Siege of Yorktown (1862)
The Siege of Yorktown (English: Siege of Yorktown ), also known as the Battle of Yorktown (English: Battle of Yorktown ) took place in 1862 during the American Civil War as part of the peninsular campaign between Confederate defenders and attackers of the Union . The siege of the city of Yorktown began on April 5 after the US 4th Army Corps first made contact with Confederate forces at Lees Mill and ended on May 4 with the completion of the Confederation's withdrawal to Williamsburg . This event should not be confused with the Battle of Yorktown in September 1781.
background
The Union of Northern States under Abraham Lincoln sought a quick decisive victory over the Southern Confederation in the early stages of the Civil War . General George B. McClellan , who had replaced Winfield Scott in the fall of 1861 , was instructed to use an attack on the state of Virginia to take the capital of the Confederation, Richmond , as quickly as possible and thus to end the secession. McClellan, always defensive, had largely spared most of his strength since the north's defeat at the Bull Run on July 21, 1861, in order to avoid a second defeat.
The Peninsula Campaign began on March 17, 1862, with the landing in waves of over 120,000 Northern Potomac Army soldiers at Fort Monroe on the southeastern end of the Virginia Peninsula . After the partial victory of the Confederation Navy in the naval battle of Hampton Roads on March 8, the Union had been forced to refrain from a direct amphibious attack and to attack Richmond exclusively by land.
At the time the Union forces landed, there were no more than 13,000 Confederate defenders in Yorktown. Major General John B. Magruder was in command of the defense lawyers . Magruder's vastly outnumbered forces held the Warwick Line , a south-east defensive belt. The Warwick Line stretched along the Warwick River from Yorktown on the York River to Mulberry Point on the James River , and thus encompassed the entire peninsula.
McClellan planned to use the 3rd US Army Corps ( Samuel P. Heintzelman ) to lock the Confederate forces in their positions and then surround them on the left flank with the 4th US Army Corps ( Erasmus D. Keyes ). At that time, the Union High Command underestimated the length of the Warwick Line and assumed that the Confederation was only set up in the immediate vicinity of the city of Yorktown itself.
Course of the battle
On April 4, 1862, the first enemy contact between the two armies took place at Lees Mill , where the 4th US Corps implemented the planned advance over the left flank. Lees Mill was defended by Confederate artillery formations as well as infantry formations in trenches. The commander of 4th Corps, Erasmus D. Keyes, reported the heavy fortifications to McClellan. McClellan's further course of action was strongly influenced by this report and held back the Union troops for fear of heavy losses.
Had Keyes or McClellan been more actively scouting the Confederation lines, they would have found that the defenders were overwhelmed with their positions. An early Union assault at this point would have a high probability of penetrating the Warwick Line and forcing the southerners to abandon Yorktown. On the southern side, General Magruder tried to deceive the Union about the strength of his troops. He ordered his troops to switch between positions as loudly as possible or to allow the enemy to sight them several times in a short time in order to look like several units.
At this point, several major Confederation units were on their way to Yorktown to reinforce Magruder's defenders from behind. McClellan believed on April 5 that Joseph E. Johnston's forces had joined the defenders. This was a misconception, however: Johnston's vanguard did not arrive in Yorktown until April 10th. The Union let another possible window of time for the attack pass by.
McClellan ordered the enemy line of defense to be tested with decoys on the evening of April 5th. On April 6th this test was carried out by parts of two Union brigades. The entire length of the Warwick River was judged to be insurmountable, again Magruders deception could confuse the Union, and further operations of the northern states thwarted by bad weather until April 10th.
On April 9, identified Union units to Dam Number One (dt .: Dam Number One ) east of Lee's Mill as a possible attack on the Warwick River. It was the only major part of the river where the east bank, called Garrow Ridge , was geographically higher than the west bank, so that Union artillery could easily support the attack from here. However, this message to General McClellan was intercepted by Confederate forces, and McClellan did not learn of the strategic value of Dam Number One until April 14th .
On April 10, McClellan requested reinforcements from the US government. A division of over 12,000 men, commanded by William Buel Franklin , was posted. It took Franklin's division ten days to ship to the Virginia Peninsula and then remained on standby in port.
The Confederate defenders were amazed at McClellan's repeated passive approach. The Union Army, 50,000 strong at that time, estimated by the Confederates at 200,000 and more, had allowed the southerners to strengthen the positions of the Warwick Line with more and more soldiers.
On April 15, McClellan ordered Garrow Ridge to be taken. A division under General Smith made good progress on April 16, but failed to take advantage of the initial successes. The Union suffered 309 casualties during the action at Garrow Ridge.
