Secret conference of the Friedrich List Society in September 1931 on the possibilities and consequences of credit expansion

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On 16./17. September 1931, at the height of the global economic crisis , after the outbreak of the German banking crisis , the secret conference of the Friedrich List Society on the possibilities and consequences of credit expansion took place.

The basis for discussion and discussion at the conference was Wilhelm Lautenbach's plan for an (active) economic recovery through investment and credit expansion ("Lautenbach Plan") of September 9, 1931.

Knut Borchardt and Hans Otto Schötz published the originally shorthand protocol of the secret conference in 1991.

Context and economic paradigms in the run-up to the conference

Representative of the business cycle theory of that time was the belief of the International Chamber of Commerce in the paradigm shaped by the classical theory that increased government spending would increase the interest on credit-financed corporate investments. In 1927, the Association of German Industry had vehemently called for state austerity policies (in addition, they were still traumatized by the great inflation until 1923 ) and it was not only conservative circles that were skeptical of any additional government spending. From 1929 onwards, the net borrowing of the state budget was drastically reduced. With regard to economic crises, the paradigm was that crises burn out of their own accord (the market should be cleansed of weak companies - today: market cleansing ) and one had to wait until the so-called "self-healing powers" of the market would bring about an upswing from the bottom of the crisis. In his writing, Thoughts on Crisis Control (September 2, 1931), State Secretary of the Reich Ministry of Finance, Hans Schäffer, presented possible alternatives as follows:

  • You can just let deflation go on and burn out;
  • Deflation can be accelerated to quickly bring the crisis to an end;
  • One can intervene in deflation in order to keep the price level at a certain level.

Beginning paradigm shift

In the run-up to the conference, Gerhard Colm characterized the deflationary crisis in three points:

  • The crisis has lost its capitalist meaning by affecting not only weak but also good companies.
  • The shock on the domestic market caused by lowering wages is particularly great.
  • The worst thing is the psychological point of view that the entrepreneur does nothing more, but when he gets money, becomes liquid.

Convening the conference

Inspired by Lautenbach's discussion of his paper Deficit Policy? Reichsbank commitment as a catalyst? The desperate path - without foreign capital! , Schäffer turned to Reichsbank President Hans Luther . In July 1931 Heinrich Rittershausen published On the Days after the Collapse , which referred to the collapse of the German banks, in which Rittershausen advocated credit creation through a policy of cheap money in order to stimulate the economy . On the evening of August 31, 1931, Hans Schäffer and Hans Luther met and discussed the concepts. Luther came to an understanding with Reichsparkommissar Friedrich Saemisch , they called the secret conference.

The dilemma

Lautenbach's first draft, which he presented to Hans Schäffer on August 26th, describes the initial situation as follows:
“We are now faced with the following dilemma: Consideration of our balance of payments forces us to adopt an extremely cautious credit policy, and according to the prevailing view, even more restrictive Credit policy. Because there is a constant risk of the short-term foreign credits that are still being withdrawn, it seems to be a natural imperative of a cautious and sound economic policy to use credit crunch to ensure that the relationship between exports and imports in our foreign trade is not just the same as before is maintained, but that the surplus should, if possible, be increased sharply («deflationary pressure»).

Dwindling reserves despite austerity policies

On the other hand, such a deflationary credit policy threatens overall economic life with further paralysis and, as a result, with a complete disruption of public finances. The worsening economic and financial situation would of course also lead to the most serious domestic political complications. The overall picture that Germany offers with such a development would undoubtedly move the possibility of a consolidation of our private foreign debts into the unpredictable distance and at the same time conjure up the danger of an excessive continued withdrawal of short-term credits and, last but not least, an unstoppable flight of capital. "

Lautenbach plan

Lautenbach on his basic assumptions:

  • The natural way to overcome an economic and financial emergency in the capitalist economy is not a restriction, but an increase in performance.
  • The dispositions of the entrepreneurs are determined by the earnings opportunities. One could think of increasing these opportunities by lowering production costs in order to encourage entrepreneurs to resume larger production. [...] The three main cost elements are:
  • Interest,
  • Public taxes,
  • Wages and salaries.

