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Oblivious of the U.S. Marine offensive, General Nasu sent the 9th Company of the 4th Infantry Regiment's 3rd Battalion across the Matanikau on the evening of [[October 7]]. The Japanese regiment commander received word of the U.S. Marine operation about 03:00 on [[October 8]] and immediately ordered his 1st and 2nd battalions closer to the river to counter the Marine operation.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 284-285.</ref>
Oblivious of the U.S. Marine offensive, General Nasu sent the 9th Company of the 4th Infantry Regiment's 3rd Battalion across the Matanikau on the evening of [[October 7]]. The Japanese regiment commander received word of the U.S. Marine operation about 03:00 on [[October 8]] and immediately ordered his 1st and 2nd battalions closer to the river to counter the Marine operation.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 284-285.</ref>


"Torrential" rain on [[October 8]] slowed the U.S. 7th Marines and the Whaling Group as they attempted to cross the Matanikau. Near evening the U.S. 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines reached the first ridge west of the Matanikau about a mile from Point Cruz. Opposite their position on the east bank of the river, Company H from the U.S. 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines unknowlingly advanced into an exposed position between the Japanese 9th Company on the east bank and the rest of the Japanese 3rd Battalion on the west bank and was forced to withdraw. As a result, the Marines halted their attack for the night and prepared to resume it the next day. Unaware that the Marines threatened their positions on the west bank of the Matanikau, the Japanese commanders, including Maruyama and Nasu, ordered their units to hold in place. During the night, the survivors of the Japanese 3rd Company attempted to break out of their pocket and cross the sandbar at the mouth of the Matanikau. The Japanese advanced directly into a company of the 1st Raiders and a "fierce, confused, hand-to-hand fight" left ten Marines and 36 Japanese dead, effectively destroying the remainder of the 3rd Company.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 287.</ref>
"Torrential" rain on [[October 8]] slowed the U.S. 7th Marines and the Whaling Group as they attempted to cross the Matanikau. Near evening the U.S. 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines reached the first ridge west of the Matanikau about a mile from Point Cruz. Opposite their position on the east bank of the river, Company H from the U.S. 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines unknowingly advanced into an exposed position between the Japanese 9th Company on the east bank and the rest of the Japanese 3rd Battalion on the west bank and was forced to withdraw. As a result, the Marines halted their attack for the night and prepared to resume it the next day. Unaware that the Marines threatened their positions on the west bank of the Matanikau, the Japanese commanders, including Maruyama and Nasu, ordered their units to hold in place. During the night, the survivors of the Japanese 3rd Company attempted to break out of their pocket and cross the sandbar at the mouth of the Matanikau. The Japanese advanced directly into a company of the 1st Raiders and a "fierce, confused, hand-to-hand fight" left ten Marines and 36 Japanese dead, effectively destroying the remainder of the 3rd Company.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 287.</ref>


Almost 700 Japanese troops were killed for the loss of 65 dead Marines.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 282-290.</ref>
Almost 700 Japanese troops were killed for the loss of 65 dead Marines.<ref>Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 282-290.</ref>

Revision as of 12:31, 17 March 2007

Actions along the Matanikau (September – October 1942)
Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II

U.S. Marines cross the Matanikau River on Guadalcanal in October, 1942.
DateSeptember 23 – September 27 and October 6 – 9, 1942
Location
Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands
Result September action: Japanese victory
October action: United States victory
Belligerents
United States Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
Alexander Vandegrift,
Merritt A. Edson
Chesty Puller		 Harukichi Hyakutake,
Kiyotaki Kawaguchi
Akinosuka Oka
Masao Maruyama
Yumio Nasu
Strength
3,000[1] 1,900[2]
Casualties and losses
156 killed[3] 750 killed[4]

The Actions along the Matanikau in September and October, 1942 were two separate but related engagements among a series of engagements between the United States and Imperial Japanese Navy and Army forces around the Matanikau River on Guadalcanal during the Guadalcanal campaign. These two particular engagements, the first taking place between September 23 and September 27, 1942, and the second between October 6 and 9, 1942 were two of the largest and most significant of the Matanikau actions.

