German-Austrian customs union

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The initiator of the customs union project, the German Foreign Minister Julius Curtius (left). Photo taken in October 1931

The German-Austrian customs union was a project of the German Empire and the Republic of Austria in 1930 and 1931. It met with vigorous protests from the governments of France , Italy and Czechoslovakia because there was an annexation of Austria and a hegemonic position of Germany in Central and Southeastern Europe seemed to be preparing. The British government was also hostile to the project because it increased international tensions. The plan for a customs unionfailed in the late summer of 1931 when the French government took advantage of Austria's financial straits during the global economic crisis and made international loan assistance dependent on the project being abandoned. According to a ruling by the Permanent International Court of Justice , it was also incompatible with the Geneva Protocol of 1922, in which Austria had undertaken to maintain its economic and financial independence. In part of the research, the customs union project is seen as a milestone in the development of German foreign policy towards a tough course of confrontation. There is no consensus on this.

Emergence

In February 1930 the Austrian Chancellor Johann Schober made a state visit to Berlin to prepare a trade agreement that was to be signed in April 1930. In talks with the Reich government on February 22, 1930, he also mentioned the possibility of a customs union , which he considered to be ruled out in view of the international legal situation. The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office , Carl von Schubert , a long-time employee of Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann , who had died a few months earlier , agreed and referred to the Geneva Protocol from 1922, with which Austria confronted Great Britain, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia had undertaken to maintain its economic independence and to have its state finances controlled by the League of Nations . The German Foreign Minister Julius Curtius ( DVP ), on the other hand, said that a customs union should be discussed in advance. Two days later he was optimistic that it would be permissible under international law if it were “terminable or limited in time”.

The background to this was the impending withdrawal of Belgian and French troops from the Rhineland, which they had occupied in early 1919 . With this concession, the victorious powers induced the German Reich to agree to the Young Plan , a reparation plan negotiated in 1929 . When the last occupation troops had withdrawn from the Rhineland at the end of June, Curtius believed he had to show less consideration for France, which was opposed to closer cooperation between the two German-speaking countries. In addition, the Social Democrats had not been represented in the government in Germany since April . Instead of the Social Democrat Hermann Müller , who had always supported Stresemann's policy of understanding with France , the conservative center politician Heinrich Brüning had been Reich Chancellor since March 31, 1930, who had promised in his first government declaration an "organic further development of the previous foreign policy" - so no easy continuation the previous understanding policy. Bernhard Wilhelm von Bülow , who had replaced Schubert as State Secretary in the Foreign Office in June, seemed to be the right man for this new course . Since then, German foreign policy has no longer aimed at an understanding with France, but has tried to achieve success in the revision of the Versailles Treaty, if necessary in confrontation with the neighbor.

On July 3, 1930, Karl Ritter , head of the Department of Economics in the Foreign Office, warned his Viennese colleague Richard Schüller that it was now time to “finally get together”. The two officials met in September and agreed on the basic lines of a customs union. When the German Foreign Minister Curtius met the Austrian Chancellor Schober on the sidelines of the League of Nations meeting in Geneva in September , he was disappointed to find that he was only talking about further trade benefits without mentioning the customs union. Nevertheless, on the basis of the agreement with Schüller, Ritter worked out a draft contract and sent it to Vienna. On January 5, 1931, Schüller “essentially” agreed - the matter is currently not topical. At the next League of Nations meeting in January, Curtius Schober met again and suggested "urgently" that we should accelerate the process now; Austria should take the initiative. Schober refused, but invited Curtius to make a state visit to Vienna.

In Berlin, Curtius also obtained the approval of Chancellor Brüning, which he apparently gave without further inquiries. Leading ministerial officials from the Foreign Office and the Reich Ministry of Finance expressed doubts as to whether Austria could withstand diplomatic and, above all, financial pressure from France in the wake of the global economic crisis . Curtius himself stated in a retrospective justification that he had also informed the ambassadors in the signatory states of the Geneva Protocol and that they had not rejected his proposal. The historian Hermann Graml describes this statement as a mere protective claim.

Without giving these powers any advance information, Curtius traveled to Vienna to see Schober, who had been Foreign Minister in the cabinet of his successor Otto Ender since the end of 1930 . Curtius pushed for the customs union to be finally concluded. The Austrians hesitated, but did not contradict. On March 5, 1931, Germans and Austrians agreed on the wording of the agreement on a customs union. It was also agreed how the other powers could be brought to consent: On the one hand, the agreement should be presented as a mere preliminary contract, as an agreement to discuss a customs union. On the other hand, they wanted to present it as a preliminary stage to European unification , as proposed by the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand in September 1929. Therefore, both governments wanted to publish it at the next meeting of the European Studies Committee in May 1931. This body was convened by the League of Nations in September 1930 to examine Briand's proposals. Similarly, State Secretary Bülow had already announced in January 1931 that he wanted to “put a pan-European cloak on the matter” in order to make it easier for the other states to agree.

content

Germany and Austria at the time of the customs union project

The protocol that Curtius and Schober had negotiated was not a treaty under international law , but only a pactum de contrahendo : In it Germany and Austria announced their intention “to negotiate a treaty to harmonize the customs and trade relations of the two countries as soon as possible [...] to enter ". The content of the contract to be concluded was described in detail in the twelve articles of the protocol: Both countries wanted to form a single customs area without internal tariffs, but their national independence was to be preserved, as well as that of the customs administrations of both countries. All commitments made to third countries were recognized - by that the Geneva Protocol of 1922 was meant. Negotiations on intermediate tariffs for certain groups of goods and their duration should still be negotiated, as well as freedom of establishment and trade and questions of taxation of companies in the respective other country, an approximation of the common animal disease agreement of 1924 and the consequences of trade agreements with third countries for the common economic area would have. An arbitration committee with equal representation should be set up in which disputes could be settled. It should be possible to terminate the contract after a period of twelve months, but no earlier than three years after its entry into force. The customs union should be open to further members and was described as the beginning of a reorganization of the European economic situation by way of regional agreements.

