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Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the [[Geneva Conventions]] to captives from [[the war on terror]]. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a [[competent tribunal]]s to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of [[prisoner of war]] status.
Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the [[Geneva Conventions]] to captives from [[the war on terror]]. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a [[competent tribunal]]s to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of [[prisoner of war]] status.


Subsequently the [[Department of Defense]] instituted the [[Combatant Status Review Tribunal]]s. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were ''lawful combatants'' -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an [[enemy combatant]].
Subsequently the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] instituted the [[Combatant Status Review Tribunal]]s. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were ''lawful combatants'' -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an [[enemy combatant]].


===Summary of Evidence memo===
===Summary of Evidence memo===

Revision as of 15:32, 7 January 2008

Faiz Mohammed Ahmed Al Kandari
Detained at Guantanamo
ISN552
Charge(s)no charge, held in extrajudicial detention

Fayiz Mohammed Ahmed Al Kandari is a Kuwaiti citizen who has been detained without charge in Guantanamo Bay since 2002. [1] Al Kandari's Guantanamo detainee ID is 552. The US Department of Defense reports he was born on June 3 1975 in Kuwait City.

Identity

There is another Guantanamo captive named Al Kandari, Abdullah Kamel Al Kandari. Both men faced the allegation that their names were found on a suspicious list.

Detention in Bagram

In the witness request he submitted to his Combatant Status Review Tribunal Faiz Mohammed Ahmed Al Kandari wrote about his interrogation in Bagrham [sic].[2]

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a trailer the size of a large RV. The captive sat on a plastic garden chair, with his hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor.[3][4] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.[5]

Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.

Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.

Summary of Evidence memo

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Faiz Muhammed Ahmed al Kandari's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, on 21 September 2004.[6] The memo listed the following allegations against him:

a The detainee is a member of al Qaida:
  1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan and provided religious instruction at the al Farouq training camp in the September 2001 timeframe.
  2. The detainee has family ties to an al Qaida cell that killed a U.S. soldier in Kuwait.
  3. The detainee recruited personnel to participate in the Jihad in Afghanistan and arranged their travel, as well as his own, from the United Arab Emirates to Pakistan.
  4. Once in Pakistan, the detainee and the others he had recruited resided at a guesthouse with known al Qaida operatives.
  5. The detainee later traveled into Afghanistan and received wapons training at the Khaldan training camp. Usama Bin Laden [sic] personally provided religious instruction and trainee [sic] at this camp.
  6. The detainee then recruited [sic] further training, including with explosives, at the al Farouq traing camp. Usama Bin Laden was also present at this camp, as were individuals who were involved with the 11 September 2001 attacks.
  7. The detainee was in the Tora Bora mountain region in October or November 2001.

Transcript

Faiz Muhammed Ahmed Al Kandari initially planned to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal but changed his mind when the President of his Tribunal disallowed his request for witnesses.[7][8]

Witness requests

The witnesses Faiz Muhammed Ahmed Al Kandari requested were his father and Sheik Mohammead Wali Allah Arrahmani.[2][9] In his witness request he explained his request thus:

Reason: They know the reason I left KUWAIT to go to AFGHANISTAN and the details of my trip and all the things I did.

His Tribunal President ruled that his witnesses were not relevant.[10]

ISN ### has requested 2 wimesses. The first is his father who the detainee states knew

the demus~o f his trip. Howevetrh ere is no indication that his father knewt his information from first hand observation but most likely from what either the Detainee or others had told him were the details of his trip. Unless the father has first hand knowledgeo f the trip, then the information wouldb e not be relevant and the request for

this wimess is denied.

The second witness is for Sheik Mohammed Ali Allah Arrahmani but no reason for being requested was provided. Again, unless they have first hand knowledgeo f what the Detainee did during his trip, the information would be not be relevant and therefore the request for witness is denied.

Missing evidence

Faiz Mohammed Ahmed Al Kandari's Personal Representative wrote that the notebook he had been captured with, which his interrogators had consulted could not be located by those responsible for managing the evidence against the captives.[2]

Personal details from his family

Faiz Mohammed Ahmed Al Kandari's family answered questions posed to them by the Tribunal.[11] His family answered that he traveled to Afghanistan for charitable work.[11]

  • His mother had cancer, his charitable efforts were influenced by his mother's serious disease.
  • He traveled by air. His family paid for his travel.
  • He had worked with the Salwa Charitable Committee.
  • Other than the Salwa Committee he never worked with any other NGO.
  • He phoned from Afghanistan several times.
  • He had traveled to Bosnia, for charitable work, in 1994.
  • He had previously traveled to Afghanistan, for charitable work, in 1997.
  • He had gone on family trips to Europe, and to Bahrain.
  • He had traveled on his own to Saudi Arabia, for religious purposes.