Lautenbach already assumed in his report on the Brauns Commission ( foreign capital as a catalyst? ) That the business cycle depends on investment activity “and that the condition of the upswing is always credit expansion.” However, entrepreneurs were denied access to credit because the Banks were not sufficiently liquid. And Lautenbach concluded: “To get out of the depression, new capital investments are needed, which entrepreneurs tackle with the help of credit. There are no such entrepreneurs today, because there are nowhere to be seen any opportunities for them, and there is no credit. "

State investments would have needed credit as well - issuing bonds against foreign capital was of course a theoretical financing option. In the summer and autumn of 1931 (after the collapse of the German banks ), however, the chance of foreign capital was extremely slim. Lautenbach did not consider a lowering of the key interest rate by the Reichsbank to be sensible, since it would have risked the withdrawal of even more foreign capital. In this respect, there were not many alternatives and Lautenbach came to the conclusion: "The only practically possible cost reduction is the lowering of wages and salaries.", And immediately asks the question: "What does this mean in terms of economic policy?"

Lautenbach was of course clear that falling wages with unchanged employment would reduce overall economic demand, which is why employment had to be expanded with unchanged wage expenditure for companies. In the given situation, a substantial revival of the economy could only have been possible through state, credit-financed investments and the voluntary lowering of wages as a victim of the workers should at the same time signal readiness for sanctions abroad. Tax cuts would have made sense in terms of economic policy, but would have had an adverse effect on other countries.

Since Lautenbach had long since internalized the mechanism of granting credit in 1931 , his plan was based on the assumption that government contracts financed by loans would liquidate the frozen corporate loans and thus replace the frozen corporate loans with state loans (from commercial banks), which would not worsen bank liquidity . If the profitability of companies were to be increased, so that the confidence of the domestic and foreign financial wealthy and that of the capital market in German corporate bonds would increase, the entrepreneurs could finance their investments with borrowing in such a way that neither the liquidity of the domestic commercial banks nor that of the Reichsbank would be reduced .

From a financial point of view, the Lautenbach Plan assumes that the Reichsbank will provide the state with credit contingents for infrastructure investments, with which the entrepreneurs will increase their employment and even begin to demand capital goods (after they have cleared their warehouses). The commercial banks are encouraged to lend further to the companies by means of loan guarantees from the Reichsbank. When the economy begins to pick up again, private individuals begin to spend more money again, which means that outstanding loans can be serviced. Borrowing generates income for other economic entities, which when these are spent again enable the loans to be serviced. Previously reduced wages and prices increase competitiveness on the foreign market and the reduced prices increase demand on the domestic market, provided that the domestic employment situation improves. If the German economic engine gets going again, foreign capital will (again) be attracted to acquire German corporate securities, which enables entrepreneurs to fund their bank debts.

Lautenbach explains the technical credit conclusion in his plan as follows: “The overall result of the theoretical credit considerations can be summed up in the sentence that credit expansion, in connection with generous investments, does not contribute to further illiquidization, but rather to the liquidation and consolidation of our banking industry . "

The conference

Wilhelm Röpke describes the problematic of the economic situation at that time as follows: “The decisive factor in this secondary deflation is that the contraction in the credit volume and the contraction in the economic volume are fatally interrelated.” Where is the cause and where is the effect , asks Hans Luther to. Röpke replies: "The cause undoubtedly lies in the endeavors of the entrepreneurs to refrain from any new investment, not even to satisfy the need for renewal and to find the balance at an ever lower level."

The topic at the conference is repeatedly whether the time has come for a possible upswing. At that time it was assumed that in a deflationary economic crisis a natural downturn would have to take place until measures to stimulate the economy had any effect at all at the lowest point of the crisis - some conference participants feared that they would fizzle out too soon. There are always fears about how foreign countries will react to government spending financed by loans - to what extent further foreign capital would be withdrawn and to what extent creditors who are silent ( Basel Standstill Agreement of August 1931) would give their approval.