Announcement

Curtius presented this result to the Reich Cabinet on March 16, 1931:

"Politically, the Anschluss is not yet ripe, economically it can now be decisively promoted, taking into account the foreign policy difficulties involved in such an approach."

In France and Czechoslovakia in particular, “a considerable foreign policy discussion” can be expected. Curtius did not explain how the project could still be implemented. Brüning thought the timing was “not particularly fortunate,” but did not contradict the plan. The other ministers also drew attention to the risks of the project, but also agreed, if only the Permanent International Court of Justice in The Hague was not involved - an indication that they were well aware of the precarious international situation. This is also indicated by Bülow's warnings with which he accompanied the documents to the German embassy in Paris on March 17:

"We must under no circumstances show any trace of guilty conscience at such meetings and during the expected press storm ."

After both cabinets agreed, the Germans warned that the project had to be published on March 23, otherwise it could no longer be discussed in the European Study Committee. But this date had been fixed for months. On March 13, Schober reported to the Council of Ministers that he had not been able to resist Curtius' insistence on an accelerated pace, even if the element of surprise would probably have a diplomatic detrimental effect. Curtius probably feared that the hesitant Austrians would back down after all. These did not prevail with their request to assign the initiative to the German side alone. Germans and Austrians agreed on joint demarches by the ambassadors of both countries in London, Paris and Rome. Since Curtius now feared indiscretions from the press, he urged that the date be brought forward even further. As a result, there was no more time for diplomatic preparations: On March 21, Germany and Austria informed the governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia about the project. The feared indiscretion did indeed take place: on March 17, 1931, the Wiener Neue Freie Presse reported that Austria had concluded a customs union with Germany. The governments in Prague and Paris therefore already knew: when the German ambassador Leopold von Hoesch presented the demarche on the Quai d'Orsay , his interlocutor Philippe Berthelot already had “a long written report” with all the counter-arguments.

Motifs

Reich Chancellor Heinrich Brüning (left) and his Foreign Minister Julius Curtius. Photo taken in April 1931

In the research, various reasons are discussed why politicians from Austria and the Weimar Republic tackled the risky customs union project. On the one hand, it seemed to be a safeguard against other combinations with which Austria tried to free itself from its chronic economic and financial hardship, such as the Danube Federation or France's plans to economically restructure Central and Southeastern Europe and thus its allies on a small scale Strengthen Entente . Since these multilateral approaches failed in 1931, the time seemed ripe for a bilateral solution. A solution under the influence of France also threatened to make it difficult or impossible to annex Austria to the German Reich, which despite the prohibition in both the Versailles Treaty and the Treaty of Saint-Germain was one of the goals of German foreign policy. A customs union could be a step on the way or a replacement for the connection. If other states also joined, the customs union seemed suitable to help build a new Central Europe, with a strong external impact towards the east and south-east, where the German Reich would soon assume a hegemonic position economically and politically. Similar plans have been advocated by the German public since 1928 by the Central European Business Day, an industrial lobby organization. State Secretary Bülow envisaged even more extensive revision goals in the direction of the German eastern border . He assumed that a successful German-Austrian customs union would soon force Czechoslovakia to join. Next, the German Reich must also create "closer economic relations" with the Baltic states :

"Then Poland is encircled with its poorly established economic body and exposed to all sorts of dangers: We have it in a pair of pincers that may sooner or later make it mature to approach the idea of ​​exchanging political concessions for tangible economic concessions."

In addition to these tangible foreign policy goals, domestic policy goals also played a role. The Brüning government was a minority government that was dependent on the approval of the small right-wing parties in the Reichstag and on the goodwill of the monarchist Reich President Paul von Hindenburg . Brüning also tried repeatedly to persuade the NSDAP to support his cabinet, which after their first major victory in the Reichstag elections in September 1930 had called for the connection of Austria through a customs union. Domestic politics was also one of Schober's motives: the civil servant, who was not bound by any party, had concluded an electoral alliance between the Greater German People's Party and the Landbund in the 1930 National Council election . His orientation towards Germany, to which the Social Democrats , who traditionally believed in Greater Germany, leaned towards, should help the Greater Germans to gain ground in domestic politics vis-à-vis their coalition partner, the Christian Social Party , but above all vis-à-vis the Heimwehr . Schober had failed because of the disarming of this fascist movement, which since the Korneuburg oath of May 1930 openly acknowledged its anti-parliamentary goals and sought to align with Mussolini's Italy.

Economic considerations played a role above all on the Austrian side. Since the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy in 1918, the Alpine republic had had to struggle with serious economic and financial problems, which had not been overcome by the international financial aid provided in 1922. In fact, the question of whether an independent Austria would be economically viable at all was a constant topic in the economic discussion. As early as 1927, the Austrian National Council set up a commission to study a customs union with Germany. For Schober, the integration of Austria into a common economic area with Germany was an economic necessity, even if some Austrian branches of industry would not be able to cope with German competition. On August 30, 1930, he told the Neue Freie Presse that Austria had been torn out of a large old economic area in 1918 without it being given the opportunity to join another economic area, that this was "the Austrian problem"; At the same time, he made it unmistakably clear which other economic area had priority for him: “No combination from which Germany is excluded - every combination that includes Germany” Economic considerations are less evident on the German side. After all, the economic policy department of the Foreign Office in Berlin expected a significant increase in the German foreign trade volume and German industrial production at the expense of the Austrians.

