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Also siege equipment such as ballistae.
Also siege equipment such as ballistae.



==Influence and modern impact==
Luttwak states that there are "instructive similarities" between Roman and modern military strategy.<ref>Luttwak, p. 1</ref>


==References==
==References==

Revision as of 20:19, 8 August 2007

The Military of ancient Rome (known to the Romans as the militia) relates to the combined military forces of Ancient Rome from the founding of the city of Rome to the end of the Western Roman Empire. Originally consisting entirely of the Roman army, a small navy was added during the Second Samnite War. The Roman military was an important part of the Roman state. Josephus describes the Roman people as "as if born ready armed."[1]. Its campaign history stretched over 1300 years and saw Roman armies campaigning as far East as Parthia, as far south as Africa, and as far north as the then-legendary British Isles.

History

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Rape of the Sabine Women, by Nicolas Poussin, Rome, 1637-38 (Louvre Museum)

Initially, Rome's military consisted of an annual citizen levy performing military service as part of their duty to the state. During this period, the Roman army would prosecute seasonal campaigns against its tribal neighbours and Etruscan towns within Italy. As the extent of the territories falling under Roman suzerainty expanded, and the size of the city's forces increased, the soldiery of ancient Rome became increasingly professional and salaried. As a consequence, military service at the lower (non-staff) levels became progressively longer-term. Roman military units of the period were largely homogeneous and highly regulated. The army consisted of units of citizen infantry known as legions (Latin: legiones) as well as non-legionary allied troops known as auxilia. The latter were most commonly called upon to provide light infantry or cavalry support.

Rome's forces came to dominate much of the Mediterranean and further afield, including the provinces of Britannia and Asia Minor at the Empire's height. They were tasked with manning and securing the borders of the provinces brought under Roman control, as well as Italy itself. Strategic-scale threats were generally less serious in this period, and strategic emphasis was placed on preserving gained territory. The army underwent changes in response to these new needs and became more dependent on fixed garrisons than on march-camps and continuous field operations. In the late Empire, military service continued to be salaried and professional for Rome's regular troops. However, the trend of employing allied or mercenary troops was expanded such that these troops came to represent a substantial proportion of Rome's forces. At the same time, the uniformity of structure found in Rome's earlier military forces disappeared. Soldiery of the era ranged from lightly-armed mounted archers to heavy infantry, in regiments of varying size and quality. This was accompanied by a trend in the late empire of an increasing predominance of cavalry rather than infantry troops, as well as a requital of more mobile operations.

Personnel

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Roman soldiers on the cast of Trajan's Column in the Victoria and Albert museum, London.
Plot of changing Roman military manpower

At its territorial height, the Roman Empire may have contained between 45 million and 120 million citizens.[2] Historian Edward Gibbon estimated that the size of the Roman army "most probably formed a standing force of 375,000" men at the Empire's territorial peak in the time of Hadrian. This probably included only legionary and auxiliary troops.[3] However, Gibbon states that it is "not... easy to define them with any tolerable accuracy." In the late Imperial period, when vast numbers of foederati were employed by the Romans, Antonio Santosuosso estimated the combined number of men in arms of the two Roman empires numbered closer to 700,000 in total (not all members of a standing army), drawing on data from the Notitia Dignitatum. However, he notes that these figures were probably subject to inflation due to the practice of leaving dead soldiers "on the books" in order to continue to draw their wage and ration. Furthermore, it is irrespective of whether the troops were raised by the Romans or simply hired by them to fight on their behalf.[4]

Evidence has also emerged recently that the Roman army may have included women as well as men. Women were never admitted into core units such as the legions, but there is archaeological evidence that some women did serve in the federated troops used in the late Empire.[5] Contemporary sources made no record of this phenomenon and there is no archaeological evidence that suggests that women constituted a significant proportion of troops even amongst the federated troops of the late empire.

Initially, Rome's military consisted of an annual citizen levy performing military service as part of their duty to the state. During this period, the Roman army would prosecute seasonal campaigns against largely local adversaries. As the extent of the territories falling under Roman suzerainty expanded, and the size of the city's forces increased, the soldiery of ancient Rome became increasingly professional and salaried. As a consequence, military service at the lower (non-staff) levels became progressively longer-term. Roman military units of the period were largely homogeneous and highly regulated. The army consisted of units of citizen infantry known as legions (Latin: legiones) as well as non-legionary allied troops known as auxilia. The latter were most commonly called upon to provide light infantry or cavalry support. Military service in the later empire continued to be salaried and professional for Rome's regular troops. However, the trend of employing allied or mercenary troops was expanded such that these troops came to represent a substantial proportion of Rome's forces. At the same time, the uniformity of structure found in Rome's earlier military forces disappeared. Soldiery of the era ranged from lightly-armed mounted archers to heavy infantry, in regiments of varying size and quality. This was accompanied by a trend in the late empire of an increasing predominance of cavalry rather than infantry troops, as well as a requital of more mobile operations.

