German banking crisis

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The economic and political effects of the banking crisis after the collapse of the Dresdner Bank , the Danat Bank and subsequent bank collapses in 1931 are referred to as the German banking crisis . It was an important aspect of the global economic crisis in Germany.

The German banking crisis (summer 1931) began with the collapse of the Austrian Creditanstalt (spring 1931).

initial situation

After the end of the First World War , subsequent inflation (until 1923) and the subsequent currency reform , the Reichsbank was re- regulated by the Reichsbank Act of August 30, 1924 (RGBl. II, p. 235) as part of the Dawes Plan . The key points were: minimum coverage by gold and gold-convertible currencies (40%, at least 30% gold), high discount rates and independence, guaranteed by the General Council (made up of seven German and seven foreign members).

The high discount rates of the German Reichsbank made loans for domestic economic entities (including the public budget) on the one hand expensive ( restrictive monetary policy ), on the other hand high interest rates attracted foreign capital (foreign exchange) and increased the liabilities of the German banks. From 1930, reparation payments were mainly to be made in (gold-convertible) currencies. Benefits in kind only played a subordinate role. Large entrepreneurs were able to raise capital directly on the (foreign) capital market by issuing their own corporate bonds.

In the event of liquidity bottlenecks , the credit institutions refinanced themselves through the Reichsbank , which was provided with 1 billion Reichsmarks in 1924, including foreign currency worth 800 million Reichsmarks by issuing government bonds to international investors (mainly the USA). Foreign (foreign currency) loans enabled the legally prescribed currency cover with regard to the Reichsbank's foreign exchange reserves . If the Reichsbank lost foreign currency, it was therefore less able to give refinancing loans to the banks. In this phase, the German credit institutions had only little liquidity.

Prehistory and course

Share index 1924–1942 (Statistisches Reichsamt)

From 1928 the German economy began to stagnate, bankruptcies increased - in this respect, open credit claims could be serviced less and less (devaluation of the banks' asset positions). In addition, the public budgets drastically reduced their net borrowing from 1929 onwards. Likewise, the private sector began to save, restricted their consumption and were also encouraged to do so, since it was assumed that this would make the banks more liquid, which in retrospect turned out to be a fatal fallacy.

The New York stock market boom ended with the crash of Black Thursday 1929 at the latest, with which foreign investors increasingly began to withdraw capital from Germany - also because they themselves became increasingly illiquid (also due to the US banking crisis in autumn 1930). Another wave of credit deductions (almost 1 billion Reichsmarks) followed the Reichstag election of September 1930, in which the NSDAP had become the second largest party. Overall, the deductions of autumn 1930 increased the deflationary pressure on the already weak (German) economy.

Portal Oesterreichische Nationalbank

For speculative reasons and to secure loans, the German credit institutions had extensive blocks of shares in numerous companies, which were increasingly devalued because of the price decline associated with the economic crisis on the stock exchanges (see also the illustration of the share index). Along with the price management repurchased shares were these effects without provoking further price falls, no longer for sale on the capital market. The exchange rate losses had to be written off; this put pressure on the banks' earnings situation and reduced their liquidity.

Creditanstalt (Austria)

The Austrian Creditanstalt was more numerous than most Central European Bank United creditors large companies that had become insolvent as a result of the crisis. The Creditanstalt published its balance sheet on May 11, 1931, making it known that the loss of 140 million schillings made in 1930 had consumed almost all of its share capital . This news triggered a run of many domestic and foreign creditors on the Creditanstalt and on other banks in Europe.

The Austrian National Bank lost in 1931 most of its reserves of gold and foreign currency holdings, and had to be rescued by other Austrian financial institutions ultimately by the state April 30 to October 7.

Karstadt and Nordstern

The announcement of a large loss at the Karstadt group on May 11 increased the uncertainty of many investors. In May 1931 alone, German and foreign investors withdrew the equivalent of RM 288 million in foreign currency from the German banks, with the five major banks Deutsche Bank and Discontogesellschaft , Danat-Bank , Commerz- und Privatbank and Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft particularly affected. After it became known on May 30th that the insurance company Nordstern was also in trouble, further foreign currency was withdrawn. It was thus foreseeable that the Reichsbank would soon no longer dispose of the gold and foreign currency volume of 40% of the banknotes in circulation that was prescribed by the Reichsbank Act: the flight of capital threatened to turn into a currency crisis .

