Succession to the Spanish throne 1868–1870

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Isabella II of Spain . Her dismissal in 1868 led to years of searching for a successor. The search gained world historical significance because it indirectly triggered the Franco-Prussian War , which brought about the unity of Germany .

The succession to the Spanish throne 1868–1870 was about the succession of Queen Isabella II . She had lost her throne in a coup in September 1868. The leaders of this September Revolution , Generals Juan Prim and Francisco Serrano Domínguez , searched all of Europe for a suitable new king.

One of the possible candidates was Leopold , a prince from the House of Hohenzollern . The Prussian Prime Minister and North German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had urged the prince to run for office. Bismarck wanted to increase the Prussian reputation. When the French ambassador to Spain learned on July 2, 1870 that the Spaniards would soon crown Leopold, this led to an outcry in France. The French government threatened war, so Leopold withdrew his candidacy on July 12th.

The French government, however, continued to seek confrontation and then pressed the Prussian King Wilhelm , the head of the House of Hohenzollern, to apologize for the candidacy and to rule out a similar candidacy in the future. Wilhelm refused and commissioned Bismarck to inform the press about it. Bismarck's communication based on the Emser Depesche was deliberately formulated in such a way that it made the contact between the two sides appear particularly harsh and undiplomatic. The outrage in France led to the declaration of war on Prussia.

The question of the Spanish succession to the throne became the occasion for the Franco-German War of 1870/1871. The cause were years of tension between Prussia and France after the German War of 1866. France's aim was to curb Prussian power and conquer areas on the left bank of the Rhine. During the Franco-Prussian War, the southern German states joined the North German Confederation . This is how the German Empire emerged from the Bund .

In November 1870, the Spanish Parliament elected one of the other candidates for king, the Italian Duke of Aosta, Amadeus . However, the political situation in Spain remained permanently unstable. Amadeus abdicated in February 1873.

prehistory

Importance for Europe

Isabella's flight from Spain was interpreted as an exposure and weakening of France, and at the same time as an opportunity for Italy and Germany. This led to suspicions that the Duke of Montpensier had contributed to Isabella's fall with Bismarck's support. French Prime Minister Émile Ollivier knew the rumors but admitted that the revolutionary movement in Spain was older and needed no push from Berlin. A direct Prussian influence is also unlikely because there were no personal connections and because the overthrow of a queen would not have suited the legitimist position in Berlin.

In an internal letter, the North German Chancellor Bismarck interpreted the overthrow of Isabella as favorable to peace, because a French attack would be less likely. Keeping the succession open is in Prussia's interest, and Prussia should also retain the goodwill of the transitional regime. King Wilhelm stressed Spain's independence in a speech to the Prussian state parliament. For Bismarck, the succession to the throne was initially no more important than the St. Gotthard tunnel or the imperial plan of 1870 : just another thorn in Napoleon III's flesh, an opportunity for provocation.

For Prussia, the question of succession to the throne was the chance to disturb Napoleon and distract him from the German question, but also to approach Spain as a possible ally. Possibly Bismarck believed in a new alliance: With a pro-Prussian Spain behind her, France would have shrank from war, or in the event of war France could have got into a two-front war, as Austria did with Italy in 1866. France hoped that in the course of the line of succession it could strengthen its influence on Spain with a renewed Bourbon monarchy. This would have given France, writes Hans-Otto Kleinmann, a “trump card for the encirclement policy towards Prussia”. Italy liked to see a stronger Spain in foreign policy, which was directed against France's addiction to great power. Britain, Russia and Austria, on the other hand, waited and tried to keep the peace for different reasons.

Situation in Spain

Caricature of the Spanish Revolution of 1868 and the democratic years that followed

Compared to the 18th century, Spain had a more difficult foreign policy situation. It had lost most of its colonies, there were no longer Bourbons on the throne in France and Spain at the same time, and internal conflicts prevented a policy of national interest. Spain would have liked to act in harmony with France and Great Britain in order not to bind itself unilaterally to France, but Great Britain behaved cautiously in terms of foreign policy in 1860–1870. France was an overpowering neighbor, diplomatically and economically. It was in the Spanish interest to forge close ties with other powers, especially after the revolution of 1868.

In Spain, the Liberal Union, the Progress Party and the Democrats joined forces against the Republicans for a short time. In the constitutional deliberations in 1869, these had demanded that the head of state must be a Spaniard, born in Spain and of Spanish parents. In practice, only a republican head of state would have been possible. The majority rejected this and on May 21 explicitly voted for a monarchy. On June 12, Prim had to declare in parliament that the government could not yet present a candidate. This is because Spain is only now completing its constitutional order and because unrest in the country has deterred candidates. The most urgent task of the transitional rule is therefore the restoration of peace and order. Serrano became regent on June 15, i.e. a temporary substitute monarch.