Command structure

Template:SeeAlsoSideBox The nominal head of the military prior to the establishment of the Roman Republic was the king, although little else is known of the military command structure during this early period. From the Republic onwards, the Senate was the nominal head of the military, but in practice became increasingly subservient to the wishes of their leading citizens, who became known eventually as Emperors: Julius Caesar was named imperator ("commander") and "Father of the Country" and for all intents and purposes "could do as he liked".[6] As the Empire developed, the Emperor became the de facto head of the Roman military. The command structure grew in complexity throughout the Republic and Empire, but a simple representation is presented below:

File:Rmn-mil-cmd-strct-1.png File:Rmn-mil-cmd-strct-3.png
Military command structure of the Roman Kingdom Military command structure of the Roman Republic Military command structure of the early to mid Roman Empire Military command structure of the late Roman Empire

Culture

Historian Peter Heather describes Roman military culture as being "just like the marines, but much nastier".[7] At least in the legions of the Republic, discipline was fierce and training harsh, all intended to instil a group cohesion or esprit de corps that could bind the men together into effective fighting units. Unlike opponents such as the Gauls, who were fierce individual warriors, Roman military training concentrated on instilling teamwork and maintaining a level head over individual bravery - troops were to maintain exact formations in battle and "despise wild swinging blows"[8] in favour of sheltering behind ones shield and delivering efficient stabs when an opponent made himself vulnerable.

Loyalty was to the Roman state but pride was based in the soldier's unit, to which was attached a military standard - in the case of the legions a legionary eagle. Successful units were awarded with accolades that became part of their official name, such as the 20th legion, which became the XX Valeria Victrix (the "Valiant and Victorious 20th").

Of the martial culture of less elite units such as sailors, and light infantry, little is known, but it is doubtful that its training was as intense or its esprit de corps as strong as in the legions.[citation needed]

Funding and expenditures

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Roman coins grew gradually more debased due to the demands placed on the treasury of the Roman state by the military
File:Rmn-revenue.png
Timeline of funding sources for the Roman military

Although early in its history troops were expected to provide much of their own equipment, eventually the Roman military was almost entirely funded by the state. Since soldiers of the early Republican armies were also unpaid citizens, the financial burden of the army on the state was minimal. However, since the Roman state did not provide services such as housing, health, education, social security and public transport that are part and parcel of modern states, the military always represented by far the greatest expenditure of the state.[9]

During the time of expansion in the Republic and early Empire, Roman armies had acted as a source of revenue for the Roman state, plundering conquered territories, displaying the massive wealth in triumphs upon their return and fuelling the economy[10] to the extent that historians such as Toynbee and Burke believe that the Roman economy was essentially a plunder economy. However, after the Empire had stopped expanding in the second century, this source of revenue dried up; by the end of the third century, Rome had "ceased to vanquish."[11] As tax revenue was plagued by corruption and hyperinflation during the Crisis of the Third Century, military expenditures began to become a "crushing burden"[12] on the finances of the Roman state.[13] It now highlighted weaknesses that earlier expansion had disguised. By 440, an imperial law frankly states that the Roman state has insufficient tax revenue to fund an army of a size required by the demands placed upon it.[14]

Several additional factors bloated the military expenditure of the Roman Empire. Firstly, substantial rewards were paid for the demeanor of "barbarian" chieftains in the form of negotiated subsidies and for the provision of allied troops.[15] Secondly, the military boosted its numbers, possibly by one third in a single century.[16] Finally, the military increasingly relied on a higher ratio of cavalry units in the late Empire, which were many times more expensive to maintain than infantry units.[17]

While military size and costs increased, new taxes were introduced or existing tax laws reformed in the late Empire in order to finance it frequently. Although more inhabitants were available within the borders of the late Empire, reducing the per capita costs for an increased standing army was impractical. A large number of the population could not be taxed because they were slaves or held Roman citizenship, which exempted them from taxation in one way or another.[18] Of the remaining, a large number were already impoverished by centuries of warfare and weakened by chronic malnutrition. Still, they had to handle an increasing tax rate[19] and so they often abandoned their lands to survive in a city.[20] Of the Western Empire's taxable population, a larger number than in the East could not be taxed because they were "primitive subsistence peasant[s]"[21] and did not produce a great deal of goods beyond agricultural products. Plunder was still made from suppressing insurgencies within the Empire and on limited incursions into enemy land. Legally, much of it should have returned to the Imperial purse, but these goods were simply kept by the common soldiers, who demanded it of their commanders as a right. Given the low wages and high inflation in the later Empire, the soldiers felt that they had a right to acquire plunder.[22][23]

Capabilities

Readiness and Disposition

Locations of Roman legions, 80 AD.

