Asymmetrical demobilization

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In political science, asymmetrical demobilization is an election campaign strategy that aims to demotivate potential voters of the political opponent by avoiding statements on controversial issues to the point that they refrain from voting. If one's own voters are not unintentionally demobilized at the same time, the proportion of votes of the party that practices this strategy increases. The decline in voter turnout is accepted with approval when asymmetrical demobilization is used .

Political science research

The term was first used in the 2006 parliamentary elections in Catalonia . After the coalition of PSC , ERC and the green-alternative ICV - EUiA broke up due to a dispute over the new statute of autonomy of Catalonia , the CiU held back with content. While the governing parties suffered significant losses, the CiU emerged from the election as the strengthened, strongest political group.

As part of the election campaign for the 2009 federal election , the Elections Research Group described Angela Merkel's and the CDU's campaign strategy as "asymmetrical demobilization". Matthias Jung , head of the Elections Research Group, said of the 2009 election results that under the given framework conditions, the CDU's election campaign strategy could hardly be improved. The main goal was to keep disappointed SPD supporters at home.

The political scientist Andreas Blätte inserted the term into a rational choice theory of the calculated election campaign strategy : In the 2009 election campaign, the CDU chose a "restricted campaign style", while the SPD chose a "polarizing campaign style". For both parties, this was the benefit-maximizing strategy in view of the candidate selection. As a result, as a combination of both campaign strategies, the 2009 federal election resulted in an “asymmetrically polarized party competition” directed in favor of the CDU.

More recent studies, however, highlight the lack of research on the phenomenon of asymmetric demobilization. With the exception of negative campaigning , classical political electoral research mainly knows mobilization effects, but no demobilization effects. A restricted election campaign strategy can, however, have a demobilizing effect by overriding mobilizing factors. By adopting political program points from the political competitor and by non-provocative responses to provocations by the competing party, such a strategy minimizes the ability to differentiate between the two parties. The voter who is inclined to one party cannot differentiate specifically between the two parties and remains insensitive to the special activation attempts of his inclined party; he decides not to vote. If the electoral norm is more pronounced among the supporters of the restricted party, the supporters of their political competition are demobilized asymmetrically and they gain relative shares of the vote.

Since then, the term has been used in journalistic articles commenting on the federal elections in 2013 and 2017 .

supporting documents

  1. ^ A b Matthias Jung, Yvonne Schroth, Andrea Wolf: Change of government without change of mood . In: From Politics and Contemporary History . No. 51 , 2009, p. 12-19 .
  2. ^ Ignacio Lago, José Ramón Montero, Mariano Torcal: The 2006 Regional Election in Catalonia: Exit, Voice, and Electoral Market Failures . In: South European Society and Politics . tape 12 , no. 2 , June 1, 2007, ISSN  1360-8746 , p. 221-235 , doi : 10.1080 / 13608740701306607 .
  3. ^ Elections research group: Bundestag election 2009. An analysis of the election of September 27, 2009 . Institute for Election Analysis and Society Observation, Mannheim 2009.
  4. ↑ Matthias Jung: Merkel's risky option. In: Cicero. 2009, accessed December 11, 2017 .
  5. ↑ Markus Feldenkrichen, René Pfister: "Change of government without change of mood". Spiegel interview with election researcher Matthias Jung about the crisis of the party system. In: Der Spiegel No. 39, September 22, 2018, p. 44.
  6. ↑ Andreas Blätte: Reduced party competition through calculated demobilization . In: The 2009 Bundestag election . VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010, ISBN 978-3-531-17476-1 , p. 273–297 , doi : 10.1007 / 978-3-531-92494-6_14 ( springer.com [accessed December 12, 2017]).
  7. ↑ a b Oliver Weber: Asymmetrical demobilization. Why party supporters become non-voters . Research Gate, January 8, 2018.
  8. ↑ Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, Christian Mackenrodt: Social networks and mass media as mobilizers and demobilizers: A study of turnout at a German local election . In: Electoral Studies . tape 29 , no. 3 , p. 392–404 , doi : 10.1016 / j.electstud.2010.03.011 ( elsevier.com [accessed January 16, 2018]).
  9. ^ Matthias Kamann: Angela Merkel's asymmetrical demobilization. In: WORLD. May 3, 2013, accessed December 12, 2017 .
  10. ↑ Detlef Esslinger: Angela, the asymmetrical. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung. June 28, 2017. Retrieved December 12, 2017 .
  11. ↑ Anja Maier : Meet three. In: taz . July 17, 2017. Retrieved December 12, 2017 .