Requirements for a candidate

Juan Prim in 1861, later Prime Minister of Spain in the transition period

The search for a candidate turned out to be extremely difficult. The requirements more or less excluded a Spaniard. Yet the people themselves did not want a foreigner on the throne.

  • Basically only one man from the European nobility was to be thought of. He should belong to a ruling princely house.
  • Prime Minister Prim in particular rejected the Bourbon dynasty, the dynasty of the former Queen Isabella.
  • The candidate should be Catholic. The people would not have found it credible if someone had changed religion just to become king. However, the candidate should not be so devout that he would have displeased the Liberals.
  • He should be intelligent and have a pleasant personality with a strong personality.
  • It was an advantage if he was neither too young nor too old. Besides, people liked to see the candidate already having a son who would one day continue the dynasty.
  • Spain's foreign policy should benefit from the succession to the throne and not be burdened additionally. Napoleon III should not be against the candidate, who otherwise should have had particularly strong support, nationally and internationally.

After all, the person sought had to want to become a candidate at all. Because of the troubled situation in Spain, the throne was not exactly attractive.

Candidates

Duke of Montpensier

Antoine von Orleans, Duke of Montpensier , not only had Napoleon III. to the opponent, but was unpopular in Spain.

Antoine, Duke of Montpensier , was the brother-in-law of the deposed Queen Isabella, namely the husband of her sister Louise. When Louise refused to run, all eyes were on her husband Antoine. However, Antoine was the youngest son of Louis-Philippe I , the French king of the House of Orleans from 1830 to 1848. Napoleon III would vehemently try to prevent this representative of a competing French dynasty. Antoine should not have expected any support from the Progress Party and the Democrats on the Spanish throne. Prim also spoke out against the husband of a Bourbon woman, that would have been the continuation of the younger branch of the lineage which he had overthrown.

Napoleon III considered an Orleans as the Spanish king to be the worst result of the candidate search, as he said in February 1869, for example. He would have seen it as a personal insult and feared that Montpensier would come to an understanding with Bismarck. The leaders of the Liberal Union found Montpensier unsympathetic and untrustworthy. Had there been no resistance from France, they might have accepted it as their last choice.

Salazar, a confidante of Prim, said in February 1870 that anyone who has not been elected to the Spanish parliament in two by-elections could hardly become king. At the latest after Montpensier had killed the former Infante Don Enrique von Bourbon in a duel in March 1870 , there was no longer any prospect of the throne for him. The Spanish government only used him as a negative figure to make other candidates acceptable to the French emperor.

Ferdinand and Luis of Portugal

Ferdinand von Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha, as Ferdinand II. King of Portugal from 1837 to 1853 and regent for two years in place of his son

In early 1869 the leaders of the Progress Party and the Democrats were able to imagine Ferdinand as king. He was the former king of Portugal and father of the current king Luis. Another member of the Braganza House would have been welcome. In mid-January 1869, the attempt to get Ferdinand to run for office failed. He didn't want to give up his retirement.

Ferdinand's candidacy would not have worried any other nation. He came from the Saxe-Coburg-Gotha family, was 52 years old, healthy, Catholic by birth, but liberal, and had introduced parliamentary government in Portugal. He spoke Spanish, was politically experienced, and loved arts and science. Even the Republicans would have accepted him in the interests of national unity. He had enough descendants to succeed him to the throne. If his son, King Luis of Portugal, were to succeed him in Spain, Iberia would be united under a single king. (This view was more popular in Spain than in Portugal, however.)

Ferdinand had already refused the Greek throne, but it was assumed that he would not refuse if the large majority of the Spanish parliament called him. But when the newspapers reported in April 1869 that the Spanish cabinet wanted to offer Ferdinand the throne, the Portuguese ambassador in Madrid reported: Ferdinand would reject the election.

Italian candidates

The House of Savoy had been a kind of auxiliary dynasty for Spain since 1713 due to the Pragmatic Sanction . A candidate from Italy would automatically have the support of this European power behind him. Napoleon III should have shown more consideration for Spain in order not to lose Italy for its planned anti-Prussian Triple Alliance with Austria .

Many Spaniards would have rejected an Italian prince, for anti-clerical and anti-papal reasons. Nevertheless, Prim accepted the suggestion of a former Spanish ambassador in Florence that he speak to Amadeus of Savoy , the Duke of Aosta and second son of the Italian King Victor Emanuels II. For a short time, Duke Ferdinand von Alençon was thought of . He spoke perfect Spanish and had completed his military training in Spain. However, he was an Orleans.