The conference participants agree on the financial framework of at least 1.5 billion Reichsmark needed for economic stimulus programs, whereby the participants agreed that the loan amount should only be invested gradually, only cautiously in the economy and under no circumstances should the public be informed about the loan expansion plan, in order not to stir up the latent fear of inflation among the German population from 1923 (at that time, the trade press and economic experts generally assumed inflation would occur with credit expansion, even during deflationary developments).

Reichsbank President Luther addressed the Reichsbank's limited lending options several times at the conference - he did not make a decision at the conference as to whether or not to accept a Reichsbank commitment.

Attendees

  1. COLM, Gerhard : economist, statistician and sociologist.
  2. DIEHL, Karl : political economist.
  3. DREYSE, Fritz : Vice President of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank .
  4. DURST, Karl: Administrative lawyer in the Reich Ministry of Labor , responsible f. Housing and Real Estate.
  5. ERNST, Friedrich : Administrative lawyer in the Prussian Ministry of Trade and Industry, State Commissioner at the Berlin Stock Exchange .
  6. EUCKEN, Walter : political economist
  7. DELETED, Hans : national economist, journalist, press officer of the Reichsbank (from August 1931)
  8. HEIMANN, Eduard : political economist
  9. HILFERDING, Rudolf : formerly Reich Finance Minister (1923 and June 1928 to December 1929), (still) recognized financial expert
  10. LANSBURG, Alfred : banker, business journalist, specialist journalist (pseudonym: "Argentarius")
  11. LAUTENBACH, Wilhelm : Economist in the Reich Ministry of Economics
  12. LÖB, Rudolf : banker, deputy member of the central committee of the Reichsbank, July / August 1931 ( German banking crisis ) intermediary between the Reich government, Reichsbank, credit banks and foreign creditors, involved in the conclusion of the standstill agreement.
  13. LUTHER, Hans : President of the Reichsbank
  14. NEISSER, Hans : Economist
  15. NORDHOFF, Karl: Reichsbank director, head of the statistical (economic) department.
  16. POHL, Wolfgang : Press officer of the Reich Ministry of Economics , business journalist.
  17. POPITZ, Johannes : State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Finance i. R., honorary professor for finance and tax law.
  18. RITTERSHAUSEN, Heinrich : bank department head, professor of business administration.
  19. RÖPKE, Wilhelm : Economist
  20. SAEMISCH, Friedrich : President of the Court of Auditors, Reich Savings Commissioner and Chairman of the Reich Debt Committee.
  21. SALIN, Edgar : political economist
  22. SCHÄFFER, Hans : Lawyer, State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Economics, from December 1929 State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Finance.
  23. SCHWERIN v. KROSIGK, Johann : Head of the budget department in the Reich Ministry of Finance, head of the reparations department.
  24. STERN, Ernst: Head of the economic policy department at Reichskreditgesellschaft AG
  25. TRENDELENBURG, Ernst : State Secretary, Managing Director of the Reich Ministry of Economics.
  26. WARMBOLD, Hermann : Agricultural specialist, board member of IG Farben. (from 9 October 31: Reich Minister of Economics)
  27. WEIGERT, Oscar : German representative at the International Labor Office (Geneva), lawyer.
  28. WELTER, Erich : business journalist.
  29. WITT, Cornelius: Scientific Secretary of the German Association for Political Science Further Education.

episode

Hans Luther did not dare to expand the Reichsbank loan any further due to the already short currency (mostly he is assumed to be afraid of inflation, which according to the protocol he did not have). A credit expansion would have required the approval of foreign creditors and the international central banks. The Brüning cabinet approved the Lautenbach plan, but did not know how to finance it. For a short time there was the idea of ​​a bond. The ministries nevertheless worked out their economic stimulus programs, which were estimated at 1–1.5 billion in total. Only the government under Papen , which was able to successfully conclude the negotiations prepared by Brüning (July 9, 1932, the reparation obligations were canceled at the Lausanne Conference), implemented measures to stimulate the economy (Papen Plan).

