Fear of radiation

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Fear of radiation or radiophobia is the fear of the negative consequences of certain types of radiation.

The term first appeared in German-language literature in the early 1950s in connection with the consequences of the atomic bombs being dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki . Further "waves" of radiophobia arose in connection with the Chernobyl disaster and the discussion about electrosmog .

In Ukraine , where the Chernobyl catastrophe occurred in 1986 , this diagnosis is assumed by some doctors and representatives of the authorities that sick people simulate and that radioactivity is the cause of their illness.

Risk perception

The psychological research on risk perception has revealed that lay the health risks of nuclear energy estimate higher than experts . In addition, the public does not perceive the health risk from radiation to be consistent across all radiation sources .

In one of the first psychometric studies (1978), in which three groups of laypeople and a group of experts were asked to rank 30 different activities and technologies according to their relative health risks, experts estimated the risks of nuclear energy to be significantly lower than those of laypeople. In contrast, laypeople underestimated the radiation risk from X-rays compared to experts. Nuclear energy was perceived as less voluntary, more catastrophic, more terrifying, more deadly, less controllable and newer. A factor analysis revealed two key factors: Fear and, to a lesser extent, obscurity. These two main factors were confirmed in follow-up studies. They apply to laypeople; Instead, experts see risk as synonymous with the expected mortality rate.

Further representative studies from the USA, Sweden, Canada, Norway and Hungary over the following decades also came to the conclusion that nuclear energy is perceived as a high-risk technology with little benefit to society, whereas X-rays are perceived as very useful and low-risk.

Before the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, Americans expected catastrophes of immense proportions from such accidents, comparable to the consequences of a nuclear war . In post-accident replications of these surveys, even more extreme ideas were found.

Weart pointed out that historically with the discovery of radioactivity, especially because of the material transformations associated with it ( transmutation ), old mythical ideas of dangerous, hidden powers became popular again. Smith (1988) emphasized that the perception of nuclear energy is inextricably linked with the atomic bomb. Erikson (1990) pointed to the broad toxicity issue associated with new technologies, as well as in the chemical field . Invisible, penetrating contamination that can hardly be removed results in a fundamental difference to natural disasters in terms of risk perception. Many studies found that most people (60–75%) believe that even temporary exposure to radiation from radioactive sources could one day cause cancer. This sensation explains why it can never be too expensive for many people to avoid radiation. In an analysis (1993) of more than 500 life-saving interventions, the highest costs per year of life saved were determined for radiation protection.

Effects

The effects of risk perception are critical. For example, although nobody died as a result of the Three Mile Island accident and only a few cancer deaths were expected from it, no other accident in US history has resulted in such high social costs (stricter requirements, lower utilization of power plants, relocation to more expensive energy sources). According to Kaperson et al. The key here is the signal value, i.e. expectations about the probability and extent of future accidents. The signaling effect of an accident with a known technology (e.g. railway accident ) can therefore be significantly below that of a technology that is perceived as less well understood, such as nuclear energy, even with many fatalities.

The stigma associated with radiation damage can also have significant socio-economic consequences. For example, the Goiânia accident (1987) resulted in residents of the region no longer being accepted as hotel guests in other parts of the country, and pilots refusing to fly with them on board. Tourism in the region suffered considerable damage, and sales prices of products from the region plummeted for at least a month, although no product was ever found to be contaminated.

Risk communication

Much has been written about the need for risk communication and the difficulties encountered with it. It is always important to convey the information in a way that facilitates decision-making. For example, in a case of very low levels of 1,2-dibromoethane in food in the 1980s, the media showed that it was unable to translate the information issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) into practical consumption recommendations.

Comparing risks is a standard approach to risk communication. Statements such as: "The annual risk of living next to a nuclear power plant is equivalent to driving three miles in a car" are not always effective, however, and instead of education, they can cause trouble. More effective comparisons can be made between different radiation sources. For example, the additional lifelong radiation dose for people in Belarus after the Chernobyl accident was significantly lower than the lifelong radiation dose from moving from New York City to Denver . When the radiation from the Chernobyl accident reached the United States, the EPA made it clear through the media that the doses it received were far smaller than those obtained from an X-ray examination. In Europe, however, risk communication on Chernobyl was a disaster. Authorities made different statements, the units of measurement were mixed up, the public distrusted comparisons with natural radiation and reacted in some cases angry.

Psychological research has shown that perceptions of risk are very persistent and change slowly. New findings are more likely to be perceived as reliable if they confirm the original view. On the other hand, if the original opinion is poorly formed, people react very quickly to reports. The framing effect is then of decisive importance.

The failure of risk communication can in many cases be explained by a lack of trust . Medical technologies like x-rays are trusted more than industrial technologies like nuclear energy. It is also very difficult to build trust for the following reasons:

  • negative (confidence-reducing) events are easier to recognize than positive ones. While negative events often take the form of specific, well-defined incidents such as accidents, lies, or mistakes, positive events are often difficult to grasp. How many positive events are included in a 24-hour accident-free operation of a nuclear power plant, for example, is not obvious.
  • negative events are given greater weight than positive ones, even if the latter are recognized as such. Psychological experiments on hypothetical events in nuclear power plants prove this.
  • negative news is perceived as more credible than positive news; this has also been proven by psychological experiments.
  • Suspicion is self-reinforcing. First, because mistrust prevents personal contacts and experiences that can lower mistrust. Second, distrust influences the interpretation of events according to original conceptions.

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Radiophobia - a new psychological syndrome. In: West J Surg Obstet Gynecol. Vol. 59, No. 11, Nov 1951, pp. Viii-x; passim. PMID 14877113
  2. ^ RH Pastel: Radiophobia: long-term psychological consequences of Chernobyl. In: Mil Med. Volume 167, No. 2 Suppl, Feb 2002, pp. 134-136.
  3. ↑ BI Davydov, VG Zuev, SB Obukhova. [Electromagnetic fields: is there any probability of the risk of cancer?]. In: Aviakosm Ekolog Med. Volume 37, No. 2, 2003, pp. 16-19. PMID 12722420 (Russian)
  4. ↑ Annette Langer : Chernobyl engineer: "The dying will go on" - Interview with the atomic physicist Larissa Lebedewa, einestages.spiegel.de, July 31, 2007.
  5. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k Paul Slovic: Perception of Risk from Radiation. In: Radiation Protection Dosimetry. Volume 68, No. 3/4, 1996, pp. 165-180.
  6. ^ Spencer R. Weart: The Rise of Nuclear Fear . Harvard University Press, 2012, ISBN 978-0-674-05233-8 , pp. 7-10.