King Victor Emmanuel II proposed his fifteen-year-old nephew Thomas, Duke of Genoa. In October 1869, a Spanish commission of the monarchist parties voted for Thomas. But this immediately led to the resignation of ministers, and at the end of December Victor Emanuel had to report that he had not been able to prevail against the resistance of the duchess. After fifteen months, Spain still had no king and the cabinet resigned as a whole in early January 1870. In this situation, according to Lawrence D. Steefel, it was only natural to think of Leopold von Hohenzollern again.

Spanish candidates

General Baldomero Espartero , already 75 years old, was a former Prime Minister from the time of the regent Maria Christina (1840). He would have been a kind of “people's king”. Despite his reputation, he did not have a majority in the Cortes and there was no international coverage. Prim made him an offer on May 13, 1870, but the general refused.

Don Carlos (Charles VII) was the leader of the Carlist. The revolutionaries rejected him just as much as the Bourbons.

Leopold of Hohenzollern

Leopold von Hohenzollern , born in 1835, took part in the German War in 1866 as a Prussian officer . He was married to the Portuguese king's daughter Antonia Maria .

Leopold von Hohenzollern was of legal age, but not too old, Catholic but not ultramontane . At the beginning of the New Era in Prussia, his father Karl Anton had served as Prussian Prime Minister. Leopold's brother Karl had been a constitutional monarch in Romania since 1866 . Leopold could be seen as moderately liberal and therefore suitable for the new order in Spain. Although he officially belonged to the Prussian royal family, he was with Napoleon III. more closely related than with the Prussian King Wilhelm. He already had sons who could continue the line. His wife was a Portuguese princess, which made a later unification of the Iberian kingdoms conceivable. In February 1870, Salazar described Leopold as pleasant, but he had some doubts about his strength and character.

In the fall of 1866, the Prussian diplomat Georg von Werthern had a conversation with members of the Spanish Unión Liberal. These spoke of an imminent overthrow of the queen and a possible successor; Werthern told them that Leopold was the most suitable. When he was back in Germany at the end of 1866, Werthern later claimed, he had made Leopold's father Karl Anton aware of the matter; in any case, Karl Anton cannot have been very impressed. When exactly the Prussian Prime Minister and North German Chancellor Bismarck first became interested in the Spanish succession remains controversial. Contemporaries and historians have referred to trips by Prussian military personnel and diplomats such as Theodor von Bernhardi to Spain.

Karl Anton von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen , Leopold's father, picture from 1886

Even when the transitional regime was set up, the international press acted on Leopold as a possible candidate. At this early stage, however, there could only be rumors behind it.

At the beginning of December 1868, Karl Anton wrote to his son Karl I of Romania that they did not know anything about this candidacy, which constantly appeared in the press. If it were brought to the house, he would never advise it: France was jealous because of the Hohenzollern ruler in Romania and would not accept a Hohenzollern in Madrid. On April 19, 1869, Karl Anton received a letter from his son-in-law, Philipp von Flanders : According to the Belgian government, it was said from Spain that Leopold's candidacy had a good chance. Karl Anton reported about this to the Prussian king. Wilhelm confirmed to Karl Anton that he would not press Leopold to run for office.

Hohenzollern candidacy in 1870

Napoleon III around 1865. Elected by the French people in 1848, he made himself emperor in 1852.

Increasing to Leopold from 1869

In early 1869, Ferdinand and the Duke of Montpensier appeared as the most likely candidates. In March 1869 the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon wrote to a colleague that he should use his contacts with Marshal Prim to propose Leopold. Leopold is an excellent person and personally known to the ambassador. Napoleon III would probably take no pleasure in Leopold, but would still prefer him to the Duke of Montpensier. At the time, Napoleon himself did not yet take Leopold's candidacy seriously. Personally, he had nothing against the Hohenzollern, but rejected him as a descendant of Joachim Murat . The French emperor preferred Alfonso, Isabella's son.

Salazar, as Prim's envoy, met Karl Anton and his sons Karl and Leopold in Germany in September 1869 to informally explore the possibilities. Karl refused to exchange the Romanian title for the Spanish crown. Leopold showed little inclination to accept the crown, but also did not reject the offer outright. As preconditions, Leopold mentioned to Salazar: his election must be unanimous, there must be no competition with another candidate, Napoleon must agree and his election must in no way be directed against Portugal.

Between February 6th and 17th, Prim made the decision to send Salazar back to Germany. He received a letter in which the Spanish Prime Minister Leopold asked for a positive answer. In February 1870 Salazar convinced Karl Anton of the candidacy. The latter wrote to his son to put the decision in the hands of the Prussian king. The matter should not be treated emotionally, but factually and as a family decision. If the king wanted to look at them further, he should ask Karl Anton to come to Berlin and hear the opinion of Crown Prince Friedrich and Bismarck's.