The Matanikau River area on Guadalcanal included a peninsula called Point Cruz, the village of Kokumbona, and a series of ridges and ravines stretching inland from the coast. Japanese forces used the area to regroup from attacks against U.S. forces on the island, to launch further attacks on the U.S. defenses that guarded the Allied airfield (called Henderson Field) located at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal, as a base to defend against Allied attacks directed at Japanese troop and supply encampments between Point Cruz and Cape Esperance on western Guadalcanal, and as a location for watching and reporting on Allied activity around Henderson Field.

In the first action, elements of three U.S. Marine battalions, under the overall command of U.S. Marine Major General Alexander Vandegrift, attacked Japanese troop concentrations at several points around the Matanikau river. The Marine attacks were intended to "mop-up" Japanese stragglers retreating towards the Matanikau from the recent Battle of Edson's Ridge, to disrupt Japanese attempts to use the Matanikau area as a base for attacks on the Marine Lunga defenses, and to destroy any Japanese forces in the area. The Japanese, under the overall command of Major General Kiyotaki Kawaguchi, repulsed the Marine attacks. During the action, three U.S. Marine companies were surrounded by Japanese forces, took heavy losses, and barely escaped with assistance from a U.S. Navy destroyer and landing craft manned by U.S. Coast Guard personnel.

In the second action two weeks later, a larger force of U.S. Marines successfully crossed the Matanikau River, attacked Japanese forces under the command of newly arrived generals Masao Maruyama and Yumio Nasu, and almost completely destroyed a Japanese infantry regiment. The second action forced the Japanese to retreat from their positions east of the Matanikau and hindered Japanese preparations for their planned major offensive on the Lunga perimeter set for late October, 1942.

Background

On August 7, 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.[5] Taking the Japanese by surprise, by nightfall on August 8 the Allied landing forces had secured Tulagi and nearby small islands, as well as an airfield, later called Henderson Field by Allied forces, under construction at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal.[6]

File:RabaulStratArea.jpg
The Solomon Islands area in the south Pacific. The Japanese base at Rabaul is at the upper left. Guadalcanal (lower right) lies at the southeastern end of "The Slot".

In response to the Allied landings on Guadalcanal, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assigned the Imperial Japanese Army's 17th Army, a corps-sized command based at Rabaul and under the command of Lieutenant-General Harukichi Hyakutake, with the task of retaking Guadalcanal from Allied forces. The 17th Army, currently heavily involved with the Japanese campaign in New Guinea, had only a few units available to send to the southern Solomons area. Of these units, the 35th Infantry Brigade under Major General Kiyotaki Kawaguchi was at Palau, the 4th (Aoba) Infantry Regiment was in the Philippines and the 28th (Ichiki) Infantry Regiment was embarked on transport ships near Guam. The different units began to move towards Guadalcanal immediately, but Ichiki's regiment, being the closest, would ultimately arrive first. The "First Element" of Ichiki's unit, consisting of about 917 soldiers, landed from destroyers at Taivu Point, east of the Lunga perimeter, on August 19, attacked the U.S. Marine defenses, and were almost completely annihilated during the resulting Battle of the Tenaru on August 21.[7]

Japanese Major General Kiyotaki Kawaguchi (seated center) in a group photo with his brigade staff at Palau shortly before departing for Guadalcanal.[8]

Between August 29 and September 7, Japanese destroyers (called "Tokyo Express" by Allied forces), plus a convoy of slow barges, delivered the 6,000 men of Kawaguchi's brigade, including the rest of Ichiki's regiment (called the Second Echelon) and much of the Aoba regiment, to Guadalcanal. 5,000 of the troops and Kawaguchi himself landed 20 miles east of the Lunga Perimeter at Taivu Point. The other 1,000 troops, under the command of Colonel Akinosuka Oka, landed west of the Lunga Perimeter at Kokumbona.[9] During this time, Vandegrift continued to direct efforts to strengthen and improve the defenses of the Lunga perimeter. Between August 21 and September 3, he relocated three Marine battalions, including the 1st Raider Battalion, under U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson (Edson's Raiders), from Tulagi and Gavutu to Guadalcanal.[10]