The military capability of Ancient Rome – its military preparedness or readiness – was always primarily based upon the maintenance of an active fighting force acting either at or beyond its military frontiers, something that historian Luttwak refers to as a "thin linear perimeter."[24] This is best illustrated by showing the dispositions of the Roman legions, the backbone of the Roman army. (see right). Because of these deployments, the Roman military did not keep a central strategic reserve after the Social War. Such reserves were only re-established during the late Empire, when the army was split into a border defense force and mobile response field units.

Power projection

The Roman military was keen on the doctrine of power projection – it frequently removed foreign rulers by force or intimidation and replaced them with puppets. This was facilitated by the maintenance, for at least part of its history, of a series of client states and other subjugate and buffer entities beyond its official borders, although over which Rome extended massive political and military control. On the other hand, this also could mean the payment of immense subsidies to foreign powers[25] and opened the possibility of extortion in case military means were insufficient.

Sustainability

The Empire's system of building an extensive and well-maintained road network, as well as its absolute command of the Mediterranean for much of its history, enabled a primitive form of rapid reaction, also stressed in modern military doctrine, although because there was no real strategic reserve, this often entailed the raising of fresh troops or the withdrawing of troops from other parts of the border. However, border troops were usually very capable of handling enemies before they could penetrate far into the Roman hinterland.

The Roman military had an extensive logistical supply chain. There was no specialised branch of the military devoted to logistics and transportation, although this was to a great extent carried out by the Roman Navy due to the ease and low costs of transporting goods via sea and river compared to over land.[26] There is archaeological evidence that Roman armies campaigning in Germania were supplied by a logistical supply chain beginning in Italy and Gaul, then transported by sea to the northern coast of Germania, and finally penetrating into Germania via barges on inland waterways. Forces were routinely supplied via fixed supply chains, and although Roman armies in enemy territory would often supplement or replace this with foraging for food or purchasing food locally, this was often insufficient for their needs: Heather states that a single legion would have required 13.5 tonnes of food per month, and that it would have proved impossible to source this locally[27]

Policing

For the most part, Roman cities had a civil guard used for maintaining the peace. Due to fears over rebellions and other uprisings, they were forbidden to be armed up to militia levels. Policing was split between the civil guard for low-level affairs and the Roman legions and auxilia for suppressing higher-level rioting and rebellion. This created a limited strategic reserve, one that fared poorly in actual warfare.

Engineering

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The massive eartern ramp at Masada, constructed by the Roman army to breach the city's walls

The Roman military also had extensive engineering capabilities. Heather writes that "Learning to build, and build quickly, was a standard element of training".[28] This engineering expertise served in the construction of siege equipment such as ballistae, onagers and siege towers, as well as allowing the troops to construct roads, bridges and fortified camps. All of these led to strategic capabilities, allowing Roman troops to, respectively, assault besieged settlements, move more rapidly to wherever they were needed, cross rivers to reduce march times and surprise enemies, and to camp in relative security even in enemy territory.

International stance

Rome was established as a nation making aggressive use of its high military potential. From very early on its history it would raise two armies annually to campaign abroad. Far from the Roman military being solely a defence force, for much of its history, it was a tool of aggressive expansion. Notably the Roman army had derived from a militia of mainly farmers and gaining new farming lands for the growing population or later retiring soldiers, was often one of the campaigns' chief objectives. Only in the late Empire did the Roman military's primary role become the preservation of control over its territories. Remaining major powers next to Rome were the Kingdom of Aksum, Parthia and the Hunnic Empire. Knowledge of China, the Han Dynasty at the times of Mani, existed and it is believed that Rome and China swapped embassies in about 170.[29]

Grand strategy

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In its purest form, the concept of strategy deals solely with military issues. However, Rome is offered by Edward Luttwak and others as an early example of a state that possessed a grand strategy which encompassed the management of the resources of an entire nation in the conduct of warfare. Up to half of the funds raised by the Roman state were spent on its military, and the Romans operated a system of grand strategy that was clearly more complicated than simple knee-jerk strategic or tactical responses to individual threats. Rome's grand strategy changed over time, implementing different systems to meet different challenges and reflecting changing internal priorities, but elements of Rome's grand strategy included client states, the deterrent of armed response in parallel with manipulative diplomacy, and a fixed system of troop deployments and road networks.