In a letter dated March 1 to his father Karl Anton, Leopold reported that King Wilhelm was still undecided. Bismarck said that a republic in Spain had to be prevented in view of the political relations of Europe. The entire House of Hohenzollern would be honored if one of them came to the Spanish throne. Otherwise, a Bavarian prince in Spain could play into the hands of the " ultramontanes ", that is, the Catholics.

King Wilhelm told Bismarck: If there were to be war between France and Prussia, and if Spain had a pro-German government, France would have to leave one or two army corps on the border with Spain. A Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne would therefore reduce the risk of war. The maintenance of the peace did not depend on the goodwill of France, but on the strong position of Prussia. Therefore Bismarck urged the king to see that Leopold accepted the crown.

Bismarck's memorandum to the king of March 9, 1870 was interpreted differently. One extreme was the view that Bismarck had selflessly wanted to provide Spain with a king who had to be more agreeable to Napoleon than the Duke of Montpensier or a republic. At the other extreme was the charge that Bismarck had already wanted to provoke France to declare war. But this was unlikely to be so sharp, since Bismarck normally did not tie his hands in a way that would only have allowed one result. However, he was aware of the risks of a Hohenzollern line to the throne. Everyone involved, such as Prim and Karl Anton, feared Napoleon's resistance, but the extent of this resistance was uncertain. Bismarck downplayed the danger of war.

At a dinner in the Berlin Palace, the king discussed the matter in private. Crown Prince Frederick joined the king's concerns over the uncertain situation in Spain and the uncertainty surrounding international reactions. There is also the opposition of legitimate heirs to the throne and it is not known how the votes are distributed in the Spanish parliament. Most of the other participants in the round, such as Rudolph Delbrück and Albrecht von Roon, were more optimistic. The arguments put forward changed Karl Anton and Leopold, and on March 16 they told the King that Leopold would be ready for the “sacrifice” if Wilhelm ordered it. Wilhelm refused to do this, however.

Decision on candidacy and publication

Karl Anton wanted to come to a decision and have three points clarified: There must be at least a two-thirds to three-quarters majority for Leopold in the Spanish parliament; there should be no threat of national bankruptcy ; the planned anti-clerical laws would have to be implemented in good time that Leopold would no longer be associated with them. Prim and Serrano urged a swift decision, if possible before the next parliamentary meeting on April 19, as rumors circulated that the transitional rulers were deliberately trying to extend the state without a kingship. They let Bismarck know that Leopold was the best candidate. France will not be able to reproach Spain, because after all it is about the interests of Spain, not Prussia.

Prim wrote a letter to Bismarck in April that said Prim's position would soon become untenable. The situation in Spain is safe for Leopold. If you want to found a dynasty, you have to take a little risk. In addition, Prim made contact with Ferdinand, who did not want to change his mind, and with Marshal Baldomero Espartero, Duke of Vitoria, perhaps the only conceivable Spanish candidate. However, he canceled with reference to his age and health.

Reports about the favorable situation in Spain made Leopold more optimistic at the end of May, and Crown Prince Friedrich let Karl Anton win him over as a mediator between Leopold and the King. On June 19, Leopold finally agreed, and Wilhelm two days later. Bismarck insisted on secrecy in further proceedings in order to avoid the impression that this was an official matter. Officially, he maintained that it was a family matter for the Hohenzollern family. He could hardly expect to get away with it, according to the historian Lothar Gall. But if France were to try to break through this fiction, it would have to reveal that its resistance was in fact intended to contain Prussia. Bismarck assumed that the German nation would then stand behind Prussia.

Bismarck wanted to present France with a fait accompli. As little time as possible should pass between the announcement of Leopold's candidacy and the election of the king. This plan failed, however: The telegram from a Spanish negotiator was incorrectly deciphered in Germany. The result was that the Spanish government did not put the election on an early date, but on August 1st. On July 2, the government announced the candidacy to the French ambassador. Immediately attention in France turned to Prussia. Urged by the French Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, the Prussian Ambassador Werthern promised to report to King Wilhelm.

French government demands

Antoine de Gramont , Foreign Minister of the French Empire in 1870 (May 15 to August 9)

When the French government learned of the Hohenzollern candidacy, it could have waited with a public reaction. That would have given her the opportunity to negotiate. However, their actual conflict strategy, as adopted in the cabinet on July 6, unnecessarily narrowed their scope of action, as Wilfried Radewahn judges. The background to this is that the French government wrongly assumed that Austria and Italy would stand by them in the event of war and that southern Germany would remain neutral. The situation was assessed as favorable for the conflict to gradually escalate.

