Triple Alliance Plan 1868–1870

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States of Europe before 1870 and the points of contention between France, Austria and Italy

The Triple Alliance plan (or plan of a Triple Alliance ) was an attempt to form an alliance of Austria-Hungary , France and Italy to manufacture. In the years 1868 to 1870, the three countries temporarily intended to increase their own security in this way and to achieve further goals. The plan failed because of the different goals and the different willingness to stand by each other in the event of war.

The importance of these negotiations became apparent in July 1870: the French government mistakenly believed that it nevertheless had a certain degree of agreement with the other two powers on how to proceed together. With this deceptive feeling of security, France let the crisis over the Hohenzollern candidacy in Spain escalate. In fact, Austria-Hungary and Italy remained neutral in the Franco-German War .

History and goals

France

A caricature in the English Vanity Fair , September 1869. The French Emperor Napoleon III. needs the support of lady parliamentarianism after the liberals had gained strength.

France under Napoleon III. operated a contradicting foreign policy: on the one hand, it advocated the nationality principle, especially in Italy and Germany, on the other hand, it also paid attention to its own advantage. Foreign policy successes were of great importance for Napoleon's insecure regime.

Until 1866, Napoleon III. still sympathy for Prussia; nevertheless he had concluded a secret treaty with Austria in the event of an Austro-Prussian war. That was because he was expecting an Austrian victory. For his neutrality in the event of war, Napoleon III wanted. be allowed to have a say in Germany's future and possibly get the Rhineland under his control. When Prussia won the German War in the summer of 1866, France received nothing and felt betrayed.

As a result, the official France showed itself to be benevolent towards Prussia and the North German Confederation . Not least because of the Luxembourg crisis in 1867, however, it rearmed itself and tried to provoke Prussia to war. Military intervention was intended to prevent Prussia from becoming stronger and forcing the southern German states to join the North German Confederation. Allan Mitchell, for example, sees the Triple Alliance negotiations as a French attempt to encourage the southern states to oppose Prussia. They should be offered a realistic alternative while Prussia would be isolated.

Austria-Hungary

In the Peace of Prague, Austria had to admit that the German Confederation had been dissolved and that Prussia was allowed to establish a federal state in northern Germany. The southern German states were allowed to join together to form a confederation ( Southern German Confederation , which, however, did not come about). Nevertheless, Austria was still trying to “re-enter Germany”.

Since 1867 Austria was a dual monarchy as Austria-Hungary; A safeguard in foreign policy should also help against the internal crisis. The dual monarchy sought protection from an attack by Italy and did not want to be isolated in the event of a Prussian or Russian attack.

For Austria-Hungary, however, the immediate danger lay in the east. The dual monarchy needed support against Russia and for the pursuit of its interests in the Balkans. An alliance with France served Austria-Hungary primarily to secure against a French victory against Prussia: In such a case Austria-Hungary wanted a say in the future of German conditions.

Italy

Since 1860/1861 Italy was largely a nation-state within the boundaries known today. In the war of 1866 it received Veneto from Austria , which it had secured in an alliance treaty with Prussia . But one last larger country remained outside the Kingdom of Italy: the Papal States around Rome . There French troops supported the Pope militarily. In doing so, Napoleon complied with the wishes of conservative Catholics in France and throughout Europe. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, traditionally inclined towards the Pope, would have come to terms with the end of the Papal States for the sake of the Triple Alliance. With the view of Rome, so the expectation in Vienna, Italy's gaze could be diverted from Tyrol.

Italy had no quarrel with Prussia. Instead, it wanted to make Rome the capital of the kingdom soon and possibly reacquire Nice from France and acquire Tyrol from Austria. King Victor Emmanuel would also have liked to strengthen his shaky, republican-attacked throne through his alliance with two emperors. Above all, Italy had to offer its neutrality, while its allegedly 200,000 soldiers (in fact, it was more like 60,000) would have been difficult to transport to Austria due to the lack of railway lines. In December 1868 Italy offered Austria-Hungary neutrality, even in the event of an Austro-Russian war, but demanded Tyrol in return. Austria-Hungary had tense relations with Russia, but found the price for Italian neutrality too high. Minister of State Friedrich von Beust referred the Italians to Paris.

Course of negotiations

Napoleon III sought an alliance with Austria-Hungary since 1868 after the desire for independence had increased in southern Germany. Then France thought of a war alliance with Austria and Italy and the formation of a southern German alliance. The aftermath of the war of 1866 should be erased.

On March 1, 1869, Napoleon III worked. already in a Triple Alliance. In the event of an Austro-Russian war, France would send troops to the Rhine (that is, the border with Prussia). In the event of a Franco-Prussian war, Austria-Hungary would station troops in Bohemia to intervene if Russia were to assist the Prussians. In the event of war, Italy would have to contribute 200,000 soldiers, for which it was to be rewarded with Tyrol. The two emperors would mediate on the Roman question . But Austria-Hungary feared losing its neutrality, and the French foreign minister complained that the draft treaty was unilaterally favoring Austria-Hungary.