How the customs union project behaved towards the planned project to revise the German reparation obligations is controversial. The historian Philipp Heyde assumes that both revision projects were carried out side by side and that the Foreign Office and the Reich Chancellery failed to coordinate their plans. Hermann Graml , on the other hand, believes that Brüning failed to slow down the customs union project with the aim of repairing it: The foreseeable resentment of the French had destroyed the various plans for financial aid for Germany, which stood in the way of his plan to shake off the obligations of the Young Plan through proven insolvency would have.

Reactions

The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš (left) with his counterparts from the Little Entente Nicolae Titulescu (Romania) (center) and Bogoljub Jevtić (Yugoslavia). Photo from 1932
French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand . Photo from 1926

The governments in Paris, London, Rome and Prague reacted with surprise or shock to the German-Austrian demarche. Everywhere one saw oneself faced with a fait accompli , the protective claim that nothing definite had been negotiated and that the customs union was a first step towards a European Union got nowhere. Since the British and Italian governments officially denied that such a project existed after Curtius' trip to Vienna , the governments there felt downright deceived.

The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš frankly explained to the German envoy Koch that an economic alliance would only be considered for his country if Germany were not involved. On April 23, Beneš declared in front of parliament that joining the customs union would put his country in opposition to the liberal states of the West in terms of foreign trade policy, and that Czechoslovakia would lose its “entire political freedom of movement”. She could therefore only join an economic alliance that was concluded in agreement with the League of Nations or at least with the major European powers: “Without an agreement between Berlin and Paris there will be no peace in Europe.” The Foreign Minister exaggerated this opinion in relation to the Austrian envoy Ferdinand Marek the customs union project to:

“It is the preparation of a war , initially an economic war, and then inevitably a military one as well. He said this with full awareness of the scope of this claim. "

The French reaction was also clear: Here the press reminded us that the unification of the German Empire in 1871 with the Zollverein was also preceded by a trade union. The unilateral German approach made people feel uneasy about the panther jump to Agadir in 1911. The only exception to the otherwise unanimous rejection of the project by the French public was made by the socialist politician André Le Troquer , who saw it as the start of a pan-European customs union. The French government reacted with great determination: as early as March 20, it proposed that all four signatory powers of the Geneva Protocol of 1922 should come together in Vienna and protest against the fact that “Germany and Austria […] had embarked on a path ], which leads to the connection ”. The French lodged a formal protest against Austria against what they believed to be an illegal project, which violated the Geneva Protocol of 1922, and against Germany all negotiations on economic cooperation or financial aid were suspended. In public speeches, Prime Minister Pierre Laval and Foreign Minister Briand sharply criticized German politics. Briand felt personally betrayed by the customs union project because it had taken over the rhetoric of his Europe project and directed it against French interests. He was also snubbed by the fact that on March 3, 1931, in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies , he had made fun of the "Anschluss prophets" such as the nationalist deputy Henry Franklin-Bouillon and affirmed Austria's annexation to the German Reich is currently not up to date. Now he was publicly disavowed. That was doubly unpleasant for the foreign minister because he was a candidate for the presidential election on May 13th. Now his nationalist opponents kept reproaching him for his misjudgment of March 3rd, the view was widespread that his pro-German course had made "l'Anschluss économique", as the planned customs union was commonly known in France, possible in the first place. Indeed, Briand's rival Paul Doumer became the new French president. The customs union project was considered by contemporaries to be the cause of the defeat of Briand, who as a member of the government and the favorite of the left opposition had actually had the best prospects. Since Briand was only able to work to a limited extent due to illness - he suffered from uremia from which he would die almost a year later - his influence on the shaping of French foreign policy, which was increasingly shaped by the Prime Minister, declined.

There were also positive voices in the UK. Winston Churchill, for example, praised the project as an opportunity for Brüning's minority government to improve its domestic political base. The Foreign Office, however, was angry about the project, not so much because they doubted its political and legal admissibility, but because it seemed likely to exacerbate tensions in Europe. Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson had high hopes for the Geneva International Disarmament Conference , which was due to begin in early 1932. It could only be a success if there was a certain easing of tension in international relations beforehand and politicians who were willing to relax, among whom he included Chancellor Brüning and above all Foreign Minister Briand, remained in their offices until then. Both seemed to be endangered by the German-Austrian project, which is why the head of the Central Europe Department of the Foreign Office Omre Sargent formulated that the aim of British foreign policy was "simply [...] to kill it".

There was also criticism in Germany. The publicist Theodor Wolff sharply criticized the German-Austrian approach as blind actionism, which is likely to gamble away foreign policy territory that has already been won. The SPD, on the other hand, found itself in a dilemma on the question of the customs union: on the one hand, it was traditionally Greater German ; on the other hand, it was against any provocation by its French partners. In addition, the party wanted to demonstrate national reliability and not allow any new stabbing legend to emerge. The foreign policy spokesman for the SPD parliamentary group in the Reichstag, Rudolf Breitscheid , therefore only criticized the secrecy of the project from parliament. On March 24th, he asked the Reichstag to “in future, in similar cases, take a little more consideration of the legitimate claims of the German parliament.”

In Austria, parts of industry opposed that, because of their technology deficit, feared they would not be able to cope with German competition. Otherwise the project met with great approval. On April 29, the social democrat Karl Renner declared in his inaugural speech as President of the National Council:

"May we [...] be allowed to take the first step and unite economically with our mother country. In my and probably also on behalf of all of you I greet our great German mother people at this hour! "

fail

Great Britain and France used different strategies that caused the German-Austrian project to fail in the autumn of 1931. The French resorted to financial diplomacy, the British initiated a political and legal test. Both processes took place at the same time, and both led to the desired success on September 3 and 5, 1931, respectively.