Also on July 6, Foreign Minister Antoine de Gramont gave a speech to the French Parliament that resembled a declaration of war. If a foreign power places one of its princes on the throne of Charles V , the European balance is disturbed to the detriment of France. France would then do its duty without hesitation. On the following day, Gramont instructed Benedetti to rush to King Wilhelm immediately and to demand that Leopold withdraw.

While it was vacation time in Europe and Bismarck was staying in Varzin, the Prussian diplomat Werthern tried to bring about peace. He even sent a representative to Karl Anton to lobby for Leopold's withdrawal. Benedetti spoke to Wilhelm in Bad Ems , where he was staying for the cure, for the first time on July 9th. Wilhelm replied, as requested by Bismarck, that it was a purely family matter. As head of the Hohenzollern dynasty, he agreed, because the Sigmaringer should be free to decide. Immediately on July 10th, however, Wilhelm wrote to Karl Anton that Leopold should withdraw his candidacy. Wilhelm didn't want another war. Leopold announced his withdrawal on July 12th. Wawro: “Even without Bismarck at his side, Wilhelm now understood that Napoleon III. the desire for more than security stood; it was about the humiliation of Prussia before the eyes of Europe. "

Vincent Benedetti , French ambassador for Prussia since 1864

In France people were enthusiastic about Leopold's withdrawal, the prices on the stock exchange rose by four to five percent. Napoleon III and Prime Minister Ollivier were satisfied. But Foreign Minister Gramont, Empress Eugénie and the press were out for war. Gramont asked the Prussian ambassador in Paris that King Wilhelm should apologize to the Kaiser in a letter. While the Prime Minister was absent, Gramont suggested that the Emperor ask the Prussian king for guarantees for the future. This will strengthen the position of the French government vis-à-vis parliament and public opinion. Napoleon hesitated, but gave in after the empress otherwise predicted the fall of the empire. The apology should only be requested orally. When Wilhelm was approached again by Benedetti in Bad Ems, he was genuinely surprised. He did not want to give up the required declaration of guarantee that Prussia would never again bring any of its princes to the Spanish throne. He now officially informed the Prussian government of the request. The latter was in France's interest.

Emser Depesche and Bismarck's message to the press

Heinrich Abeken was a Prussian diplomat and accompanied the king in Bad Ems. On July 13, Abeken sent Chancellor Bismarck a telegram that has gone down in history as the “Emser Depesche”. In it Abeken repeated what the king had told him. The King suggested that Bismarck inform the press of France's request and its rejection.

King Wilhelm of Prussia in Bad Ems with the French ambassador Benedetti, as a draftsman imagined

Bismarck was later accused of having falsified the telegram. However, it was not his job to forward the internal government text unchanged to the press. So it would have been inappropriate to announce that the King had judged the Ambassador Benedetti to be very intrusive. Bismarck was therefore free to choose how he would portray the events. He chose to stick closely to Abeken's text. He sent his own text to the Prussian embassies at the German courts and at the same time to the press. Several events were summarized in Bismarck's text so that it appeared that they related to the conversation on the promenade. Above all, Bismarck changed the key. Both Benedetti's request and the king's reaction were particularly brusque, sharp and provocative.

Regardless of the assessment of the extent to which Abeken's text was “falsified” or whether Bismarck presented the encounter correctly or atmospherically: Bismarck has exceeded his jurisdiction as Federal Chancellor. The North German Federal Constitution provided for a collaboration between the Federal Presidium (Prussian King) and the Federal Chancellor. Bismarck was aware of the consequences his communication to the press could have. So he should have discussed with King Wilhelm beforehand - who didn't want a war.

“Bismarck could be certain that this presentation would provoke a passionate surge of national sentiment in Germany. It was just as certain that France must find them a grave insult. Napoleon III If he did not want to lose all respect, he could only reply to the revised Emser dispatch with a declaration of war. The redrafting of the Emser Depesche was a decision, a decision for war . "

- Ernst Rudolf Huber : German constitutional history

However, a constitutional reproach must also be made against the king. He should not have officially approved Leopold's renunciation, at least not without the consent of the responsible Federal Chancellor. Abeken's despatch said nothing of the king's arbitrariness. Had Bismarck known about it, he should have resigned.

When France declared war on Prussia on July 16, it was no longer about the Hohenzollern candidacy, but only about national honor. The so-called Emser Depesche (Bismarck's message to the press) had turned a dynastic question and a diplomatic affair into a national cause, according to Nipperdey. Generally in the world, and occasionally even in France, the cause of war was regarded as null and void. In the USA , for example , Napoleon stood there as a warmonger who had interfered in a domestic Spanish affair. In fact, he was only concerned with strengthening his declining empire, a victory was important for the imperial prince's succession to the throne. Foreign opinion about Germany only changed when the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was demanded. Napoleon III was captured by the Germans during the war, and his empire was eventually replaced by the Third French Republic .