Equipment

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Bas relief of a Roman ballista

Changed throughout history - pilum, gladius, etc. Although their iron-working was enhanced by a process known as carburization, the Romans are not thought to have developed wide steel use, and broadly speaking the 1300 years of Roman military technology did not see radical change in technological level, but technological change occurred and Roman armies of the early empire were much better equipped than early republican armies. Metals used for arms and armour included primarily iron and brass. Roman military personal equipment was produced in large numbers to established patterns and used in an established way. According to Hugh Elton, Roman equipment (especially armor) gave them "a distinct advantage over their barbarian enemies." [30] According to Luttwak, Roman equipment was not of a better quality than that used by the majority of its adversaries.[31]

The Romans were known for their borrowing of good weapons from their enemies. Initially they used Greek and Etruscan weapons such as a large oval shield and long pike. On encountering the Celts they adopted Celtic equipment. Adopted gladius from Iberians. Once a weapon was adopted it became standard. The standard weapons varied somewhat during Rome's long history, but the equipment and its use were never individual.

Also siege equipment such as ballistae.


References

Footnotes

(none so far)

Citations

  1. ^ Williamson, G. (tr.), Josephus, The Jewish War, 1959, p. 378
  2. ^ Estimates range wildly because census data was imprecise and there is some disagreement over how many federated tribes had settled permanently in the late Empire.
  3. ^ Gibbon E., The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Penguin, 1985, para. 65
  4. ^ Santosuosso, p. 188
  5. ^ Smith, L., Women warriors from Amazon fought for Britain's Roman army,[1] in The Times, 22 December 2004
  6. ^ Grant, p. 195
  7. ^ Heather, P., The Fall of the Roman Empire, MacMillan, 2005, p. 6
  8. ^ Heather, P., The Fall of the Roman Empire, MacMillan, 2005, p.6
  9. ^ Heather, P., The Fall of the Roman Empire, MacMillan, 2005, p. 64
  10. ^ Caesar is said to have spent "huge portions of the wealth he accumulated in his victorious wars... on celebrating Triumphs... [and] on erecting magnificient buildings". Grant, p. 194
  11. ^ Gibbon, p. 199
  12. ^ Santosuosso, p. 214
  13. ^ Jones, p. 1041
  14. ^ Heather, p. 297
  15. ^ Hadas, M, et al., Imperial Rome, in Great Ages of man: A History of the World’s Cultures, New York, Time-Life Books, 1965
  16. ^ Heather, P., The Fall of the Roman Empire, MacMillan, 2005, p. 64
  17. ^ Jones, AHM, The Later Roman Empire 284-602, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964, p.1035
  18. ^ Including the millions of citizens of Rome
  19. ^ Edward Gibbon relates that "the fertile... province of Campania...was [w]ithin sixty years of the death of Constantine... granted [an exemption from tax amounting to] three hundred and fifty thousand... acres of desert and uncultivated land" - Gibbon, p. 376
  20. ^ Santosuosso A., Soldiers, Emperors and Citizens in the Roman Empire, Westview, 2001, p. 214
  21. ^ Santosuosso A., Soldiers, Emperors and Citizens in the Roman Empire, Westview, 2001, p. 214
  22. ^ Grant, M., The History of Rome, Fabre and Faber, 1993, p. 287
  23. ^ Heather, P., The Fall of the Roman Empire, MacMillian, 2005, p. 29
  24. ^ Luttwak, p. 80
  25. ^ Hadas, M, et al., Imperial Rome, in Great Ages of man: A History of the World’s Cultures, New York, Time-Life Books, 1965
  26. ^ Luttwak notes that Roman troops could march roughly 15 miles per day over long distances, while ships could carry them far more economically and at speeds of 27-81 miles per day. - Luttwak, p. 81
  27. ^ Heather, P., The Fall of the Roman Empire, MacMillan, 2005, p. 55
  28. ^ Heather, P., The Fall of the Roman Empire, MacMillan, 2005, p. 7
  29. ^ Fan Ye, Xiyu chuan ("Chapter on the Western Regions"), in Hou Han shu (Official history of the Later Han Dynasty), ch. 88.
  30. ^ Elton, Hugh, 1996, Warfare in Roman Europe, AD 350-425, p. 110
  31. ^ In Luttwack, E., The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, JHUP, 1979, Luttwack states that "Roman weapons, far from being universally more advanced, were frequenetly inferior to those used by... enemies

Bibliography

Primary sources
  • Livy, The Rise of Rome, Oxford University Press, 1998
  • Polybius, History, Book 6
  • Tacitus, The Histories, Book V
Secondary sources
  • Gibbon E., The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Penguin, 1985
  • Goldsorthy A., In the Name of Rome: The Men Who Won the Roman Empire, Weidenfield and Nicholson, 2003
  • Grant, M., The History of Rome, Faber and Faber, 1993
  • Heather, P., The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History, MacMillan, 2005
  • Jones, The Later Roman Empire,Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964
  • Lane Fox, Robin, The Classical World, Penguin, 2005
  • Luttwak, E., The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, Johns Hopkins
  • Matyszak, P., The Enemies of Rome, Thames and Hudson, 2004
  • Santosuosso, A., Soldiers, Emperors and Civilians in the Roman Empire, Westview Press, 2001