Italy was unhappy that it would have to automatically deploy its soldiers as soon as Austria-Hungary or France decided to go to war. In addition, it only wanted to join a Triple Alliance if French troops were withdrawn from Rome, the king told the French foreign minister on June 25.

Nevertheless, on May 20, 1869 there was a new draft contract; the monarchs of France and Austria-Hungary had already agreed on this, but the consent of the Italian king was still lacking.

The Italian King Viktor Emanuel II Italy wanted to make Rome his capital and therefore strove to annex the Papal States. Napoleon III but refused and protected the papal state with French troops.

The draft provided for a "peace, assistance and friendship pact":

  • The three powers advise each other on all important European questions.
  • They assure each other of their national territory.
  • In times of crisis they set up an attack and defense alliance.
  • They jointly decide on peace negotiations and territorial changes after a war.
  • In the event of an Austro-Prussian war, France and Italy come to Austria's aid immediately.
  • Italy may set up a base for its fleet in or near Tunis.
  • If Switzerland violates its neutrality, Italy receives Ticino .
  • If Austria-Hungary wins territory after a joint victorious war, Italy will receive the territories of Trento and Rovereto from Austria. In a corresponding case, Italy receives a border correction at Nice from France .
  • France supports its partners financially in the event of war (Italy by assuming the costs, Austria-Hungary by means of a loan).

Austria-Hungary also wanted it to be able to remain neutral in the event of a Franco-Prussian war. Napoleon seemed willing to do so at times, although it would have forced Paris to adopt a more cautious policy towards Prussia. For its part, France had originally intended to use the alliance with Austria to create a new German federation after a war in Germany, which would have consisted of states as equally powerful as possible. This intention finally became a general provision that compensation and changes of territory were to be decided jointly by the three powers.

In the autumn of 1869 the three monarchs exchanged letters about the outcome of the negotiations. Napoleon III and Franz Joseph I assured each other that they would consult each other before negotiating with a foreign power. Only Napoleon promised immediate help in case of war. King Victor Emmanuel II stuck to his wish for a Triple Alliance, but the signing could only take place after a solution to the Roman question.

Thereafter, negotiations on the Triple Alliance were discontinued. Both Austria-Hungary and France doubted the reliability and inner strength of the other. Austria-Hungary had to show consideration for nationalities, France for the liberal opposition. Both powers were increasingly interested in a better relationship with Russia, Austria-Hungary also with Prussia. (France, however, was not ready to give in to Russia on the issue of the straits, so that rapprochement was hopeless.) The French foreign minister even asked the Austrian ambassador whether Austria could possibly cede Galicia to Russia. When Austria-Hungary again sounded out in Paris in June 1870 whether France was still interested in the Triple Alliance, the French Foreign Minister Gramont replied: The matter should be abandoned for the moment.

Military plans

Archduke Albrecht of Austria-Teschen in 1854

In the spring and early summer of 1870, Archduke Albrecht , the General Inspector of the Austrian Army, tried to take joint action in the event of war. According to Albrecht, Austria-Hungary needed six weeks to mobilize and deploy in Bohemia. During this time, Austria must remain neutral. The French army could already march into southern Germany at this time and repel the Prussians on the Saar . In the Bavarian Franconia, French and Austrian troops were to unite and take joint action against Berlin. The Italians would move into Bavaria.

Napoleon and his ministers discussed this war plan in May 1870. They insisted on a certainty that Austria-Hungary would not remain neutral after all while France was already marching. Franz Joseph stuck to the earlier point of view. He sent a message to the French government: If Austria-Hungary were involved from the beginning of the war, then Prussia would appeal to the national and appeal to the Germans in southern Germany and Austria-Hungary. It would be different if Napoleon succeeded in being seen not as an enemy but as a liberator in southern Germany.

In May 1870, Foreign Minister Antoine de Gramont was in Vienna and Minister of State Beust informed him about the secret negotiations on the Triple Alliance. Beust vaguely pledged support from France in the question of the Spanish succession , but also warned against starting a war too early. Wilfried Radewahn: “At that time, nothing more could be expected from Austria. France had to take the initiative, and the question arises whether French foreign policy, despite the official peace declarations, did not try to set the course for a decision against Prussia. "

Classification and consequences

Kladderadatsch from 1869: Napoleon III. as a circus attraction, juggling war and peace

David Wetzel sums up the dilemma: France sought help against Prussia, Austria-Hungary against Russia. Despite a few attempts, this contradiction could not be overcome. France should have taken the warnings made by the Austrian and Italian representatives more seriously. "But these reservations had no effect on those whose shoulders were responsible for the tragic circumstances of July 1870."

Although official France held back out of calculation, the French government was largely ready for war with Prussia. Napoleon III erroneously assumed that the letters of the three monarchs amounted to a moral obligation. (In fact, however, there were no concrete agreements.) After the successful outcome of the plebiscite of May 8, 1870 for Napoleon, he also saw his domestic political situation strengthened. The war party in the French leadership and Napoleon were, however, desperate that Prussia did not give rise to war. The real challenge for France was to ensure that in the event of war only the north and not the south of Germany would stand against France.