Succession to the throne by Amadeus I.

King Amadeus I of Spain , 1871 to 1873. Due to the tense political situation in Spain, he was forced to abdicate.

After the unfortunate Hohenzollern candidacy, Prim turned back to the Duke of Aosta, Amadeus. The Italian Foreign Ministry was given permission to research opinion in Europe, and afterwards Duke Amadeus gave his consent. However, only part of the September coalition that had overthrown Isabella was behind him: Prim, the Progressives and the Democrats. For the Liberal Union it was at best tolerable, not really wanted. The Republicans, but also the conservative Carlist and the supporters of the Bourbon Alfonso, rejected the Duke. On November 16, 1870, the Cortes, the Spanish parliament, elected him king.

When Amadeus arrived in Spain in January, he immediately learned that Prim had been murdered. Amadeus' rule lacked the most important supporter from the start. Prim's death also ended the September coalition. The aristocracy was cool towards Amadeus; he was mocked in the Madrid theaters. There were six governments and three parliamentary elections under his rule. After a scandal over dealing with an officer whom his subordinates had refused allegiance, King Amadeus abdicated in February 1873.

What followed was a short-lived First Spanish Republic in which the country saw four presidents and one dictator. In 1874 Isabella's son was named Alfonso XII. new king. This restoration of the Bourbons is the origin of today's Spanish monarchy, albeit with a break from the Second Republic and the Franco regime .

Judgment on the role of Bismarck

Otto von Bismarck , Prime Minister of Prussia since 1862 and Federal Chancellor of North Germany since 1867

In historical studies and in the public arena, there has always been a lively discussion about the role Bismarck played in the Hohenzollern candidacy. In retrospect, the Chancellor seemed to have masterfully pulled the strings in the background from the start in order to achieve the desired result: the war with France, which would drive the southern German states into the arms of the North German Confederation.

The assessment of Bismarck depends, among other things, on the situation in which he was seen in 1870, after about three years of the North German Confederation. The Confederation was expanded internally and increased cooperation with the South, but there were also defeats for Bismarck, such as the customs parliament election . Wawro considers Bismarck's position to be almost as threatened as the Napoleons. Both were under pressure to justify themselves through successes in foreign policy. Nipperdey, on the other hand, does not find that Bismarck was subjectively or objectively under particular time pressure. His political alliances were not so unstable that he could not have endured the status quo for years. It was not necessary to flee to the front in the war.

Different historians such as Huber, Gall, Nipperdey and Wehler agree that Bismarck did not plan the war long in advance. The Federal Chancellor kept several paths open and took the opportunity to increase Prussia's reputation by placing a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne. When a diplomatic defeat threatened, he formulated his message to the press (the so-called Emser Depesche) with full awareness that France would almost certainly declare war.

"Bismarck did not control events," notes Christopher Clark. For Bismarck, war was a political possibility, but only if France started it. The French government was basically concerned with defending France's privileged position in Europe. Their willingness to risk a war therefore did not depend on Bismarck. France went to war because it was convinced that it would win it.

Evaluation of the line of succession

Despite the political turmoil around 1870, it can be argued that Spanish policy was "very successful" on the question of succession, said Kleinmann. Amadeus was the original preferred candidate; Spain was not drawn into the Franco-Prussian War; there was no outside intervention; France's new weakness gave Spain more freedom in foreign policy. Therefore, in France there was even a war guilt legend against Spain: Prime Minister Prim had incited France and Prussia against each other through his accomplice Bismarck. These were then distracted by the war, so that Spain could regulate the succession to the throne undisturbed.

In Kleinmann's view, Leopold was an “almost ideal candidate” for Spain, although speculation remains as to whether he would actually have received a sufficient majority in parliament. One catch, apart from Napoleon's rejection, was that Spain might have tied itself too closely to Prussia. When the great outrage arose in Paris on July 2, 1870, Prim, who was actually well-disposed towards France, rowed back to avoid Bismarck's noose. In any case, if Leopold had become King of Spain, he would probably have had the same fate as Amadeus. However, in this case Napoleon III would later, if the Bourbon rule had been restored in Spain. probably still been the French emperor.

