to the recall of the Athenian commander Alkibiades .

prehistory

In the spring of 407 BC Alcibiades returned to Athens. The strategist, previously sentenced to death in absentia and disgrace, was after the democratic restoration in Athens 410 BC. BC and since then waged a war in the Propontis to secure control of the grain routes from the Crimea to Athens. In the summer of 408 BC He was able to bring the battle on this front to a successful conclusion by persuading the Persian satrap Pharnabazos, who was allied with Sparta, to an armistice: Pharnabazos paid Alkibiades twenty talents of silver and granted Kalchedon autonomy. Alkibiades was therefore able to concentrate the Attic forces to regain Byzantion , which he succeeded. Thus not only was the Sea of ​​Marmara under control of Athens again, but also the Byzantium customs flowed back into the Attic war chest.

Sparta could not prevent the victory of Athens in this theater of war, because after the defeat of Kyzikos there was no longer a Spartan fleet in the Propontis and thus the war effort was carried out solely by the allied Persian satrap. Pharnabazos of Phrygia also had to bear the brunt of the struggle against Athens because the satrap of Lydia Tissaphernes was far more neutral than the Persian king required. In the summer of 408 BC Because of the rather moderate war successes of the Persians , Darius II drew a line under the previous division of governorship and gave his younger son Cyrus the Persian command in Asia Minor by appointing him satrap of Lydia, Cappadocia and Greater Phrygia. Tissaphernes 'satrapy was reduced to the inhospitable Caria and Pharnabazos' sphere of influence to the Hellespontic Phrygia . Since his war efforts had received so little recognition and the limitation of his satrapy was tantamount to humiliation, Pharnabazos stopped waging the war.

Received enthusiastically in Athens, Alkibiades was elected supreme warlord with special powers as "Hégémon autokrátor" in the spring of 407. The previous college of ten strategists under the nominal chairmanship of the Strategos Polemarchos as the highest war command was subordinate to him. He used his powers to build an army of 1,500 hoplites , 150 cavalry and 100 triremes . In addition, the other strategists were given tasks and units: Thrasyboulos, for example, received 30 triremes to protect the Propontis and to fight in Thrace .

The Spartans, too, saw the need for new armaments if they did not want to lose the Ionian cities to Alcibiades, which fell after the Athenian defeat at Syracuse and the Battle of Miletus in 412 BC. Had turned towards Sparta. Therefore they chose the ambitious Lysandros as the new Nauarch . He was given the task of a) establishing a good working relationship with the new satrap Cyrus, b) building up a new fleet, and c) keeping the cities of Ionia near Sparta.

Lysander first tried to get Cyrus, as the key to Sparta's success lay in building a fleet that could only be financed with Persian gold. Lysander therefore relocated the Ionian headquarters from Miletus to Ephesus because the Persian satrap residence of Sardis could be reached more quickly from there and there were more Persian dignitaries than in the more Greek Miletus.

Lysandros presented to Cyrus in Sardis and quickly developed a great influence on the satrap. The 40 year old Spartan warrior must have had a fascinating effect on Cyrus, who was just 15 years old; it has even been alleged that the young royal sprout became the Spartan's lover because it allowed him access to his private gardens. In any case, Lysandros was able to persuade Cyrus to use 500 talents from the treasure of Dareios to settle the arrears of the rowers of the Spartan fleet and to increase the pay from 3 to 4 obols per day. Since both the Attic and the Spartan fleet were dependent on rowers from abroad, rowing became much more attractive for Sparta because the Athena could only pay 3 obols.

The cities of Ionia were tied more closely to Sparta when Lysandros, with the help of the Persians, changed the urban constitutions and concentrated power in the hands of 10 people each - the decarchs . This extreme form of oligarchy was usually rejected by the urban population, leaving these 10 men completely dependent on Sparta. Lysandros placed a Spartan "adviser" ( Harmost ) at their side, who was also the commanding officer of the Spartan garrison - if a military presence on site appeared necessary.

With the Persian gold, Lysandros built a fleet of 70 ships in Ephesus and began to train them. Alcibiades now turned against this fleet.

Preparation for battle

Since Lysandros first had to build up his fleet and Alkibiades was initially still busy with the siege of Andros , the two fleets only met each other in the late summer of 407. Alkibiades moved into quarters on the island of Samos off Ephesus , the main base of Athens in Ionia. Lysandros initially avoided a battle in a realistic assessment of his numerical inferiority - even if he now had 90 ships, he was still inferior to Alcibiades' 100 triremes. So he had his ships pulled ashore and repaired.

Both fleets were paralyzed: Alkibiades succeeded in blocking Lysandros in Ephesus, but was condemned to inaction by Lysandros as long as he did not dare to battle. However, Alkibiades, who was under great pressure to succeed, did not want to lose the initiative to Lysandros and transferred command of his fleet to the captain of his flagship, Antiochus, in order to support the Attic strategist Thrasyboulos himself in the fortification of Phokaia or to blow up the siege ring around Klazomenai . In this way, the defection from Northern Ionia to Sparta could be averted and the pressure on Lysandros increased to take action himself.