Kawaguchi set the date for his attack on the Marines for September 12 and planned for his forces, split into three divisions, to approach the Lunga perimeter inland, culminating with a surprise night attack. Oka's forces would attack the perimeter from the west while Ichiki's Second Echelon, now renamed the Kuma Battalion, would attack from the east. The main attack would be by Kawaguchi's "Center Body," numbering 3,000 men in three battalions, from the south of the Lunga perimeter.[11]

Edson, along with Colonel Gerald Thomas, Vandegrift's operations officer, believed that the Japanese attack would come at a narrow, grassy, 1,000-yard-long, coral ridge that paralleled the Lunga River and was located just south of Henderson Field. On September 11, the 840 men of Edson's battalion deployed onto and around the ridge and prepared to defend it.[12]

Guadalcanal. The U.S. Marine defenses were concentrated around Lunga Point (left-center of the map). The Matanikau River, Point Cruz, and Kokumbona village, where many of the Japanese troops were located, are just to the west of Lunga Point.

Kawaguchi's Center Body of 3,000 troops began their attacks on Edson's 830 Marines on the ridge beginning on September 12 in what was later called the Battle of Edson's Ridge. After numerous frontal assaults by the Japanese that almost succeeded in overwhelming Edson's men, Kawaguchi's attack was repulsed with heavy losses for the Japanese, who retreated back into the jungle on September 14. Oka's assault in the west and the Kuma Battalion's assault in the east, were also repulsed by the U.S. Marines over the same two days. Kawaguchi's units were ordered to withdraw west to the Matanikau Valley to join with Oka's unit on the west side of the Lunga Perimeter. Most of Kawaguchi's men reached the Matanikau by September September 20.[13]

As the Japanese regrouped west of the Matanikau, the U.S. forces concentrated on shoring up and strengthening their Lunga defenses. On September 18, an Allied naval convoy delivered 4,157 men from the 3rd Provisional Marine Brigade (U.S. 7th Marine Regiment) to Guadalcanal. These reinforcements allowed Vandegrift, beginning on September 19, to establish an unbroken line of defense completely around the Lunga perimeter.[14]

The Japanese immediately began to prepare for their next attempt to recapture Henderson Field. The 3rd Battalion, 4th (Aoba) Infantry Regiment had landed at Kamimbo Bay on the western end of Guadalcanal on September 11, too late to join Kawaguchi's attack on the U.S. Marines. By now, though, the battalion had joined Oka's forces near the Matanikau. Tokyo Express runs on September 14, 20, 21, and 24 brought food and ammunition, as well as 280 men from the 1st Battalion, Aoba Regiment, to Kamimbo on Guadalcanal.[15]

U.S. Marine Lieutenant General Vandegrift and his staff were aware that Kawaguchi's troops had retreated to the area west of the Matanikau and that numerous groups of Japanese stragglers were scattered throughout the area between the Lunga Perimeter and the Matanikau River. Two previous raids by Marines on August 19 and August 27 had killed some of the Japanese forces camped in that area, but had failed to deny the location as an assembly area and defensive position for the Japanese forces threatening the western portion of the Marine defenses. Vandegrift decided to conduct another series of small unit operations around the Matanikau Valley. The purpose of these operations was to "mop-up" the scattered groups of Japanese troops east of the Matanikau and to keep the main body of Japanese soldiers off-balance to prevent them from consolidating their positions so close to the main Marine defenses at Lunga Point. The first operation was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Chesty Puller with a start date of September 23. The operation would be supported by artillery fire from the U.S. 11th Marine Regiment.[16]

September Action

Prelude

Map of the Matanikau Action, September 23 – 27, 1942. Green represents U.S. Marine units and movements and red Japanese positions and actions. Point Cruz is misidentified as "Koli Point" and the U.S. destroyer Monssen that supported the operation is misidentified as Ballard.