At the beginning of July it was announced in Paris that the Hohenzollern Prince Leopold was a candidate for the Spanish throne. The French government immediately went public with indignation and made a negotiated solution impossible. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers on July 6, Napoleon III read. the monarch's letters, which he interpreted as a promise of help. In addition to Austria-Hungary and Italy, the Guelphs and Denmark were also believed by their side in Paris ; the southern German states would remain neutral. Later it was hoped, just as in vain, for the support of Romania and the Ottoman Empire. Russia refused to agree to the actions of a Triple Alliance, fearing that it would be isolated in Europe afterwards. Russia much preferred to see a balance between France, Prussia and Austria.

France remained isolated in the Franco-Prussian War; its reason for the war, the Hohenzollern candidacy, was viewed as void in Europe. The French troops from Rome were ordered back to France and Italy annexed the Papal States. In September 1870 Napoleon III. Prisoner of war and his regime replaced by a republic . The southern German states joined the North German Confederation , creating the German Empire. Austria recognized the new situation and with it its final exclusion from Germany.

See also

supporting documents

  1. ↑ Allan Mitchell: Bismarck and the French Nation 1848–1890. Pegasus, New York 1971, p. 49.
  2. ^ Heinrich Lutz: Foreign policy tendencies of the Habsburg monarchy from 1866 to 1870: "Re-entry in Germany" and consolidation as a European power in the alliance with France. In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war. R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 1-16, here p. 8.
  3. ^ David Wetzel: A Duel of Nations. Germany, France and the Diplomacy of the War 1870–1871. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison / London 2012, pp. 30/31.
  4. ^ Heinrich Lutz: Foreign policy tendencies of the Habsburg monarchy from 1866 to 1870: "Re-entry in Germany" and consolidation as a European power in the alliance with France. In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war. R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 1-16, here p. 10.
  5. ^ David Wetzel: A Duel of Nations. Germany, France and the Diplomacy of the War 1870–1871. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison / London 2012, p. 30.
  6. ^ David Wetzel: A Duel of Nations. Germany, France and the Diplomacy of the War 1870–1871. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison / London 2012, pp. 27/28.
  7. ↑ Wilfried Radewahn: European questions and conflict zones in the calculation of French foreign policy before the war of 1870. In: Eberhard Kolb (ed.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - conflict fields - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 33-64, here pp. 49/50.
  8. ^ David Wetzel: A Duel of Nations. Germany, France and the Diplomacy of the War 1870–1871. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison / London 2012, p. 29.
  9. ^ David Wetzel: A Duel of Nations. Germany, France and the Diplomacy of the War 1870–1871. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison / London 2012, pp. 29/30.
  10. ^ Heinrich Lutz: Foreign policy tendencies of the Habsburg monarchy from 1866 to 1870: "Re-entry in Germany" and consolidation as a European power in the alliance with France. In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war. R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 1-16, here pp. 5/6.
  11. ^ Heinrich Lutz: Foreign policy tendencies of the Habsburg monarchy from 1866 to 1870: "Re-entry in Germany" and consolidation as a European power in the alliance with France. In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war. R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 1-16, here pp. 6-8.
  12. ^ Heinrich Lutz: Foreign policy tendencies of the Habsburg monarchy from 1866 to 1870: "Re-entry in Germany" and consolidation as a European power in the alliance with France. In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war. R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 1-16, here p. 9.
  13. ↑ Wilfried Radewahn: European questions and conflict zones in the calculation of French foreign policy before the war of 1870. In: Eberhard Kolb (ed.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - conflict fields - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 33-64, here p. 53.
  14. ^ Heinrich Lutz: Foreign policy tendencies of the Habsburg monarchy from 1866 to 1870: "Re-entry in Germany" and consolidation as a European power in the alliance with France. In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war. R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 1-16, here pp. 10-12.
  15. ^ Heinrich Lutz: Foreign policy tendencies of the Habsburg monarchy from 1866 to 1870: "Re-entry in Germany" and consolidation as a European power in the alliance with France. In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war. R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 1-16, here pp. 13/14.
  16. ^ Heinrich Lutz: Foreign policy tendencies of the Habsburg monarchy from 1866 to 1870: "Re-entry in Germany" and consolidation as a European power in the alliance with France. In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war. R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 1-16, here pp. 14/15.
  17. ↑ Wilfried Radewahn: European questions and conflict zones in the calculation of French foreign policy before the war of 1870. In: Eberhard Kolb (ed.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - conflict fields - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 33-64, here p. 55.
  18. ^ David Wetzel: A Duel of Nations. Germany, France and the Diplomacy of the War 1870–1871. The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison / London 2012, pp. 31/32.
  19. ↑ Wilfried Radewahn: European questions and conflict zones in the calculation of French foreign policy before the war of 1870. In: Eberhard Kolb (ed.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - conflict fields - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 33-64, here pp. 50/52.
  20. ↑ Wilfried Radewahn: European questions and conflict zones in the calculation of French foreign policy before the war of 1870. In: Eberhard Kolb (ed.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - conflict fields - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 33-64, here pp. 57-60.