Belgian railway crisis, 1869

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The Belgian railway crisis was a Franco-Belgian conflict in 1868/1869. A French railway company , the Ostbahngesellschaft, wanted to take over two railway lines in eastern Belgium . The Belgian government suspected that the French imperial government wanted to acquire indirect influence in Belgium, so they prevented the project.

The conflict raised emotions in both countries and had the potential to escalate into a European crisis or worse. In France it was suspected that the North German Confederation was secretly interfering , while Great Britain wanted to stay out of the crisis, but also wanted to protect Belgium. The crisis was resolved by a compromise found in a Franco-Belgian committee in Paris. By British pressure, the French Emperor Napoleon III. after and waived an acquisition.

Acquisition plans

Map of Belgium with railway lines, circa 1850s

In the east of Belgium there was the Compagnie du Grand Luxembourg with the route from Luxembourg to the north and the Compagnie du Liègeois-Limbourgeois with a route from Liège to the Dutch border. Both companies were in financial difficulties. The Belgian state did not want to buy them up, so in October 1868 they turned to a French railway company: the Chemin de fer de l'Est . At the beginning of the year, this company had already taken over the lines of the Compagnie Guillaume-Luxembourg from Luxembourg for 45 years. The French Eastern Railway Company would have dominated the railway network from the Swiss to the Dutch border. She was financially supported by the French government.

On December 8, 1868, the Ostbahngesellschaft concluded a provisional contract with the two Belgian ones. While the Belgian government knew about the project early on and had not taken any action, the Belgian public was outraged: The acquisition seemed like a dangerous economic penetration of the country, so the Belgian government now tried to prevent the matter. In return, there were calls in the French press to annex Belgium.

More violent, the Belgian Government resisted the sounds of France, at the time I Napoleon remembered. On February 6, 1869, the government submitted a bill to parliament: Foreign companies should only be allowed to buy or finance Belgian railways with the approval of the state. The law came into force on February 23.

Worsening of the crisis

The French Emperor Napoleon III. tried to acquire Belgium, Luxembourg and German border areas.

While, according to David Wetzel, the French government was wrongly suspected, Klaus Hildebrand writes of an "encroachment on Belgian independence". France actually wanted to hit Prussia with this. In a mixture of fear and arrogance, the French Empire raised a claim to supremacy in Europe. It called for the law to be withdrawn and suspected Prussia of being behind the Belgian resistance. In fact, Federal Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had not yet intervened in the crisis.

British Foreign Secretary George Villiers Clarendon wanted to stay out of the matter, even if Belgian neutrality was his top priority. Bismarck, however, tried to combine Belgian neutrality and the German question. He pointed out to Great Britain that northern Germany could only defend Belgium together with Great Britain. Otherwise, he suggested, he might come to an understanding with France on German unity by surrendering Belgium to the French emperor. London, however, dreaded the prospect of getting into a Franco-Prussian war, which would become more likely with such a British-Prussian alliance.

Foreign Secretary Clarendon tried unsuccessfully to convince the French that the Prussians were not always behind French failures. But he correctly trusted that France did not want a break with Great Britain, although the Kaiser now saw the railway question as a personal matter. Clarendon proposed to the Belgian Government that it should buy the two railway companies in question itself. Belgium did not want to set a precedent because other Belgian railway companies also had financial problems.

Negotiations in Paris

After Napoleon III on March 6th. Having called for a Franco-Belgian committee to settle all questions, Great Britain was in favor of a mixed committee of inquiry. In doing so, Foreign Minister Clarendon had come far to meet the French, as he wanted to take Napoleon's domestic political difficulties into account. Meanwhile, he warned the British ambassador in the Belgian capital, Brussels , that British support for Belgium had limits and that false expectations should not be aroused. Clarendon's aim was to force Belgium to compromise. He also managed to keep the British public calm. Had it recognized the danger Belgium was in, it could have urged the government to take dramatic action.

