Young plan

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Proclamation in the Reichsgesetzblatt of March 19, 1930

The Young Plan was the last of the reparation plans that regulated the payment obligations of the German Reich on the basis of the Versailles Treaty . It was negotiated by a body of international financial experts in Paris from February to June 1929 , and the final formulation took place at two intergovernmental conferences in August 1929 and January 1930 in The Hague . It came into effect on May 17, 1930, retroactively to September 1, 1929 and set an average annuity of around two billion Reichsmarks , most of which had to be paid in foreign currency . It was supposed to remain in place until 1988, but was suspended by the Hoover moratorium in June 1931 and repealed by the Lausanne Conference in July 1932 . It was named after Owen D. Young .

Emergence

Problems with the Dawes Plan

In 1924 the Dawes Plan came into effect, the first reparations plan that actually resulted in payments to France . With the Dawes bond issued at the same time, the American capital market for Germany had been reopened, and long-term bonds and short-term loans in the billions flowed to the German private sector and the public sector in the Reich. As a result, the economy of the Weimar Republic grew significantly in these golden twenties , and despite a passive trade balance , there was enough foreign currency to pay the annuities of the plan.

Nevertheless, from 1927 onwards, unease grew on all sides. The Wall Street banks and the US Treasury were increasingly concerned that Germany could soon be over-indebted: since 1924, foreign loans worth over ten billion Reichsmarks had flowed into Germany, a large part of which had not been spent on investment purposes: The German municipalities used it to finance B. their parks and housing. The question also arose as to which type of debt should have priority in the event of a payment crisis, private loans or state reparations. Playing off the two types of debt in this way was entirely part of the German strategy. The reparations expert Hans Simon had already formulated in 1927: "The greater our private debt, the smaller our reparations".

Raymond Poincaré, French Prime Minister 1912–1913, 1922–1924 and 1926–1929

The French government also became increasingly concerned. As early as 1919, the United States had been demanding repayment of the inter-allied war debts attributable to France , which had been granted in 1917 and 1918. In the French public, this request was rejected outraged, the former ally USA referred to as "Uncle Shylock ". Since France urgently needed loans to stabilize the franc after the inflation of 1924 and 1925 , but the American capital market remained closed to it as long as the repayment of the war debts was not settled, the French ambassador in Washington, Henri Bérenger, and the American Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon formulated an agreement in April 1926: It regulated the repayment of war debts within 62 years at an interest rate of 1.6 percent and also a loan of 407 million US dollars granted in 1919 for ten years The fact that France had paid the Americans for the military equipment left in the country after the World War was included.

A similar agreement that Treasury Secretary Joseph Caillaux concluded with his British counterpart Winston Churchill in June 1926 was even more favorable to France. Nevertheless, the Chamber of Deputies refused to ratify these agreements before the German reparations were finally settled: they were to be used, among other things, for the French payments to the USA. The government of Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré threatened to come under time pressure. The $ 407 million material loan would have been due if the Mellon-Bérenger Agreement had not been ratified by July 1929. Under these conditions, the French willingness to agree to a new reparations plan grew and to be satisfied with less than the 132 billion gold marks demanded from Germany in the 1921 London payment plan .

In Germany, too, people were not entirely satisfied with the Dawes Plan. In 1928 the normal annuity of 2.5 billion Reichsmarks was due for the first time. That corresponded to 12.4 percent of total German government spending and at least 3.3 percent of national income . Had the economy continued to develop positively, an even higher sum would have been due due to the prosperity index of the plan, which threatened to exceed German solvency. There was also a domestic political problem. The much touted "repercussions" of the concessions made by Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann in the Locarno Treaty had largely failed to materialize, and no further revisions of the Versailles Treaty were imminent. This weakened Stresemann's domestic political position, especially with the parties of the right.

The decision to revise the Dawes plan

Reparation agent Parker Gilbert with pessimistic reports on the state of the German economy - nationalist assembly from January 1929

In this situation, the reparations agent Seymour Parker Gilbert traveled to Paris in January 1928 and convinced the government there of his plan for an overall solution: The German reparations should be finalized and at a realistic level. This would allow the entire German reparation debt to be brought to the market as a mobilization loan: Banks and private customers would buy the shares and receive annual interest and repayments from the German Reich, while France would receive its money in one fell swoop and thereby inter-allied Repay war debts all at once and at a favorable discount . The German government would not be happy to get involved in such a plan, however, since the debt service on the reparation notes, once they were in the hands of banks and private individuals, could not be refused without seriously damaging the creditworthiness of the German economy. In order to persuade Germany to consent nevertheless, France should withdraw its soldiers from the Rhineland earlier than provided for in the Versailles Treaty. Gilbert managed to convince the French government of his plan. Since the spring of 1928, both Poincaré and his foreign minister, Aristide Briand , who was always ready to reach an agreement, spoke out in public speeches in favor of linking the reparations revision with the Rhineland question.