"Tribute"

In this critical situation, the Brüning government ( Brüning I cabinet ) wanted to cushion its second “ emergency ordinance to secure the economy and finances”, which contained further tough austerity measures. To this end, it published a declaration on June 9, 1931, in which a further burden on Germany through reparations payments was described as economically unsustainable. This declaration went down in history as a "tribute call" because the government, following the parlance of the right-wing extremists, delegitimized the reparations as tributes . The effect of this declaration, which was intended for public opinion in Germany, was devastating abroad: since, according to the Young Plan, Germany could only get part of its reparation obligations deferred in the event of “abnormal economic difficulties”, many creditors feared national bankruptcy and tried theirs beforehand Withdraw funds from Germany. The Reichsbank therefore lost over 400 million Reichsmarks in foreign currency in the first four days after the call for tribute. To further uncertainty, carried out on 10/11. June the demand of several factions in the Council of Elders of the Reichstag for a convocation of the Reichstag. The emergency decree, which with its drastic means ensured the solvency of the Reich, threatened to be repealed and the Brüning government to be overthrown. Only when the draft proposals were rejected with the votes of the SPD on June 16, the capital deductions were reduced again. Overall, the Reichsbank lost approx. 1.4 billion RM in the period from June 1st to 17th, that was more than half of its gold and foreign exchange holdings. As a result, it came dangerously close to the coverage limit of 40% prescribed in the reparation plans (Dawes 1924 and Young 1929/1930).

How the foreign exchange losses of the Reichsbank in the period from May 1929 to July 1931 can be explained is controversial in research. The German economic historians Karl Erich Born and Gerd Hardach believe that they are primarily due to loan cancellations from abroad. The British historian Harold James , on the other hand, emphasizes the not inconsiderable role that German capital flight played. The British economic historian Theo Balderston agrees: According to this, since 1929 it has primarily been Germans who have made foreign currency abroad; the loan cancellations by foreign banks after the call for tribute would have dealt the “death blow” even to cautious banks such as the Berlin trading company .

"Nordwolle", DANAT and Dresdner Bank

At the beginning of June 1931 the Danat-Bank refused to extend a loan to the city of Berlin. On June 17, 1931, a high, existential loss of the largest European wool company, the North German wool combing (abbreviated "North Wool") became known. The DANAT -Bank as well as the Dresdner Bank were involved with the "Nordwolle" through extensive loans.

Because of the rumors already published in various newspapers about an impending bankruptcy procedure for Nordwolle and the resulting difficulties for DANAT-Bank, the lower number of loan cancellations due to the canceled convocation of the Reichstag increased again; On June 19, the Reichsbank's gold and foreign exchange holdings were only the equivalent of RM 100 million above the statutory coverage of 40%. After the President of the Reichsbank Hans Luther tried in vain to obtain a discount credit from the Bank of England on June 20, the Reichsbank Board decided to introduce a quota of bills of exchange to be submitted by the commercial banks by June 22.

On the same day , the President of Danat-Bank, Jacob Goldschmidt , visited Oscar Wassermann , the CEO of Deutsche Bank und Disconto-Gesellschaft (DeDi-Bank), to persuade him to merge the two banks in view of the liquidity problems of DANAT-Bank. but this met with rejection from Aquarius. In a meeting with Brüning, Goldschmidt said the next day that the DANAT bank would no longer be able to make payments without support. An offer by the commercial banks to provide the DANAT-Bank with an exchange credit to provide 250 million RM with an imperial guarantee prevented the counter from closing on July 10th.

Hoover moratorium

President Herbert Hoover

In view of the general economic difficulties and the worsening credit crisis in Germany from the American President Hoover on 20./21. The moratorium on political foreign debts announced in June, initially limited to one year, initially reassured foreign creditors. However , the discharge that had occurred since the publication of the Hoover moratorium only lasted for a short time: France, as the largest reparations creditor, opposed Germany's temporary suspension of payments, so that the moratorium did not come into force until July 7, with a delay. Furthermore, the Reichsbank failed in its repeated attempts to increase its foreign currency holdings through extensive rediscount credit from the foreign central banks. After negotiations with the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank for International Settlements , she had only been promised $ 100 million on June 24, so that the Reichsbank's foreign exchange portfolio was still only slightly above the statutory coverage requirement. The foreign creditors tried to counter an apparently imminent suspension of payments by canceling their remaining loans in Germany, which meant a renewed deduction of foreign currency from June 27th. On August 8, a special committee met at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel to propose a standstill agreement for commercial bank debt.