The slight setback at Garrow Ridge convinced McClellan again that an assault on Yorktown was not feasible. The Northern Army then prepared for a long siege, but the Southerners' retreat came before them.
The U.S. Navy's York River Flottila commander , Missroon, was relieved of his command on April 30 and replaced by the more aggressive William Smith. Smith then used his ships to bomb the city of Yorktown from the east. Confederation General Johnston saw in the increased aggression of the US Navy the danger of a possible amphibious landing behind his line of defense and then made the decision to prepare the withdrawal of the southerners from the peninsula.
On May 3rd, orders were issued on the southern side to withdraw troops from Yorktown. This withdrawal was completed by May 4th. Again, McClellan's response was too slow to significantly interfere with Confederation forces operationally. His order to Franklin's division, still in port on the ships, to cut off the enemy retreat by an amphibious assault, was not carried out until May 7th.
On May 4th, Yorktown fell into the hands of Union forces. Although the Confederation had lost the battle tactically and abandoned the city, the Southerners had bought four weeks to defend the city of Richmond against McClellan's advance. This time cushion, plus further unnecessary delays by McClellan, finally allowed the Confederation to take a temporary break in June 1862.
Aftermath
After the Confederation withdrew from Yorktown, the southerners withdrew from Williamsburg on May 5, 1862, and from Norfolk on May 9 . On May 11, the CSS Virginia , the victorious ironclad in the Battle of Hampton Roads, had to be grounded and blown up by its captain, which dealt a severe blow to the morale of the Confederate population. By the end of May, over 100,000 Union troops under McClellan's command had reached the Richmond area, threatening the Confederation capital, while another 30,000 Northerners under Irvin McDowell threatened the city of Fredericksburg .
The capture of Richmond was prevented in late June 1862 by a counter-offensive by the Confederation and several victorious skirmishes, often collectively called the Seven Day Battle . The Potomac Army was forced to retreat after the final defeat at the Battle of Malvern Hill and the chance of a quick victory over the secessionists was wasted.
McClellan was, in the eyes of many Northerners, the main culprit for the failure of the Peninsula Campaign because of his repeatedly overcautious approach to both Yorktown and Richmond, and made himself an enemy , among others, Secretary of Commerce Salmon P. Chase and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton . Within a month of the Malvern Hill defeat, several cabinet members openly urged President Lincoln to remove McClellan from his command. In November 1862, after the Battle of Antietam , McClellan was replaced by Ambrose Burnside on Lincoln's orders .
McClellan was long known for his cautious pace, u. a. at Yorktown, among historians as an untalented and poor general, but in recent times McClellan's thorough approach and the high morale which he inspired in his troops were positively emphasized. Even so, it is very likely that McClellan was the main culprit in the Union's failure to take Richmond.
Individual evidence
- ^ Gary W. Gallagher (ed.): The Richmond Campaign of 1862: The Peninsula & the Seven Days . The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 2000, ISBN 0-8078-2552-2 , pp. IX (English).
- ^ A b c David J. Eicher: The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War . Simon & Schuster, New York City 2001, ISBN 0-684-84944-5 , pp. 215 (English).
- ↑ Frances H. Kennedy (Ed.): The Civil War Battlefield Guide . Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston 1998, ISBN 0-395-74012-6 , pp. 88 (English).
- ^ John S. Salmon: The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide . Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg 2001, ISBN 0-8117-2868-4 , pp. 76 (English).
- ↑ a b c d e f g Kevin Dougherty, J. Michael Moore: The Peninsula Campaign of 1862: A Military Analysis . University Press of Mississippi, 2005, ISBN 1-57806-752-9 , pp. 77-85 (English).
- ↑ a b Siege of Yorktown. In: American Battlefield Trust. Retrieved August 6, 2020 .
- ^ A b Rowena Reed: Combined Operations of the Civil War . 1978, p. 133-160 (English).
- ^ Russell Beatie: Army of the Potomac . tape 3 . William and Mary College, 1984, p. 393-408 .
- ^ A b c d e Gary W. Gallagher (Ed.): The Richmond Campaign of 1862: The Peninsula & the Seven Days . The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 2000, ISBN 0-8078-2552-2 , pp. 7-16 (English).
- ^ Gary W. Gallagher: The American Civil War: Course Guidebook . The Great Courses, Chantilly 2000, pp. 83 .
- ^ Gary W. Gallagher: The American Civil War: Course Guidebook . The Great Courses, Chantilly 2000, Lecture 12: The Peninsula Campaign, pp. 48-51 .