Aristide Briand, French Foreign Minister 1915–1917, 1921–1922 and 1924–1932

In Germany they were originally against such a “dreadful horse trade”, as Carl von Schubert , the State Secretary in the Foreign Office, initially described the American-French idea.

But after Hermann Müller, a social democratic chancellor, had taken office in the summer of 1928 , there was increasing domestic political pressure to show success for Stresemann's policy of understanding, which the SPD had always supported. Therefore, the new government soon decided to take an initiative to clear the Rhineland, knowing full well that this would involve a counterclaim for a new regulation of reparations. This happened after extensive diplomatic explorations during the autumn meeting of the League of Nations in Geneva : Chancellor Müller demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops, Briand responded with the demand for a new regulation of reparations, whereupon the interested six powers - besides Germany and France also Great Britain, Belgium, Italy and Japan - agreed on September 16, 1928 that an independent panel of experts should draft a final reparations plan while negotiations on the evacuation and military control of the Rhineland should begin.

The government under Chancellor Müller (SPD) tried to regain certain freedoms for Germany in return for a final payment under the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. This included an evacuation of the Rhineland , an end to sovereignty restrictions through an end to international control over the Reichsbank and Reichsbahn, and an end to reparations. At the League of Nations conference in September 1928, it was finally decided to set up an international commission of experts to settle the question of reparations under the American economic expert Owen Young .

The expert consultations

The namesake of the Young Plan, Owen D. Young (right) in 1924 in Berlin

The fourteen international financial experts who had to draw up the new reparations plan were to be independent and committed only to their economic expertise. In this way it was hoped to depoliticize the reparations, which were morally and politically highly controversial because of their justification in Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles. This failed, because in order not to receive fewer reparations from the German Reich under the new plan than would have to be paid to the USA in terms of inter-allied war debts, Poincaré and Churchill set the outcome of the expert consultations in advance on October 19, 1928. The two French experts Émile Moreau and Jean Parmentier were also committed to this result by an instruction from the government of December 27, 1928: Germany's future reparations payments had to cover the war debt payments of the creditors and produce a surplus for France and Belgium; in addition, they had to be finally determined and mobilized on the capital market. Although the possibility of mobilizing reparations on the American capital market was now severely restricted by the stock market boom that hit Wall Street in the summer of 1928 and which fourteen months later would culminate in the devastating crash of Black Thursday , the hope was that reparations would be made to be able to accommodate later on Wall Street.

The French expert Émile Moreau, head of the Banque de France
Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank 1924–1930 and 1933–1939

The German experts Hjalmar Schacht and Albert Vögler , however, trusted that the basis of the new plan would be the objective solvency of Germany and not the needs of the creditor states, and prepared detailed dossiers accordingly. They also felt they were in a strong negotiating position, believing the Americans, who, along with Owen D. Young, chaired the committee, on their side . However, they were disappointed at the deliberations that began in Paris on February 9, 1929: the British and French bluntly informed him that they were expecting an annuity of 2 to 2.5 billion Reichsmarks. Schacht offered 1.37 billion a year on February 11, but on the condition that Germany would return its colonies and help reclaim the Polish corridor . The creditors indignantly rejected this proposal. Schacht traveled to Berlin and urged the Reich government to abandon the negotiations. But that would demonstrate to the whole world that the reparations would not be reduced in the near future and possibly exceed the German solvency. Some international creditors have already started to withdraw their short-term loans from Germany. Under these circumstances, the cabinet asked Schacht to negotiate further and, at his own request, instructed him on May 1, 1929, to approve a compromise proposal that Committee chairman Young had meanwhile worked out.