Rescue packages

In the ministerial meetings of the following days, the Reichsbank reached an agreement with the commercial banks on a capital reconstruction, in which the Reich was to provide 50 million RM for the issue of new shares in compensation for an extensive debt waiver by the creditor banks. Finance Minister Dietrich and Reich Chancellor Heinrich Brüning agreed to this plan on the condition that the Hoover moratorium came into force beforehand and that the Reich would have the necessary funds at its disposal. To calm the financial markets, Brüning also tried to induce the economy to form a guarantee syndicate, under which all companies with business assets over RM 5 million were to jointly assume a default guarantee of RM 500 million in favor of the Reichsbank's subsidiary, the Golddiskontbank . The big companies in particular kept their promises noticeably low, so that the economic guarantee finally enforced by emergency ordinance on July 8th had no effect on foreign countries.

A plan initiated by the Economic Committee of the Reich Cabinet to form a guarantee association of all major banks in connection with a Reich guarantee for the DANAT-Bank and other institutions threatened by illiquidity ultimately failed on July 12th due to the contradiction of the commercial banks who did not want to take on such a risk - also because they themselves did not have sufficient reserves.

After the bank representatives in the course of exploratory deliberations had alternated between general bank holidays and bank holidays that only apply to DANAT-Bank, the Reich Government finally took over the full guarantee for all DANAT-Bank deposits by emergency decree of July 12th and at the same time ordered their liquidation at. The other credit institutions saw themselves deceived in their hopes of being able to reassure their bank customers by limiting the emergency ordinance to the DANAT bank.

Further rediscounting efforts, Dresdner Bank, Rheinische Landesbank

On July 10, Reichsbank President Hans Luther and his French colleague Moret negotiated an extensive rediscount loan to overcome the banking crisis that the Bank of England had previously failed. Both Moret and the French finance minister Flandin assured their willingness to make funds available to the Reichsbank, but only under certain political framework conditions. For example, Germany should give up his requests for revision of the Young Plan and the Polish corridor and drop plans for a customs union with Austria . Since Luther could not respond to these demands and subsequently did not receive a French loan, the Reichsbank directorate decided on July 11 to tighten their credit restrictions, which consequently ruled out further refinancing of DANAT-Bank through the Reichsbank. Alternatively, the Reichsbank could have fallen short of the legally prescribed banknote cover, thus abandoning the link between the Reichsmark and gold and leaving the exchange rate of the Reichsmark to the game of supply and demand on the currency markets, just as the Bank of England did a few weeks later in a comparable Situation did. As a result, she could have created any amount of money to finance the threatened commercial banks as a lender of last resort until the run was over. That it did not was because of the disastrous inflation experience of the early 1920s , which still seemed more threatening than the banking panic and deflation that followed.

On July 13th, DANAT-Bank closed its counters, Dresdner Bank and Rheinische Landesbank announced their insolvency.

  • Reichsbank

  • Reichsbank President Luther later became ambassador to the USA

  • DANAT bank

  • Dresdner Bank

  • Rheinische Landesbank

  • Bank run of a Berlin savings bank on July 13, 1931

Bank holidays

On July 14th, after a general onslaught of bank customers, Dresdner Bank also had to admit its illiquidity to the Reich government. The Reich government announced general bank holidays for July 14th and 15th. Due to the crisis of confidence intensified by the bank holidays and the unchanged situation, the Reich government severely restricted payment transactions even after the bank holidays through several emergency decrees in order to avoid repeating the events of July 13th. Payment transactions were fully re-opened on August 5th. The government used this three-week forced calming of the financial markets to plan and introduce extensive changes in the state's relationship with the banking sector and to reorganize the troubled credit institutions.

Bank bailout and nationalization

Was re-established the Akzept- and guarantee bank illiquid end of July / early August institutes acceptances made available, making disbursement requests could be served again.In the course of the acute banking crisis, the savings banks, too, had to limit or suspend payments due to their tight liquidity, which resulted from the municipalities having direct access to deposits. Therefore, by emergency ordinance of November 6th, the savings banks were converted into institutions under public law with their own assets, which were allowed to lend a maximum of 25% of the total deposits as municipal loans and had to hold certain liquidity reserves at the giro centers . Since the big banks had to cope with high liquidity losses due to the economic crisis in general and the capital withdrawals, which worsened dramatically in the acute banking crisis, the Reich government felt compelled to use state funds to strengthen and save the equity base of the credit institutions. In fact, almost all of the large commercial banks were nationalized . In 1932 , the Reich and the Golddiskontbank, which was involved in the capital reconstruction, were 91% in the Dresdner Bank, which was merged with the DANAT Bank, 70% in the Commerz- und Privatbank, which was merged with the Barmer Bankverein , and finally 30% in the Deutsche Bank and Disconto-Gesellschaft involved. After 1933 the big banks were gradually re-privatized.

