Aeroflot flight 2306
| Aeroflot flight 2306 | |
|---|---|
 An Aeroflot Tu-134 |
|
| Accident summary | |
| Accident type | Fire on board |
| place |
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|
| date | 2nd July 1986 |
| Fatalities | 54 |
| Survivors | 38 |
| Aircraft | |
| Aircraft type |
Tupolev Tu-134 A, Russian SFSR
|
| operator |
Aeroflot , Russian SFSR
|
| Mark | CCCP-65120, Russian SFSR
|
| Departure airport |
Vorkuta Airport , Russian SFSR
|
| Stopover |
Syktyvkar Airport , Russian SFSR
|
| Destination airport |
Moscow Sheremetyevo Airport , Russian SFSR
|
| Passengers | 86 |
| crew | 6th |
| Lists of aviation accidents | |
On July 2, 1986, a Tupolev Tu-134 had to make an emergency landing on the second segment of the inner-Soviet scheduled flight Aeroflot flight 2306 from Vorkuta via Syktywkar to Moscow after a fire broke out, with 54 of the 92 occupants killed.
Plane and crew
The aircraft was an approximately 8-year-old twin -engine Tupolev Tu-134 A (aircraft registration number CCCP-65120, serial number 60482), which had completed 13,988 flight hours and 7989 flight cycles from June 24, 1978 until the accident. The crew consisted of the flight captain Vladimir Fyodorovich Dubrowskij, the first officer Dmitri Denisovich Kuleschow, the flight engineer Sadyrbek Imanaljewitsch Shamyrkanow, the navigator Alexander Jakowlewitsch Dmitrijew and the flight attendants EE Kazakow and V. Kutschajewa.
course
After a flight without delay, the Tu-134 landed in Syktyvkar. Five passengers got on there, including two Bulgarians who were carrying the individual parts of chainsaws in their hand luggage. A total of 86 passengers were now on board, including 19 children. After a standstill of 48 minutes, the Tu-134 took off at 9:55 a.m. Moscow time . During the climb, the smoke alarm for the rear cargo hold was triggered at 10:07 a.m. at an altitude of 5,600 m; the plane was about 90–95 km from the airport. Captain Dubrowski then sent flight engineer Shamyrkanov, who reported to him about smoke. At 10:09:30 a.m., the captain left his seat and went with the flight engineer to the hold, although according to the manual he was supposed to immediately inform air traffic control , send the emergency signal and initiate an emergency descent. Arriving at the back he saw a flame and the smoke that had formed on a piece of luggage. At 10:10:46 a.m. Dubrowski re-entered the cockpit and sent the first officer Kuleshow and a flight attendant to fight the fire.
Due to the illegal behavior, the Tu-134 rose to 6,700 m and a further 45–50 km, a total of 140 km, from the airport in Syktywkar when the master initiated the emergency descent at 10:10:46, during which the landing gear was extended , and the machine sank to 1,000 m. 4 minutes after the smoke alarm, the master reported the fire to the air traffic controller at 10:11:11 . The landing gear was retracted at 5,300 m while the passenger cabin was filled with smoke, which was made worse by the fact that the pilots did not lower the cabin pressure at 4,000 m as per the regulations and, contrary to the regulations, throttled the engines to idle , which is why the ventilation did not provide full power .
Due to the large amount of smoke and the high temperature, Kuleshov and Shamyrkanov were unable to get to the source of the fire, especially since they were not wearing a smoke mask or an oxygen tank, and arbitrarily emptied 2 fire extinguishers ; 5 minutes after the smoke alarm. Both returned to the cockpit and reported to Dubrovsky, who was flying at 1,000 m, that the fire had not been extinguished.
The captain then decided at 10:18 a.m. to make an emergency landing in the area and informed the air traffic controller. The pilots then extended the landing gear again at 1,200 m and sank to 300 m, which enabled visual flight . Because of the low altitude, radar and radio contact was initially broken off, which was bridged by another aircraft. The smoke meanwhile led to coughing and nosebleeds among the passengers, some lost consciousness; the vent was still not set to the highest level.
The pilots then changed the course from 300 ° (northwest) to 100 ° (east) and unsuccessfully tried to find a suitable landing site in the wooded landscape due to the low altitude. The landing flaps were extended and the tailplane was trimmed to the landing position.
At 10:27:10, 20 minutes after the smoke alarm, the aircraft touched down in the forest, the trees of which were 23-25 m high, without the cabin being prepared, and came to a stop 340 m further after it broke, whereby a ground fire broke out. The front entrance door was stuck. Instead, the passengers climbed on their own through the hatch for the front luggage compartment and the cockpit window, while the captain, first officer and the flight engineer were carried out by a flight attendant. After the emergency signal was triggered at 10:12 a.m., search and rescue teams were informed at 10:26 a.m. of the imminent landing in the forest, which found the scene of the accident at 1:35 p.m.
A total of 54 inmates died; 52 passengers, some of them from smoke poisoning according to the autopsy , the flight engineer Shamyrkanov, who was rescued alive from the aircraft, and the navigator Dmitriev, who sat illegally at his work station on landing and was killed on impact.
Investigations
On the day of the accident, the cargo was loaded into the rear cargo hold. Checking hand luggage and cargo was not mandatory according to the regulation that came into force on March 11, 1981, which is why dangerous cargo and other prohibited substances could still be loaded on board. The freight was not checked in Vorkuta either. Because of the destruction, it was not possible to determine what caused the fire. There may be a spontaneously flammable liquid on board that dripped onto the floor or there was a flammable liquid that caught fire due to a defect in the wiring.
Regardless of this, the crew violated several regulations, including delayed emergency descent, not wearing smoke masks or using only 2 instead of all 4 fire extinguishers or not switching the ventilation system to maximum. Investigations showed, however, that this did not have a major impact on the exit, especially since the cargo hold was classified as non-fire hazard and therefore did not have its own extinguishing device. According to some investigators, a cable fire or leakage of hydraulic fluid can be excluded as the cause of the fire; they suspected that a passenger had loaded such cargo in Syktyvkar, which, like the entire cargo, was not checked.
swell
- Description of the accident on the Aviation Safety Network , accessed April 13, 2020
- Description of the accident on airdisaster.ru, accessed on April 13, 2020
- Description of the accident on avia.pro, accessed on April 13, 2020
- Pictures of the accident site on baaa.acro, accessed on April 13, 2020
Coordinates: 61 ° 7 ′ 12 ″ N , 49 ° 29 ′ 24 ″ E