Schacht had given up his independence, but was no longer responsible for the outcome of the negotiations. His colleague Vögler, on the other hand, resigned on May 23: he wanted the negotiations to fail and the subsequent credit crisis to occur in order to demonstrate Germany's inability to pay two billion Reichsmark in reparations every year. He was replaced by the managing director of the Reich Association of German Industry , Ludwig Kastl, who worked constructively with Schacht in the search for compromises. On June 9, 1929, the fourteen experts were able to present the “New Plan”, which is usually called the “Young Plan” after the chairman of their committee.

The Hague Conferences

The governments of the six powers that had commissioned the creation of the Young Plan approved it in principle in June. In order to put it into effect and to agree to the early evacuation of the last occupied zone of the Rhineland, they had to meet for a conference. Briand and Stresemann agreed at the Madrid League of Nations conference in June 1929 that the "general liquidation of the war" should be decided there, that is, the amicable and final settlement of all questions still arising from the First World War .

This conference took place in The Hague from August 6 to 31, 1929 and showed that British-French solidarity on the reparations question had meanwhile broken down. Churchill's successor as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Labor politician Philip Snowden , made three demands: the supplies in kind that would damage British trade must be limited, Great Britain had a higher share of German reparations payments after the distribution key established at the Spa Conference in 1920, and in particular to their share payable in all circumstances. Overall, he demanded an increase in the annual British reparation income by the equivalent of 48 million Reichsmarks. He got into sharp and personal arguments with his French colleague Henry Chéron. Snowden signaled to the German Reichstag delegate Rudolf Breitscheid that he was ready to abandon the whole Young plan if necessary. This would trigger a sensitive financial crisis, but the transfer protection of the Dawes Plan would remain in force, which means that “Germany would be better off in a few months than it is now”. However, the Germans did not want to get involved because, as Finance Minister Rudolf Hilferding announced , the savings in reparations that the Young Plan would bring with it had already been “completely used up” in the 1930 budget: if the Young Plan were to fail, it would be that not only bring a financial crisis with it, but plunge the empire into immediate financial difficulties.

Henry Chéron, French Minister of Finance 1928–1930 and 1932–1933

Snowden was in a strong negotiating position as his interest in getting the Young Plan into effect was less than that of any of his adversaries. Therefore, the "iron Chancellor of the Exchequer", as he was soon called admiringly in Great Britain, stubbornly insisted on his demands for several weeks, which also delayed the negotiations on the troop withdrawal. For domestic political reasons, Briand, who had meanwhile become Prime Minister for the eleventh time, refused to give a date for the evacuation before an agreement was reached on the reparations issue. A solution was finally achieved through reallocations within the creditor tranches, but above all at the expense of the German Reich. Germany waived the so-called surplus , the difference between the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan during the five-month transition period amounting to 300 million Reichsmarks. This made it possible to satisfy three-quarters of the British demands. In addition, Stresemann renounced any possibility of postponing payment for several million Reichsmarks annually. Finally, compromise solutions were found on the issue of deliveries in kind.

Now Briand was ready to give in on the evacuation question and agreed to 30 June 1930 as the final date for the occupied Rhineland, and he no longer raised the French demand to control the demilitarization of the Rhineland. The Young Plan and the evacuation of the Rhineland were basically a done deal, but because the negotiations had taken significantly more time than planned, it was agreed to clarify the remaining questions at a second conference.

The German delegation at the second Hague Conference: Reich Finance Minister Paul Moldenhauer , Reich Foreign Minister Julius Curtius, Minister for the Occupied Territory Joseph Wirth , on the far right State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry Carl von Schubert

The second Hague Conference took place from January 3rd to 20th, 1930. Here issues were resolved mostly technical in nature, namely the establishment of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which should replace the Reparations Parker Gilbert, the question of whether, as foreseen by the Treaty of Versailles, the creditors in the event of a German payment failure continued sanctions could impose , and the mobilization of a first installment of reparations.

In the meantime, the New York stock market crash of October 24, 1929 had shown that the American capital market would for the foreseeable future be unable to pre-finance the entire value of the German reparation debt for the European creditor powers, which would reduce the inter-allied war debts to the USA Wanted to repay the blow. Nevertheless, the new French Prime Minister André Tardieu, true to the French goal of finally gaining financial security, insisted that as large a part as possible be mobilized and thus made available to his country immediately. In order to interest the Germans in mobilizing reparations, he proposed that part of the Young Loan, as the new financial product was called, be paid out to the Reich. Since the Müller government had chronic problems balancing the budget, it consented. In the Young Loan 200 million US dollars reparations were 100 million US dollars for the German Reich pooled. Because of this, and because another foreign loan from the Reich government was included in the contract, their creditworthiness abroad was closely linked to their punctual payment of the reparations. At the same time, the new Foreign Minister Julius Curtius had to solemnly affirm the finality of the Young Plan and promise that Germany would not make lightly use of the possibilities to postpone reparation payments.