Hearsay evidence

The study entitled, No-hearing hearings, cited Al Kandari as an example of a captive for whom all the evidence against him was "hearsay evidence".[12] The study quoted the Tribunal's legal advisor:[12]

"Indeed, the evidence considered persuasive by the Tribunal is

made up almost entirely of hearsay evidence recorded by unidentified individuals with no first hand knowledge of the events

they describe."

The study commented:[12]

“Outside of the CSRT process, this type of evidence is more commonly referred to as 'rumor'.”

Administrative Review Board hearings

Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".[13]

Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".

They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.

First annual Administrative Review Board hearing

The factors for and against continuing to detain Al Kandari were among the 121 that the Department of Defense released on March 3 2006.[14]

The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. While attending an Islamic Institute in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) the detainee recruited a fellow student and another friend to participate in the Jihad in Afghanistan and arranged their travel, as well as his own, from the United Arab Emirates to Pakistan.
  2. The detainee worked strongly for funding Jihad through fliers, pamphlets and a senior Muslim cleric. The detainee also created and distributed videotapes to support Jihad and specifically encouraged people to go to Afghanistan and Tunisia to fight.
  3. The detainee was both a religious and military leader within al Qaida and the Taliban. The detainee frequently gave speeches to the recruits at the al Qaida training camps in Afghanistan, and to al Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. The speeches were designed to encourage the students and the fighters in pursuing Jihad and to build their confidence and conviction in their mission.
  4. The detainee provided religious instruction at al Farouq training camp in the September 2001 timeframe.
b. Training
  1. The detainee traveled to the Khalden training camp in Afghanistan where he received weapons training on the Kalashnikov, Dusaka (AKA Docka), Grinov, BKC automatic rifles, and RPG’s, and anti-aircraft guns. Usama Bin Laden provided religious instruction and gave advice and encouragement to the Jihadists.
  2. The detainee received further training with explosives at al Faruq training camp. The explosives training included instructions on production of bombs, setting of explosives, detonating a series of bombs, production of Molotov cocktails, and the use of grenades and petrol bombs. Usama Bin Laden used to visit the camp and supervise some of the training.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee was with Usama Bin Laden in the Tora Bora mountain region when the U.S. bombing campaign began.
  2. In Pakistan, the detainee and the others he had recruited resided at Al Shaykh Al-Libi’s guesthouse in Islamabad.
  3. Al-Libi helped run the Khaldan camp and taught classes in topography and land and celestial navigation.
  4. A senior al Qaida member arranged for the detainee to travel to Peshawar. The detainee then traveled from Peshawar to Afghanistan with Saudi Nationals involved in the planning of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.
  5. The detainee spent most of his time in Afghanistan with Usama Bin Laden as a spiritual advisor and Islamic teacher.
  6. The detainee is related to one of the al Qaida members responsible for the attack on U.S. Marines on Failak Island, Kuwait on 8 October 2002. This relative is considered by his peers as among the best al Qa’ida [sic] cadre. Additionally, the detainee, Salayman Abu Ghayth, and the detainee’s relative attended an airport training camp near Qandahar.
  7. The detainee is associated with Abu Ghayth.
  8. Salayman Abu Ghayth is an al Qaida spokesman.
  9. The detainee’s name appeared on a list of captured mujahidin found on a hard drive with is associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM).
  10. The detainee was the leader of a Mujahiden group, Tabligh, in Kuwait. The detainee conducted a lot of meetings with Usama Bin Laden (UBL). The detainee collected money for UBL through a Sheik at a local mosque. The detainee was described as the legal advisor and close friend to UBL.
  11. The detainee was associated with the Al Wafa organization.
  12. According to a foreign government service, as of early August 2002, the non-governmental organization “Wafa” officially named (Al Wafa Igatha Al Islamia) (Wafa Humanitarian Organization) and headquartered in Saudi Arabia, was believed to have had connections to Usama Bin Ladin and Afghan Mujahidin.
d. Other Relevant Data
  1. A foreign government service considers the detainee to be a hardcore extremist, unlikely to respect either law or human life. They consider the detainee a threat to the US and its allies, and believe he has the potential to be a high-level terrorist planner.
  2. The detainee’s overall behavior has been generally non-compliant. Assaults include spitting and throwing fluids on guards. A guard found a crude shank in the detainee’s possession. Detainee has been a regular leader of prayer, and continually physically trains in his cell. He teaches martial arts on occasion to other detainees.
  3. The detainee has encouraged Muslims to cause problems for the guards at GTMO and conduct a strike. He also issued a Fatwa to not eat the chicken and meat at GTMO because Muslim law doesn’t permit it.
  4. The detainee often complains about President Bush and the U.S. Government and stated that his “interrogator and her government are criminals”.