Foreign exchange control

On July 15, trading in foreign currency had been restricted to the Reichsbank. With the introduction of foreign exchange management , the Reich government also essentially complied with a demand made by the American Federal Reserve and the Bank of England , which primarily blamed the flight of capital for the decline in the Reichsbank's gold and foreign exchange holdings. On July 18, the Reich President issued an 'ordinance [...] against capital and tax flight'. Foreign exchange holdings had to be reported to the Reichsbank and sold to it on request.

French grant?

Rescue could only come from abroad now. France, where the global economic crisis had not yet set in, had the necessary financial means to help Germany. There was also a political interest in restoring Germany's solvency and thus its ability to pay reparations again after the Hoover moratorium had expired in 1932. The French government under Prime Minister Pierre Laval demanded , however, political consideration in return for such financial aid - four billion francs were envisaged. The Brüning government should declare a “political moratorium” and refrain from revising the Versailles Treaty for ten years. Brüning's minority government could not or would not admit that. An international summit meeting on July 18 and 19, 1931, to which Brüning and his Foreign Secretary Julius Curtius , British Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson and American Foreign Secretary Henry L. Stimson had traveled to Paris, therefore remained without result. Germany had to overcome the banking crisis without foreign financial aid. At a follow-up conference in London on July 22, 1931, the assembled statesmen agreed not to withdraw any further loans from Germany until November and to set up an international commission of experts to examine further German loan requirements.

Credit crunch

In the German banking sector, the banking crisis exacerbated the concentration and rationalization process that had already been implemented. Because of their high losses, the big banks in particular were forced to cut their staff to a not inconsiderable extent and to close branches. Furthermore, mergers and bankruptcies reduced the number of existing or independent credit institutions. More decisive for the economy and further political development, however, turned out to be the restriction on the granting of loans resulting from the increased deposit withdrawal. Also because of this inadequate supply of capital to the economy, bankruptcy proceedings and production shutdowns increased, so that the economic crisis and unemployment continued to worsen.

Discount rate increase

In addition to the restructuring of the banking system, another urgent task of the Reich government was to stop the foreign capital withdrawal from Germany. On August 1, the discount rate was even increased to 15%, further exacerbating the credit crunch that was already in place .

Disintegration of the gold monetary system

Starting from the German banking crisis, the English banking system came under pressure. On September 20, 1931, England gave up the gold standard and its pound was devalued dramatically. The devaluation of the British currency made the following economic upswing possible for England. In February 1932, England began to restrict its imports through protectionist measures modeled on the Smoot-Hawley Act - general tariff increases became the rule (see also the competitive paradox ).

The release of the pound led to discussions among the German experts . September 1931 held secret conference had not yet been able to enter. Wilhelm Lautenbach had presented a "double strategy" to combat deflationary policy ( Lautenbach Plan ). Brüning strictly rejected the Lautenbach Plan, especially with regard to its dependence on the (seven) creditor powers: “A public employment program to reduce general unemployment is a luxury that the Germans cannot afford.” Brüning hoped the German deflation made possible the cancellation of the reparations obligations. The Lautenbach plan was rejected and, after the reparation payments were actually suspended ( standstill agreement reached in July 1932 in Lausanne), the Papen cabinet took up again.

Main balance sheet item of the Reichsbank (cf. 1929/31/33)

Little by little, the individual countries moved away from the gold currency standard. They had no choice but to escape the deflationary spiral . The states of the British Empire Canada, India as well as Sweden, Denmark, Norway, a total of 25 states left the gold currency system. The USA stuck to the gold standard for an unusually long time (until March 1933) and it was not easy for the Weimar Republic to make arbitrary decisions in this regard. The already declining credit investment by private individuals with a parallel worsening credit crunch was impossible to deal with due to continued gold cover until 1933 with a simultaneous gold outflow.

reception

The root cause of the German banking crisis is still controversial among experts. The often used portrayal of the flight of foreign capital or foreign currency as the main cause falls short of the mark. Rather, the German banking crisis can be seen in connection with the global economic situation and the precarious situation of German companies and their difficulties. Undoubtedly, short-term foreign credit and incoming foreign exchange were not used solely to provide long-term credit.