Another concession that Curtius had to make was even more annoying: in the past negotiations it remained open as to when the Reich government had to transfer the monthly due dates: while the Germans wanted to pay at the end of the month, the creditors unanimously insisted that the second Week of the month. Calculated over the entire term of the Young Plan, this meant a loss of interest for the German side and an increase in the price of 80 million Reichsmarks.

Reichsbank chief Schacht was indignant about this. He had already considered the Young Plan in the form it had been negotiated in Paris to be too expensive for the German performance. After it had been worsened again at the first Hague Conference to Germany's disadvantage, it had already gone on the opposition course to the Reich government and torpedoed another foreign loan that Finance Minister Hilferding needed to cover budget holes. Nevertheless, Curtius had brought him into the German delegation so that he could help set up the BIS. When it became known that Germany had had to give way again, he began to make political demands on his own responsibility for the construction of the new bank, so that the organizing committee stopped its work for the time being. Schacht had to be forced by the ministers to work constructively, which he did afterwards, but the scandal damaged the confidence of the creditor powers, and especially France, in the German willingness to pay.

The fact that the French public lacked this confidence was the reason for the long and thorny negotiations on the question of sanctions. Tardieu said that this item on the agenda was only “necessary because there is parliamentarism”. Finally, a dilatory formula was agreed upon , according to which the creditor powers would regain their "full freedom of action" if the International Court of Justice should find that the Reich was in the process of "tearing up" the Young Plan. This could be interpreted differently by the public opinions of the countries involved: The French saw it as an opportunity to fall back on the robust sanction options of the Versailles Treaty, while the Germans merely recognized the freedom of action which every sovereign state is entitled to under international law . After this question had also been clarified, the “New Plan”, as the Young Plan was officially called, and the agreement on the evacuation of the Rhineland were signed on January 20, 1930 by the heads of government of the six powers. They expressed their hope that "in the near future the consequences of the world war can be regarded as settled."

content

The Young Plan provided for a German reparation debt of the equivalent of 36 billion Reichsmarks. This sum was to be repaid by 1988 with interest. The annuities were to rise rapidly from 1.7 billion to 2.1 billion Reichsmarks, after 1966 they should decrease to 1.65 billion Reichsmarks. Taking the year 1930 as the basis, the German Reich had to pay an average of around 12 percent of its exports , 2.5 percent of its net national product and 7.3 percent of all public revenues annually .

The transfer protection of the Dawes Plan was abolished, that is, the Reich was in future responsible for ensuring that the amount raised from tax revenue could be transferred to the Bank for International Settlements in foreign currency or in kind . This institution took over the functions of the Reparations Commission provided for in the Versailles Treaty , which, like the office of general agent for reparation payments, was abolished. Likewise, the control options that the creditor powers had secured for themselves in the Dawes Plan over the Deutsche Reichsbahn and the Reichsbank disappeared , as did the prosperity index, which means that Germany could be sure that it would no longer have to pay even if the economic situation was favorable.

The deliveries in kind, with which Germany had often competed with companies in the creditor countries, were to expire after ten years. The remaining payment obligation in foreign currency was divided into a so-called unprotected annuity, which had to be transferred in foreign currency under all circumstances and consisted of 600 million Reichsmarks. The so-called protected annuity, which is more than twice as large, could initially be transferred to Reichsmarks in the event of a “relatively short depression ”. The foreign currency had to be delivered in the year after next at the latest. In this case a so-called special advisory committee had to meet, which had to submit proposals to an intergovernmental conference on how Germany could overcome its foreign exchange problems. However, he was not allowed to propose a change to the plan, because the Young Plan claimed to finally regulate the German reparation obligations. In the event of a transfer postponement, France had to set up a guarantee fund equivalent to the equivalent of 500 million Reichsmarks, from which the foreign exchange losses of the smaller creditor powers were to be offset. The protected annuity was closely linked to its inter-allied war debts through a "Simultaneous Memorandum" that the creditor powers attached to the Young Plan: If the US were willing to make an estate here, it would pass it on to Germany.