British League of Nations diplomacy

British Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson in front of the League of Nations Palace in Geneva. Photo taken in January 1931
Meeting of the European Study Committee in Geneva. Photo from May 1931. At the table you can see the Austrian Foreign Minister Johann Schober (2nd from left), who is making a statement, four places further to the right the Italian Foreign Minister Dino Grandi , next to him the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand , next to the German Foreign Minister Curtius, two places to the right British Foreign Minister Arthur Henderson and to his right the Czech Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš .

For the British, it was important to put the customs union project on the back burner or to carry it out as quietly as possible, without permanently disrupting the atmosphere for the disarmament conference. Therefore, they were also against the French proposal for joint protest marches. On the contrary, Foreign Minister Henderson had the two ambassadors in London, Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath and Georg Albert von und zu Franckenstein , confirm that no fait accompli was planned with the customs union. In doing so, he invalidated Ambassador Aimé de Fleuriau's argument that swift action was required and obtained French consent to put the question on the agenda for the next session of the League of Nations, due in May. The aim was to forward it to the Permanent International Court of Justice in The Hague. Italy and, surprisingly, Austria also agreed to this approach, where apparently they were not as firmly behind the project as the Germans suspected. Therefore, after some reluctance, the government in Berlin also gave in: on April 10, the British government asked that the question of the customs union be dealt with in the League of Nations.

When the council met on May 18, 1931, chaired by Curtius, the mood was unfavorable towards the German-Austrian plan. The British motion was approved unanimously on May 19th. Thereupon Henderson put the question to Schober, outside the agenda and without this having been agreed with the chairman Curtius, whether Austria would waive any further prosecution of the customs union until the League Council had dealt with it again after a judgment from The Hague. Pushed into a corner, the Austrian Foreign Minister affirmed. With that, Henderson had what he wanted: Even if Schober and Curtius later declared in front of the press that they would of course stay in touch on the matter, all serious negotiations were now impossible for the time being. Foreign Minister Curtius later interpreted it as a success that he had prevented the Council from discussing the legal as well as the political and economic aspects of the customs union project. In the German press, however, he was accused of referring the customs union question to the Hague Court as a serious foreign policy defeat.

The Permanent International Court of Justice deliberated from July 20 to August 3, 1931 on the admissibility of the customs union. The point of view of Austria was represented by Hans Sperl . On September 5, the Tribunal published its “avis consultatif”. According to this, the customs union project is incompatible with the Geneva Protocol of 1922, which obliged Austria to maintain its economic independence. The representatives of France, Romania , Poland, Italy, Spain , Columbia , Cuba and El Salvador voted in favor of this vote, while those of Germany, Great Britain, the United States, the Netherlands , Belgium , Japan and China voted . With eight to seven votes, the result was very close. The view that the customs union project also violated the ban on joining the Treaty of Saint-Germain did not find a majority. A day later the League of Nations met, which, under the chairmanship of the Spanish Foreign Minister Alejandro Lerroux , took note of the opinion of the Tribunal and refrained from further discussion of the matter, which could have further humiliated Germany and Austria. A vote was not even necessary, because three days earlier the customs union project had already failed due to French financial diplomacy.

French financial diplomacy

For France, the customs union project meant a direct attack on its position of power in Central and Southeastern Europe. It was feared that it would lead to an annexation of Austria and thus make the German Reich even stronger, about whose demographic and potentially also economic superiority France worried in the interwar period. Therefore, the customs union was interpreted as an attack on France's security. On March 23, the cabinet under Prime Minister Laval decided to thwart the customs union with all available means. Attempts to help Germany, which was already badly affected by the global economic crisis, through loan aid and economic cooperation, and thus also to secure its ability to pay reparations, have been discontinued for the time being. As a correlate to this negative attitude, a plan constructif was presented on May 7th , which made positive offers for a solution to the economic and trade problems of Central and Southeastern Europe. The fact that the responsibility for this plan lay with Undersecretary for Economics André François-Poncet and not with the Foreign Ministry shows the weakening Briand suffered within the government apparatus. The plan constructif envisaged an end to the most-favored-nation trade system . Instead, Austria and the states of Central and Southeastern Europe should grant each other trade preferences for their industrial goods or agricultural products. In addition, through transnational cartelization, the economic competition between the successor states of the Danube Monarchy should be moderated and they should be offered improved credit options. Both Great Britain, which continues to rely on liberalism in terms of trade policy, and the German Reich, which stuck to the binational solution of the customs union, could not find anything constructive in the plan. The European Study Committee in Geneva, to which it was presented on May 16, dealt with it by referring it to its sub-committees. The other side of French financial diplomacy, to which François-Poncet drew attention in his “Mémoire sur l'Anschluss économique”, should prove to be successful. According to his estimate, the French banks would have given short-term loans worth one billion Reichsmarks to German companies, which could be quickly withdrawn:

André François-Poncet (on the lowest level), Prime Minister Pierre Laval and Foreign Minister Aristide Briand in Berlin. Photo taken in October 1931

“However, this is only a threat. We can give Germany to understand that France could grant it an infinitely more effective financial aid if it abandons its project and comes back to our side. "

François-Poncet expected that the Germans would soon listen to the "voice of wisdom" again.

In June 1931, after outflows of short-term loans amounting to billions, Germany ran into financial difficulties. In order to give the international financial system a respite, the American President Herbert Hoover proposed that the German reparations and the inter-allied war debts be suspended for a year. Voices rose among the French public demanding that the government make its approval dependent on German concessions, in particular on renouncing the customs union. Laval did not dare to exploit the generous American initiative so blatantly, especially since a similar attempt by the Italian fascist government was brusquely rejected in Washington on June 23. The US-British-French negotiations on the Hoover moratorium dragged on, partly because Laval remained tough on financial issues with regard to his domestic political critics. To make it easier for him to agree, the British are now urging that Brüning should renounce the customs union as a sign of concession. The Chancellor, who was also troubled domestically, refused. It wasn't until July 8, 1931, nearly three weeks after Hoover's original proposal, that the moratorium came into effect. The confidence of the capital markets in Germany's solvency did not return: the credit withdrawals continued, on July 13, 1931 Germany was insolvent, and the German banks were closed for several days by emergency decree . The customs union also played a role in the international negotiations that followed on a possible stabilization of the German financial situation. In return for the rescue loan aid, the French demanded a “political moratorium” of ten years, which means that the Germans should forego all attempts to revise the Versailles Treaty. During a state visit to Paris, Brüning and Laval advised, but came to the conclusion that a billion-dollar loan would be impractical: If there were no political considerations in return for the customs union and the other German revision projects, the French government would face domestic political difficulties and would likely be overthrown. The German government was threatened with the same if it complied with the French demands.

