Vienna Ministerial Conference 1834

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Klemens Wenzel von Metternich was the leading politician in Austria and the German Confederation. The initiative for the Vienna Conferences went back to him.

The Vienna Ministerial Conference from January to June 1834 (also: Vienna Conferences) was a meeting of the most important states in the German Confederation . It was a matter of those states that had their own votes in the Select Council of the Bundestag . At the invitation of Austria, they discussed how to proceed after the Six Articles of 1832 and the Frankfurt Wachensturm of 1833. These meetings at ministerial level were therefore not formal meetings of the Bundestag (in which the German states were represented by envoys).

A final protocol of June 12, 1834 contained 60 articles. The participating states agreed that the protocol should remain secret. The resolutions should still be binding, just like federal resolutions. In contrast, those provisions that were to become formal federal laws were made public. These federal laws were actually passed later in the Bundestag: on October 30, 1834, on November 13, and a year later, on November 5, 1835.

In terms of content, the final minutes dealt with a federal arbitration tribunal and restrictions for state parliaments and universities. After the secret resolutions became public, there was much criticism. That is why they were only partially carried out. The 60 articles were problematic because their secret part violated state law and should also apply to states that had not even participated in the conference.

content

That part of the 60 articles that became public federal law mainly concerned federal jurisdiction and universities. Among other things, a federal resolution dealt with the dispatch of files in certain cases, which was no longer mandatory. A federal arbitration tribunal was set up by federal law of October 30th, which should at least deal with disputes in the states. The main issue was the dispute between governments and parliaments over the state constitutions. However, this court was not intended to be a permanent institution, nor was the existing Austrägalordnung, and as a result this option of an arbitration tribunal was not used.

The “Common Measures Regarding Universities and Other Teaching and Educational Institutions in Germany” (or “Second Federal University Law”, according to the Karlsbad Decrees ) of November 13, 1834 committed the universities to punitive measures against students who had political connections had participated. Such students, who were banned from their university, were not allowed to be admitted to other universities, not to become civil servants, to hold school or church office, and not to work as lawyers or doctors. A university resolution was not sufficient for a lecturer's license to teach, the approval had to come from the state authority.

In the secret part of the 60 articles, the rights of the state parliaments were restricted. The monarchical principle could not be restricted by further powers for the state parliaments. The chambers' budgetary law should not be interpreted in such a way that they could determine all of the country's income and expenditure. If necessary, the national army had to dissolve the chambers. State parliaments were also not allowed to deliberate on the validity of federal resolutions. Budget conflicts were now considered a reason for federal intervention , even if there was no threat of popular riot.

In addition, the Viennese secret resolutions tightened the Karlsbad Federal Press Act: for example, gaps in censorship in newspapers, with which the editors had previously made censorship interventions clear, should no longer be tolerated. Further provisions concerned the import of literature from abroad and the admission of new newspapers, which had to be expressly carried out (and not simply by toleration).

Evaluation and consequences

At the conference of 1834, Ernst Rudolf Huber criticized the fact that it tried to create a new, inadmissible federal law. In addition to the proper, public federal laws, there were intergovernmental secret agreements with the claim to be just as binding for the federal members as federal decrees. In both a confederation and a federal state , formally valid federal law could only come into being through the corresponding channels of federal legislation, not least when it came to matters that were affected by federal competence.

This alleged federal law by means of secret treaties violated the state constitutions: The 60 articles contained provisions that, for example, concerned the budget law in the states. This state law could have been overlaid by a federal law, but not by secret international agreements. In addition, many member states of the German Confederation were not involved in the secret treaties. The Vienna participating states had no right to represent these member states and to impose rights on them. According to Michael Kotulla, the 60 articles could only represent a "political declaration of intent" by the participating governments. It would have been “in breach of federal law” to apply provisions that contradicted existing federal law.

When the 60 articles became known soon afterwards, this led to violent outrage among the public. Many states did not dare or were unwilling to use them. A Saxon minister said that his government would not carry it out against the resistance of the chambers. However, it was not to be expected that the chambers would approve the articles. Around 1840 it became clear that constitutionalism had advanced so far that such secret resolutions could no longer be effective.

See also

supporting documents

  1. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1988, pp. 177-179.
  2. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1988, p. 180/181, p. 184.
  3. ^ Jürgen Müller: German Confederation and German Nation 1848-1866. Habil. Frankfurt 2003, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen 2005, p. 36.
  4. ^ Michael Kotulla: German constitutional history. From the Old Reich to Weimar (1495–1934) . Springer, Berlin 2008, p. 374.
  5. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1988, pp. 181/182.
  6. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1988, p. 182.
  7. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1988, p. 179.
  8. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1988, pp. 179/180.
  9. ^ Michael Kotulla: German constitutional history. From the Old Reich to Weimar (1495–1934) . Springer, Berlin 2008, p. 374.
  10. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German constitutional history since 1789. Volume II: The struggle for unity and freedom 1830 to 1850 . 3rd edition, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart [ua] 1988, p. 180.