On May 17, 1930, the Young Plan came into effect retrospectively to September 1, 1929. At the same time, the Young bond was put on the market (see below).

Reactions

France

The Young Plan was mostly welcomed in France. The left and liberal press rated him positively, only on the right side of the political spectrum was criticized that the plan and the associated evacuation of the Rhineland impaired both the financial and military security of the republic. Colonel François de La Rocque from the right-wing veterans' organization Croix de Feu even formed a “committee against the evacuation of the Rhineland and the abandonment of the Saar region”, which wanted to prevent the ratification of the Young Plan through mass protests and extra-parliamentary pressure.

These and similar currents did not achieve mass publicity. However, since all governments from 1926 to 1932 relied on a coalition of the political center with the nationalists and right-wing Catholics, for example the Fédération Républicaine, difficulties arose here. It was not possible to complete the Young Plan by July 1929, the last possible date for the ratification of the agreement on the inter-allied war debts. So Poincaré had to ask the Chamber to ratify the Mellon-Bérenger Agreement before Germany had approved the Young Plan. Both the political right and the opposition socialists , who otherwise support Briand's foreign policy, insisted on linking the two debts, which the United States strictly rejected. The Prime Minister, who was already suffering from health problems, was only able to enforce the ratification by asking the vote of confidence . On July 12, 1929, the Chamber approved the War Debt Agreement with a narrow majority, but at the same time resolved the reservation that it would only be served as long as sufficient reparations were received from Germany. Since a conditional ratification would not be recognized by the USA, a different formulation was chosen than in the Senate , the second chamber of parliament. As a result, the reservation did not become legally binding and the debt agreement became final. Poincaré resigned a few days later. He was succeeded by Foreign Minister Briand, who formed a short-lived, so-called “holiday cabinet”, which primarily put the adoption of the Young Plan on the agenda. It soon failed because of the paradox of the French policy of understanding, which followed the ideals of the political left but was pursued by center-right governments. When a member of the left-wing bourgeoisie Radical Socialists , who actually supported Briand's foreign policy, demanded a debate on foreign policy for domestic reasons in October 1929, Briand put the vote of confidence and was defeated - several members of his own majority, to whom his foreign policy was too compliant, voted against him.

His successor was André Tardieu from the right-wing liberal Alliance démocratique . On March 29, 1930, he succeeded in securing an impressive majority in the Chamber for the ratification of the Young Plan. For this purpose, following a request from several members of the Fédération Républicaine, he had delayed the parliamentary deliberations until the German Reichstag had given its approval. On the other hand, the speech of the new Finance Minister Paul Reynaud was convincing , who drew a very positive balance: The Young Plan had put reparations on an equal footing with Germany's private debt and thus secured it, it covered the inter-allied war debts and generated a surplus to rebuild those destroyed in the war French territories. The originally fixed sum of 132 billion gold marks plus interest had to be sacrificed, but "this sacrifice is the price of the final solution". He did not mention the original goal of mobilizing reparations on a large scale and thus repaying the inter-allied debts in one fell swoop, because a financial action of this magnitude had become completely illusory after the New York stock market crash of October 1929.

After the adoption of the Young Plan, the French sought closer cooperation with the German Empire. Tardieu told the German ambassador that his government was aiming for “conscious rapprochement with Germany”, and Briand presented his memorandum on the establishment of a European Union in Geneva on May 17, 1930, the day the Young Plan came into force. With the apparently final solution to the reparations question and the withdrawal from the occupied Rhineland, the last points of dispute arising from the Versailles Treaty seemed to have been liquidated, and the way seemed free for a secure and peaceful future.

Germany

Although this meant a financial relief for the German Reich compared to existing agreements, the nationalist associations German National People's Party (DNVP), National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) and the Stahlhelm tried to bring this plan down by means of a referendum. The DNVP chairman Alfred Hugenberg called the plan a "machine of high capitalism for the subjugation of Germany", especially the long duration of the payment obligation was emphasized in the nationalist agitation ("You have to indulge into the third generation !"). In July 1929 they founded the "Reich Committee for the Referendum against the Young Plan". On December 22nd, 1929 , the citizens voted on the " Freedom Act ", which was supposed to revise the entire Versailles Treaty and which contained the punishment of those who signed the plan by penalism for treason .