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Knut Borchardt, Hans Otto Schötz (ed.): Economic policy in the crisis. The (secret) conference of the Friedrich List Society in September 1931 on the possibilities and consequences of credit expansion. Baden-Baden 1991.
  2. ↑ Monika Rosengarten: The International Chamber of Commerce. Economic policy recommendations in the period of the Great Depression, 1929-1939. Berlin 2001. ( online ) p. 182 f:
    "In state investments they [the International Chamber of Commerce] saw the danger of a crowding-out for private investments."
  3. ^ Karl Dietrich Erdmann (Ed.): Files of the Reich Chancellery: Weimar Republic. Die Kabinette Marx III and IV. Volume 2. Boppard 1988. p. 1094 ff. ( Online ( memento of the original from October 30, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and Archive link according to instructions and then remove this note. ) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / books.google.at
  4. ↑ Werner Ehrlicher: The financial economy of the Federal Republic of Germany. In: Concise dictionary of economics. Volume 3. 1981. ( online ) p. 170.
  5. ↑ Hans-Werner Wohltmann: Fundamentals of the macroeconomic theory. 4th edition. Munich 2005. ( online ) p. 14:
    “From a historical point of view, dogma dominated until the mid-thirties [...]. In both theories the self-healing powers of the market [...] "
  6. ↑ Hans Gestrich: Monetary Policy and World Economy. Berlin 1934. p. 13:
    “If in the years 1931/1932 the opponents of active economic policy always argued that if the crisis were to run, the economy would have to be“ cleansed ”of weak and inefficient enterprises, experience has shown that the crisis itself has made more and more enterprises weak. The “inability to perform” consisted more and more only in the existence of debts, which remained the same with falling sales and prices. Financing with outside capital is not yet a criterion of inefficiency, especially in the modern economy. It makes good sense to speak of a cleaning function for economic crises, since the bad and inept actually fall first. But the longer a crisis lasts, the deeper it becomes, the more purification becomes simple senseless destruction. The theories of "burning out" of the economic crisis and its "cleaning function" had a fatal influence on German economic policy in 1931/32. "
  7. ^ Charles Poor Kindleberger: The World in Depression 1929-1939. Berkeley and Los Angeles 1975. P. 173. ( online )
  8. ^ Heinrich Rittershausen: On the day after the collapse. Berlin 1931. p. 11 f:
    “It is the rigid and excessive interest rate level that prevents capital formation from taking place, a fact that has often been overlooked in the struggle against the rigidity of price and wage levels. The disruptions caused by excessive cartel prices etc. may be considerable, but they only play a minor role in comparison to the stagnation resulting from the artificial interest rate level [...]. The lack of insight is only to blame for the apparent lack of capital insofar as the artificial inflation of our interest rate level has not been adequately appreciated, indeed it has even been considered necessary for erroneous reasons of repair policy. The removal of the unnatural condition on the interest rate market has been neglected for years, as a result of which our entire economic policy has fallen on the failed foundation of the allegedly existing severe lack of capital. If, therefore, we ignore the simple case of the formation of capital, which remains constant year after year, as we had before and as we have before us today in France, every jerky supply of new capital requires certain credits. The intermittent rationalizations were processes of capital formation that had begun, meant sudden additional formation of capital, and thus presupposed a certain type of credit, since without such the process of capital formation cannot be completed. To a certain extent, there is “latent” capital formation, in that an improvement in the production apparatus has been carried out, which has freed 50 people. The loan must anticipate their outcome; it must be granted before any new savings are available. "
  9. ↑ Karl Häuser : German National Economy in the Diaspora. The thirties and forties until the end of the war. In: Gains of Knowledge, Loss of Knowledge. Continuities and discontinuities in economics, law and social sciences between the 20s and 50s. Stuttgart 1998. S 186. ( online )
  10. ↑ Cf. Willi Albers, Anton Zottmann: Concise Dictionary of Economics. Volume 5. Stuttgart and Tübingen 1980. p. 383. ( online )
  11. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach: Deficit Policy? Reichsbank commitment as a catalyst? The desperate path - without foreign capital! August 1931. In: Interest, Credit and Production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel) Tübingen 1952, p. 137.
  12. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach: Foreign capital as a catalyst. In: Interest, Credit and Production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel) Tübingen 1952. p. 130:
    “The observation of all business cycles and crises confirms again and again that the business cycle in its upswing and downswing is only the reflex of larger or smaller investment activity and that the condition of the upswing is always credit expansion . "