The following primary factors favor release of transfer:

  • The detainee denied ever teaching Islam or providing religious instructions, but stated he mentored men in reading and reciting the Koran. The detainee also denied ever visiting a training camp in Afghanistan.
  • The detainee claims to have been in Afghanistan working for a charitable organization.

Transcript

Faiz Muhammed Ahmed Al Kandari chose to participate in his first annual Administrative Review Board hearing.[15]

Opening Statement

Prior to beginning his opening statement Faiz Mohammed Ahmed Al Kandari had some questions:

  • "I requested a long time ago to [show] [sic] my time [that] [sic] I attend the college [sic] and the time [that] [sic] the two students attended the same college. Was that [ever] [sic] done? Do you have the answer to that?
  • "I also requested [information] [sic] again [a] [sic] long time ago [about the] [sic] al Farouq [training] camp. [The al Farouq training cmap] was closed September 2001 [because] [sic] one of the detainees told me. He was in training [at] that camp. I asked the interrogator ot find [out] information for me. That was a long time ago and I have not heard [anything] about that [again]. Is there an answer?
  • "Connections, that [is] C. 4... They're referring to the Saudi Nationals, is there anyway I can find out who they are?

Faiz Muhammed Ahmed al Kandari thanked his Board for the opportunity explain his situation. He thanked the Board for having his shackles removed. He stated that he believed: ...that the United States still believes in democracy and [is] still the best country for human rights.

Faiz Muhammad Ahmed al Kandari confirmed he left Kuwait at the end of June 2001, stayed in Pakistan for two months, want went to Afghanistan at the end of August 2001. He questioned how he could have attended three different training camps, fought on the front lines, served as a religious leader, and stayed at Usama bin Laden's side, all during the three months he was in Afghanistan. He asked: "I ask, are these accusations against Faiz or against Superman?"

Faiz Muhammad Ahmed al Kandari pointed out that traveling to Afghanistan was not a violation of Kuwaiti law. He didn't think he had committed a crime, and he didn't think he owed anyone any apology for his travel.

Faiz Muhammad Ahmed al Kandari told his Board that, even if apologizing would lead to his release, he would rather stand on principle, and decline to give a false apology, because he hadn't done anything wrong. Faiz Muhammad Ahmed al Kandari offered a joke to explain what he called his attitude towards "the scales of justice".

The transcript seemed to indicate that his Assisting Military Officer had offered the replies to each of the factors that favored detention. But those answers were not included in the transcript.

Letter from Neil H. Koslowe

Faiz Muhammad Ahmed al Kandari's lawyer, Neil H. Koslowe, submitted a letter and 39 pages of letters from Kuwaitis to his Board, on January 31 2005.[15] His parents, siblings aunts, uncles, friends, neighbors all submitted letters testifying to his good character and assured the Board he had never shown any interest in extremism, and had never approved of violence. The package also included a letter from Abdulwahed M. Al Awadi, the local member of Kuwait's legislative assembly, and a family friend, who told the Board that he knew the captive personally, and could testify to his good character.


Second annual Administrative Review Board hearing

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Faiz al Kandari's second annual Administrative Review Board, on 3 July 2006.[16] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.

The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. An individual stated that the detainee fought in Bosnia.
  2. An individual stated that in April 2000 the detainee traveled to Islamabad, Pakistan, stayed at a guest house for one month, and then went to Kabul. Afghanistan, where he stayed two days at another guest house.
  3. The detainee's travel arrangements were made by a senior al Qaida operative.
  4. An individual stated that the detainee stayed at the Usama bin Laden guest house in Qandahar, Afghanistan for one month.
  5. An individual stated that the detainee worked strongly for funding jihad through fliers and pamphlets, collected money fro Usama bin Laden in Kuwait, and created and distributed videotapes to support jihad. The individual stated that the detainee traveled often back and forth between Afghanistan and Kuwait.
  6. An individual stated that the detainee was a representative of Usama bin Laden and was both a religious and military leader within al Qaida and the Taliban.
  7. An individual stated that the detainee frequently gave speeches to recruits at al Qaida training camps and to al Qaida and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.
  8. An individual stated that while in Tora Bora, the detainee wore a military uniform, carried an AK-47 and fought with al Qaida and the Taliban.
  9. An individual stated that the detainee was in charge of a group in Tora Bora.
  10. An individual stated that in late October 2001 in the mountains of Tora Bora the detainee attended a meeting of fighting location leaders to discuss fighting strategy and the distribution of surface-to-air missiles and other anti-aircraft weapons.
  11. The detainee stated that his most recent employment was in Afghanistan with the al Wafa organization.
  12. Al Wafa is a Terrorist Exclusion List designee. This gives the United States Government the ability to exclude alienas associated with al Wafa from entering the United States.
b. Training
  1. An individual states that the detainee trained on the Kalashnikov and other automatic rifies, rocket propelled grenades and anti-aircraft guns at the Khalden camp.
  2. An individual stated that the detainee received explosives training, to include the production of TNT bombs, setting explosvies, detonating synchronized timed bombs, Molotov cocktails, petrol bombs and grenades at the al Farouq camp.
  3. An individual stated that the detainee took a course in snipe-shooter [sic] training at the Airport Training Camp near Qandahar, Afghanistan.
c. Connections/Associations
  1. An individual stated that the detainee was very close to Usama bin Laden, and while in Tora Bora, the detainee frequently slept near Usama bin Laden and carried out his instructions.
  2. The detainee's name was on a list of captured Mujahedin found on a hard drive associated with a senior al Qaida member.
  3. The detainee's name appeared on a chart developed by a foreign government service depicting the relationship between al Qaida elements and Kuwaiti extremists.
  4. An individual stated that the detainee was the leader of a three-member Mujahedin group in Kuwait.
  5. An individual spoke of the detainee's involvement with Usama bin Laden and connection to the 11 September 2001 hijackers.
d. Intent
  1. An individual stated that the detainee recorded a propaganda tape titled "Jihad, Your Way to Heaven."
  2. The detainee and his relatives are all capable of carrying out operations against United States, Western or Kuwaiti interests.

