Austro-German consultations 1919

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Austro-German consultations in 1919 were a series of exploratory talks, some of which were secret, between the governments of German Austria and the German Reich immediately after the end of the First World War .

Otto Bauer - most important negotiator on the Austrian side

Framework

At the end of the war in November 1918, the formerly supranational Old Austria ( Cisleithanien ) had already disintegrated (see here ). It was clear that this would have a dramatic impact on citizens' lives, particularly on an economic level. In addition, the political elite of German Austria saw the continued existence of German Austria as secure only within the German Empire, whereby a basic German national mood also played an essential role here.

The German Reich government, in turn, saw after Austria the possibility of compensating for losses in territory and people, which is why Bavaria in particular operated "follow-up propaganda".

Therefore, talks began in 1919 at the national and local levels. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Otto Bauer, negotiated as representative for the German-Austrian state government Renner I and Renner II . His Reich German negotiating partner was the local Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau . The main goal was the state unification of the two countries (German Austria had already formulated this goal constitutionally on November 12, 1918). Should this goal not be achievable, negotiations would be conducted with a view to the closest possible cooperation (keyword: customs union).

The basis for the negotiations were the following points, in particular on the Austrian side:

  1. The not yet negotiated peace treaties and the associated unresolved territorial situation of both states.
  2. The efforts of Vorarlberg to join Switzerland .
  3. The possible establishment of an independent Bavaria with the involvement of North Tyrol .
  4. The supply of the Austrian population with food (especially potatoes).
  5. The military threat to Austria from Hungary .

The German side, in turn, demanded large-scale German propaganda measures from the Austrians in order to convince existing skeptics of a possible connection, as well as a coordination of the Austrian legislation with the German one.

result

As early as the spring of 1919, long before the Paris peace treaties were signed, it became apparent that the victorious powers (particularly France ) would not agree to the annexation of Austria to Germany. In addition, the extremely desolate economic situation in Austria after the war was a major reason for Berlin not to conduct the talks in a very goal-oriented manner, since Germany itself had to solve numerous war-related problems. In addition, there was a not inconsiderable number of people in Austria (including those with a monarchist-patriotic attitude) who vehemently rejected any paternalism by “Prussia-Germany”. Certain circles in Germany were skeptical or even negative about the Austrian request to establish Vienna as the second capital of the Reich.

The complete rejection of the German-Austrian wishes by the victorious powers led to the resignation of chief negotiator Otto Bauer on July 26, 1919, as his political ideas had proven to be impracticable.

The talks did not lead to any useful result before the Paris peace negotiations were concluded. In the Paris suburb agreements, Austria and the German Reich had to renounce the connection of Austria. In September 1919, Austria noted in the Treaty of Saint-Germain that it had to remain independent and instead of German Austria, it had to be called Austria. The treaty was ratified by the Constituent National Assembly in Vienna in October 1919 . The state name adopted at the time, “Republic of Austria”, has remained until today, with the exception of the years 1934 to 1945.

Conclusion

The negotiations show that not only the victorious powers but also attitudes in Austria and Germany opposed the merger of the two countries in 1919. The prevention of the Anschluss brought about by the victorious powers (see ban on the Anschluss ) was one of the decisive factors in 1938 for the fact that many Austrians had no objection when Adolf Hitler then forcibly achieved this Anschluss. The most prominent example cited is Karl Renner , who was just as at the forefront in Austria when the First Republic was founded as he was when the Second Republic was founded in 1945. Renner accepted the "Anschluss" in a declaration that the Nazi media liked to publish as a historical fact.

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ^ German Foreign Office (ed.): Files on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945; Series A: 1918–1925 Volume II. May 7 to December 31, 1919 . Göttingen 1984, p. 199 .
  2. ^ German Foreign Office (ed.): Files on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945; Series A: 1918–1925 Volume II. May 7 to December 31, 1919 . Göttingen 1984, p. 44 .
  3. ^ German Foreign Office (ed.): Files on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945; Series A: 1918–1925 Volume II. May 7 to December 31, 1919 . Göttingen 1984, p. 207 .
  4. ^ German Foreign Office (ed.): Files on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945; Series A: 1918–1925 Volume II. May 7 to December 31, 1919 . Göttingen 1984, p. 420 .
  5. ^ German Foreign Office (ed.): Files on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945; Series A: 1918–1925 Volume II. May 7 to December 31, 1919 . Göttingen 1984, p. 102-103 .
  6. ^ German Foreign Office (ed.): Files on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945; Series A: 1918–1925 Volume II. May 7 to December 31, 1919 . Göttingen 1984, p. 198/398 .
  7. ↑ Memories of Walter Koch : Walter Koch: The Saxon Ambassador in the Lebendiges Museum Online (LeMO) portal , “Zeitzeugen” section, on the website of the German Historical Museum (DHM), accessed on August 30, 2016.

literature

  • Jürgen Elvert: Central Europe! German plans for a European reorganization (1918–1945). Franz Steiner, Stuttgart 1999, ISBN 3-515-07641-7 , pp. 111-118 ( Historical Communications. Supplement 35), (At the same time: Kiel, Univ., Habil.-Schr., 1996).