  13. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach: Foreign capital as a catalyst. In: Interest, Credit and Production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel) Tübingen 1952. p. 132:
    “On the other hand, every observer knows and every entrepreneur can painfully feel that the banks today do not even think about satisfying any loan requests for additional production, and for that reason because they are not sufficiently liquid. "
  14. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach: Foreign capital as a catalyst. In: Interest, Credit and Production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel) Tübingen 1952. S. 133:
    “It therefore has no choice but to try to draw in the necessary capital from abroad in the long term, and if it succeeds, the cramping of the German banking industry can suddenly become apparent will be resolved and German production will start up again under the invigorating flow of energy, which is based on the implementation of public works on the one hand and the restored efficiency of the domestic credit system on the other, and gradually come back to normal. "
  15. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach: Deficit Policy? Reichsbank commitment “as a catalyst? The desperate path - without foreign capital! In: Interest, Credit and Production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel) Tübingen 1952. p. 138:
    “How little economic reason and consistency determine the behavior of foreign groups is shown most clearly by the attitude of foreign banks. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the attempt and endeavor of these banks to liquidate their loans to Germany as soon as possible is downright absurd from a macroeconomic perspective. "
  16. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach: Possibilities of an economic recovery through investment and credit expansion. September 9, 1931. In: Interest, Credit and Production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel) Tübingen 1952. p. 140, right column:
    “The closer the domestic interest rate comes to the rate to be paid for short-term foreign loans, the greater the risk that domestic entrepreneurs who previously directly or indirectly via the German banks have made use of short-term foreign loans, have lost interest in obtaining these foreign loans under all circumstances, as far as possible. In addition to the reluctance of foreign lenders to continue to maintain the loans in Germany, there would be the internal reluctance of German borrowers.
    There is also the risk that export currencies will not be delivered if the exporter is less under the pressure of tight credit and high interest rates. All of this would result in an even greater collapse of our foreign credit volume than is to be feared in and of itself because of the weaknesses of the standstill agreement . The resulting deterioration in our foreign exchange balance would be unbearable. "
  17. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach: Possibilities of an economic recovery through investment and credit expansion. September 9, 1931. In: Interest, Credit and Production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel) Tübingen 1952. p. 142, right column:
    “Therefore, under no circumstances should a policy of wage reduction be pursued in isolation, but only within the framework of an overall program that absolutely guarantees the hiring of a very considerable number of workers. [...] Because right now we have the paradoxical state of affairs that in spite of extraordinarily reduced production, demand constantly lags behind supply, and hence the tendency towards ever more extensive production cuts. So we always have production surpluses that we don't know what to do with. "
  18. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach: Possibilities of an economic recovery through investment and credit expansion. September 9, 1931. In: Interest, Credit and Production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel) Tübingen 1952. p. 149:
    “Such an investment and credit policy removes precisely the imbalance between supply and demand on the domestic market and thus gives direction and goal to overall production again. If we fail to pursue such a positive policy, we will inevitably steer into further economic decline and complete disruption of our state economy, into a condition which then, in order to avoid an internal political catastrophe, will force a strong new short-term public debt for purely consumer-related purposes, while we still have it in our hands today to bring our economy and public finances back into balance at the same time by drawing on this loan for productive tasks. "
  19. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach: Possibilities of an economic recovery through investment and credit expansion. September 9, 1931. In: Interest, Credit and Production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel) Tübingen 1952. p. 148:
