Battle of Verrières Ridge

Battle of Verrières Ridge
Part of Operations Atlantic and Spring, Battle of Normandy, World War II
Canadian soldiers under fire near Fleury sur-Orne in the early hours of July 25, 1944
Date 19 July, 1944 - 25 July, 1944 Location Verrières Ridge, 8 kilometers south of Caen, Normandy, France Result Defensive German Victory, Canadian forces fail to seize ridge and take heavy casualties, German counterattacks make minor gains.
Belligerents
First Canadian Army	I SS Panzer Corps
Commanders and leaders
Guy Simonds Charles Foulkes	Günther von Kluge Kurt Meyer Wilhelm Bittrich
Strength
2 Infantry Division 1 Armoured Brigade	3 Panzer Divisions, 1 Infantry Division
Casualties and losses
Canadian 2,600+	German unknown

The Battle of Verrières Ridge was a series of engagements fought as part of the Battle for Normandy during the Second World War. The main combatants were the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and elements of Three SS Panzer Division. The battle took place from July 19 - July 25, 1944, being part of both Operation Atlantic (July 18-20) and Operation Spring (July 25-27). The battle is generally regarded from the Canadian perspective as being a tactical and strategic mistake, involving a costly and highly controversial attack by The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada on July 25. In the aftermath of World War II, it has become one of the most controversial and investigated battles in Canadian Military History.

Background

File:Geography of Verrieres.jpg

The geography of Verriéres Ridge and the surrounding area

Verrières ridge is located 8 kilometers south of Caen, and was a major objective of Commonwealth forces landing on D-Day. The ridge overlooks the broad plains south of Caen, and dominates the countryside between Caen and Falaise. In the aftermath of D-Day, Allied forces were stopped short of the city of Caen and positional warfare ensued until the first week of July. After Caen was finally taken during Operation Charnwood, British and Canadian forces next participated in Operation Goodwood. By the third week of July, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, with support from the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, had managed to get to the foot of Verrières Ridge. However, the ridge itself had not yet been taken. In the aftermath of Charnwood and Goodwood, Verrières Ridge was seen as an important strategic position for movement towards Falaise.

German defences

After the Allied capture of Caen in early July, forces of the 1st SS Panzer Korps, under experienced German Field Marshal Gunther von Kluge, had turned Verrières Ridge into their main defensive position along the Anglo-Canadian front. Although not particularly imposing, the geography around the ridge meant that the Germans were capable of firing at advancing forces from three sides (across the Orne, from the ridge itself, and from "the factory" area south of St. Martin). Two main combat formations, the 12th SS Panzer Division and 1st SS Panzer Division, held the ridge with hundreds of guns, Tiger tanks and mortars. A third formation, the 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen, was held in reserve. In addition, the three SS Panzer Divisions were given additional support by the 272nd Grenadier Infantry Division, a force composed mainly of Russian and Polish combatants that had been raised as one of the 270 divisions in late 1943.

Calgary Highlanders' attempt

On 19 July, as part of a follow-up to Operation Goodwood, The Calgary Highlanders launched an attack to take the northern spur of Verrières Ridge. However, German mortar fire was so accurate that the unit achieved very little gain. Tanks from The Sherbrooke Fusiliers were sent in support of the battalion. They were able to eliminate several machine-gun positions on either side of Point 67 itself. Eventually, the regiment managed to dig in on Point 67 (on the northern edge of the ridge) in the face of accurate return-fire.

Over the next several hours, repeated attempts were made to exploit the position, mainly by 5th and 6th Canadian Infantry Brigades, which were fought back with heavy casualties by "tenacious" German defenders from four divisions. German Panzers and infantry made minor counterattacks against Canadian positions. By that point, however, the Calgary Highlanders had established strong defensive positions on Point 67.

In order to exploit the foothold made on the ridge (both by the Calgary Highlanders and by the British during Operation Goodwood), General Simonds, commander of II Canadian Corps, rapidly prepared an offensive to take the eastern side of the Orne and the main slopes of Verrières Ridge, scheduled to begin on July 20, 1944.