The U.S. Marine plan called for Puller's battalion to march west from the Lunga perimeter, scale a large terrain feature called Mount Austen, cross the Matanikau River, and then reconnoiter the area between the Matanikau and Kokumbona village. At the same time, the 1st Raider Battalion, noew under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B. Griffith, was to cross at the mouth of the Matanikau to explore the area between the river, Kokumbona, and further west towards Tassafaronga. The Marines thought that there were about 400 Japanese in that area.[17]

The number of Japanese troops in the Matanikau Valley was actually much higher than the Marines expected. Believing that the Allies might attempt a major amphibious landing near the Matanikau River, Kawaguchi assigned Colonel Akinoskua Oka's 124th Infantry Regiment, now numbering about 1,900 men, to defend the Matanikau area. Oka deployed his "Maizuru" Battalion around the base of Mount Austen and along the west and east banks of the Matanikau River. The rest of Oka's force was located west of the Matanikau, but in position to respond quickly to any Allied attacks in that area.[18]

Action

The 930 men of Puller's battalion marched west from the Lunga perimeter early on the morning of September 23. Later that morning, Puller's troops chased away two Japanese patrols that were reconnoitering the Marine Lunga defenses. Puller's battalion then camped for the night and prepared to climb Mount Austen the next day.[19]

At 17:00 on September 24, as Puller's men hiked up the northwest slope of Mount Austen, they surprised and killed a bivouac of 16 Japanese soldiers. The noise from the skirmish alerted several companies of Oka's Maizuru Battalion, who were emplaced nearby. The Maizuru troops quickly attacked Puller's Marines, who took cover and returned fire. Acting on Oka's orders, the Japanese slowly disengaged while withdrawing towards the Matanikau River and the engagement was over by nightfall. The Marines counted 30 dead Japanese, but had suffered 13 dead and 25 wounded themselves. Puller radioed headquarters and requested help to evacuate the wounded. Vandegrift replied that he would send the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (2/5) as reinforcements the next day.[20]

A Marine 105mm gun and crew supports Marine operations on Guadalcanal.

2/5, under Lieutenant Colonel David McDougal, rendezvoused with Puller's unit early on September 25. Puller sent his casualties back to the Lunga perimeter with three companies of his battalion and continued on with the mission with his remaining company (Company C), his headquarters staff, and 2/5 and bivouacked for the night between Mount Austen and the Matanikau River.[21]

On the morning of September 26, Puller and McDougal's troops reached the Matanikau River and attempted to cross over a bridge previously built by the Japanese that was called the "one-log bridge." Due to the resistance by the Japanese defenders, the Marines proceeded north along the east bank of the Matanikau to the sand spit on the coast at the mouth of the river. Oka's troops repulsed a Marine attempt to cross the Matanikau at the sand spit as well as another attempt to cross the one-log bridge later in the afternoon. In the meantime, Griffith's Raider battalion along with Merritt A. Edson, now the commander of the 5th Marine Regiment, joined Puller and McDougal's troops at the mouth of the Matanikau.[22]

A view of the Point Cruz area looking south. The three companies from Puller's battalion landed just to the right of Point Cruz as seen in the picture (bottom foreground) and occupied the ridge located in the lower center of this picture.

Edson brought with him a "hastily devised" plan of attack, primarily written by Lieutenant Colonel Merrill B. Twining, a member of Vandegrift's division staff, that called for Griffiths Raiders, along with Puller's Company C, to to cross the one-log bridge and then outflank the Japanese at the river mouth/sand spit from the south. At the same time, McDougal's battalion was to attack across the sand spit. If the attacks were successful, the rest of Puller's battalion would land west of Point Cruz to "take the Japanese by surprise from the rear." Aircraft from Henderson Field as well as Marine 75mm and 105mm artillery would provide support for the operation. The Marine offensive would begin the next day, on September 27.[23]

The Marine attack on the morning of September 27 didn't make much headway. Griffith's Raiders were unable to advance at the one-log bridge over the Matanikau, suffering several casualties, including the death of Major Kenneth D. Bailey and the wounding of Griffith. The Japanese, who had reinforced their units at the mouth of the Matanikau during the night, repulsed the attacks by McDougal's men.[24]

As a result of "garbled" messages from Griffith due to a Japanese air raid on Henderson Field that disrupted the Marine communication's net, Vandegrift and Edson believed that the Raiders had succeeded in crossing the Matanikau. Therefore, Puller's battalion was ordered to proceed with the planned landing west of Point Cruz. Three companies of Puller's battalion, under Major Otho Rogers, landed from nine landing craft just west of Point Cruz at 13:00. Rogers' Marines pushed inland and occupied a ridge, called Hill 84, about 600 yards from the landing area. Oka, recognizing the seriousness of this landing, ordered his forces to close on Roger's Marines from both the west and east.[25]

Map overlay on an aerial photo of the Point Cruz area showing the U.S. Marine retreat from the ridge (center) to the coast for withdrawal by landing craft. The shaded areas represent the Japanese positions. The U.S. destroyer Monssen that supported the withdrawal is misidentified as the Ballard in this picture.