    “This sacrifice made by the workers is economic savings that can be made economically usable by hiring new workers to carry out public works as new capital. This coupling of a sacrifice and austerity program with an economic development program sanctions our credit and investment policy as well as our austerity policy. "
  20. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach: Possibilities of an economic recovery through investment and credit expansion. September 9, 1931. In: Interest, Credit and Production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel) Tübingen 1952. p. 141, right column:
    “All savings opportunities must be exhausted at the current level of taxation. The replacement of direct taxes by indirect taxes is likely to meet insurmountable domestic opposition. Covering the deficit resulting from tax reductions with loans would be extremely effective in terms of economic policy, but would completely discredit us in the eyes of other countries and is therefore practically impossible. "
  21. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach: Possibilities of an economic recovery through investment and credit expansion. September 9, 1931. In: Interest, Credit and Production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel) Tübingen 1952. p. 151, right column:
    “By realizing existing inventories, bank debts that were previously considered frozen are regularly thawed out, so that the new financing credits do not increase the total of the illiquid bank investments, but rather has only been relocated. "
  22. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach: Possibilities of an economic recovery through investment and credit expansion. September 9, 1931. In: Interest, Credit and Production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel) Tübingen 1952. p. 153, right column:
    “On the whole, there is a certain rhythm of credit expansion and contraction and, in turn, expansion and contraction as well as the resolution of the previous rigid accounts. This fact that a somewhat more normal movement also sets in on the debit accounts means at the same time a strong relief of the capital market, because under these circumstances the banks put their debtors less under the pressure to sell deposited securities. This is extremely beneficial for the price development on the stock exchange and thus again provides an opportunity for the bank's creditors to realize their assets by purchasing securities. "
  23. ^ Wilhelm Lautenbach: Possibilities of an economic recovery through investment and credit expansion. September 9, 1931. In: Interest, Credit and Production. (Ed. Wolfgang Stützel) Tübingen 1952. S. 155, right column.
  24. ↑ Knut Borchardt, Hans Otto Schötz (ed.): Economic policy in the crisis. The (secret) conference of the Friedrich List Society in September 1931 on the possibilities and consequences of credit expansion. Baden-Baden 1991. p. 105.
  25. ^ Tilman Koops: The Cabinets Brüning I u. II. March 30, 1930 to October 10, 1931. Boppard 1982. ( online ( Memento of the original from December 13, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. ) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / books.google.at
  26. ↑ Knut Borchardt, Hans Otto Schötz (ed.): Economic policy in the crisis. The (secret) conference of the Friedrich List Society in September 1931 on the possibilities and consequences of credit expansion. Baden-Baden 1991. p. 49 (introduction by the editors):
    “But SCHÄFFER finally gave up his dream in October 1931, if it was one. In a letter to MJBONN, in which he thanked MJBONN for a detailed written criticism of his memorandum of September 2, he was not entirely convinced of BONN's arguments. But it is enough if the majority of people regard the proposed measures as inflationary in order to make the plan unfeasible. “The mere fact that you, dear professor, and - as I will admit, not you alone - regard the plan as inflationary, finally excludes its implementation. You don't have to fear any more rash from me. ”[...] For those who played a decisive role in shaping BRÜNING's financial policy, the matter was indeed over. If SCHÄFFER ever had doubts about the necessity, in the following months he will concentrate fully on his task of balancing the Reich budget - and he resigned from his office when he saw this policy endangered by the overly generous promises of the Chancellor. "
  27. ↑ Cf. Knut Borchardt, Hans Otto Schötz (Ed.): Economic Policy in the Crisis. The (secret) conference of the Friedrich List Society in September 1931 on the possibilities and consequences of credit expansion. Baden-Baden 1991.
  28. ↑ Albrecht Ritschl: Germany's crisis and economic situation 1924-1934. Domestic economy, foreign debt and reparation problem between Dawes plan and transfer lock. Berlin 2002. ( online ( Memento of the original December 7, 2013 Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link is automatically inserted and not yet tested Please review the original and archive link under. Instructions and then remove this notice. ) S. 154: " The standstill agreement stipulated a partial standstill, which mainly affected short-term commercial loans. " @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / books.google.at
  29. ↑ Hans Erich Priester: The secret of July 13th. A factual report from the banking crisis. 1932. p. 31 ff. ( Online )