literature

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Gerhard Rübel : Fundamentals of monetary foreign trade. (2nd edition) Munich 2005. ( online ) p. 170.
  2. ^ Gerhard Schulz : Germany on the eve of the great crisis. Berlin 1987. ( online ) p. 102; Michael Wala: Weimar and America. Ambassador Friedrich von Prittwitz and Graffron and German-American relations from 1927 to 1933 . Stuttgart 2001, p. 113 ( online ).
  3. ↑ Holger-René Bruckhoff: On the development of central banks and banking supervision in Germany and the Netherlands. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2010, p. 23 ( online ).
  4. ↑ Young Plan. In: Carola Stern , Thilo Vogelsang , Erhard Klöss and Albert Graff (eds.): Dtv lexicon on history and politics in the 20th century . dtv, Munich 1974, Vol. 3, p. 887; Peter Krüger : The foreign policy of the republic of Weimar . Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 1985, p. 483 f.
  5. ^ Hans Pohl : Economy, business, credit system, social problems. Part 2. Stuttgart 2005. ( online ) p. 26.
  6. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach : Interest, credit and production . (edited by Wolfgang Stützel ), Tübingen 1952, p. 86; Ulrich Kluge: The Weimar Republic. Paderborn 2006 ( online ) p. 100.
  7. ↑ Holger-René Bruckhoff: On the development of central banks and banking supervision in Germany and the Netherlands. Frankfurt 2010. ( online ) p. 26.
  8. ↑ Ursula Büttner : Weimar. The overwhelmed republic 1918–1933. Stuttgart 2008, p. 388 ( online ).
  9. ↑ Werner Ehrlicher : The financial economy of the Federal Republic of Germany. In: Handwortbuch der Wirtschaftswwissenschaft Volume 3 (1981), p. 170 ( online ).
  10. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach : Interest, credit and production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel ) Tübingen 1952. ( PDF ( Memento from December 20, 2016 in the Internet Archive )) p. 81.
  11. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach: Interest, credit and production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel) Tübingen 1952. ( PDF ( Memento from October 2, 2016 in the Internet Archive )) p. 91.
  12. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach: Interest, credit and production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel) Tübingen 1952. ( PDF ( Memento from December 20, 2016 in the Internet Archive )) p. 62.
  13. ^ Ulrich Kluge: The Weimar Republic . Paderborn 2006. ( online ) p. 382.
  14. ↑ Ursula Büttner: Weimar. The overwhelmed republic 1918–1933. Stuttgart 2008. ( online ) p. 429.
  15. ↑ Walter Euchner, Richard Saage : The failure of dictatorial legitimation patterns and the future viability of democracy. Berlin 1995. ( online ) p. 165.
  16. ^ Arnold Suppan: Yugoslavia and Austria 1918–1938. Bilateral foreign policy in the European environment. Munich 1996, p. 1047 ( online  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. ).@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / books.google.at  
  17. ↑ Erich Zöllner : History of Austria. From the beginning to the present. Munich 1990, p. 571 ( online ).
  18. ↑ Tilman Koops (Ed.): Die Kabinette Brüning I and II. Volume 1. Boppard 1982. ( online  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this note. ) Introduction XLVIII; Harold James : Germany in the Great Depression. DVA, Stuttgart 1988, pp. 287-296; Theo Balderston: The Origins and Course of the German Economic Crisis November 1923 to May 1932 . Haude & Spener, Berlin 1993, pp. 161-172.@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / books.google.at  
  19. ^ Karl Erich Born: The German banking crisis 1931. Finances and politics . Piper, Munich 1967, pp. 67-77; Gerd Hardach: World market orientation and relative stagnation. Monetary Policy in Germany 1924 . Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1976, pp. 126-131.
  20. ↑ Harold James: Germany in the Great Depression. DVA, Stuttgart 1988, pp. 285-293.
  21. ^ Theo Balderston: The Origins and Course of the German Economic Crisis November 1923 to May 1932 . Haude & Spener, Berlin 1993, pp. 163-170.
  22. ↑ Holger-René Bruckhoff: On the development of central banks and banking supervision in Germany and the Netherlands . Peter Lang 2010 ( ISBN 978-3631595589 ), p. 27 ( online ).