While the German government resisted the temptations of French financial diplomacy simply because it would have been swept away by a domestic political storm if accepted, the Austrians were more receptive. On May 11, 1931, Creditanstalt , Austria's largest bank, which had taken over when it merged with Bodencreditanstalt , declared itself insolvent. Research does not accept French manipulations as the cause. In order to prevent a financial panic, the Austrian state assumed joint liability for all domestic liabilities of the bank. He was in danger of becoming insolvent himself; In addition, the withdrawal of short-term foreign credits endangered the stability of the schilling . The Rothschild banking house , together with the Bank for International Settlements , offered to help Austria and to issue treasury bills worth 150 million schillings on the world market, but France demanded a waiver of the customs union as a condition and gave the government in Vienna an ultimatum of three Hours. In Berlin, the leaders of the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Finance and the Reichsbank discussed how to help the Austrian partners - either by taking over shares in the Creditanstalt with a Reich guarantee or by buying up the treasury bills. Since a maximum of 15 million schillings had to be released for this in the imperial budget, the aid did not come about.

The Austrian Chancellor Ender did not believe that he would be able to implement a waiver and the consolidation of federal finances, which was also required, and resigned on June 16. His successor was the Christian Socialist Karl Buresch , who was able to avert an immediate bankruptcy of his country with a bridging loan from the Bank of England . The British endeavored to thwart the French policy of “ blackmail ”, but were increasingly drawn into the pull of the international financial crisis and had to terminate the credit line to Austria at the beginning of August.

On July 16, 1931, the Austrian government bowed to French pressure. The ambassador in Paris, Alfred Grünberger , promised to renounce the customs union on the Quai d'Orsay and obtained the promise that France would participate in the financial rescue of Austria without renewing its humiliating ultimatum. Shortly afterwards, Schober suggested to the Germans that “the negotiations should be continued on a larger scale, now that a German-Austrian customs union is not possible” - a clauses for Austria's withdrawal from the joint project. On August 11th, the Buresch government sought a League of Nations loan. On September 3, 1931, Schober and Curtius declared before the European Committee of the League of Nations that “neither country has the intention of pursuing the project originally envisaged”. These declarations had been drafted the days before together with François-Poncet, who a few weeks later was to become the French ambassador in Berlin. In the Reich Cabinet, Curtius presented it as his success that he had not confessed to guilt and did not have to waive any legal claims. But he couldn't gloss over the fact that his defeat was complete: the customs union had failed politically and legally. On October 3, 1931, he resigned as Foreign Minister. Schober also lost his office soon after. The Christian Socials blamed him and the customs union project for the catastrophically deteriorating economic situation. The Greater Germans, on the other hand, saw themselves increasingly under pressure from the growing National Socialist movement in their national issues . When in January 1932 they asked Chancellor Buresch to ensure that the “German course” of Austrian foreign policy would be continued in principle, he refused: Schober and the Greater Germans then left the government. In the state elections on April 24, 1932 in Vienna, Lower Austria and Salzburg, the Greater German People's Party lost almost all of its votes to the NSDAP.

reviews

The customs union project is mostly judged negatively in the research: Germans and Austrians acted tactically clumsy, giving the impression with their long secrecy that they are betraying the other interested governments or presenting a fait accompli; they overestimated both their legal position and their political strength. The revision of the German reparation obligations, which Brüning tackled at the same time, also makes the customs union project appear “out of place”. The consequences at the international level were even more significant. For the historian Peter Krüger , the Customs Union project was “the fall of mankind of German foreign policy, a challenge to the European state system, and a poorly calculated one”. Instead of the trusting cooperation and the patient search for compromises with France, which had made up Stresemann's policy of understanding, there has now been triumphs and confrontation; instead of equality among the great powers, Germany has now sought hegemony . The French historian Jacques Bariéty interprets the project as part of an overall German strategy, disguised with economic arguments, "to take on the legacy of the Habsburg Empire in Southeastern Europe ". In view of France's still dominant position of power in Europe, this was not possible, which is why the Bielefeld social historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler speaks of a “politically ludicrous project”. The historian Tilman Koops describes the project

“As a fateful diplomatic error that arose from the overestimation of the Reich's freedom of movement in foreign policy and the misjudgment of British and French reactions. The customs union shook foreign confidence in Germany's reliability and weakened the German position in the banking and credit crisis. "

The “complete failure” of the customs union project ( Eberhard Kolb ) subsequently undermined the confidence of Germans and Austrians in diplomatic solutions, in peaceful dispute settlement and the institution of the League of Nations. Rolf Steininger judges that as a consequence that meant "for Germany [...] Hitler , for Austria Dollfuss ".

British historian Anne Orde is more positive about the project. In their opinion, it was not politics that played the main role, but the economy: Originally, the customs union was planned as the first step in a long-term strategy to combat the global economic crisis through economic cooperation in Central and Southeastern Europe, all other motives were only due to public pressure has been pushed to the fore in both countries. The Australian reparations historian Bruce Kent has a similar opinion:

"The Customs Union plan was just a clumsy and at an inopportune time attempt to conduct constructive economic diplomacy."