See also

Source edition

  • Josef Becker (ed. With the collaboration of Michael Schmid): Bismarck's Spanish "Diversion" 1870 and the Prussian-German war for the establishment of an empire. Sources on the pre- and post-history of the Hohenzollern candidacy for the throne in Madrid 1866–1932:
    • Volume I: The Road to the Spanish Throne Offer. Late 1866–4. April 1870. Schöningh, Paderborn et al. 2003, ISBN 3-506-70718-3 .
    • Volume II: From the crisis of the German national movement to the Prussian-French July crisis. April 5, 1870-12. July 1870. Schöningh, Paderborn et al. 2003, ISBN 3-506-70719-1 .
    • Volume III: Spanish "Diversion", "Emser Depesche" and legend of the founding of the empire until the end of the Weimar Republic. July 12, 1870–1. September 1932. Schöningh, Paderborn et al. 2007, ISBN 978-3-506-70720-8 .

literature

  • George Bonnin (Ed.): Bismarck and the Hohenzollern Candidature for the Spanish Throne. Chatto & Windus, London 1957.
  • Jan Markus Metzlar: De candidatuur-Hohenzollern. A critical study over de wordingsgeschiedenis by the candidatuur van Leopold van Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen voor den Spaanschen troon in 1870 (Diss. Utrecht). W. Bergmans: Tilburg, 1924.
  • Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962.