  23. ↑ Eckhard Wandel : Banks and Insurance in the 19th and 20th Century. Munich 1998, p. 100 ( online ).
  24. ↑ Florian Pressler: The first world economic crisis. A Little History of the Great Depression. Beck, Munich 2013, ISBN 978-3-406-64535-8 , pp. 140 f.
  25. ↑ Holger-René Bruckhoff: On the development of central banks and banking supervision in Germany and the Netherlands. Frankfurt 2010. ( online ) p. 28.
  26. ↑ Harold James: Germany in the Great Depression. DVA, Stuttgart 1988, p. 303.
  27. ↑ Ludwig Sperk, Manfred Wilsdorf: The liquidity situation of the German savings banks. Berlin 1956. ( online ) p. 161.
  28. ^ Hans Pohl: Economy, business, credit system, social problems. Part 2. Stuttgart 2005. ( online ) p. 140.
  29. ↑ § 1 (1), Reichsgesetzblatt 1931 Part 1, pp. 373 to 376.
  30. ↑ Philipp Heyde: France and the end of reparations. The failure of the French stabilization concepts in the Great Depression of 1930–1932 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 48 (2000), issue 1, pp. 53–56 ( online , accessed on January 14, 2018); Sylvain Schirmann: On the question of French credits for Germany 1930/31. France's political approach . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 65 (2017), issue 4, p. 592 f.
  31. ↑ Manfred Pohl: Philipp Holzmann. History of a construction company 1849–1999. Munich 1999. ( online ) p. 149.
  32. ^ Hans Gestrich: The Young Plan. Leipzig 1930. p. 122.
  33. ↑ Monika Rosengarten: The International Chamber of Commerce: Economic Policy Recommendations in the Time of the Great Depression from 1929-1939. Berlin 2001. ( online ) p. 75.
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  35. ↑ Otto Kraus: Theory of international economic relations. Berlin 1956. ( online ) p. 211.
  36. ↑ Dieter Pentzek: The Free Exchange Rate. Theoretical investigation of the possibility of a transition to a new exchange rate system. Berlin 1963. ( online ) p. 23.
  37. ^ Karl J. Mayer: Between Crisis and War. France in US foreign economic policy between the Great Depression and World War II. Stuttgart 1999. ( online ) p. 144.
  38. ^ Hans Gestrich: Monetary Policy and World Economy. Berlin 1934. p. 57.
  39. ^ Albrecht Ritschl: Germany's crisis and economic situation 1924–1934. Domestic economy, foreign debt and reparations problem between Dawes plan and transfer lock. Berlin 2002: ( online ( memento of December 7, 2013 in the Internet Archive )) pp. 158–161.
  40. ^ Charles P. Kindleberger: The World in Depression 1929-1939. London 1986. ( online ) pp. 170-173.
  41. ^ Charles P. Kindleberger: The World in Depression 1929-1939. London 1986. pp. 174 f.
  42. ^ Hans Gestrich: Monetary Policy and World Economy. Berlin 1934. pp. 64 f.
  43. ↑ Wolfgang Waldner: Why the monetary policy 1929-1933 caused the world economic crisis. Norderstedt 2009. p. 105.
  44. ^ Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld: Internationale Wirtschaft. Theory and Politics of Foreign Trade. (8th edition) Munich 2009. ( online ) p. 669.
  45. ^ Richard H. Tilly: Money and credit in economic history. Stuttgart 2003. ( online ) p. 178.
  46. ^ Günter Abramowski: files of the Reich Chancellery. Weimar Republic. The Marx III and IV cabinets (1926–1928). Boppard 1988. online ( Memento from April 10, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Introduction, LXXIX.
  47. ↑ Knut Borchardt: Growth, crises, scope for action in economic policy. Göttingen 1982. ( online ) pp. 216-219.
  48. ↑ United States. Congress House. Committee on Banking and Currency: Grassroots Hearings on Economic Problems. Newark, Los Angeles, Atlanta 1969. ( online ) P. 652.
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  50. ^ Hermann Graml: Between Stresemann and Hitler. The foreign policy of the presidential cabinets Brüning, Papen and Schleicher. Munich 2001. ( online ( memento of April 10, 2014 in the Internet Archive )) p. 134.
  51. ^ Gerhard Schulz: From Brüning to Hitler. Between democracy and dictatorship. Volume 3. Berlin 1992. ( online ) pp. 397-399.
  52. ↑ Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich: The German Inflation 1914-1923. Causes and consequences from an international perspective. Berlin 1980. ( online ) p. 150 and table on p. 151.
  53. ^ Hans Gestrich: The Young Plan. Leipzig 1930. pp. 120f.