The historian Andreas Rödder occupies a middle position: he sees Curtius in greater continuity with his predecessor Stresemann; the transition from its “revisionism by mutual agreement” to a “negotiation revisionism” was caused by the fact that after the Young Plan had been passed and the Rhineland had been evacuated, there were no more opportunities for compromise between France and Germany. Curtius' approach is therefore only a variant of the Stresemannian concept and must be seen in contrast to "confrontational revisionism", as demanded by the extreme right of the Weimar Republic. At the same time, Rödder also criticizes the “risk strategy” that Curtius pursued in the customs union affair.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Martin Vogt (edit.): Files of the Reich Chancellery : Das Kabinett Müller II. Boldt, Boppard 1970, No. 453 ( online , accessed on January 13, 2011)
  2. ^ Hermann Graml: Presidential System and Foreign Policy. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte . 21 (1973), p. 136 ( online (PDF; 6.4 MB), accessed on January 13, 2011)
  3. ↑ On the change in German foreign policy in the summer of 1930 Peter Krüger : The foreign policy of the Republic of Weimar. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1985, pp. 512-516; Franz Knipping : Germany, France and the end of the Locarno era 1928–1931. Studies on international politics in the early stages of the Great Depression. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 142-148 u.ö.
  4. ^ Hermann Graml: Between Stresemann and Hitler. The foreign policy of the presidential cabinets Brüning, Papen and Schleicher. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2001, p. 91 f .; Jürgen Nautz: Negotiator of trust. From the posthumous writings of Section Head Dr. Richard Schüller. Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Vienna 1990, p. 160.
  5. ↑ Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Youngplan. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, p. 146. In his memory books Curtius writes that Brüning had commissioned him to conclude the customs union, Julius Curtius: Effort for Austria. The failure of the customs union plan of 1931. Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, Heidelberg 1947, p. 34; ders .: Minister of the German Republic for six years. Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, Heidelberg 1948, p. 191. Brüning denies this: Memoirs 1918–1934. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart 1970, p. 265.
  6. ↑ Rolf Steininger: "... Put a pan-European cloak on the matter ...". The German-Austrian customs union project of 1931. In: Michael Gehler (Ed.): Unequal partners? Austria and Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1996, p. 457 ff.
  7. ^ Hermann Graml: Between Stresemann and Hitler. The foreign policy of the presidential cabinets Brüning, Papen and Schleicher. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2001, p. 92 f.
  8. ↑ Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Youngplan. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, p. 146.
  9. ↑ Bülow's letter to the German ambassador in Washington Friedrich von Prittwitz and Gaffron of January 20, 1931, printed in: Files on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945. Series B, Volume XVI, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1982, No. 174.
  10. ↑ Also on the following Herbert Michaelis, Ernst Schraepler (Ed.): Causes and consequences from the German collapse in 1918 and 1945 to the state reorganization of Germany in the present. A collection of certificates and documents on contemporary history. Volume 8: The Weimar Republic. The end of the parliamentary system. Brüning - Papen - Schleicher 1930–1933. Document publisher Dr. Herbert Wendler, Berlin undated, pp. 237-240.
  11. ^ Tilman Koops (edit.): Files of the Reich Chancellery. The Brüning I and II cabinets (1930–1932). Volume 2, Boldt, Boppard 1982, No. 263 ( online , accessed January 15, 2011) (here are the quotations); Hermann Graml: Between Stresemann and Hitler. The foreign policy of the presidential cabinets Brüning, Papen and Schleicher. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2001, p. 92 f.
  12. ↑ cit. with Hermann Graml: Between Stresemann and Hitler. The foreign policy of the presidential cabinets Brüning, Papen and Schleicher. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2001, p. 94.
  13. ↑ Frederick G. Stambrook: The German-Austrian Customs Union Project of 1931. A Study of German Methods and Motives. In: Journal of Central European History. 21 (1961), p. 36; Rolf Steiniger: "... Put a pan-European cloak on the matter ...". The German-Austrian customs union project of 1931. In: Michael Gehler (Ed.): Unequal partners? Austria and Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1996, p. 470 ff; Hermann Graml: Between Stresemann and Hitler. The foreign policy of the presidential cabinets Brüning, Papen and Schleicher. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2001, p. 94, on the other hand follows Curtius' later statements, according to which the advance notice in the Neue Freie Presse. forced to publish it more quickly.
  14. ^ Hoesch's telegram to the Foreign Office of March 23, 1931, printed in files on German foreign policy 1918–1945. Series B, Volume XVII, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1982, p. 109 f.
  15. ↑ Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Youngplan. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, p. 147 ff.
  16. ^ Hermann Graml: Between Stresemann and Hitler. The foreign policy of the presidential cabinets Brüning, Papen and Schleicher. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2001, pp. 95-100.
  17. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand : The past realm. German foreign policy from Bismarck to Hitler. Oldenbourg, Munich 2008, p. 527.
  18. ↑ Jürgen Elvert: Central Europe! German plans for a European reorganization (1918–1945). Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1999, p. 204 f.
  19. ↑ Bülow's letter to the German envoy in Prague, Walter Koch, dated April 15, 1931, printed in files on German foreign policy 1918–1945. Series B, Volume XVII, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1982, No. 82.