Soon after occupying the ridge, Roger's men came under heavy fire from two directions from Oka's forces. Major Rogers was hit by a mortar shell that blew him in half, killing him instantly. Captain Charles Kelley, commander of one of the companies, took command and deployed the Marines in a perimeter defense around the ridge to fight back, "the best they could."[26] The Marines on Hill 84 were without radio communication and thus, couldn't call for help. The Marines improvised by using white undershirts to spell out the word "H-E-L-P" on the ridge. A Cactus Air Force (the name for the Allied aircraft operating out of Henderson Field) SBD Dauntless supporting the operation spotted the undershirt message and relayed the message to Edson by radio.[27]

At this point, Edson received a message from the Raider Battalion reporting their failure to cross the Matanikau. Edson, speaking to those around him, stated, "I guess we better call them off. They can't seem to cross the river." Puller angrily replied, "You're not going to throw these men away!" apparently in reference to his men trapped on the west side of the Matanikau, and "stormed" off toward the beach where, with the help of his personal signalmen, Puller was able to hail the U.S. Navy destroyer Monssen that was supporting the operation. Once aboard Monssen, Puller and the destroyer led ten landing craft towards Point Cruz and established communications with Kelly on the ridge by signal flag.[28]

By this time, Oka's troops had moved into position to completely cut-off the Marines on Hill 84 from the coast. Therefore, Monssen, coordinated by Puller, began to blast a path between the ridge and the beach, "toppling trees and throwing chunks of dirt, foliage, and Japanese into the air." After about 30 minutes of firing by the destroyer, the way was clear for the Marines to escape to the beach. In spite of taking some casualties from their own artillery fire, most of the Marines made it to the beach near Point Cruz by 16:30. Oka's troops put heavy fire on the Marines at the beach in effort to keep them from successfully evacuating and the U.S. Coast Guard crews manning the U.S. landing craft responded with their own heavy fire to cover the Marine's withdrawal. Under fire, the Marines boarded the landing craft and successfully returned to the Lunga perimeter, ending the action.[29]

Aftermath

A painting depicts U.S. Coast Guard landing craft crews covering the evacuation of U.S. Marines under fire near Point Cruz, Guadalcanal on September 27, 1942

The results of the action were "gratifying" to the Japanese, still reeling from their defeat at Edson's Ridge two weeks prior. Oka's troops counted 32 bodies of U.S. Marines around Hill 84, as well as capturing 15 rifles and several machine-guns that the Marines left behind.[30]

The action, described as "an embarrassing defeat" for the U.S. Marines, resulted in much "finger-pointing" among the Marine commanders to assess blame. Puller blamed Griffith and Edson, Griffith blamed Edson, and Twining blamed Puller and Edson. Colonel Gerald Thomas, Vandegrift's operations officer, blamed Twining for the "fiasco." The Marines, however, learned from the experience and the defeat was the only one of that size suffered by U.S. Marine forces during the Guadalcanal campaign.[31]

October Action

Prelude

The Japanese continued to deliver additional forces to Guadalcanal in preparation for their planned major offensive in late-October. Between October 1 and October 5, Tokyo Express runs delivered troops from the 2nd Infantry Division, including their commander, Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama. These troops consisted of units from the 4th, 16th, and 29th Infantry Regiments.[32] In an attempt to exploit the advantage gained in the September Matanikau action, Maruyama deployed the three battalions of the 4th Infantry Regiment under Major General Yumio Nasu along the west side of the Matanikau River south of Point Cruz with three companies placed on the east side of the river. The Japanese units east of the river were to assist in preparing positions from which heavy artillery could fire into the U.S. Marine's perimeter around Lunga Point. The Marines, however, made plans to foil the Japanese attempts to solidify their positions along the Matanikau.[33]