Hugenberg and the Stahlhelm leaders Franz von Stephani and Franz Seldte at a rally for the referendum in the Berlin Sports Palace

The referendum failed in the second instance because the referendum would have required the approval of 50 percent of all eligible voters , but only 13.5 percent of all eligible voters went to vote. This 13.5 percent vote consisted of 5,838,890 yes votes and only 338,195 no votes. 94.5 percent of those who voted had approved the referendum. The government had deliberately set the voting date on the last Sunday shopping before Christmas.

In older research, the thesis was often put forward that the cooperation with the financially strong Hugenberg and the bourgeois right-wing radicals made the NSDAP “socially acceptable” and was of decisive importance for its further rise. The Berlin political scientist Otmar Jung contradicts this by showing that the upward trend in the election results for the NSDAP had already started before the Young Plan campaign. The often held opinion that the referendum had significantly promoted the rise of the NSDAP meant that the Parliamentary Council did not introduce plebiscites in the Basic Law (except for territorial changes in the federal states).

Further development

After following a proposal by US President Herbert Hoover during the Great Depression to a general moratorium ( Hoover moratorium came), the Young Plan was supported by the Lausanne Conference lifted in July 1,932th

Young bond

Young bond, 5½% gold bond for $ 1,000 from 1930

With the Young Loan, the Reich borrowed 1.47 billion Reichsmarks (300 million gold marks ) at 5.5 percent interest over 35 years (until 1965). Two thirds of the sum went to the reparations creditors and to support the German economy, one third to the Deutsche Reichspost and the Deutsche Reichsbahn . Despite the rather sluggish capital market after Black Thursday (called Black Friday in German), the bond issue was a great success with the international public. After Hitler came to power , interest payments ceased. Due to the London debt agreement , the bond had to be serviced again with new conditions. The remaining term was extended until 1980, but the coupon was reduced. The backward interest from 1933 to 1944 was converted into a so-called foundation bond and paid off by 1972. Due to the negotiating skills of Hermann Josef Abs, the interest from 1945 to 1952 only had to be paid back with the reunification of Germany, evidenced by vouchers . These warrants were temporarily sold like historical securities (although still valid) at the lowest possible prices, since a reunification seemed unlikely. However, they revived on October 3, 1990, so that Germany again issued a foundation bond ( WKN including 117012, 117016 and 117020) with a three percent coupon, a volume of 200 million D-Marks and a term of 20 years, in which the coupons could be converted. In October 2010 the Federal Office for Central Services and Unresolved Property Issues made the last payments. The few bonds for which the owners at the time did not accept the exchange offer from 1953 are still subject to the original gold clause, which enabled repayment in gold. Therefore, there are isolated cases against the Federal Republic in the USA . The fate of the Young bond is shared by that of the Dawes bond .

literature

  • Hermann Graml : Between Stresemann and Hitler. The foreign policy of the presidential cabinets Brüning, Papen and Schleicher . Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2001, ISBN 3-486-64583-8 , ( series of the quarterly books for contemporary history 83).
  • Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Young Plan 1929–1932. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, ISBN 3-506-77507-3 , ( Schöningh collection on past and present ), (At the same time: Berlin, Freie Univ., Diss., 1996). Digitized
  • Bruce Kent : The Spoils of War. The Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918–1932. Clarendon, Oxford 1989, ISBN 0-19-822738-8 .
  • Otmar Jung : Plebiscitary breakthrough in 1929? On the significance of referendums and referendums against the Young Plan for the NSDAP. In: History and Society . 15/1989, pp. 489-510.
  • Franz Knipping : Germany, France and the end of the Locarno era 1928–1931. Studies on international politics in the early stages of the Great Depression . Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, ISBN 3-486-53161-1 , (also: Tübingen, Univ., Habil.-Schr., 1984).
  • Julius Curtius : The Young Plan. Distortion and truth . Franz Mittelbach Verlag, Stuttgart 1950.
  • Hjalmar Schacht : The end of the reparations . Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg 1931.
  • Hans Gestrich : The Young Plan. Content and effect. Commonly presented . Verlag von Philipp Reclam jun., Leipzig 1930, ( Reclams Universal-Bibliothek 7061-7062).