In London there was already fear of a war in which France would defeat Prussia and then perhaps even rule the Belgian and Dutch coasts. The level-headed manner of Bismarck was welcomed, who was aware of the scope of the Paris negotiations. The French negotiators around the Brussels ambassador were arrogant and provocative. They demanded that the Belgian government approve the sale of the two railway companies. The Belgian Prime Minister, on the other hand, wanted to grant rights of way and, on top of that, fix tariffs. His government was keen to maintain control of railways on Belgian territory. The Prime Minister succeeded in bringing in the negotiations through counter-proposals. On April 16, he threatened to invoke the powers that guarantee Belgian neutrality. His French opponent left the room, screaming that Prussia was behind it and that sooner or later there would be war.

So Foreign Secretary Clarendon let the French know that humiliation of Belgium would disrupt relations with Britain; He had already written to his ambassador in Brussels that an alliance between Great Britain and Prussia was possible at any time. The canal fleet was put under steam. Napoleon gave in, startled. The governments of France and Belgium signed a corresponding protocol on April 27, 1869. The upcoming commercial negotiations lasted until the summer.

Evaluation and classification

Research has suggested that Napoleon gave in because an alliance with Austria-Hungary had not come about and he shrank from a war. Or the prospect of a British-Prussian alliance made him do it. Klaus Hildebrand, on the other hand, agrees that Belgium's resistance and Great Britain's determined demeanor were decisive. Britain has had many opportunities to form alliances and put its global weight on the scales. Napoleon understood the disadvantages that a break with the other great Western power would have brought with it.

While France had considered Prussia to be the main enemy since the turn of the year 1866/1867, Great Britain saw the European equilibrium just restored. During the railway crisis, Great Britain recognized that France was ready for war and Prussia was prudent. Despite Bismarck's domestic policy, it was positively noticed that the Chancellor had temporarily come to terms with the status quo and did not try to destroy Austria-Hungary . In addition, there was generally a friendly atmosphere towards Great Britain in Prussia and Germany, very different from France. Great Britain emerged from the crisis knowing that despite its military powerlessness it had achieved political success. As a result, it continued to seek neutrality towards France and the North German Confederation.

See also

supporting documents

  1. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: No intervention. The Pax Britannica and Prussia 1865/66 - 1869/70. An investigation into English world politics in the 19th century. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1997, p. 313.
  2. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: No intervention. The Pax Britannica and Prussia 1865/66 - 1869/70. An investigation into English world politics in the 19th century. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1997, p. 313/314.
  3. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: No intervention. The Pax Britannica and Prussia 1865/66 - 1869/70. An investigation into English world politics in the 19th century. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1997, p. 314/315.
  4. ^ David Wetzel: A Duel of Nations. Germany, France and the Diplomacy of the War 1870–1871. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison / London 2012, pp. 34/35.
  5. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: No intervention. The Pax Britannica and Prussia 1865/66 - 1869/70. An investigation into English world politics in the 19th century. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1997, pp. 310-312, p. 315.
  6. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: No intervention. The Pax Britannica and Prussia 1865/66 - 1869/70. An investigation into English world politics in the 19th century. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1997, p. 312.
  7. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: No intervention. The Pax Britannica and Prussia 1865/66 - 1869/70. An investigation into English world politics in the 19th century. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1997, pp. 318-320.
  8. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: No intervention. The Pax Britannica and Prussia 1865/66 - 1869/70. An investigation into English world politics in the 19th century. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1997, p. 323/324, p. 326/327.
  9. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: No intervention. The Pax Britannica and Prussia 1865/66 - 1869/70. An investigation into English world politics in the 19th century. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1997, p. 329, p. 332/233.
  10. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: No intervention. The Pax Britannica and Prussia 1865/66 - 1869/70. An investigation into English world politics in the 19th century. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1997, p. 323/324, p. 335-.
  11. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: No intervention. The Pax Britannica and Prussia 1865/66 - 1869/70. An investigation into English world politics in the 19th century. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1997, p. 336, p. 338.
  12. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: No intervention. The Pax Britannica and Prussia 1865/66 - 1869/70. An investigation into English world politics in the 19th century. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1997, p. 323/324, p. 337-.
  13. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand: No intervention. The Pax Britannica and Prussia 1865/66 - 1869/70. An investigation into English world politics in the 19th century. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 1997, p. 310, p. 315-317.