On his retreat, Alcibiades had given Antiochus strict orders not to venture into battle in his absence. However, Antiochus did not keep to this order, lay down in the port of Notion, from where he watched the bay of Ephesus, and let parts of the fleet sail regularly to call on Lysandros ships to battle - although initially in vain. The fact that there was a battle in Alcibiade's absence may have been due to Antiochus 'vanity or simply to Lysandros' tactical sophistication. In any case, the explanation that the crews of the Athenian fleet, condemned to inactivity, put Antiochus under massive pressure to finally take action is plausible. This would suggest that Antiochus not only regularly challenged the Spartans to battle, but eventually went so far as to venture into a small battle in order to raise the fighting spirit. Lysandros did not miss the fact that the Athenians were hungry for success. He drew the conclusion from their behavior that despite his inferiority they could fight a victorious battle.

Course of the battle

In order to satisfy the Athenians' hunger for battle on the one hand, and on the other hand not to disregard the orders of Alkibiades, Antiochus decided to engage in a small battle: he planned to set a trap for the Spartans with a few ships and to raise the courage of the Athenians with the victorious skirmish. To do this, he had the entire Athenian fleet ready, but only drove with the ten best ships towards Ephesus, holding back eight for an ambush, while he himself took on the role of bait with another ship and into the port of Ephesus drove in. So he wanted to lure out a Spartan unit, which he would then overpower with the remaining eight ships. Alkibiades himself had used this strategy with great success at the Battle of Cyzicus.

But Lysandros had been waiting for such an opportunity: he manned his entire fleet and sent his three fastest ships after the two Attic ships, which managed to put Antiochus before Notion. The other eight Athenian ships rushed to the rescue, but could not even overwhelm the three Spartan ships, because Lysandros came up with his entire fleet. The Athenians in Notion also noticed this and drove to meet Lysandros. Both fleets now met in the Gulf between Ephesus and Notion.

However, while Lysandros was leading his fleet in battle formation from Ephesus, the Athenians were not prepared for a battle with the entire Spartan fleet. The Athenian fleet contingents arrived on the battlefield uncoordinated, each as fast as it got. Antiochus had probably already fallen at this point in time, so that the Athenians also lacked a unified command. As a result, the numerical superiority of the Athenians was offset by the better strategy of Lysandros. By the end of the battle, the Athenians had lost between 15 and 22 ships.

Consequences of the battle

The battle had minor military consequences. Alkibiades immediately went to Notion together with the thirty ships of Thrasyboulos and from there led the united Athenian fleet to Samos. Because the losses of the battle were compensated for by the contingent of Thrasyboulos, Alcibiades again had numerical superiority and successfully blocked Lysandros in Ephesus. However, there was no longer a major meeting, as Lysandros avoided a second battle after the success achieved. The Athenians only had to withdraw the crew in Phokai.

The moral damage, however, was far greater, because the belief in the abilities of Alcibiades as a charismatic leader waned after the battle. Instead of being re-elected as military leader for the following year, Alkibiades voluntarily went into exile and retired to his private fortress in Thrace . Thrasyboulos and other deserving commanders were also drawn down by the fall of Alcibiades and were not re-elected. As a result, Athens emerged from the year weakened, while Lysandros was able to hand over an intact fleet of over 100 ships and orderly conditions in Asia Minor to his successor.

swell

• Diodorus: Greek world history . 5 vols. Edited by Gerhard Wirth, Otto Veh and Th. Nothers. (= Library of Greek Literature) Stuttgart 1992–2005, here Vol. II (1993): Book XI-XIII (Translated by Otto Veh), and Vol. III (2001): Book XIV-XV (Translated by Otto Veh ).
• Xenophon: Hellenika . Edited with Greek-German translation by Gisela Strasburger. (= Tusculum Collection) Munich ³2000 (1972).
• PR McKechnie and SJ Kern (eds.): Hellenica Oxyrhynchia , [Engl.] With translation and commentary by Warminster 1988.

Secondary literature

• Antony Andrewes: Notion and Kyzikos: The Sources Compared . In: The Journal of Hellenic Studies . Volume 102, 1982, pp. 15-25.
• Robert J. Buck: Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy. The life of an Athenian statesman. Stuttgart 1998 ( Historia individual writings . Volume 120).
• CW Fornara: The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404 . Wiesbaden 1971, p. 70.
• Donald Kagan: The Fall of the Athenian Empire . Ithaca 1987.
• Detlef Lotze: Lysander and the Peloponnesian War . In: Treatises of the Saxon Academy of Sciences in Leipzig, philological-historical class . Volume 57/1, 1964, pp. 5-98.

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Xen. Bright. I, 4.20; Diod. XIII, 69.3
2. ↑ Plut. Lys. 3.3
3. ↑ Xen. Bright. I, 5.1-7, Diod. XIII, 70.1-3
4. ↑ Xen. Bright. I, 4.10
5. ↑ Xen. Bright. I, 5.11
6. ↑ Diod. XIII, 71.1
7. ↑ Plut. Alc. 35.5
8. ↑ pause. IX, 32.6
9. ↑ Xen.
10. ↑ Hell. Oxy. 8.3
11. ↑ Xen. Bright. I, 5.15
12. ↑ Xen. Bright. I, 6.33
13. ↑ Xen. Bright. I, 5.20
14. ↑ Plut. Lys. 5.3; Nep. Alc. 7.3