Aware of the Japanese activity around the Matanikau, the U.S. Marines prepared for another offensive in the area with the objective of driving Japanese forces west and away from the Matanikau valley. Applying lessons learned from the September action, this time the Marines prepared a carefully coordinated plan of action involving five battalions: two from the 5th Marine Regiment, two from the 7th Marine Regiment, and one from the 2nd Marine Regiment augmented with Marine scout and sniper personnel (called the Whaling Group). The 5th Marine battalions were to attack across the mouth of the Matanikau while the other three battalions were to cross the Matanikau inland at the "one-log bridge", turn north, and attempt to trap the Japanese forces between themselves and the coast. This time the Marine division headquarters planned to retain control of the entire operation and carefully arranged detailed support for the operation from artillery and aircraft.[34]

Action

On the morning of October 7, the two 5th Marine battalions attacked west from the Lunga perimeter towards the Matanikau. With direct-fire support from 75mm guns mounted on halftracks, plus additional troops supplied by the 1st Raider Battalion, the Marines forced the Japanese 3rd Company, 4th Infantry into a small pocket on the east side of the Matanikau about 400 yards from the river mouth. The Japanese 2nd Company tried to come to the aid of their comrades in the 3rd Company, but were unable to cross the Matanikau and took casualties from Marine gunfire. Meanwhile, the two 7th Marine battalions and the Whaling Group reached positions east of the one-log bridge unopposed and bivouacked for the night.[35]

Oblivious of the U.S. Marine offensive, General Nasu sent the 9th Company of the 4th Infantry Regiment's 3rd Battalion across the Matanikau on the evening of October 7. The Japanese regiment commander received word of the U.S. Marine operation about 03:00 on October 8 and immediately ordered his 1st and 2nd battalions closer to the river to counter the Marine operation.[36]

"Torrential" rain on October 8 slowed the U.S. 7th Marines and the Whaling Group as they attempted to cross the Matanikau. Near evening the U.S. 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines reached the first ridge west of the Matanikau about a mile from Point Cruz. Opposite their position on the east bank of the river, Company H from the U.S. 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines unknowingly advanced into an exposed position between the Japanese 9th Company on the east bank and the rest of the Japanese 3rd Battalion on the west bank and was forced to withdraw. As a result, the Marines halted their attack for the night and prepared to resume it the next day. Unaware that the Marines threatened their positions on the west bank of the Matanikau, the Japanese commanders, including Maruyama and Nasu, ordered their units to hold in place. During the night, the survivors of the Japanese 3rd Company attempted to break out of their pocket and cross the sandbar at the mouth of the Matanikau. The Japanese advanced directly into a company of the 1st Raiders and a "fierce, confused, hand-to-hand fight" left ten Marines and 36 Japanese dead, effectively destroying the remainder of the 3rd Company.[37]

Almost 700 Japanese troops were killed for the loss of 65 dead Marines.[38]

Aftermath

The Japanese recorded that this loss of the Matanikau position was a "very bad omen" for their next major attempt, ultimately unsuccessful, to defeat U.S. forces on Guadalcanal later in October in what became known as the Battle for Henderson Field.[39]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Actions along the Matanikau (September – October 1942).