Web links

supporting documents

  1. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 11/12.
  2. ↑ Hans-Otto Kleinmann: The Spanish succession to the throne in international politics before the outbreak of the Franco-German war . In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 125-150, here p. 135.
  3. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 13/14.
  4. ^ Geoffrey Wawro: The Franco-Prussian War. The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871. Oxford University Press, Oxford u. a. 2003, p. 34.
  5. ↑ Hans-Otto Kleinmann: The Spanish succession to the throne in international politics before the outbreak of the Franco-German war . In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 125-150, here pp. 139-141.
  6. ↑ Hans-Otto Kleinmann: The Spanish succession to the throne in international politics before the outbreak of the Franco-German war . In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 125-150, here pp. 130/131, 133.
  7. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, p. 35.
  8. ↑ Marcel Emerit: L'opinion de Napoléon III sur la question du trone d'Espagne en 1869. In: Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine , 1954 (16), No. 3 (July – September 1969), pp. 431– 438, here p. 435.
  9. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, p. 48.
  10. ↑ Hans-Otto Kleinmann: The Spanish succession to the throne in international politics before the outbreak of the Franco-German war . In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 125-150, here p. 143.
  11. ↑ Hans-Otto Kleinmann: The Spanish succession to the throne in international politics before the outbreak of the Franco-German war . In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 125-150, here pp. 142/143.
  12. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, p. 33.
  13. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, p. 28.
  14. ↑ Marcel Emerit: L'opinion de Napoléon III sur la question du trone d'Espagne en 1869. In: Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine , 1954 (16), No. 3 (July – September 1969), pp. 431– 438, here pp. 432-434.
  15. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, p. 48.
  16. ↑ Marcel Emerit: L'opinion de Napoléon III sur la question du trone d'Espagne en 1869. In: Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine , 1954 (16), No. 3 (July – September 1969), pp. 431– 438, here p. 435.
  17. ↑ Hans-Otto Kleinmann: The Spanish succession to the throne in international politics before the outbreak of the Franco-German war . In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 125-150, here p. 144.
  18. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, p. 28.
  19. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 30/31.
  20. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 31/32.
  21. ↑ Hans-Otto Kleinmann: The Spanish succession to the throne in international politics before the outbreak of the Franco-German war . In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 125-150, here p. 145.
  22. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, p. 29.
  23. ↑ Marcel Emerit: L'opinion de Napoléon III sur la question du trone d'Espagne en 1869. In: Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine , 1954 (16), No. 3 (July – September 1969), pp. 431– 438, here p. 435.
  24. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, p. 32.
  25. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 45-48.
  26. ↑ Hans-Otto Kleinmann: The Spanish succession to the throne in international politics before the outbreak of the Franco-German war . In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 125-150, here p. 144.
  27. ↑ See Hans-Otto Kleinmann: The Spanish Succession to the Throne in International Politics before the Outbreak of the Franco-German War . In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 125-150, here p. 144.
  28. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 14/15, p. 22.
  29. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, p. 44.
  30. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 22/23.
  31. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, p. 15.18
  32. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 13/14. P. 26.
  33. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 28/29.
  34. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, p. 34.
  35. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, p. 30.
  36. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, p. 33.
  37. ^ Marcel Emerit: L'opinion de Napoléon III sur la question du trone d'Espagne en 1869. In: Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine , 1954 (16), No. 3 (July – September 1969), pp. 431– 438, here p. 437.
  38. ^ Marcel Emerit: L'opinion de Napoléon III sur la question du trone d'Espagne en 1869. In: Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine , 1954 (16), No. 3 (July – September 1969), pp. 431– 438, here p. 436.
  39. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 43/44.
  40. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 50-52.
  41. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 53/54.
  42. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 54/55.
  43. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, SS 57/58, p. 60.
  44. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 60/61.
  45. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 61-65.
  46. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, p. 65.
  47. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 68/69.
  48. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, pp. 72-75.
  49. ↑ Lawrence D. Steefel: Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1962, p. 79.
  50. ^ Lothar Gall: Bismarck. The white revolutionary. Propylaen-Verlag, Frankfurt am Main et al. 1980, pp. 429/430.
  51. ^ Lothar Gall: Bismarck. The white revolutionary. Propylaen-Verlag, Frankfurt am Main u. a. 1980, pp. 430/431.
  52. ↑ Wilfried Radewahn: European questions and conflict zones in the calculation of French foreign policy before the war of 1870 . In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 33-64, here p. 57 f.
  53. ^ Georges Bordonove: Napoléon III. Pygmalion: Paris, 1998, p. 345.
  54. ^ Geoffrey Wawro: The Franco-Prussian War. The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871. Oxford University Press, Oxford u. a. 2003, pp. 35/36.
  55. ^ Lothar Gall: Bismarck. The white revolutionary. Propylaen-Verlag, Frankfurt am Main et al. 1980, p. 433.
  56. ^ Geoffrey Wawro: The Franco-Prussian War. The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871. Oxford University Press, Oxford u. a. 2003, p. 36/37.
  57. ^ Georges Bordonove: Napoléon III. Pygmalion: Paris, 1998, p. 345.
  58. ^ Franz Herre: Napoleon III. Glory and misery of the Second Empire. Bertelsmann: Munich 1990, pp. 328/329.
  59. ^ Lothar Gall: Bismarck. The white revolutionary. Propylaen-Verlag, Frankfurt am Main et al. 1980, pp. 433/434.
  60. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German Constitutional History since 1789 , Volume III: Bismarck and the Reich. 3rd edition, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1988, p. 718.
  61. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German Constitutional History since 1789 , Volume III: Bismarck and the Reich. 3rd edition, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1988, p. 718.
  62. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German Constitutional History since 1789 , Volume III: Bismarck and the Reich. 3rd edition, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1988, p. 720. Emphasis in the original. So also Lothar Gall: Bismarck. The white revolutionary. Propylaen-Verlag, Frankfurt am Main et al. 1980, p. 434.
  63. ^ Ernst Rudolf Huber: German Constitutional History since 1789 , Volume III: Bismarck and the Reich. 3rd edition, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1988, pp. 719/720.
  64. ↑ Thomas Nipperdey: German History 1866-1918 . Volume II: Power State Before Democracy. CH Beck, Munich 1992, p. 59.
  65. ↑ John Gerow Gazley: American Opinion of German Unification, 1848-1871 . Diss. Columbia University, New York 1926, pp. 324/325.
  66. ↑ Raymond Carr: Spain 1808-1939 . Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1975, pp. 318/319.
  67. ↑ Raymond Carr: Spain 1808-1939 . Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1975, p. 319.
  68. ↑ Walther L. Bernecker, Horst Pietschmann: History of Spain. From the early modern era to the present , Kohlhammer, Stuttgart a. a. 1993, p. 234.
  69. ↑ Raymond Carr: Spain 1808-1939 . Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1975, pp. 323/324.
  70. ^ Geoffrey Wawro: The Franco-Prussian War. The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871. Oxford University Press, Oxford u. a. 2003, p. 31.
  71. ↑ Thomas Nipperdey: German History 1866-1918 . Volume II: Power State Before Democracy. CH Beck, Munich 1992, p. 56.
  72. ^ Lothar Gall: Bismarck. The white revolutionary. Propylaen-Verlag, Frankfurt am Main u. a. 1980, p. 428/429.
  73. ↑ Thomas Nipperdey: German History 1866-1918 . Volume II: Power State Before Democracy. CH Beck, Munich 1992, pp. 56/57, 59/60.
  74. ^ Hans-Ulrich Wehler: German history of society 1849-1914 . CH Beck, Munich 1995, p. 316, 321/322.
  75. ↑ Christopher Clark: Prussia. Rise and fall 1600–1947 . DVA, Munich 2007, p. 628.
  76. ↑ Hans-Otto Kleinmann: The Spanish succession to the throne in international politics before the outbreak of the Franco-German war . In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 125-150, here p. 129.
  77. ↑ Hans-Otto Kleinmann: The Spanish succession to the throne in international politics before the outbreak of the Franco-German war . In: Eberhard Kolb (Hrsg.): Europe before the war of 1870. Power constellation - areas of conflict - outbreak of war . R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1987, pp. 125-150, here p. 149.