The following primary factors favor release of transfer:

a.
 The detainee denied ever visiting a training camp in Afghanistan.
b.
 The detainee denied ever meeting Usama bin Laden.
c.
 The detainee stated that he is not an extremist and does not have ties to high-level al Qaida members.

Transcript

There is no record that Faiz Muhammed Ahmed Al Kandari chose to participate in his second annual Administrative Review Board hearing.

Repatriation

On May 12, 2007, the Kuwait Times reported that Kuwait and the USA concluded negotiations regarding the repatriation of the remaining Kuwaiti captives.[17]

References

  1. ^ list of prisoners (.pdf), US Department of Defense, May 15 2006
  2. ^ a b c Personal Representative 23 (September 25 2004). "Detainee ### Witness Relevancy Request" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. p. 17-18. Retrieved 2007-11-06. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  3. ^ Guantánamo Prisoners Getting Their Day, but Hardly in Court, New York Times, November 11 2004 - mirror
  4. ^ Inside the Guantánamo Bay hearings: Barbarian "Justice" dispensed by KGB-style "military tribunals", Financial Times, December 11 2004
  5. ^ "Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials". United States Department of Defense. March 6 2007. Retrieved 2007-09-22. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  6. ^ OARDEC (21 September 2004). "Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal - AL KANDARI, Faiz Mohammad Ahmed" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. p. 20. Retrieved 2007-11-06. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  7. ^ President Tribunal Team 5 (21 October 2004). "Detainee ### Witness Approval by Convening Authority" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. p. 4. Retrieved 2007-11-06. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  8. ^ Personal Representative 23 (21 October 2004). "Detainee ### Witness Approval by Convening Authority" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. p. 5. Retrieved 2007-11-06. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  9. ^ President Tribunal Team 5 Colonel redacted USAF. "Unclassified Summary of basis for Tribunal decision" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 13–15. Retrieved 2007-11-06.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  10. ^ President Tribunal Team 5 (September 26 2004). "Detainee ### Witness Relevancy Request" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. p. 19. Retrieved 2007-11-06. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  11. ^ a b "QUESTIONS FOR THE FAMILY OF Faiz Mohammed Ahmed A! Kandhari" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 23–24. Retrieved 2007-11-06. Cite error: The named reference "CsrtQuestionsForFaizAlKandariFamily" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  12. ^ a b c Mark Denbeaux, Joshua Denbeaux, David Gratz, John Gregorek, Matthew Darby, Shana Edwards, Shane Hartman, Daniel Mann, Megan Sassaman and Helen Skinner. "No-hearing hearings" (PDF). Seton Hall University School of Law. p. 17. Retrieved April 2. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  13. ^ (Spc Timothy Book (Friday March 10 2006). "Review process unprecedented" (PDF). The Wire (JTF-GTMO). p. 1. Retrieved 2007-10-12. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  14. ^ Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Faiz Mohammed Ahmed Al Kandari Administrative Review Board - page 31
  15. ^ a b OARDEC. "Summary of Administrative Review Board proceedings (with detainee present)" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 145–157. Retrieved 2007-11-07. Cite error: The named reference "ArbTranscriptFaizMuhammedAhmedAlKandari" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  16. ^ OARDEC (3 July 2006). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Kandari, Faiz Mohamed Ahmed" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 28–40. Retrieved 2007-11-06. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  17. ^ B Izzak (May 12, 2007). "US to free last Kuwaiti Guantanamo detainees". Kuwait Times. Retrieved May 14. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= and |date= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)

External links

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