References

Notes

  1. ^ 2,100 were involved in the September action. Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 271. Number estimated by adding the reported strength of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (900) to the estimated strengths of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (600) and 1st Raider Battalion (600).
  2. ^ Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 101 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 204.
  3. ^ 91 were killed in the September action and 65 in the October action. Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 213. Frank (Guadalcanal, p. 274) says 60 were killed.
  4. ^ Between 30 and 60 were killed in the September action. Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 206 and 213.
  5. ^ Hogue, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 235-236.
  6. ^ Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, pp. 14–15 and Shaw, First Offensive, p. 13.
  7. ^ Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 88 and Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 141–143, 156-158, & 681. The 35th Infantry Brigade contained 3,880 troops.
  8. ^ Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 136-137.
  9. ^ Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 114-124, Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 199-212, Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 87-112 and Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 118-121.
  10. ^ Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal, p. 15 and Hough, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 298.
  11. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 219-220 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 112-115 & 243. Most of the men in Ichiki's second echelon were from Asahikawa, Hokkaidō. "Kuma" refers to the brown bears that lived in that area.
  12. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 223 & 225-226, Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 132 & 134-135 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 130-131, 138.
  13. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 228-246, Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 140-147 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 138-193.
  14. ^ Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 156 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 198-200.
  15. ^ Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal, p. 152, Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 224 & 266 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 132 & 158.
  16. ^ Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 204 and Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 270.
  17. ^ Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 96, Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 204 and Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 270.
  18. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 269 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 202-203, 209.
  19. ^ Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 205.
  20. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 270, Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 97, Hough, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 315, and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 206.
  21. ^ Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 208, Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 270-271 and Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 97.
  22. ^ Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 97-99, Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 271 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 208.
  23. ^ Hough, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 315, Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 208 and Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 271-272.
  24. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 272, Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 97-99, and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 208-209.
  25. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 273, Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 210 and Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 97-99.
  26. ^ Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 209 and Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 272-273.
  27. ^ Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 99-100, Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 273 and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 210.
  28. ^ Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 210, Hough, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, p. 316-317, and Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 273.
  29. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 273, Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign, p. 100-101, and Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 212-213. U.S. Coast Guard Signalman First Class Douglas Albert Munro was killed while providing covering fire from his landing craft for the Marines as they evacuated the beach and was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor by the U.S. government.
  30. ^ Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 213-124 and Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 274.
  31. ^ Smith, Bloody Ridge, p. 214-215.
  32. ^ Rottman, Japanese Army, p. 61.
  33. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 282-283.
  34. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 282-284.
  35. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 284-285.
  36. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 284-285.
  37. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 287.
  38. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 282-290.
  39. ^ Frank, Guadalcanal, p. 282-290.

Books

  • Alexander, Joseph H. (2000). Edson's Raiders: The 1st Marine Raider Battalion in World War II. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-020-7. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Frank, Richard (1990). Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. New York: Random House. ISBN 0-394-58875-4.
  • Griffith, Samuel B. (1963). The Battle for Guadalcanal. Champaign, Illinois, USA: University of Illinois Press. ISBN 0-252-06891-2. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Morison, Samuel Eliot (1958). The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February 1943, vol. 5 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. ISBN 0-316-58305-7. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help) Online views of selections of the book:[1]
  • Rottman, Gordon L. (2005). Japanese Army in World War II: The South Pacific and New Guinea, 1942-43. Oxford and New York: Osprey. ISBN 1-84176-870-7. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Smith, Michael T. (2000). Bloody Ridge: The Battle That Saved Guadalcanal. New York: Pocket. ISBN 0-7434-6321-8. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Tregaskis, Richard (1943). Guadalcanal Diary. Random House. ISBN 0-679-64023-1.

Web

  • Anderson, Charles R. (1993). "GUADALCANAL" (brochure). U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. Retrieved 2006-07-09. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |accessyear=, |coauthors=, and |month= (help)
  • Cagney, James (2005). "The Battle for Guadalcanal" (javascript). HistoryAnimated.com. Retrieved 2006-05-17.- Interactive animation of the battle
  • Chen, C. Peter (2004 - 2006). "Guadalcanal Campaign". World War II Database. Retrieved 2006-05-17. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)
  • Flahavin, Peter (2004). "Guadalcanal Battle Sites, 1942-2004". Retrieved 2006-08-02. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |accessyear=, |coauthors=, and |month= (help)- Web site with many pictures of Guadalcanal battle sites from 1942 and how they look now.
  • Hoffman, Jon T. (1995). "Matanikau" (brochure). FROM MAKIN TO BOUGAINVILLE: Marine Raiders in the Pacific War. Marine Corps Historical Center. Retrieved 2006-12-28. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |accessyear=, |coauthors=, and |month= (help)
  • Hough, Frank O. "Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal". History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II. Retrieved 2006-05-16. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |accessyear= and |month= (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Miller, John Jr. (1949). "GUADALCANAL: THE FIRST OFFENSIVE". UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Retrieved 2006-07-04. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |accessyear=, |coauthors=, and |month= (help)
  • Shaw, Henry I. (1992). "First Offensive: The Marine Campaign For Guadalcanal". Marines in World War II Commemorative Series. Retrieved 2006-07-25. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |accessyear=, |coauthors=, and |month= (help)
  • Zimmerman, John L. (1949). "The Guadalcanal Campaign". Marines in World War II Historical Monograph. Retrieved 2006-07-04. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |accessyear=, |coauthors=, and |month= (help)
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