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich: American Capital Export and Reconstruction of the German Economy 1919–1923 compared to 1924–1929. In: Michael Stürmer (Ed.): The Weimar Republic. Besieged Civitas. 2nd ext. Edition. Athenäum Verlag, Königstein / Ts. 1985, pp. 131-157.
  2. ↑ Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Youngplan 1929-1932. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, p. 38.
  3. ↑ On the inter-allied war debts see Denise Artaud: La question des dettes interalliees et la reconstruction de l 'Europe (1917–1929). 2 vols. Champion honore, Paris 1978; Bruce Kent: The Spoils of War. The Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918–1932. Clarendon, Oxford 1989, pp. 268f and so on.
  4. ↑ Horst Möller: Europe between the world wars. Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 1998, p. 47. (= Oldenbourg floor plan of history, vol. 21)
  5. ↑ Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Youngplan 1929-1932. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, p. 39; Franz Knipping: Germany, France and the end of the Locarno era 1928-1931. Studies on international politics in the early stages of the Great Depression. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 34-39, on the other hand, is of the opinion that the initiative to revise the Dawes Plan came from Schubert.
  6. ↑ Bruce Kent: The Spoils of War. The Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918–1932. Clarendon, Oxford 1989, p. 282.
  7. ↑ Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Youngplan 1929-1932. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, p. 43ff.
  8. ^ William C. McNeil: American Money and the Weimar Republic: Economics and Politics on the Eve of the Great Depression. Columbia University Press, New York 1988, pp. 216-219.
  9. ↑ Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Young Plan 1929–1932. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, p. 49.
  10. ↑ Bruce Kent: The Spoils of War. The Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918-1932. Clarendon, Oxford 1989, p. 310.
  11. ↑ Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Young Plan 1929–1932. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, p. 51.
  12. ^ Franz Knipping: Germany, France and the end of the Locarno era 1928-1931. Studies on international politics in the early stages of the Great Depression. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1987, p. 99.
  13. ↑ Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Youngplan 1929-1932. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, p. 53.
  14. ↑ Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Young Plan 1929–1932. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, p. 54.
  15. ↑ Bodo Harenberg (Ed.): Chronicle of the 20th Century. Chronik Verlag, Dortmund 1991, p. 414.
  16. ↑ Also on the following see Peter Krüger, Die Außenpolitik der Republik von Weimar , Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1985, pp. 483f; Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Youngplan 1929-1932. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, p. 47f.
  17. ^ Rainer Meister: The great depression. Constraints and room for maneuver of economic and financial policy in Germany 1929-1932. transfer verlag, Regensburg 1991, p. 44f.
  18. ↑ Also on the following Philipp Heyde: The end of reparations. Germany, France and the Youngplan 1929-1932. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, pp. 54-65.
  19. ↑ On the ratification of the Mellon-Bérenger Agreement, cf. Denise Artaud: La question des dettes interalliees et la reconstruction de l 'Europe (1917-1929). Champion honore, Paris 1978, Vol. 2, pp. 913-918; Bruce Kent: The Spoils of War. The Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918-1932. Clarendon, Oxford 1989, p. 304.
  20. ^ Franz Knipping: Germany, France and the end of the Locarno era 1928-1931. Studies on international politics in the early stages of the Great Depression. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1987, p. 58 (here the quote)
  21. ↑ On this paradox see Philipp Heyde: Das Ende der Reparationen. Germany, France and the Youngplan 1929-1932. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, pp. 55f.
  22. ^ Ferdinand Siebert: Aristide Briand: 1862-1932. A statesman between France and Europe. Rentsch, Erlenbach-Zurich 1973, pp. 530-534.
  23. ↑ Philipp Heyde: The end of the reparations. Germany, France and the Youngplan 1929-1932. Schöningh, Paderborn 1998, p. 56f. (here the quote)
  24. ↑ Cornelia Navari: The Origins of the Briand plan. In: Diplomacy & Statecraft. 3: 74-104 (1992); Ralph Blessing: The possible peace. The modernization of foreign policy and Franco-German relations 1923-1929. Oldenbourg, Munich 2008, pp. 447-462.
  25. ↑ s. on this, Börse Online 38/09, pp. 42–43.
  26. ↑ Michael Wala: Weimar and America. Ambassador Friedrich von Prittwitz and Gaffron and German-American relations from 1927 to 1933. Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 2001, p. 150f.
  27. ↑ DPA-InfolineRS: History: Germany settles the last war debts. In: Focus Online . October 1, 2010, accessed October 14, 2018 .