Operation Atlantic

The next attack, on July 20th, was made by South Saskatchewan Regiment, with supporting units from the Cameron Highlanders, as part of Operation Atlantic. In the early hours of July 20, the Cameron Highlanders were able to secure a position in St. Andre-sur-Orne, but was quickly tied down by accurate German counterattacks. The South Saskatchewan Regiment itself moved directly up the slopes of Verriéres Ridge. The attack began with full support from tanks and Hawker Typhoons. However, the attack ran into torrential rains, rendering the typhoons and armoured support useless, and the infantry began to falter in the mud. By the end of the day, the South Saskatchewan Regiment had taken 282 casualties, while failing to secure the ridge. Heavy German counterattacks by a pair of Panzer Divisions caused the South Sasks to retreat past the support lines. Further attacks struck the supporting battalion, the Essex Scottish, inflicting over 300 casualties as they tried to hold back the advance of the 12th SS Panzer Division. However, General Guy Simonds was adamant that Verrières ridge be taken, and sent in the Black Watch and The Calgary Highlanders in order to stabilize the precarious position. Minor counterattacks by both regiments on July 20th managed to prevent further advance by German Panzers. In total, attacks on Verriéres during Operation Atlantic accounted for over 1,100 casualties. By the end of Operation Atlantic, Canadian forces held several positions at the foot of the ridge, including a now secure position on Point 67. However, four German divisions still held the ridge itself.

Verrières and Operation Spring

General Guy Simonds, the planner of Operation Spring, during an inspection tour before D-Day. PAC Photo.

File:Operation spring.jpg

The starting lines of Operation Spring, showing layout of divisional and battalion forces for both sides

With the capture of Caen on July 19, a breakout in the area was both possible, and likely. Likewise, General Omar Bradley, Commander of the American forces, was planning his own breakout, Operation Cobra. Around the same time, Guy Simonds began to design his own breakout offensive, codenamed Operation Spring. Originally, Spring had been designed by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery as a "Holding Attack", with the intention of tying down German forces while Operation Cobra broke out. On July 22, however, General Guy Simonds changed the plan of Operation Spring to one of a breakout offensive. If Verrieres Ridge could be taken, Simonds would be able to exploit his position with armor and artillery attacks, pushing the Germans back and allowing for a breakout. From there, two British Armoured Divisions would push south towards Falaise. The original plan called for the attack to take place on July 23, but "inclement weather" postponed the operation forty-eight hours. Ultra received reports of this, and sent them to Simonds' HQ.

July 25 and the Black Watch

Why should such a suicidal thing have to be done?

Private Ernest Alexander, Black Watch Regiment

German Nebelwerfer rocket artillery at Verrieres Ridge

The Black Watch was instructed to take Verrières ridge on July 25, along with the Calgary Highlanders, who attacked the adjacent Bourguebus Ridge in an attempt to capture May-Sur-Orne. They were to attack at approximately 05:30 from their assembly area at St. Martin, along with armor units and artillery cover. However, they ran into heavy German resistance on the road to St. Martin, and didn't even arrive at their assembly area until close to 08:00. By that time, the two highest ranking officers, Lt. Col Cantlie and his senior commander, had been killed. Command of the Black Watch passed to 24 year old Major Phil Griffin. At 08:30, he met with 5th Brigade's Commander, Brigadier General W.J. Megilland, and planned his assault. Because the armored support failed to show up in St. Martin, the infantry would have to attack alone. When they attacked the ridge at 09:30 (in now broad daylight while walking in a straight line up the ridge), they were easy targets for well entrenched German defenders, who were equipped with tanks, 88-mm antitank guns, Nebelwerfer rocket artillery, machine gun nests and dozens of mortar pits. To make matters worse, communications were knocked out within 5 minutes of the start of the advance. Very few members of the Black Watch managed to make it to the crest of the ridge. On the reverse slope of the ridge, they were subject to even heavier bombardment, as well as the added danger of land-mines, as they ran into the counterattacking forces of the 272nd Infantry Division. Of the 325 men that left the assembly area, 315 of them were either killed, wounded, or captured in the course of the battle. All senior commanders of the Black Watch were killed, and two entire companies virtually annihilated. The Calgary Highlanders also took heavy casualties in two attempts to take Bourguebus ridge. The 25th of July marked the costliest single day for a single Canadian battalion since the Dieppe Raid of 1942.

Aftermath

German counterattacks in the aftermath of Operation Spring, July 25-26, 1944

All of the ground gained during the battle by the Black Watch and Calgary Highlanders was lost in vicious German counterattacks, inflicting heavy casualties on the Highlanders and the previously untouched Black Watch support company.

The Black Watch was reformed after Verrières ridge. The Black Watch suffered the highest casualty rates of any Canadian infantry battalion during the remainder of the Second World War. Although The Essex Scottish Regiment took heavier casualties throughout the duration of the war, many of these were taken in the Dieppe Raid of 1942. The soldiers killed at Verrières Ridge are buried in Bretteville, a Canadian war cemetery between Caen and Falaise. The central area of the ridge (Verrières Village) was taken by the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, and held. The east side was taken and subsequently lost, although a pair of British Armoured Brigades were able to secure significant footholds near the positions of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry. Further attempts to take the western portion of the ridge were unsuccessful until August 8, when after repeated attacks Operation Totalise managed to wrest the ridge from its SS defenders.