  30. ↑ Ursula Büttner: Weimar. The overwhelmed republic 1918-1933. Stuttgart 2008. ( online ) p. 621: "The coverage of the Reichsbanknotes was 40% at the end of June 1931, 31.2% at the end of September, 24.2% at the end of December and 25.2% at the end of February 1932."
  31. ↑ Karsten Steiger: Cooperation, Confrontation, Downfall. Collective bargaining and arbitration during the global economic crisis and its preconditions. Stuttgart 1998. ( online ) p. 159:
    “The plans of Oberregierungsrat Lautenbach and Finance Minister Dietrich to finance a job creation program in the amount of RM 2 billion through credit expansion in order to create additional purchasing power met with general approval in the cabinet but failed but at the objections of the President of the Reichsbank Hans Luther [...] "
  32. ↑ Knut Borchardt, Hans Otto Schötz (ed.): Economic policy in the crisis. The (secret) conference of the Friedrich List Society in September 1931 on the possibilities and consequences of credit expansion. Baden-Baden 1991. Final plea, Reichsbank President LUTHER , p. 300:
    “The opinion was not unanimous about whether something can be done in this direction with the help of the Reichsbank. Even as to whether the plan should now be carried out without the help of the Reichsbank, opinions were not entirely unanimous, although the opinion here was that, if there were ways to carry out such a plan by mobilizing latent capital forces without burdening the Reichsbank , you should do it. At least that was the predominant opinion. As far as the Reichsbank was concerned, I should like to distinguish three levels in the views. Some gentlemen have most definitely called any entry into such a plan incorrect because of inflationary concerns. But it was a minority. I think you would only have two votes to count like this. The great majority of the votes believed that a sum could be approached that could be made available for work to alleviate unemployment in central bank practice, as it has been done a lot in times of crisis. In this second possible path, which the majority of gentlemen probably considered, some saw only a practical process, and others saw in it a partial fulfillment of the great, general, theoretical train of thought. A third group finally took the position that one could also name a final number. Mr. COLM first pronounced this number as the final number with 1.5 billion. Mr. LAUTENBACH did this in his report. Mr. RÖPKE took up the idea. Mr. COLM said very clearly that this was not a scientific finding, but merely something emotional, and I believe that was the only way in which Mr. RÖPKE took things up. Now I would like to say something very emphatic about this. I would like to ask all gentlemen present - it goes without saying that this conference was confidential - but to make it clear in their consciousness that this large number has not been named here for any scientific reason. For I am concerned that if such an idea could even come out, it could do us very serious harm in terms of our currency, trust in the foreign mark, and German government policy and central bank policy. I would like to ask that the utmost reserve be kept here and I would like to all gentlemen who believe that they can go relatively far towards this 1.5 billion, since they only ever said all these things in connection with assumed political situations and the like ask that you only express these trains of thought as far as possible with the utmost reserve. This is a practical request. But, gentlemen, you have heard so many examples from today's discussion of how dangerous it is for a central bank, how dangerous it is for the reputation of our mark, if such thoughts spread at all that I believe that I am justified in this direction to request the utmost restraint from you. "
  33. ↑ Albrecht Ritschl: Germany's crisis and economic situation 1924-1934. Domestic economy, foreign debt and reparation problem between Dawes plan and transfer lock. Berlin 2002. S. 160. ( online ( memento of the original dated December 7, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this note. ) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / books.google.at
  34. ^ Willi Albers, Anton Zottmann: Concise dictionary of economics. Volume 5. Stuttgart and Tübingen 1980. p. 333. ( online )
  35. ^ Tilman Koops: The Cabinets Brüning I u. II. March 30, 1930 to October 10, 1931. Boppard 1982. Introduction, XCIII. ( online ( Memento of the original dated December 7, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this note. ) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / books.google.at
  36. ^ Hermann Graml: Bernhard von Bülow and German foreign policy. Hubris and a sense of proportion in the Foreign Office. Munich 2012. p. 109. ( online )
  37. ↑ Andreas Korsch: The status of the employment policy discussion at the time of the global economic crisis in Germany. In: The Keynesianism. Volume 1. Berlin and Heidelberg 1976. pp. 94 ff ( online ).
  38. ^ Hans Jäger: Lautenbach, Wilhelm. In: Neue Deutsche Biographie 13. 1982. ( online ) p. 726 f: "Ideas developed by Lautenbach and Rüstow to improve liquidity were used in the" Papen Plan "at the end of 1932 by issuing tax vouchers in a modified form."