  20. ^ Hans Mommsen : Rise and Fall of the Republic of Weimar 1918–1933. Paperback edition. Ullstein, Berlin 1998, p. 463 f.
  21. ^ Franz Mathis: Economy or Politics? On the economic motives of a political unification 1918–1938. In: Michael Gehler (Ed.): Unequal partners? Austria and Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1996, pp. 427-439.
  22. ↑ Harro Molt: "... like a block in the middle of Europe". “Anschluss” and “Central Europe” during the Weimar Republic 1925–1931. Peter Lang, Frankfurt 1986, p. 19 ff.
  23. ^ Walter Goldinger , Dieter A. Binder: History of the Republic of Austria 1918–1938. Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, Vienna 1992, p. 179.
  24. ↑ Rolf Steininger: "... Put a pan-European cloak on the matter ...". The German-Austrian customs union project of 1931. In: Michael Gehler (Ed.): Unequal partners? Austria and Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries , Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1996, p. 446.
  25. ^ Gerhard Schulz: From Brüning to Hitler. The change in the political system in Germany 1930–1933 (= Between Democracy and Dictatorship. Volume 3). de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1992, p. 302.
  26. ^ Causes and consequences from the German collapse in 1918 and 1945 to the state reorganization of Germany in the present. A collection of certificates and documents on contemporary history. Volume 8: The Weimar Republic. The end of the parliamentary system. Brüning - Papen - Schleicher 1930–1933. Document publisher Dr. Herbert Wendler, Berlin undated, p. 240 f.
  27. ^ Franz Mathis: Economy or Politics? On the economic motives of a political unification 1918–1938. In: Michael Gehler (Ed.): Unequal partners? Austria and Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1996, p. 439.
  28. ↑ Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Youngplan. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, p. 149.
  29. ^ Hermann Graml: Between Stresemann and Hitler. The foreign policy of the presidential cabinets Brüning, Papen and Schleicher. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2001, p. 97.
  30. ^ Gerhard Schulz: From Brüning to Hitler. The change in the political system in Germany 1930–1933 (= Between Democracy and Dictatorship. Volume 3). de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1992, p. 310.
  31. ^ Causes and consequences from the German collapse in 1918 and 1945 to the state reorganization of Germany in the present. A collection of certificates and documents on contemporary history. Volume 8: The Weimar Republic. The end of the parliamentary system. Brüning - Papen - Schleicher 1930–1933. Document publisher Dr. Herbert Wendler, Berlin undated, p. 246.
  32. ↑ Rolf Steininger: "... Put a pan-European cloak on the matter ...". The German-Austrian customs union project of 1931. In: Michael Gehler (Ed.): Unequal partners? Austria and Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1996, p. 476.
  33. ^ Claus W. Schäfer: André François-Poncet as ambassador in Berlin (1931–1938). Oldenbourg, Munich 2004, p. 55; Hermann Graml: Between Stresemann and Hitler. The foreign policy of the presidential cabinets Brüning, Papen and Schleicher. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2001, p. 102.
  34. ↑ Guido Müller: European social relations after the First World War. The Franco-German Study Committee and the European Cultural Association. Oldenbourg, Munich 2005, p. 250 ff.
  35. ^ Note from the French ambassador Aimé de Fleuriau to Foreign Minister Arthur Henderson from March 20, 1931, In: Herbert Michaelis, Ernst Schraepler (Ed.): Causes and consequences of the German collapse in 1918 and 1945 to the state reorganization of Germany in the present. A collection of certificates and documents on contemporary history. Volume 8: The Weimar Republic. The end of the parliamentary system. Brüning - Papen - Schleicher 1930–1933. Document publisher Dr. Herbert Wendler, Berlin undated, p. 240 f.
  36. ^ Hoesch's telegram of March 23, 1931, In: Tilman Koops (edit.): Files of the Reich Chancellery. The Brüning I and II cabinets (1930–1932). Volume 2, Boldt, Boppard 1982, No. 271, Note 4 ( online , accessed February 27, 2011)
  37. ^ Claus W. Schäfer: André François-Poncet as ambassador in Berlin (1931–1938). Oldenbourg, Munich 2004, p. 57.
  38. ^ Victor Margueritte: Aristide Briand. Flammarion, Paris 1932, pp. 325-329.
  39. ^ Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi : The European Nation. German publishing company, Stuttgart 1953.
  40. ^ Hermann Pünder : Politics in the Reich Chancellery. German publishing company, Stuttgart 1961.
  41. ^ Martin Gilbert : Winston S. Churchill. Volume 5: Prophet of Truth 1922-1939. Heineman, London 1979, p. 311.
  42. ^ Robert WD Boyce: British Capitalism at the Crossroads, 1919-1932. A Study in Politics, Economics, and International Relations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987, p. 314.
  43. ↑ Jürgen Elvert: Central Europe! German plans for a European reorganization (1918–1945). Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1999, p. 128.
  44. ^ Heinrich August Winkler : The way into the disaster. Workers and labor movement in the Weimar Republic 1930–1933. Dietz, Bonn 1990, p. 322.
  45. ↑ Herbert Michaelis, Ernst Schraepler (Ed.): Causes and consequences from the German collapse in 1918 and 1945 to the state reorganization of Germany in the present. A collection of certificates and documents on contemporary history. Volume 8: The Weimar Republic. The end of the parliamentary system. Brüning - Papen - Schleicher 1930–1933. Document publisher Dr. Herbert Wendler, Berlin undated, p. 242.
  46. ^ Rolf Steininger, Michael Gehler (Ed.): Austria in the 20th century. A study book in two volumes. From the monarchy to the Second World War. Böhlau, Vienna / Cologne / Weimar 1997, p. 117.
  47. ^ Franz Mathis: Economy or Politics? On the economic motives of a political unification 1918–1938. In: Michael Gehler (Ed.): Unequal partners? Austria and Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1996, p. 412.
  48. ^ Curtius' report to the Reich Cabinet, May 27, 1931, In: Tilman Koops (arr.): Files of the Reich Chancellery. The Brüning I and II cabinets (1930–1932). Volume 2, Boldt, Boppard 1982, No. 306 with note 19 ( online , accessed February 27, 2011)