The failure to capture the ridge did little to the overall Allied Position, as the success of Operation Cobra was so overwhelming that significant resources were diverted from the ridge to keeping the Americans boxed in. Subsequent attacks were successful. All three Panzer Divisions that had been involved in the battle were transferred to the American front shortly afterwards, to deal with the breakout offensive of Operation Cobra, which thusly allowed for the ridge to be rapidly taken on August 8.

Canadian Controversy

The action of the Black Watch was most gallant but was tactically unsound in its detailed execution.

General Guy Simonds, official Operation Spring report, January 1946

General Sir Bernard Montgomery (eighth from left) talking with Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds (ninth from left) at 2nd Canadian Corps Headquarters in Normandy, France, 20 July 1944". Photo by Lt. Donald I. Grant. [1].

German history does not put particular significance on Verrières Ridge. However, the Battle of Verrières Ridge has earned itself the distinction of being one of the most re-examined battles in the history of the First Canadian Army. In Simond's official report on Operation Spring, released after the war, he blamed "11th hour re-enforcement" of German lines, and "strategically unsound execution on the part of Major Phillip Griffin and the Black Watch" for the failure of Operation Spring. However, recently declassified ULTRA documents show that Guy Simonds, as well as several other high-command member, had likely been notified of a massive German buildup on Verrières ridge on July 23. Some historians, including David O'Keefe and David Bercuson, use this piece of information to accuse Simonds of being too careless with the lives of his men. By contrast, historians such as Terry Copp & John A. English argue that, given the amount of pressure that all allied commanders, especially Bradley and Simonds, were under to break out from Normandy, it is likely that Simonds had little choice in the decision he made.

However, Operation Spring did succeed in its later-defined objective of a "Holding Attack", and allowed overwhelming success in Operation Cobra, thus nullifying any immediate inquiry into its failure. It should be noted that the commander of the Normandy Sector, Field Marshal Kluge, was at the Canadian front on July 25, instead of the American front. The Battle of Verrières Ridge had little overall effect on the attempts to break out of Caen, as significant resources were transferred to the American Front in the aftermath of Cobra, , and subsequent attempts to capture the ridge were successful.

References

• Bercuson, David (2004). Maple leaf Against the Axis. Red Deer Press. ISBN 0-88995-305-8. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Unknown parameter |origdate= ignored (|orig-date= suggested) (help)
• Copp, Terry (March/April 1999). The Approach to Verriéres Ridge. Legion Magazine. Canvet Publications Ltd.
• Copp, Terry (May/June 1999). The Toll Of Verrières Ridge (HTML). Legion Magazine. Canvet Publications Ltd.
• Copp, Terry The Fifth Brigade at Verriéres Ridge. Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies.
• Major Ellis, L.F. (2004). Victory in the West Voloume, Volume I The Battle of Normandy. History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, Official Campaign History. Naval & Military Press Ltd. ISBN 1-84574-058-0. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |origdate= ignored (|orig-date= suggested) (help)
• Granatstein, Jack L. (2004). The last good war. Douglas & Mcantyre
• Jarymowycz, Roman. Der Gegenangriff vor Verrières German Counterattacks during Operation "Spring": 25-26 July 1944 (PDF). Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies.
• Jarymowycz, Roman. Tank tactics: from Normandy to Lorraine, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001 ISBN 1555879500
• Juno Beach Centre. Courseulles-sur-Mer, Normandy, France
• O’Keefe, David. (2007, March 29). Black Watch: Massacre at Verrieres Ridge (HTML) [Documentary]. Toronto, Canada: History Television (Alliance Atlantis Communications)
• Scislowski, Stanley. Verrieres Ridge - A Canadian Sacrifice (HTML). Maple Leaf Up. Retrieved on 2007-06-20
• Simonds, Guy (31 January 1946). Operation "SPRING" (PDF). Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies.
• Zuehlke, Mark (2001). The Canadian Military Atlas. Stoddart. ISBN 0-77373-289-6. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameters: |coauthors= and |origdate= (help)

External links

• Essex Scottish Regiment at Verrieres Ridge
• Black Watch Regiment at Verrieres Ridge, History Television
• Simonds Report
• Roman Jarymowycz-counterattacks on Verrieres Ridge

Footnotes

See also

• Operation Spring
• Operation Atlantic
• Operation Totalise
• Guy Simonds
• ULTRA