  49. ↑ Herbert Michaelis, Ernst Schraepler (Ed.): Causes and consequences from the German collapse in 1918 and 1945 to the state reorganization of Germany in the present. A collection of certificates and documents on contemporary history. Volume 8: The Weimar Republic. The end of the parliamentary system. Brüning - Papen - Schleicher 1930–1933. Document publisher Dr. Herbert Wendler, Berlin undated, p. 254.
  50. ^ Gerhard Schulz: From Brüning to Hitler. The change in the political system in Germany 1930–1933 (= Between Democracy and Dictatorship. Volume 3). de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1992, p. 500 f.
  51. ^ Also on the following see Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Youngplan. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, pp. 151-160.
  52. ^ German text in the files on German foreign policy 1918–1945. Series B, Volume XVII, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1982, p. 126; see. Claus W. Schäfer: André François-Poncet as ambassador to Berlin (1931–1938). Oldenbourg, Munich 2004, p. 56 f.
  53. ^ Philipp Heyde: France and the end of the reparations. The failure of the French stabilization concepts in the Great Depression of 1930–1932. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. 48 (2000), p. 46 f ( online (PDF; 9.9 MB), accessed on March 7, 2011)
  54. ^ Edward W. Bennett: Germany and the diplomacy of the financial crisis, 1931. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1962, pp. 263-274.
  55. ^ Edward W. Bennett: Germany and the diplomacy of the financial crisis, 1931. Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1962, pp. 166-199.
  56. ^ Philipp Heyde: France and the end of the reparations. The failure of the French stabilization concepts in the Great Depression of 1930–1932. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. 48 (2000), p. 52 ff ( online (PDF; 9.9 MB), accessed on March 7, 2011)
  57. ^ Dieter Stiefel: Financial Diplomacy and the Great Depression. The crisis of the Creditanstalt für Handel und Gewerbe 1931 (= series of publications of the Institute for Bank History Research. Volume 12). Knapp, Frankfurt 1989, pp. 75ff.
  58. ↑ Rolf Steininger: "... Put a pan-European cloak on the matter ...". The German-Austrian customs union project of 1931. In: Michael Gehler (Ed.): Unequal partners? Austria and Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1996, p. 477.
  59. ^ Tilman Koops (edit.): Files of the Reich Chancellery. The Brüning I and II cabinets (1930–1932). Volume 2, Boldt, Boppard 1982, No. 298 and 305 ( online here and here , accessed March 15, 2011)
  60. ^ Gerhard Schulz: From Brüning to Hitler. The change in the political system in Germany 1930–1933 (= Between Democracy and Dictatorship. Volume 3). de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1992, p. 387 f.
  61. ↑ So the formulation of the British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald on June 18, 1931, In: Papers relating to the Foreign Policy of the United States 1931. Volume I, Washington 1946, p. 24 ( online , accessed March 7, 2011)
  62. ↑ a b Bruce Kent: The Spoils of War. The Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918–1932. Clarendon, Oxford 1989, p. 338.
  63. ^ Curtius' report in the Reich Cabinet of October 3, 1931, Tilman Koops (arr.): Files of the Reich Chancellery. The Brüning I and II cabinets (1930–1932). Volume 2, Boldt, Boppard 1982, No. 503 ( online , accessed March 16, 2011)
  64. ^ Tilman Koops (edit.): Files of the Reich Chancellery. The Brüning I and II cabinets (1930–1932). Volume 2, Boldt, Boppard 1982, No. 298, Note 6 ( online , accessed March 15, 2011)
  65. ^ Tilman Koops (edit.): Files of the Reich Chancellery. The Brüning I and II cabinets (1930–1932). Volume 2, Boldt, Boppard 1982, No. 503 ( online , accessed March 16, 2011)
  66. ^ Adam Wandruszka : Austria from the founding of the first republic to sole socialist government 1918–1970. In: Theodor Schieder (ed.): Handbook of European history. Volume 7 / II, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1979, p. 847.
  67. ^ For example, Hans Mommsen : Rise and Fall of the Republic of Weimar 1918–1933. Paperback edition, Ullstein, Berlin 1998, p. 465 f; Gerhard Schulz: From Brüning to Hitler. The change in the political system in Germany 1930–1933 (= Between Democracy and Dictatorship. Volume 3). de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1992, p. 309 ff; Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Youngplan. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, p. 146 ff; Hermann Graml: Between Stresemann and Hitler. The foreign policy of the presidential cabinets Brüning, Papen and Schleicher. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2001, p. 93 f.
  68. ^ Henning Köhler : Germany on the way to itself. A history of the century. Hohenheim-Verlag, Stuttgart 2002, p. 242.
  69. ^ Peter Krüger: The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar. Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 1985, p. 533.
  70. ↑ Raymond POIDEVIN , Jacques Bariéty: France and Germany. The history of their relationships 1815–1975. Verlag CH Beck, Munich 1975, p. 367.
  71. ^ Hans-Ulrich Wehler: German history of society. Volume 4: From the beginning of the First World War to the founding of the two German states 1914–1949. CH Beck Verlag, Munich 2003, p. 261.
  72. ^ Tilman Koops: Introduction. In: files of the Reich Chancellery. The Brüning I and II cabinets (1930–1932). edited by the same. Volume 2, Boldt, Boppard 1982, p. LXXXVI ( online , accessed April 8, 2011)
  73. ↑ Eberhard Kolb: The Weimar Republic. Oldenbourg, Munich 2002, p. 139.
  74. ↑ Rolf Steininger: "... Put a pan-European cloak on the matter ...". The German-Austrian customs union project of 1931. In: Michael Gehler (Ed.): Unequal partners? Austria and Germany in the 19th and 20th centuries. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 1996, p. 441.
  75. ^ Anne Orde: The Origins of the German-Austrian Customs Union Affair of 1931. In: Central European History. 13, 1980, pp. 34-59.
  76. ^ Andreas Rödder: Stresemanns legacy. Julius Curtius and German Foreign Policy 1929–1931. Schöningh, Paderborn 1996.

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